The Cipher Brief

OPINION — The war in Ukraine has evolved into a complex geopolitical conflict, shaped not only by military strategy but by global economic dependencies. While Western nations continue to provide financial and military aid, a critical vulnerability has emerged: Ukraine's heavy reliance on Chinese drone components. The Ukrainian drone manufacturers with whom I have spoken admit that their drones are built from as much as 65% Chinese components. This dependence, while tactically necessary, has a paradoxical consequence: Western aid inadvertently strengthens the very supply chains that also benefit Russia, thereby prolonging the conflict.

Ultimately, Ukraine will only win this war by forcing Russia to spend enough that continuing to send soldiers and equipment into Ukraine becomes financially untenable. Because China maintains a strategic position in global technology manufacturing—especially in drone parts—both Ukraine and Russia draw from the same pool of resources, albeit through different channels. This paradox raises urgent questions about the effectiveness of Western aid and the long-term strategy for ending the war.

Rather than continuing to fund Ukraine’s drone purchases, the West should prioritize dismantling Chinese supply chain dominance. Doing so would not only weaken Russia’s access to critical technologies but also strengthen Western industrial capacity and reduce global reliance on China. Economic strategy, not just military support, is key to resolving the war in Ukraine and preparing for future global conflicts.

Ukraine's Dependence on Chinese Drone Components

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, drones have become a cornerstone of Ukraine’s defense. During a recent trip to the Ukrainian front lines, a Ukrainian commander explained, “The DJI Mavic is the king of battle. Nothing else is even close.” DJI drones are manufactured in China, and by 2023, Ukraine was reportedly purchasing up to 30% of the company's global Mavic production.

This dependence, however, has become a strategic liability. In 2024 and 2025, China imposed export restrictions on drone components to Ukraine, including flight controllers, motors, and navigation cameras. Through this reliance, Ukraine is handing China control over its ability to sustain the war. These restrictions have severely disrupted Ukraine’s drone supply chain, leading to shortages on the front lines and forcing military units to seek alternatives.

This dynamic reveals a troubling reality: the same Chinese components Ukraine depends on have been found in Russian drones, including the Iranian-designed Shahed loitering munitions used to attack Ukrainian cities.

China’s Dual Role: Restricting Ukraine, Empowering Russia

China’s role in the Ukraine conflict is marked by strategic ambiguity—publicly claiming neutrality while quietly enabling Russia’s war effort. This posture has had profound consequences for both sides of the battlefield. On one hand, China has imposed export restrictions on drone components to Ukraine, severely limiting its ability to produce drones for frontline operations. On the other hand, China continues to supply Russia with dual-use technologies, such as semiconductors, drone engines, and optical sensors, which are critical to sustaining Moscow’s drone production. And finally, buying Chinese components strengthens China’s economy, which enables them to support disruptive regimes, namely Russia.

Evidence of China’s support for Russia is mounting. In July 2025, Ukraine imposed sanctions on five Chinese companies after recovering Chinese-made parts from downed Russian Shahed drones which were used in attacks on Kyiv. These firms—ranging from precision munitions manufacturers to logistics providers—were supplying components that bypass Western sanctions. This selective restriction strategy benefits Russia disproportionately.

Despite efforts to scale domestic production, Ukraine’s drone industry remains constrained by limited access to critical components and manufacturing capacity, making purchases from China a necessity. The result is a battlefield dynamic in which Ukraine’s technological edge is increasingly undermined by its dependence on a supply chain controlled by a country that is, at best, strategically ambiguous, and at worst, actively enabling Russia’s war effort.

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Western Funding and Its Unintended Consequences

While Western nations have poured billions into Ukraine’s drone industry with the intent of giving them a battlefield advantage, a significant portion of Ukraine’s drone production still depends on Chinese components. This creates a troubling paradox: Western funding intended to help Ukraine may be indirectly sustaining Chinese supply chains that benefit Russia. The problem is not just tactical—it’s structural. Western aid has focused on scaling production rather than rebuilding supply chains.

Many Ukrainian drone factories that claim domestic production are actually only assembling imported Chinese components. And it’s not their fault; there are no viable alternatives to the Chinese components needed to manufacture advanced drones. This dependency undermines the strategic value of Western investment and risks prolonging the war by keeping both sides tethered to the same global supply network.

Strategic Shift: Replace Chinese Supply Chains

To truly support Ukraine—and to prepare for future geopolitical challenges—Western nations must rethink their approach. Funding should be redirected from drone purchases to building resilient, non-Chinese supply chains. This means investing in domestic and allied manufacturing of critical components, supporting Ukrainian innovation through transfer of components, and creating joint production hubs in Europe and North America which sell to Ukraine at subsidized prices. Doing so will have the secondary benefit of establishing manufacturing capacity and expertise in Europe and North America, while simultaneously reducing cash flow to China. Only by severing the link to Chinese supply chains can the West ensure that its aid is not inadvertently resourcing its adversaries.

Momentum is building for this change. In 2025, the U.S. government launched a series of legislative reforms, including the “Unleashing American Drone Dominance” Executive Order, which mandates prioritization of U.S.-made drones for federal agencies. This was followed by the DoD Procurement Directive and the FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act, which expanded budgets and imposed new barriers on foreign drones. These moves have catalyzed a surge in investment, and there seems to be greater emphasis on the horizon.

Europe is also pivoting. The Atlantic Council’s strategy brief outlines a comprehensive “protect-promote-align” framework to secure supply chains. This includes banning Chinese drones in sensitive sectors, promoting domestic manufacturing, and aligning policies across NATO, the EU, and the G7. The goal is clear: build a resilient, secure, and democratic drone ecosystem that can withstand geopolitical shocks and support allied defense needs.

Replacing Chinese supply chains will not only shorten the war in Ukraine by cutting off Russia’s access to critical technologies—it will also strengthen Western readiness for future conflicts. It will create jobs, foster innovation, and restore strategic autonomy.

Conclusion

The war in Ukraine is not only a test of military resilience but a reflection of global economic interdependence. Ukraine’s reliance on Chinese drone components has created a strategic paradox—one in which Western aid may be inadvertently sustaining the very supply chains that empower Russia. China’s dual role, restricting Ukraine while enabling Russia, underscores the urgency of rethinking how support is structured. Continued funding for drone purchases, without addressing the underlying supply chain vulnerabilities, risks prolonging the conflict and weakening the West’s strategic position.

To truly help Ukraine win, the West must shift its focus from short-term battlefield solutions to long-term economic strategy. Replacing Chinese supply chains is not just about drones—it’s about restoring industrial sovereignty, reducing dependence on authoritarian regimes, and preparing for future conflicts. By investing in domestic and allied manufacturing, the West can build a resilient defense ecosystem that serves both immediate and future security needs. Victory in Ukraine will not come solely through firepower—it will come through economic strength, strategic foresight, and the courage to reshape the systems that underpin modern warfare. The time to act is now.

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Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Europe Prepares for War

DEEP DIVE – From large-scale military drills to increased defense spending to the continent’s easternmost nations fortifying their borders with Russia, Europe is preparing for war.

Under pressure from the U.S. and threats from Russia, most NATO member nations have pledged to spend 5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense and individual nations and smaller regional blocs are taking measures of their own: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are building a network of physical barriers as part of a “Baltic Defense Line”; the Nordic nations are implementing a “total defense” strategy; and the European Union (EU) has launched a Black Sea strategy to bolster regional defense and infrastructure in Southern Europe.

It’s all part of a paradigm shift in European defense policy that Lt. Gen. Sean Clancy, head of the EU’s military committee, calls a “global reset” driven by the heightened threat from Russia, and a fear that Europe’s stalwart defender for eight decades – the United States – may pull away from the continent.

Recent actions, including Russia’s drone incursion into Poland in the early hours of September 10 have only accelerated the urgency. Polish and NATO forces shot down several of the 19 drones that entered Polish airspace, marking the first time since the launch of Russia’s now three-and-a-half-year war on Ukraine, that any NATO member has engaged militarily with Russia.

“Europe today is moving towards a war footing,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, told The Cipher Brief. “Europe is not a single entity of course, but we're in a much different place than we were even a year ago, in terms of nations realizing the threat and realizing they have to do something about it.”

“The continent is on a rearmament footing,” Liana Fix, Senior Fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations, told The Cipher Brief. “It is not seeking or desiring war. But European leaders have recognized – especially with the fear of U.S. abandonment by [U.S. President] Donald Trump – that their core duty is to provide security to their citizens, and that they are currently unable to do so without the United States. That is a huge gap to fill, which is why defense efforts – new production lines, factories, and so on - are multiplying at such a rapid pace.”

That said, it’s a mixed picture, given European politics and geography. Spikes in defense spending and military preparedness are far more pronounced in countries that share a border with Russia, or have a history of enmity with Moscow.

“Let's face it, this is the region, and these are the countries – Norway, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland – they're the countries in Europe that one way or another directly face Russia,” Toomas Ilves, a former President of Estonia, told The Cipher Brief. “And we have a history (with Russia). That's the whole point.”

And while that urgency is felt less in Western Europe, where increased defense expenditures are less politically palpable, the signs across much of the continent are unmistakable: to an extent not seen since the height of the Cold War – and in some places not since World War II – Europeans are girding for war.

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Last month, famously pacifist postwar Germany announced the opening of Europe’s largest ammunition factory, built by the defense giant Rheinmetall, that will produce 350,000 artillery shells annually, a sizable chunk of the continent’s plans to manufacture 2 million shells a year.

“This is remarkable,” Lt. Gen. Hodges said. “Number one, it's a new ammunition factory being built in Germany. Number two, even more remarkable, they just had the groundbreaking ceremony 15 months ago. That's lightning speed in Germany, to go from shovel to ready-to-produce ammunition.”

The “war footing” also means that Rheinmetall and other European defense companies now rank among the continent’s hottest investment properties. Seismic shifts have come to the Nordic countries as well. For years, Finland pushed for other nations to end their use of anti-personnel landmines, after it joined the Ottawa Treaty that banned their use or production. Now Finland is leading a group of countries – Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania – in the opposite direction; all five are withdrawing from the Ottawa treaty, citing the Russia threat. Finland and Lithuania have actually announced plans to begin producing landmines in 2026.

The small Norwegian town of Kongsberg – population 27,000 – hasn’t been on anything like a war footing since the 1940s, when resistance fighters in the town blew up a munitions factory run by occupying Nazi German forces. Now Kongsberg is home to a weapons manufacturer, local breweries have taken to making Molotov cocktails, and the town has been busy refurbishing Cold War-era bomb shelters. “The lesson we learned from Ukraine is that everybody pitched in,” Odd John Resser, Kongsberg’s Emergency Planning Officer, told the AP.

Norway, which shares a border with Russia in the Arctic north, published its first national security strategy in May, warning that “after decades of peace, a new era has begun for Norway and for Europe.” The country stopped building bomb shelters three decades ago and earlier this year it announced plans to install bomb shelters in all new buildings.

Russia’s aggression in Ukraine should be a “wake-up call for all,” Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre told the AP. “We must strengthen our defense to prevent anything like that from happening to us.”

While Poland and the Baltic nations are no strangers to threats from Moscow — their history has been marked by Russian invasions and occupations in the Soviet and Tsarist periods — they are perhaps on more of a war footing than any nations in Europe, save of course for Ukraine itself.

On September 1, Poland launched Iron Defender-25, its largest military exercise of the year, involving 30,000 Polish and allied troops. Poland has vowed to sharply boost the size of its army to 500,000, increase the pace of training, strengthen its borders, and spend more on military equipment.

In June, Estonia broke ground on its part of the Baltic Defense Line, which aims to build six hundred bunkers along each country’s border with Russia, part of a network of defenses including land mines, anti-tank ditches and so-called dragon's teeth, to run as deep as 30 miles from Russian frontiers.

“Certainly, Estonia and Poland are two of the leaders in Europe who are taking the threat seriously, who literally can look across their borders and see Russia and feel the threat,” Lt. Gen. Hodges said. “And Finland too, because of its geography and its very small population, has a tradition of comprehensive defense where the population is prepared and they have a pretty sober assessment of it, which is why they have more artillery than any other country in Europe. (These countries) are prepared.”

In the Netherlands, far from Russia, Rotterdam, Europe’s largest port, is reserving space for NATO military shipments and planning amphibious exercises. The port’s CEO, Boudewijn Siemons, has said there will be designated periods for “military cargo handling,” including the safe transfer of ammunition. Siemons has also urged stockpiling critical materials at Rotterdam and other key ports — including copper, lithium, and pharmaceuticals — to help ensure resilient supply chains in the event of war.

And with eyes to the south, the EU’s new strategy for the Black Sea calls for bolstered regional defense and infrastructure, again citing growing threats from Russia. The plan includes upgrades in transport systems—ports, railways, and airports—for military mobility, particularly in Romania and Bulgaria, and a new “Black Sea Maritime Security Hub” with the twin missions of enhancing situational awareness and protecting critical infrastructure.

Experts stress that the threat assessments and preparations look very different in different parts of Europe. The “war footing” in Tallinn or Warsaw looks nothing like it does in Paris or Madrid.

“The most fundamental observation here is that geography still counts,” Doug Lute, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, told The Cipher Brief earlier this year. “The closer you are with a land border to Russia and now a newly aggressive, revanchist, neo-imperialist Putin's Russia, the more these hard defensive measures count.”

While Poland holds its military exercises, and the “Baltic Defense Line” takes shape, some countries in Western Europe appear far more relaxed about the threat. And their politicians face questions about why social welfare spending should drop in favor of defense and security.

Spain, which sits in southwest Europe, far from any Russian border, spent only 1.3 % on defense last year, and was the one NATO member that refused to sign on to the alliance’s 5% spending pledge earlier this year. Spain and other nations are facing a skeptical public, for whom the Russia threat, and thus the need to move to anything like a war footing, is a tough sell.

Ilves, the former Estonian President, said some of these countries are “a little recalcitrant.”

“Belgium really doesn't want to do this,” he said. “Spain is probably the least interested in doing anything. And then of course we have the usual slackers” – among whom he listed Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which he says “have always been against anything that really might look bad to Russia.”

Ilves sees what he calls “a slow change” across Europe, “moving in the direction of taking defense far more seriously.” Fix believes that “the whole continent is changing, but some parts faster than others.”

“Now, Western European countries such as Germany are much closer to an Eastern European threat perception,” she said. “For example, Spain is now where Germany was in 2014, and Germany is now where Poland was in 2014. Europe is moving but starting from different positions.”

Ilves believes the differences have as much to do with history as with geography.

“The experiences that we have gone through, the brutality, the deportations – these are things that people know about,” Ilves said, speaking of the suffering of the Baltic nations during the Soviet period. “That makes a huge difference, as opposed to countries that have never had any experience with that. And this was all rekindled with (the Russian attacks against) Bucha in March of 2022, right after the war (against Ukraine) began, and the first pictures and the evidence started coming from there. My great-grandfather was shot with 140 other people in the courtyard of a medieval castle. The Russians still do this now.”

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War footing or not, there is a separate question: is the continent ready to counter the Russian threat? All the experts interviewed for this article – and others interviewed previously by The Cipher Brief — stressed the importance of a united European front, and the specific imperatives of air defense and military mobility. A “war footing” isn’t complete, they said, without the railways and bridges, airfields and ports ready to move troops and material.

“The major challenges that we have in Europe are air and missile defense,” Lt. Gen. Hodges said. “There's not nearly enough. All you’ve got to do is watch what Russia does to Ukraine every night. Imagine that slamming into Riga and Vilnius and Tallinn and Gdansk, and then all the major ports that Europe depends on. It's not only about protecting civilian populations, it's about protecting critical infrastructure.”

Hodges also cited shortfalls in Europe’s ammunition stocks, which have been made plain during the war in Ukraine – and which explain why he and others were heartened by the opening of the Rheinmetall ammunition facility. “These are areas where I think effort is being made,” he said. “We just have a long way to go.”

Hanging over the European security questions is the future of the U.S. military presence. The U.S. currently has between 90,000 and 100,000 troops deployed to Europe – 34,000 in Germany – and all are being looked at as part of a Pentagon-led Global Force Posture Review. Multiple reports have suggested that a 30% reduction of U.S. forces is on the table – though President Trump said recently that the 8,000 American forces in Poland were there to stay. “We’ll put more there if they want,” Trump told reporters at a meeting with Polish President Karol Nawrocki.

“This force posture review, it could mean anything,” Ilves said. “It could mean that U.S. troops pull out of here, which would be a big blow. And that's one thing that Europe has to prepare for in case that happens.” But he also noted that President Trump has vacillated between abandoning Europe and offering robust support.

“If the United States withdraws from Europe today, Europeans would not be able to defend themselves against Russian aggression,” Fix said. “This is why Europe’s defense efforts are being ramped up – not only because of Putin, but because of the unreliability of Trump.”

The International Institute for Strategic Studies published a report earlier this year estimating that it would take Europe 25 years and nearly $1 trillion to replace U.S. military support were Washington to withdraw completely from the continent. The report found that key gaps for NATO members would involve aircraft, naval forces, and command infrastructure.

“Where America is absolutely the key is all of the enablers, all of the things that make an army potent – long-range precise fires, deep technical intelligence, developing kill chains and target folders in order to strike,” Gen. Phillip Breedlove, a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, told The Cipher Brief. While he doesn’t believe Russia poses an imminent threat to Europe, given the weakness of its military and economy, he said that the Europeans will ultimately need to manufacture or obtain a long list of high-end hardware on their own.

“There are a few things that really only America can do,” Gen. Breedlove said, listing rapid aerial transport, high-performing air defenses, and sophisticated intelligence systems. “They really don't have the kind of strategic lift that America brings.”

Lt. Gen. Hodges, who lives in Germany, said he was surprised this summer to see a mobile troop-recruiting site on the beaches of northern Germany, and plenty of people engaging with the recruiters.

“There was a big camouflage Bundeswehr truck with several NCOs, and there were people there all day long talking to them,” he said. “They were very positively received. Two or three years ago, I don't think that would've happened.”

Experts noted that while an act of raw military aggression beyond Ukraine may be years away, if it ever comes, the “gray-zone” war that can include cyberattacks and the cutting of undersea cables, is already well underway.

Europe’s leaders “need to recognize that Russia's at war with us, even if it doesn't look and feel like war in the traditional sense,” Lt. Gen. Hodges said, referring to those gray-zone actions. “And so, we should make that very clear to our populations and to the Russians that this is unacceptable.”

Nations far from Europe “should be concerned for the simple reason that only when it is united does Europe stand strong against Russia,” Fix said. She noted that it took two Russian invasions of Ukraine – 2014 and 2022 – and two elections of Donald Trump – for Europeans to finally and seriously reinvest in their own defense.

“Divided, each European country is too weak on its own,” Fix said. “If they think in terms of solidarity for the whole continent – what NATO Article 5 essentially says, an attack on one member is an attack on all members – then they cannot allow themselves to be foot-dragging.”

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Can the West Really Stop Russia’s War in Ukraine? A View from the Frontlines.

EXPERT Q&A — Russia has not slowed its assaults on Ukraine, ceaselessly raining missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities while pushing forward - albeit slowly - on the frontlines. Former Senior CIA Officer Glenn Corn got a firsthand account of how Ukraine is faring under fire, telling The Cipher Brief about the resilience of the Ukrainians, the sabre-rattling from Russia aimed at dissuading Western support, and what Kyiv is seeking from the U.S. and Europe.

Cipher Brief CEO and Publisher Suzanne Kelly spoke with Corn from Ukraine, for an on-the-ground picture of the challenges, opportunities and immediate actions needed to counter Russia’s invasion. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

The Cipher Brief: Russia’s attacks have really been intensifying against Ukrainian cities. You've witnessed that. What has this latest barrage been like from your perspective on the ground?

Corn: We were woken up in the morning about 6:00 AM by strikes inside of Kyiv by the Russians, including one strike which damaged the Council of Ministers building downtown. I think the Russians are claiming that was not deliberate, which is interesting. It tells me something when the Russians are very quick to say that they were not behind something, because that tells me they're worried about the response.

The Cipher Brief: We've seen heavy missile attacks in civilian areas before, so this is not entirely new. But it has been stepped up. It was a bit like this when we were there with you a few months ago. Is it wearing on people differently now?

Corn: The Ukrainians are incredibly resilient, and honestly, I'm not seeing that they're cowered by these attacks. I'm sure people are upset, and I think just days ago, the Russians hit a group of pensioners that were at a post office to get their pension checks and killed a group of civilians - 20-plus. People respond to that. They're angry about that. The main thing I'm hearing and seeing though is that they're waiting for the Western response. What is the West going to do? We've given Putin a chance to negotiate a ceasefire, a way out of this disastrous war, and he's not taking it. In fact, he's doubling down and people here are asking, "When is the West, including the United States, or maybe led by the United States, going to respond?" And I think many Americans are probably asking the same question.

The Cipher Brief: That's been a question for a long time. When the West steps up and for example, says it will provide more long-range missiles to Ukraine - the response from Moscow is threats and saber-rattling. This saber-rattling deterred the Biden administration from taking a more aggressive approach to supporting Ukraine. What do you think needs to happen now, for the West to provide effective deterrence against President Putin?

Corn: Let's just go back in history, to 2022. The Russians drew several red lines: Finland joining NATO was a red line, they said they were going to respond against the West. They didn't do that. If we gave the Ukrainians ATACMS, F-16s, Moscow said that could result in a nuclear response. They didn't do that.

I think there are a lot of threats that are coming from the Kremlin. It's easy for me to say, of course, because I'm not sitting in the White House, but I think that those threats are designed to deter us from making decisions or taking action..

If we talk about the deep strike capability, the Ukrainians are doing that on their own. My personal view, based on some of the things we've heard from the Ukrainians we've spoken with, is that they don't need that as much as they need a mid-strike capability, because the information that we heard is that the Russians are preparing for another large-scale offensive in the next couple of weeks, maybe even less than a week. And the Ukrainians are going to have to be able to strike the logistics points, the collection points for Russian troops if the Russians try and mass forces along the front to strike at any particular part of the front lines.

And we all know the Ukrainians are stretched personnel wise. So, having that capability would be very valuable. But obviously that's a strategic decision. My own view is that we should give the Ukrainians the weapons they need and they should be able to use them as they need to defend themselves and to stop this Russian onslaught. And if that means striking a Shahed factory deep inside of Russia, or a factory where they're producing these Kinzhal missiles, we should let them do it. And I don't think that Russia is going launch a nuclear war over that.

The Cipher Brief: Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently accused Finland of laying the groundwork for a NATO attack on Russia - right in the midst of a Russian drone incursion into Poland. Russia began a troop build up along its border with Ukraine in 2021, saying, "There's nothing to see here, there's nothing to see here." And then all of a sudden, Russia declared Ukraine a threat and invaded with ground troops and paratroopers dropping into Kyiv. Are you concerned about the Russian rhetoric now around Finland and Russian drone incursions into other neighboring countries?

Corn: If we go back to before the Second World War, Stalin used provocation to start a war with Finland, to invade Finland. They had Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the nineties through the mid-2000s, who was used to scare the West. Then they had Yevgeny Prigozhin, who was used, in my opinion, as an example of who could come to power if Putin were to lose power. Back in the nineties, people worried about who would follow if Boris Yeltsin lost power, you could have Zhirinovsky and that would have been a disaster for the West. So, I think Medvedev is being used to some degree for propaganda and deterrence purposes. I don't think what he says carries much weight.

I'm pretty positive that Finland is not preparing to invade, or NATO is not preparing to invade Russia across the Finnish border. I think that's all hyperbole. It's designed to make excuses for some of the things they're doing and maybe to rally support inside of Russia for a cause which, my guess is, doesn't have as much popular support as the Russian regime would like. Especially as Russia's economic situation continues to worsen, which it is doing.

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The Cipher Brief:You briefed President Trump on the threat from Russia during his first term in office. You were still working at the CIA at the time, but you've talked to him about Russia in the past. If you were briefing the president today after your latest trip to Ukraine, what would be in that brief?

Corn: That the Ukrainians are ready for a deal. It's not the Ukrainians that are the problem. Putin is the problem. Putin is pushing, as a bully would do. They're trying to bully their way to a settlement that they want, which is in favor of Moscow, and it's time for the United States to stand up to Russia. In my experience, if we do that, the Russians will be willing to negotiate in a more sincere manner, but they need to see force on the other side, and we should not let them deter us with their threats, their saber-rattling, Medvedev's comments. I think if you look at past action and response, that tells you a lot. And we should look at that and learn from that.

The Cipher Brief: Besides a more severe package of sanctions being prepared in the Senate right now, what other things could be included in a show of force to Putin that you feel like might actually make a difference?

Corn: Secondary sanctions, yes, I like what the president's saying to the Europeans. They need to take a step, too. They need to show that they have skin in the game. And enough with the excuses that they're relying on Russian oil and gas. They need to make changes. They've got to do that, because we're at the point now where we all need to do something and it's going to be painful for everybody.

The additional provision of weapons systems, including air defense systems, are critically needed. We talked about long-range weapon systems. We should give them the ability to use those systems the way that they need to be used, and let the commanders decide how they want to use them.

Some of the things we're doing elsewhere right now, make sense to me. For example, what we're doing in the Caribbean and the message we're sending to Venezuela, we shouldn't forget that is a Russian ally and a People’s Republic of China ally, and so we should be putting pressure on Maduro. We should be putting pressure on any Russian ally, in my opinion, around the world.

And I've been saying this for two plus years now, that we should be showing the Russians that - just like what Ronald Reagan did with his strategy during the Cold War - we are going to challenge them wherever they challenge us. And we're going to make them have to decide where they're going to spend their very, very limited — and I have to stress that — their limited funds.

They have economic problems. We can exasperate that. And it's unfortunate that we would have to do that, but we should do that, because the Russians are not only challenging the Ukrainians now, they're doing things like threatening the life of European officials when they're in the air.

Russian drones are violating Polish airspace. There's a whole list of things they're doing which is very aggressive, and there needs to be a strong response to those things. We need to make Russia understand that they will pay a price, there will be a significant consequence if they cross a line, and they seem to be crossing the line, so now it's time to show them the consequences.

And the last thing I'll say is what I wrote an article with you on: I think the president needs to start messaging the Russian people directly. We, the U.S. government, need to message them directly. The president has given their leader a chance for peace, and he's not taking it. He should be held accountable by the people of Russia for whatever economic pain they're feeling, and for whatever consequences come from policies that we're going to have to make to punish Moscow for its continued aggression against its neighbors, not just Ukraine, but others like Georgia and Moldova, too.

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As Trump Expands Caribbean Strikes on Cartels, Much is Still Unclear

OPINION — “Extraordinarily violent drug trafficking cartels that the United States has designated as terrorist organizations have wrought devastating consequences on American communities for decades, causing the deaths of tens of thousands of United States citizens each year and threatening our national security and foreign policy interests both at home and abroad…In the face of the inability or unwillingness of some states in the region [the Western Hemisphere] to address the continuing threat…we have now reached a critical point where we must meet this threat to our citizens and our most vital national interests with United States military force in self-defense. Accordingly, at my direction, on September 2, 2025, United States forces struck a vessel [a Venezuelan speedboat] at a location beyond the territorial seas of any nation that was assessed to be affiliated with a designated terrorist organization and to be engaged in illicit drug trafficking activities.”

Those are excerpts from a September 4, 2025, letter to Congress from President Trump under the 1973 War Powers Resolution which requires a report within 48 hours after U.S. military forces undertake an action “into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation,” without Congress having previously adopted a declaration of war.

Other requirements of such a letter are the “circumstances necessitating” U.S. armed forces; the “constitutional and legislative authority” for their use, and the “estimated scope and duration of the hostilities.”

I will discuss the first two requirements below, but as to the last, Trump makes clear he sees no end to this self-declared war on drug cartels by saying, “It is not possible at this time to know the full scope and duration of military operations that will be necessary. United States forces remain postured to carry out further operations.”

I should note here that back in January 2024, with the presidential campaign getting underway, The New York Times reported that Trump’s political campaign had released a video titled “President Donald J. Trump Declares War on Cartels,” and Trump promised to “deploy all necessary military assets, including the U.S. Navy” to impose a full naval embargo on the cartels and to “designate the major cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”

On January 20, 2025, immediately after his inauguration, Trump signed an Executive Order (EO) that created “a process by which certain international cartels [such as Tren de Aragua (TdA) and La Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)] and other organizations will be designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” The EO said further that TdA and MS-13 “present an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I hereby declare a national emergency, under IEEPA [International Emergency Economic Powers Act], to deal with those threats.”

Having taken those actions, Trump expanded his anti-drug cartel war to include last month doubling up to $50 million the reward for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Nicolás Maduro for violating U.S. narcotics laws. Maduro, as head of the Cartel of the Suns, was first indicted on federal charges of narco-terrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine in 2020, during former President Trump's first term. The initial reward was $15 million. It was increased to up to $25 million during the last days of the Biden administration when Maduro assumed a third term as Venezuela’s president despite evidence that he had lost the previous presidential election.

At this time, the U.S. does not recognize Maduro as the rightful president of Venezuela.

It is against that background – Trump’s self-declared war against Western Hemisphere drug cartels and Maduro’s running Venezuela – that the U.S. last month began deploying a Navy force to the Caribbean near Venezuela. By early this month it included three Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers — the USS Sampson, USS Jason Dunham, and USS Gravely — which are designed to counter threats from the air, land, sea and even undersea simultaneously. Both the Sampson and Gravely have a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment to deal with intercepted drug situations, according to Navy releases.

However, by late August, the Pentagon had also deployed an offensive force that appears to have more than halting possible drug shipments in mind.

Arriving in the area was the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, including the USS Iwo Jima equipped with AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, with 2,200 Marines. Additionally there were two amphibious transport dock ships, the USS San Antonio and the USS Fort Lauderdale, plus several Navy P-8 surveillance planes and one attack submarine in the region.

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It was with that significant Navy force in the area that on September 2, Trump announced on Truth Social: “Earlier this morning, on my Orders, U.S. Military Forces conducted a kinetic strike against positively identified Tren de Aragua Narco terrorists.” Trump said the strike “occurred while the terrorists were at sea in International waters transporting illegal narcotics, heading to the United States. The strike resulted in 11 terrorists killed in action.”

The New York Times reported the next day that “a senior U.S. official said a Special Operations aircraft — either an attack helicopter or an MQ-9 Reaper drone — carried out the attack on Tuesday morning against a four-engine speedboat loaded with drugs.”

At a briefing for congressional staffers September 9, Pentagon officials acknowledged that the boat had turned around after spotting a military aircraft, and the boat was headed back toward shore when it was sunk.

Other than these limited details, and the widely-seen Pentagon black-and-white video, neither the White House nor the Pentagon have released additional details on the event.

Exiled Venezuelan journalists reported that the destroyed boat and eight of its dead occupants were from the small Venezuelan fishing village of San Juan de Unare in a poor and crime-ridden section of Venezuela’s northwestern coast. Three of the dead were allegedly from nearby Guiria.

According to Latin American news reports, more than 20 years ago, San Juan de Unare became a transit point for drugs, and back on September 1, not one but three boats set out headed east for Trinidad and Tobago (T and T) [not to the U.S.], a key Caribbean transit hub for the international drug trade. It was normal for boats from San Juan de Unare to travel in flotillas, with the logic that some will manage to reach their destination. In this case, the boat hit was a faster speedboat, equipped with four engines of 200 horsepower each.

One more thing worth noting from the Latin press is that the normal crew for similar drug boats would have been three or four, and for that reason the additional passengers could have been men who were either escaping the Maduro regime or had found jobs in Trinidad and were on round trip rides.

These are elements to consider as we remember the U.S. military killed all 11 speedboat passengers outright, without the normal at sea stoppage and searching for drugs as usually done in such circumstances.

That was the case last Saturday when Venezuelan government announced on Saturday that a U.S. destroyer [the USS Jason Dunham] intercepted, boarded and occupied a Venezuelan tuna fishing vessel for eight hours in the waters of the South American country's Special Economic Zone on Friday.

There are many issues to be dealt with about the September 2 incident and Caribbean military buildup. Last Wednesday, 25 Democratic Senators sent a letter to President Trump telling him, “Classifying a clear law enforcement mission as counterterrorism does not confer legal authority to target and kill civilians.”

In turn, they asked 10 questions starting with: “Please clarify the legal and substantive basis for targeting and killing civilians suspected of being affiliated with a designated entity. Please also provide a copy of all legal assessments conducted by the White House, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, or any other entity prior to the strike.’

Another question was: “As noted above, in your September 4th War Powers Report to Congress, you note the ‘potential for further such actions.’ However, you do not specify in that report, nor have you specified elsewhere, any legal authority to take military action to target and kill civilians, including those suspected of committing crimes. What is your legal authority to conduct lethal military operations against civilians at sea, within Venezuela or within other Latin American countries?”

The Senators asked for answers by September 17. Let’s see if they get any answers at all.

Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, in a September 10, interview on the USS Iwo Jima with Fox correspondent Rachel Campos-Duffy said, when asked about this U.S. Caribbean buildup, “We’re going to seek peace through strength. We’re going to put America first. It’s our hemisphere. It’s our homeland, but we are not going to sit back and watch the American people be threatened. We are not going to sit back and watch the American people be poisoned. We’re not going to see people be trafficked, see violent groups exist within our country.”

Hegseth then added, “That’s why you see mass deportations. That’s why you’re seeing criminality being locked down. That’s why our border is being locked down. This [the U.S. military force in the Caribbean] is an extension of that. This is an understanding of exactly how America should project power.”

Although Pentagon officials apparently have not yet shared such details on the September 2 strike with Congress, Hegseth claimed to Campos-Duffy, “I watched the strike live. We knew exactly who it was; exactly what they were doing; exactly where they were going; what they were involved in.”

Hegseth’s words do not replace the need for public disclosure of the facts behind such claims, nor does his rhetoric answer the Democratic Senators’ questions about the constitutional and legal justifications for what’s been going on.

This is all the more true with Trump’s announcement on September 15 that the U.S. military struck another boat allegedly carrying drugs from Venezuela. Trump said three people aboard were killed. A video included in Trump’s announcement shows that the boat, which had only two engines, was not moving when it was blown up. This strike further adds to the questions surrounding this issue.

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Ex-CIA Station Chief’s Firsthand Account from Ukraine’s Frontline

Cipher Brief exclusive: Former six-time CIA station chief Ralph Goff details the status of the frontlines in Ukraine and where Kyiv needs the most help from its allies.

EXPERT Q&A — The Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace this week underscores how far Russia is from the negotiating table and agreeing to a just, sustainable peace in Ukraine. Ralph Goff, a former six-time CIA station chief, got an on-the-ground account of this reality in Ukraine, telling The Cipher Brief about the meat-grinder tactics of Russia, and how Ukraine is relying on technology to defend against this.

Cipher Brief CEO and Publisher Suzanne Kelly spoke with Goff live from Ukraine, for insights into how Ukraine is faring with the battlefield reality of today, and why increased Western support is desperately needed. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

The Cipher Brief: The Russian drone incursion into Poland activated NATO, with the EU responding as well. What’s your take on this through an intelligence filter?

Goff: The flight of anywhere between 19 and 23 Russian drones over Poland - which the Russians claim either didn't happen, or was some sort of mistake, or the Ukrainians jammed their drones so they wandered over Polish airspace, yada-yada-yada. Excuse after excuse - It was a test. This is Vladimir Putin testing the waters after the Alaska Summit, after the last two weeks of back and forth with the European allies about where to go from here in efforts to get Russia to the negotiating table. This is absolutely vintage Vladimir Putin who - like any two-year-old child - is testing his parents' forbearance.

In this one, at least in my opinion, he may have made a big mistake. This is a violation of NATO airspace so Article 5 applies. The Poles have already invoked Article 4, which isn't much but it does mean that NATO allies gather and discuss the issue. [Ed note: Right after our interview with Goff, NATO announced Operation Eastern Sentry].

But at the same time, Putin's made a mistake because he's given NATO a gift. He's also given a gift to the Trump administration where they can react by establishing a no-fly zone over all of Ukraine or maybe a no-fly zone over the approaches to Poland, including into the airspace of Belarus by saying, "Hey, because these drones are a threat to airspace, we're taking them out before they even get here." So we'll see. I think this is a real acid test of the will of the NATO allies and the will of the Trump administration to show Vladimir Putin that he can't always have his way.

The Cipher Brief: You've been traveling with a small group of folks to some of the areas along the front lines in Ukraine. What does ground truth look like there?

Goff: What it looks like is the Russians are making slow gains, but they're advancing slower than the Western powers advanced during World War I. So it’s nothing to brag about, but it is a steady advance and it's something that the Ukrainians are having a problem dealing with.

The challenge to the Ukrainians - because they lack the manpower - is to kind of protect their manpower, try to save lives and try to husband their resources in terms of manpower. Whereas the Russians are just throwing men into it. I mean, one of the most horrifying things I heard all week was from a commander out in one of the battalions who said they are capturing Russian soldiers who, from the time they left their house - to the time they were in Ukrainian captivity - was just 12 days. Twelve days from the time they left home to the time they were captured.

The Cipher Brief: So there's no training anymore. There's no training or organization, really?

Goff: There's no training. They're basically giving them uniforms, sticking them on a bus or a train, sending them out to the front, giving them a weapon and sending them out to fight. 12 days. However, technology is making a difference.

Unfortunately, the ratio of casualties which was always very highly in favor of the Ukrainians, is beginning to shift. The Russians are making adjustments. Putin is reckless, but he's not stupid. So, we're seeing a situation where the Russian casualty rate is diminishing a bit and the Ukrainian casualty rate is staying the same, but it's still a net loss for Kyiv. Ukraine just doesn’t have the manpower to match Russia.

One of the areas where they're having problems is in what we call the ‘mid-range’, anywhere from 40 to 70 miles from the front lines. The Russians are dominating that space right now. They're able to bring their forces in, distribute them for their assaults and trickle down, and the Ukrainians just haven't had the means to strike them in that zone to break these formations up before they get closer to the front, where the Russians will send 50 guys knowing that in the end, maybe only two of them will be alive. But if those two guys have advanced 50 meters, that's a gain.

The Cipher Brief: The Cipher Brief was there with you just a couple of months ago in May and there was a lot of talk then about how there was a ‘no-man buffer zone’ that had formed along the front because of this ubiquitous use of drone technology. No one could actually go into that space without being targeted and killed by drones. Can you give us a sense of what day-to-day life is like on the front lines right now?

Goff: The day that we visited at battalion headquarters on the front, it was pretty quiet. We were watching 40 or 50 drone feeds at any given time, and there wasn't much going on there, but that said, there are times when the front becomes active. And yes, it is a death zone, but again, the difference now is that the Russians are willing to take casualties, so they will send men into that death zone, whereas the Ukrainians are forced to respond.

Let's say you have five Ukrainians in a position they successfully defend, and they hold off the Russians. Let's say they kill 10 or 20 Russians. But if they lose two guys, they're down to three. The next assault of 50 guys eventually comes and it just wears them out. So it is a numbers game. And the Putin administration, for some bizarre reason, continues to be able to recruit and mobilize. Mostly it's economic because they're recruiting soldiers from the poorest regions of the former Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation. These guys are being offered recruitment bonuses and money that is millions of rubles, which is thousands of U.S. dollars in comparison, but it's money they never would have dreamed of having. Then a couple of days later, they're either dead or in Ukrainian captivity. It's bizarre.

The Cipher Brief: You've spent a lot of time in that region professionally, and of course you're a retired senior CIA officer so you've got a lot of knowledge about what happens in these areas. If you were writing a report back today, what would you say are the top opportunities and challenges for the Ukrainian troops who are fighting along the front right now?

Goff: The top opportunities are that, if you're fighting guys who 12 days ago were sitting at home and you've been fighting a war for two or three years, you have a huge advantage in terms of your experience and your abilities, so they have that.

The challenge though, is keeping those guys alive. So for us in the West, for the United States, for NATO, I think the key here is to provide weapons, ammunition, and a non-ending supply. It can't be like last year when the bill before Congress to supporting Ukraine was frozen for months. Finally, it passed, but at the last moment, literally, and Ukrainians were hanging on by their fingertips then. Literally, it was like the cavalry coming over the hill to protect against the last charge of the enemy. So we can't allow that to happen again. We've got to enable the Ukrainians to be properly equipped and properly armed, and that includes helping them solve the problem of the mid-range distance with the types of weapons that can strike out 40, 50, 60, 70 miles from the front.

The Cipher Brief: The criticism has always been that the U.S. has given Ukraine just enough not to lose, but never enough to win. Is there anything in the places that you visited or from the leaders that you talked to that surprised you?

Goff: No real surprises other than it's just surprising that their morale is still so high. You go to these frontline units and their morale is high. There is no one sitting around morosely. And then you go to cities like one we visited on the Black Sea, it was a lovely place, and people were on the beach. It's a little weird at first to see people hanging out on the beach like a normal beach day, but then you think, "Hey, look, this is their daily reality," right? We're marking the anniversary of 9/11 in Ukraine where one could argue that every day is 9/11.

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Can NATO Still Scare Putin?

EXPERT INTERVIEW – Polish President Karol Nowrocki signed a classified decree over the weekend allowing armed forces of NATO member states to be present in his country after Poland’s airspace was violated by an incursion of 19 Russian drones last week.

Moscow’s incursion, which Western security experts see as a ‘test’ by Russia (even though it has denied those claims) that has prompted a series of responses intended to fend off a potential Russian attack in the future. And Poland isn’t alone. Romania, Lativa, Estonia and Lithuania have also reported drone incursions by Russian since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Experts believe that any effective strategy to address the incursions must be focused on deterring Russian President Vladimir Putin. And despite earlier promises to impose stricter sanctions on Russia if President Putin does not end the war in Ukraine, President Donald Trump now says that the U.S. will only carry through with those sanctions if NATO member states do the same and end all purchases of Russian oil.

THE CONTEXT

Data from the Center for Information Resilience and reported by The Wall Street Journal shows that Moscow launched close to 6,300 drones in July of this year, up from 426 just one year earlier.

According to officials, at least three Russian drones were shot down last week as Polish F-16 and Dutch F-35 fighter jets were scrambled.

Acting U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Dorothy Shea told the UN Security Council that "The United States stands by our NATO allies in the face of these alarming airspace violations…And rest assured, we will defend every inch of NATO territory”, adding that "These actions, now with the addition of violating the airspace of a U.S. ally – intentionally or otherwise – show immense disrespect for good-faith U.S. efforts to bring an end to this conflict."

On Friday, September 12, NATO launched operation Eastern Sentry to bolster deterrence. The mission includes enhanced air policing, expanding existing operations there. European Sentry is a “multi-domain activity” including aircraft, sensors and air defenses.

Air policing is the use of military fighter aircraft to protect airspace from unauthorized penetration and ensure air traffic safety from threats. NATO Air Policing is a part of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) framework, providing 24/7/365 coverage of NATO airspace. Begun in 1961, the NATO Air Policing mission provides airborne quick reaction forces (QRFs) to member countries.

As a part of the broad set of assurance measures since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Allies are providing additional assets to enhance air policing along NATO’s eastern borders. To that end, Allies supplement the existing NATO Air Policing forces in the Baltic States, deploy additional aircraft to Poland, and augment the national air policing capabilities of the Bulgarian and Romanian air forces.

THE INTERVIEW

The Cipher Brief spoke with former Supreme Allied Commander General Phil Breedlove (Ret.), who also served earlier in his career as a military fighter jet pilot, to better understand what’s stake and what options NATO has for implementing its own form of deterrence from future Russian aggression. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity. You can also watch our conversation on The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel.

General Philip M. Breedlove

Gen. Breedlove retired as the Commander, Supreme Allied Command, Europe, SHAPE, Belgium and Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. He also served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force; and Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff.

The Cipher Brief: How serious of an issue was Russia’s drone incursion into Poland?

Gen. Breedlove: I think it is serious, but it's not serious in the way that some in the press are reporting it. I've seen some press calling this an attack on Poland. I don't think that Mr. Putin intended to attack Poland, but I do believe it was completely and 1000% deliberate and that he is testing NATO and testing Poland. And for that reason, it is important. It is serious and we need to be taking appropriate action.

The Cipher Brief: Many experts are saying that what the U.S. decides to do in response could be consequential in terms of deterring President Putin. What do you think needs to be done to give NATO what it needs to be effective?

Gen. Breedlove: The very first thing would be a simple statement by President Trump saying, "This is wrong, Mr. Putin, stop it," and he needs to say it publicly for the whole world to see.

Second, I would encourage our government to help NATO to come to a better place on how we defend our skies. We are in a posture called air policing, that is a peacetime posture and operates under peacetime Rules of Engagement. Air policing is really a result of 9/11. It is a functionality of alert aircraft that are designed to address renegade - that's the official term - renegade aircraft, meaning aircraft that are not squawking appropriately, talking appropriately, or are flying in the wrong airspace. And all they can do in peacetime is to go up and to investigate and try to warn off the airplanes and this is only when a foreign country is flying over your airspace. So, as an example, when a British or a U.S. airplane is flying over Estonia, they have zero rules of engagement that allow them to engage the enemy, except in self-defense. If the enemy makes a move toward the aircraft, they can defend themselves. If the enemy makes a move to drop a bomb though, there are no rules of engagement for the air policing. I've been advocating since May of 2016 that we need to change our posture to an air defense posture with an air defense rule of engagement set, which would allow an American pilot to defend Estonia if the need arised.

The Cipher Brief: It’s not hard to imagine how a situation could escalate quickly. But you had an entire career to think about these types of things. You've also been a huge advocate of no-fly zones. You thought a no-fly zone needed to be imposed on Ukraine from day one. Could that have any bearing here now?

Gen. Breedlove: Absolutely. And we don't want to cry over spilt milk or water under the bridge, but we proposed a set of operations back in 2014, [when Russia invaded Crimea] and if we had adopted any of those, we would be in a different place than we are now. We are at the crux of being in the same situation again. In three or four years, we will be answering for the decisions we make now. And if we were to establish some sort of zone that says, "Mr. Putin, stop," publicly, loudly, so the Russian people can hear it and Mr. Putin can hear it, we will find ourselves in a different place in three years than if we just continue along the path that we're currently on.

The Cipher Brief: Another thing that you have been very vocal on is deterrence. And the fact that the U.S. has really, despite actions that it has taken in the past, has not yet deterred the Russian president from aggressive acts against his neighbors. There's a sanctions package that's just waiting to be passed right now that a lot of Republicans in Congress are trying to push forward and it hasn't really gotten the support yet from the president. What impact might those sanctions have?

Breedlove: I'm a fan of sanctions, but we also have to be intellectually honest and understand that sanctions have never, ever changed Mr. Putin's battlefield actions. Sanctions have hurt Russia, they've hurt the Russian people, they've hurt the Russian economy and they're having an impact, and we need to keep them going. But sanctions alone have never changed Mr. Putin's battlefield actions. It's going to take more. I hope we adopt the sanctions. We need to tell Mr. Putin, "We are going to put these sanctions on you," and then do it. We've already said that and we’ve passed that red line a couple of times now, but this time we need to actually do it.

The other thing that would be a smart move by our president and our country would be to use every penny of frozen Russian assets to buy weapons for Ukraine. Why is this important? Most of that money belongs to oligarchs who are right below Mr. Putin, and you start taking their money and their boats and all that stuff away from them and he's not going to have as easy a time moving around in his own political circles. We need to start punishing those oligarchs by using their money to support the war effort in Ukraine. It would be important for the world to hear, especially the Russian people, that Russian money is paying for Ukrainian weapons.

The Cipher Brief: Using those frozen Russian assets has been another point of conversation for some time now that feels like a decision needs to be made one way or another. Whose decision is it right now, is it Europe?

Gen. Breedlove: Well, it's all of us. There are multiple systems that are involved, and this is going to have to be something that western leaders - to include our president - would have to rally to get it to move forward. It can't be a NATO action because you know Mr. Putin has at least two of our leaders in his pocket and they're going to vote against that if it's a NATO action. So, this has to be more of a coalition of the willing EU, NATO kind of thing where all the nations involved, including ours says, "This money is now going to the manufacturers in Europe and the manufacturers in America who are going to put forward weapons for Ukraine." That is the picture we need the Russian people to see, that their money, these oligarchs’ money is being used to buy Ukrainian weapons.

The Cipher Brief: What about other methods of deterrence?

Gen. Breedlove: I believe that we have strategic deterrence. I believe that we have conventional deterrence inside NATO, but I would tell you that tactical nuclear deterrence is beginning to fade because Mr. Putin continually talks about Russia lowering the bar and being ready to use tactical nuclear weapons. He's doing that to deter us, and it has worked. Former President Biden's administration was completely deterred. Mr. Trump's administration is nearly completely deterred when it comes to that realm. But here's the part that I think we need to think about. The previous administration said dozens of times, ‘We will defend every inch of NATO’. When President Biden said that, here's what President Putin heard: ‘Every other country is fair game have at it.’ So, he's essentially retaken Georgia politically. He's in the middle of doing the same in Moldova. He's attacking at will in Ukraine. So, we need to change that posture. We need to establish conventional deterrence outside of NATO because it has been forfeited and given away, and that is a problem.

The Cipher Brief: There's a lot of talk right now, a lot of speculation, a lot of concern, and a lot of talk about World War III when you're looking at the alignment of China and Russia. How realistic do you think that is?

Gen. Breedlove: That's exactly what Mr. Putin wants you to think. That is the exact result he wants, and he wants people like you and me talking about it and enhancing the message and getting everybody fearful of War War III. This is what is called reflexive control [Russian military theory based on the belief that you have control over your enemy by imposing assumptions that change the way they act]. Mr. Putin is exercising reflexive control, and it is working wildly. He is succeeding magnificently in controlling Western thought and especially, the decisions of Western leaders.

As I said before, Mr. Biden's administration was nearly completely deterred, and this administration is in the same place. Our most senior policy maker in the Pentagon is absolutely deterred, and we need to get past that. We need to think about how President Kennedy faced these kinds of problems during the Cuban missile crisis, how former President Reagan faced these problems during the intermediate range missile crisis and at how we’ve faced down the Soviet Union and Russia in the past. We seem to be somewhat incapable of doing that now.

Researchers Ian Coleman and Connor Cowman contributed to this report.

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Inside Ukraine's Innovation Under Fire

Cipher Brief exclusive: Retired CW5 Joey Gagnard details how Ukrainian commanders are rewriting the rulebook on tech, tactics, and survival.

EXPERT Q&A —This week, after the Russian drone incursions into Poland, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukraine will train Polish representatives on the counter drone tactics that it has developed in the war.

Retired Chief Warrant Officer (CW5) Joey Gagnard, was on the ground in Ukraine this week and talks with Cipher Brief CEO and Publisher Suzanne Kelly about Ukraine’s ability to continue to innovate under fire. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

The Cipher Brief: You’ve been different parts of Ukraine this week and have spent some time along the front lines, talking with Ukrainian military leaders. What are they telling you about how this battle is progressing, how are things on the ground?

Gagnard: I'll tell you that the battle is progressing exactly in the way that it has previously. As the Ukrainians make advances in technology, the Russians are adapting. They're adapting their techniques and tactics for trying to impose costs against Ukrainians and vice versa. It still remains something of a rat race of technological development here in Ukraine. A lot of the commanders are super frustrated with the resource constraints that they have, but they're doing the best they can. And I can tell you that the main thing that many Ukrainians have told us is that their biggest benefit - their biggest strength - is that morale remains high, and based on our own observations during our travels, I'll tell you that that's exactly the case.

The Cipher Brief: The Cipher Brief was with you in Ukraine this past May, and there was a lot of focus on innovation and technology and getting information as quickly as possible from the battle space to the commanders and integrating that into the intelligence stream quickly. Have you seen anything during this visit that marks a significant change or a progression in that since May?

Gagnard: There are some significant advances that have been made here. Since we were here before, the Ukrainians have sped up the information flow from the front lines all the way back to the command centers where they're making decisions on use of some of their weapon systems.

Unfortunately, some of the constraints that they have logistically, some of the weapon systems that they're receiving - continue to run short. They're still very dependent on Western support for some of the weapons systems that they don't have, that they need in order to impose more costs against the Russians. But they're making tremendous advances in terms of how they use information and the speed at which information is going from the point of capture back to the command centers.

The commanders are very aware that the way they were trained to do business is not going to be sufficient, and they've made adaptations to align more with NATO standards that they've obviously become aware of through their relationships with the different people here in country. I'm super impressed with the adaptations that the Ukrainian commanders continue to make, breaking away from the training and the doctrine that they were steeped in whenever they were coming up as young officers and young soldiers. Those commanders that do have military experience, you can see that paying dividends for them.

The most effective units seem to be adopting some different tactics, looking critically at the battle spaces that they're operating in and at some of the technologies that they have at their disposal and they’re making maximum use of them. It's extraordinarily impressive to watch what they're doing with the resources they have.

The Cipher Brief: We hear a lot about the challenges they're facing. What opportunities do you see for the military in the next several months?

Gagnard: The Ukrainians are doing a phenomenal amount with the limited technology that they have. For the Ukrainian theater, the technology that they've developed during this conflict is absolutely the best thing out there, the best thing anywhere in the world right now, for this theater.

A lot of American companies are making great technology that is focused on different priorities. I think there are some real opportunities to invest in some of the tactics and some of the things that the Ukrainians are doing to better understand that in the West, especially with some of the policies that are coming out of the Pentagon, we are trying to make our defense industry more agile and more nimble.

I think there's some real opportunities to foster those relationships with the Ukrainians and see how they're doing business, see how they've tied industry into their defense ecosystem. I think that's a major opportunity for us.

Similarly, some of the things that they've done with open source information presents real opportunities for our defense enterprise to take lessons from, frankly.

Aside from that, I'm still a huge advocate for having closer military integration, shoulder-to-shoulder with the Ukrainian Armed forces here in Ukraine. I think that that would make an outsized impact if we could somehow get combat soldiers involved with Ukrainian Armed Forces in any capacity. I think it would be welcomed and I think it would have an outsized impact on all of our strategic interests.

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Putin's Drone Hit a NATO Nerve in Poland, Opening an Opportunity for Ukraine

EXPERT INTERVIEW – More Western leaders and national security experts are now saying that Russia’s recent drone incursion into Poland was not a mission gone wrong as Moscow suggested but was more likely an intended probe to determine how quickly the NATO alliance – created to safeguard security - might rally in the face of an expanded Russian attack.

President Vladimir Putin now has his answer.

In a swift response, NATO announced that it is bolstering it’s eastern flank defenses. Germany is expanding air policing over Poland. France is sending 3 Rafale fighter jets and The Netherlands is sending two Patriot air defenses, NASAMS and counter drone systems to Warsaw. The Czech Republic is sending additional helicopters and up to 150 soldiers to help defend Poland’s borders.

In this expert weekend interview, The Cipher Brief spoke with General David Petraus (Ret.) who was on the ground in Kyiv this week, talking with senior leaders - not only about the seriousness of Russia’s incursion into NATO territory - but also about how technology continues to dramatically alter the battlespace in Ukraine and how Moscow is now using its troops on the ground.

THE CONTEXT

19 Russian drones entered Polish airspace on September 9 forcing the temporary closure of several airports.
Polish F-16s and Dutch F-35s downed some of the drones, with NATO aerial refueling and AWACs C2 support.
Russia said the drones were enroute to Ukraine and were not pursuing targets inside of Poland.
Poland invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty to trigger allied consultation on response. The North Atlantic Council met on September 10 to discuss the situation and denounced Russia. Europe broadly condemned the incursion.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte called the incursion “reckless and unacceptable” and warned that the alliance will “defend every inch of NATO territory.” Allied Commander Europe General Alexus Grynkewoch said the alliance will “learn lessons” and improve readiness in response.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said “indications suggest [the incursion] was intentional, not accidental.” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said the drones “were quite obviously deliberately directed on this course.”
After President Donald Trump suggested the incursion may have been a mistake, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on Friday in a post on X that, “We would also wish that the drone attack on Poland was a mistake. But it wasn't. And we know it.”
NATO announced Eastern Sentry, a new mission to boost defenses on its eastern flank. The mission is modeled after Baltic Sentry, NATO’s maritime and aerial operation to monitor the Baltic Sea.

THE EXPERT INTERVIEW

General David Petraeus (Ret.)

General David Petraeus served more than 37 years in the U.S. military with six consecutive commands, five of which were combat, including command of the Multi-National Force-Iraq during the Surge, U.S. Central Command, and Coalition and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. He is a partner in the KKR global investment firm and chairs the firm’s global institute.

Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

The Cipher Brief: Let’s talk about this week’s Russian drone incursion into Poland, whether you believe it was an accident on Moscow’s behalf or a calculated probe, how significant of an event was this?

General Petraeus: It was a very significant episode. Again, 19 drones entered Polish airspace. The bottom line is that this could not have been a mistake. These aren't on autopilot. They may have way points from which they're flying to and from, but there were pilots behind this significant incursion. Just recently, I saw a report that five of the drones were actually headed for a major base, which is one of the hubs from which a lot of the NATO equipment is transported into Ukraine. It's one of the big areas for trans-shipment.

The NATO response was impressive, in my view. Keep in mind, you had Dutch F-35s, Polish F-16s in the air very rapidly. They clearly must have seen this coming. They've rehearsed this in the past. There was an AWACS up there to help them also with the command and control and early warning, and aerial refueling tankers were flying so they could refuel as required. At least several of the drones were shot down. So, again, an impressive response.

And then as a result of that, Poland called for an Article Four gathering. Keep in mind, Article Five is a call to arms, Article Four is a call to meet. They did that at the North Atlantic Council, of course, in Brussels at NATO headquarters. And out of that, came a very comprehensive set of actions that NATO will take, which apparently includes the U.S. as some part of the air component, but it's going to beef up all of the different capabilities that would be needed, including anti-air and anti-ballistic missile defenses for those countries on the eastern front and a number of other capabilities as well. This is now Operation Eastern Sentry.

This wasn't a wake-up call because clearly, they were already awake to the threat, but it was a significant incursion that has generated a significant response. I think the tactical response was quite impressive. The operational response - not quite strategic - perhaps you could describe it as that by NATO, was very significant, as well and quick, too.

I'm hoping that there are even bigger strategic responses though, and that this might be the catalyst in Washington for Congress to work with the White House on the sanctions package that Senator Lindsey Graham and others have been working for a number of months, which would add substantial U.S. sanctions to those already imposed by the EU and European countries [on Russia].

And then on the European side, for this to galvanize support for what is now termed the von der Leyen plan or concept, which is of course Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, who, by the way, gave a stirring State of the Union address written before the incursion, but delivered after it.

Her concept is to use those frozen hundreds of billions of dollars, of euros really, of frozen Russian reserves in European banks as collateral to give money to Ukraine now to help them. And as you know, the Ukrainians could build even more drones than the 3.5 million that they're going to build this year, if they had more money. And additional fundingwould be a huge help for them also in terms of their fiscal situation.

And then the frozen funds go back to Russia once Russia pays reparations to Ukraine for all the damage and destruction they have wrought in the country here. That's quite an artful approach because it avoids the actual seizure of these assets, which again, a number of European countries, I think rightly have concern about, that it might undermine the euro attractiveness for this kind of reserve.

I'd love to see those two actions on top of the very quick response and the very quick decisions by the North Atlantic Council to carry out the military actions announced. These would be very, very complimentery to the military actions and show Russia just how serious this was.

I think in this case, Russia has vastly overplayed its hand, just as I think it has, frankly, in terms of the huge numbers of drones and missiles that have been launched into Ukraine in recent nights that we've seen in the Institute for the Study War statistics and so forth that show the highest ever numbers. In the sense that this shows very clearly if there were any remaining possibility of whether Vladimir Putin was willing to negotiate a ceasefire and agree to some kind of sustained and just peace, as President Trump sought to achieve, that clearly is not in the cards.

The Cipher Brief: General Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said recently that the direct technological race is accelerating in the battlespace. The technology that is being put into battlefield drones, is being adapted very quickly by Russia. The Cipher Brief visited the Nemesis Regiment with you earlier this year – the separate battalion of the Unmanned Systems Forces that specializes in the use of bomber drones -what has changed on that front over the past few months?

General Petraeus: The Nemesis Regiment, now, having expanded from a battalion, is well known here in Ukraine because it (and all of the military units] is trying to compete for talent, and they have billboards that say, "Sign up for the Nemesis Regiment." They're now able to recruit directly. They now are able to do basic military training themselves as well. The workarounds that they have developed to get talent into uniform as rapidly as possible to make a difference, is really quite impressive. Only a country that is fighting for its very independence, it’s very survival, would be able to do all of this.

You'll recall that when I was last here and I talked to General Syrskyi and asked just roughly, "How many drones did you use yesterday of all types?" Because of course, they have air and ground and maritime drones (indeed, the maritime drones have been so effective that they have sunk one third of the Black Sea Fleet). His answer was, “Nearly 7,000.” And many of those flew multiple missions.

By the way, one of the briefings we had informed us that the entire remaining Black Sea Fleet is all completely in one Russian harbor as far as you can get away from Ukraine, in the eastern part of the Black Sea, with lots of defenses around it. So, the Ukrainians have basically forced it to bottle itself up just to survive, because the Ukrainians are still out there picking off occasional Russian patrol boats or carrying out other kinds of action at sea whenever they find Russian ships at sea.

The Ukrainians also have land drones of all types, remotely driven vehicles that do a lot of the back and forth from the rear to the front lines with logistics and taking casualties and so forth. And also, increasingly, remotely operated machine guns, grenade launchers, and other weapons systems, often on remotely driven vehicles.

And, of course, Ukraine has tons of all different types of aerial drones, including some now that very publicly are out there that reportedly can fly thousands of kilometers into the Russian Federation.

And long-range missiles are also now in production in Ukraine , and the numbers of these being produced are beginning to ramp up very substantially, in addition to the 3.5 million drones that will be produced this year.

I also met with the individuals that have developed the command, control, communications, intelligence and battle management intelligence - and knitting all of this together into a common operational picture/battle management system that is truly extraordinary. And the 7,000 drones doesn't quite capture all of this. They said, "In a 12-hour shift there are 40,000 flights." And again, all of this is being tracked. There are crews that are sending these out very quickly. Some come back, some does not. But just to give you a sense of the magnitude of the technology race. We learned last time that we were here, that to combat the Russian electronic warfare and jamming, as many as a quarter of the drones that go out from the Ukrainian side have tiny fiber optic cable that spools out behind them so that they can maintain the critical command and control links to fly these right into the enemy, regardless of the EW and jamming. A lot of these are first-person view suicide drones, as they're termed.

There are also other advances. The Russians, for example, now are putting jet engines on some of their Shahed drones. And because the way that you knock down drones encompasses all types of different systems - everything from a quite skillful use of heavy machine guns, laser designators, acoustic sensors, all kinds of radars, everything working together - but if they fly faster and higher, it's harder to counter. There are now also Ukrainian drones that run into the Russian drones, and again, hundreds of these are out there every night.

The skill involved in all of this is extraordinary, but the increased speed makes that much more difficult. So, what you have is a constant back and forth, where one side develops something new and innovative, the other side sees it, reverse engineers it, and adapts it. And while, of course, on the Russian side, it's much more top down than bottom up (as on the Ukrainian side), when they go top down, they can produce huge quantities very quickly. On the Ukrainian side, it's a lot more like a ‘let 1,000 flowers bloom’ initiative. There is tremendous innovation, but then you've got to figure out how to scale it. And Ukraine is doing that now, too.

Each side is very much going about this in a whole variety of different ways. The sensor component of this is particularly interesting, and then the fusion of all of the different reports. You might get a human intelligence report derived from a number of different methods. How do you then get that into the system, immediately alert those who have the means to actually deal with it, who then delivers this to those who can actually take action against it, kinetic action in many cases?

And what they're doing through their battle management system is shrinking the time from the so-called sensor to shooter, the ‘kill chain’, as Chris Brose wrote a book with that title. These are just breathtaking kinds of advances. And as you know – because you’ve been here with us - every four or five months or so, you see breathtaking new advances.

The very first time we spent time with Nemesis, and you and Brad were with us, it was a Battalion. Now it's the regiment, and it's going to be a brigade. And of course, it was founded by and still commanded by a former prime minister, the first one under President Zelensky - so everybody's in this fight. But the first time we were here, I think the drones they had were using had one antenna. Last time, I think there were three or four. Now, it's up to six. And of course, you also have the Starlink big board on top of it to communicate with what Elon Musk has put up in the constellation.

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So, Ukraine is where the most advanced innovation in the world can be found.

I also spent time with all of the defense security assistance folks in the U.S. embassy, which included more than just Americans, by the way. So, many allied countries were there as well. And while they are doing great work, we should also be doing much more, the U.S., NATO countries, and other allies and partners around the world that might be threatened by aggression, can learn huge lessons from here. But of course, the lessons aren’t really learned until they are institutionalized in some way in the military services in the form of doctrine, organizational changes, training, leader development courses, and the rest of that. And we're not doing that at all as assiduously and aggressively as we should be.

I know the US military service chiefs recognize the imperative of much more rapid innovation, but when you think that nearly 7,000 individual drones are used every day, many of which are on multiple missions, and you hear the scale of what it is they're doing, we're not remotely doing what we should be.

In terms of their organizations, the Ukrainians now have a drone platoon in every infantry company, a drone company in every infantry battalion, a drone battalion in every brigade. The new corps have their own drone units. And then there are the independent drone organizations like the Nemesis Regiment, which are active in all kinds of different ways and are apportioned according to the priorities on the battlefield, the most significant threats, the most lucrative targets and so forth.

And as you recall, drone units get points for the different targets that they strike. The strikes are all validated because you have drones watching drones. And those points can be redeemed for equipment and components that you need via an Amazon-like system that was established by Brave One (a Ukrainian government-funded organization that supports innovation) as an adjunct to the DELTA system, which is the overall software platform that is used by all of the elements of their Ministry of Defense and all their services. Noting that Ukraine don't just have an army, navy, air force and marine corps, they also now have an unmanned systems force, and the commander of that is incredibly aggressive and innovative.

The Cipher Brief: Given all of the focus on the technology, I think it's difficult for some people to understand what the front line still looks like today. Russia is still recruiting an incredible number of people with a very tight turnaround time between recruitment and when they're actually deploy. Can you just give us a picture of what that looks like today?

General Petraeus: Well, in fact, several of our other fellow travelers, as you know, Ralph Goff, Glenn Corn, and Joey Gagnard have been out to the front lines. They were down in the south. The commander down there said there are Russian soldiers who have gone from recruitment to deployment in considerably less than 20 days. In other words, recruits aren’t even getting 30 days of basic training before being integrated into a unit. No time to build cohesion and all the rest of that stuff. This is extraordinary, stunning, actually. Moscow is literally taking these individuals off the street, luring them in with huge enlistment bonuses, often from rural areas where the job opportunities are not all that great. And in many cases, the families actually celebrate that they're doing this because it leads to a massive financial windfall.

The recruits go in very quickly, are issued weapons, uniform, et cetera, and then shoved into the front lines and right into an offensive - keeping in mind that the offensives now are not combined arms as we have known them in the past. They're not tanks and armor personnel carriers supported by engineers, infantry, air defense, electronic warfare, artillery, and all the rest. They're infantrymen on foot, essentially running across a street or a field and trying to establish a foothold in the next block of buildings or treeline. It's literally proceeding at infantry pace, because the drones are so ubiquitous, the surveillance is so constant. At the minute that they're spotted, or if they get tanks moving, immediately the suicide drones will come out and take them out. So, you have almost blanket coverage except for really extreme weather when drones can't stay up or they can't see. The rest of the time, it's impossible for the kind of combined arms attacks that launched this invasion by Russia in the beginning. As you'll recall then, there were huge columns of tanks and other vehicles, and frankly, even into the second summer of the counteroffensive that was mounted by the Ukrainians. And now, you actually don't even have as clearly defined front lines as you had then with trench lines and almost World War I-like fortifications. Now you have outposts, and they'll actually allow the enemy to flow around them a bit because the drones will eventually police them up.

But this is hugely costly to the Russians. And for those Ukrainian units that are using the different command and control and intelligence and battle management systems, tools that are fusing the intelligence and enabling them to be even more effective with the drones than they otherwise would be, the exchange ratio is 10 to 1. And that's what it needs to be given how much the Russians outman and outgun the Ukrainian forces.

The Cipher Brief: What the sense of urgency now among European leaders you’ve talked to?

General Petraeus: I suspect that the events of the past number of months have probably been pretty sobering. There was some hope. President Trump made a valiant effort to try to bring this war to an end by engaging Putin, engaging the Europeans and President Zelensky. But it was for nought, it appears. And now on the NATO side, inn a lot of ways, there is renewed confidence because of the improvement in the relationship between President Trump and President Zelensky and the interation between President Trump and key European leaders.

European leaders are, of course, trying to come up with a security guarantee – which I think is quite elusive, frankly, as unless you put your forces in the front lines, you might as well just give all your stuff to the Ukrainians and arm them to the teeth. They're the security guarantee, I think, for Ukraine’s defense.

So, I think there's increasingly a more sober analysis of the prospects for some kind of ceasefire. Washington has actually gotten the Europeans – in a huge success for the White House, frankly - to increase their defense spending to 3.5% of GDP rather than the 2% that was the old standard. And even 5% when you take into account other investments in infrastructure to push the forces further out to the east and that kind of activity. And to see, again, the continued American commitment in eastern Poland and elsewhere, and the air commitment to what is going on in response to the Russian drone incursion, is very encouraging.

So, I think there's a degree of confidence that the Europeans are picking up their share of this load. The Germans, in particular, are doubling defense spending in the next 10 years or so, and that is between 700 billion and a trillion euros more than they would've spent otherwise. Other European countries are also stepping up impressively – and with swift diplomatic action, as well as much additional security assistance to Ukraine and in spending on national defense.

Washington has tried and done everything they could. President Trump engaged personally, repeatedly, and it should be clear to all now that Putin is just not really serious about negotiating an end to this war. He still has his maximalist objectives of replacing President Zelensky with a pro-Russian figure, essentially demilitarizing Ukraine to the extent that would be possible, and seeking additional land that they haven't even been able to seize. They haven't even yet gotten to the so-called fortified cities in the southeastern part of the country, in Donetsk Province in particular. And agreeing to any of those is not acceptable to Ukraine or to its leader. In fact, the Constitution of Ukraine does not allow a leader to give away territory or redraw borders.

The Cipher Brief: What else is top of mind for you as you’re on the ground there in Kyiv?

General Petraeus: I'm keen to hear from European and NATO leaders about how much this drone incursion has galvanized additional action. How much European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's stirring European Union address has reinforced that new determination, and to get a sense of where that is headed. Because there's a seriousness of purpose right now that is even greater than it was just days ago. And to put a finger on the pulse of that, I think will be very important and could produce a number of insights. Needless to say, that is very heartening to the Ukrainians who are seeing the prospect of this substantial additional European commitment. They are also heartened by recognition that Washington has done everything it can to try to be the catalyst to bring about a ceasefire. That's not going to happen, it doesn't appear. And now, I think there's a seriousness of purpose in Washington, reinforced, I hope, by this incursion to get that sanctions package through Congress to the White House and into law.

Cipher Brief Writer and Editor Ethan Masucol contributed research for this report.

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Why Russia Remains a Key Threat Behind the China Axis

OPINION — You can never count Russia out. More than three years after Vladimir Putin’s failed blitzkrieg on Kyiv, Moscow is proving it still has plenty of punch on the world stage as Putin continues to pursue his brutal war on the conventional battlefields of Ukraine and expand his war of sabotage, propaganda, and political action against the United States and its allies around the world.

Last week, at a Chinese military parade, Putin confirmed that he can stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The symbolism is unmistakable: an emerging authoritarian axis, flexing its muscles in open defiance of the United States. What’s more, Putin and Xi are working to pit countries like India, Türkiye, Brazil and other “non-aligned states” against Washington.

Washington would like to see Putin as an isolated pariah — sanctioned, weakened, irrelevant. Nothing could be further from the truth. Russia may not be a superpower on its own — its military is degraded; its economy ranks only 11th in the world and Moscow's war in Ukraine is grinding down the Kremlin’s already limited financial reserves. But Russia, in its weakened state, is an increasingly important ally and source of cheap natural resources for the People’s Republic of China.

Chinese leadership also benefits from Russia’s aggressive anti-Western actions because they keep Washington and Brussels distracted and unable to focus on countering the growing threat that China presents to the U.S. and its allies. Make no mistake: Beijing is using Moscow to advance its own global ambitions.

The military partnership between the two countries is deepening. Russia and China recently conducted joint naval drills in the Sea of Japan, staged their first-ever joint submarine exercises, and launched coordinated naval patrols in the Pacific. This is happening in the very waters where the U.S. and its allies — Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan — face the greatest danger of conflict with China.

Economically, Beijing has become Moscow’s lifeline. Cut off from the West by sanctions, Russia has turned to China for trade, technology, and energy sales. China’s share of Russia’s foreign trade nearly doubled between 2021 and 2023, accounting for more than a third of Russia’s foreign trade by 2024. Beijing is buying up Russian oil, propping up its industries, and collaborating on sensitive technologies with direct national security implications.

The tech partnership is especially troubling. China itself is fast becoming a tech powerhouse, with its corporate giant Huawei already dominating the vital global 5G market. A strengthened Russia-China technology axis would present an even greater challenge to the United States — not just commercially, but strategically.

Of course, the growing intelligence cooperation between Beijing and Moscow is a key component of the alliance’s efforts to advance each country’s economic, technological, and military capabilities while undermining the U.S.

There are ways to push back.

The Trump administration’s recent approval of the Hewlett Packard Enterprise–Juniper Networks merger, reportedly encouraged by the U.S. intelligence community, was a key move to ensure America has its own 5G champions to compete with Huawei. But economic competition alone won’t be enough.

We must recognize what China and Russia are building: an authoritarian bloc hostile to American leadership. These countries don’t always get along — Beijing and Moscow themselves have plenty of sore spots and each country is weary and paranoid about the other’s long-term ambitions to dominate the other.

Unfortunately, for now, both share an affinity for authoritarian government and a hostility toward the United States that are motivating both to overcome or overlook their concerns about one another to counter the U.S.

Beijing is clearly the senior partner in this relationship. Unlike during the Cold War, when China tilted toward Moscow, today Russia leans south toward Beijing’s gravitational pull and is increasingly economically dependent on Beijing. Together, they are expanding influence in Africa, Latin America, and even wooing countries like India as they work to weaken the American-led system that has preserved peace and prosperity in the world for decades.

The United States must get serious about this challenge. America needs to strengthen its own alliances and intelligence-sharing relationships. It needs to engage in tough global economic competition especially on tech. It needs to see the Russia-China relationship for what it is: a burgeoning bloc that seeks to displace the American-led global system that has kept the peace for decades while allowing the U.S. to thrive.

The question is who will set the rules of the 21st century: a U.S.-led coalition of free nations or an authoritarian axis led by Beijing with Moscow at its side. How the United States responds to this axis will determine nothing less than who wields global power in the twenty-first century and the type of world our children and grandchildren live in - in the years to come.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Officials Consider Response as Russian Drones Cross a Line in Poland

DEEP DIVE - Russia’s drone barrage against Poland early Wednesday was an unprecedented incident in Moscow’s three-and-a-half-year war against Ukraine, bringing Europe to what Poland’s Prime Minister refers to as the country’s most dangerous moment in decades.

“It’s incomparably more dangerous than before,” Prime Minister Donald Tusk told members of Poland’s parliament. “This situation brings us the closest we have been to open conflict since World War II.”

Many of the 19 drones that crossed into Polish territory early Wednesday were shot down but the incursion was enough to prompt Warsaw to invoke NATO’s Article 4 – in a rare direct military engagement between NATO and Russia – the first since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian Defense Ministry said it was an accident, and that the drones were never intended to enter Poland. Polish, Ukrainian and other Western officials aren’t buying it, with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte saying that the question of intent doesn’t matter; Russia should be held accountable.

“It is absolutely reckless,” Rutte said. And in a message intended for Russian President Vladimir Putin, he added, “stop violating allied airspace. And know that we stand ready, that we are vigilant and that we will defend every inch of NATO territory.”

The possibility that NATO’s support for Ukraine could lead to military conflict with Russia has been a concern since the early days of the 2022 invasion. When a single stray missile landed on Polish soil in November 2022, killing two farmers, Ukraine blamed Russia. NATO went on high alert and then-President Joe Biden was awakened in the middle of the night to be briefed. In that incident though, an investigation found that the missile was a Ukrainian air-defense missile that had misfired.

As the war dragged on, and Russia seemed unable or unwilling to act on its repeated threats to punish the West for providing aid to Ukraine, experts argued that fears of a conflagration were overblown, and that they had slowed western assistance at precisely the time when Ukraine needed it most.

Wednesday’s drone attack was a game changer. While Russian drones have strayed into Polish territory before – seven in total, in more than three years – experts say this is different. Nearly two dozen drones flew into Poland in a single event, traveling as far as a hundred miles into the country.

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Poland, along with Lithuania and Ukraine, issued a joint statement condemning the incident as a “deliberate and coordinated attack.” In a video posted on Wednesday, Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, said the drones “did not veer off course, but were deliberately targeted.” Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker agrees.

“There can be no doubt that Russia deliberately sent these drones into Polish territory,” Volker told The Cipher Brief. “They may not have intended to attack anything – they were unarmed after all – but it was a deliberate incursion into NATO territory.”

Volker and others suggested that Moscow may have carried out the incursions in order to test NATO's resolve, collect intelligence, and issue a warning that unless Ukraine surrenders soon, Russia’s war will widen.

“The number of drones that crossed into Polish territory suggest the Russians were probing, trying to watch and see how NATO reacts,” Erin Dumbacher, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, told The Cipher Brief.

Daniel Fried, a former U.S. Ambassador to Poland, told The Cipher Brief that Russia’s success in Ukraine “depends on intimidating NATO, which this attack may have intended.”

NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe Alexus Grynkewich said that the alliance did not yet know whether the act was intentional. But several experts echoed the point made by Rutte, the alliance’s Secretary General: intentional or accidental, the incursions constituted an act of aggression that should not go unpunished.

“I don’t think intent matters much going forward,” John McLaughlin, a former acting director of the Central Intelligence Agency, told The Cipher Brief. “At this point, the issue is what is NATO capable of agreeing on and what does Russia learn from that. It will be a test of whether the ‘coalition of the willing’ has substance and who is prepared to be in it.”

Fried concurs. “Intent matters, but Russia is responsible in any case and cannot be allowed to hide behind plausible deniability,” he said. “Russia can put out a credible explanation of the error, if it wants its denials to be taken seriously.”

The initial reactions to the Russian barrage have been a mix of condemnation and calls for a NATO response. The UN Security Council is to hold an emergency session in response to the incursion. And NATO says it is investigating whether the Russian drones were deliberately sent into Poland, while planning to bolster its air defense and detection systems.

“If it is proven that this was a deliberate Russian incursion, NATO leaders have to respond diplomatically and militarily in a way that deters Russia from a similar incursion,” Dumbacher and Liana Fix, a Council on Foreign Relations Fellow, wrote on Thursday, outlining a series of steps that NATO might consider.

NATO “could pursue responses with little escalatory potential, such as increasing air patrolling and strengthening air defense on the Eastern flank,” they wrote. “There is also the option of a more robust response, such as supporting a Ukrainian attack on Russian drone production sites. Diplomatically, a joint response can include the ratcheting up of sanctions on Moscow that are already being discussed in Washington and Brussels."

“The next steps should focus on reinforcing deterrence at the border,” Dumbacher told The Cipher Brief. “NATO militaries should work together to demonstrate that Russia will suffer losses if they try the same probing attack or, worse, try to come across the border with higher quantities next time.”

McLaughlin suggests a ramping up of NATO reinforcements to the alliance’s Eastern flank – “and to make clear that they will stay there for the indefinite future. Reinforce air defense across the front and in Ukraine.” He and Volker also suggested the establishment of a no-fly or air-defense zone over Ukraine backed by western resources — an idea that surfaced in the early days of the war but was deemed too likely to lead to a NATO-Russian aerial engagement.

“NATO should declare an extended air defense zone – for example, shooting down any hostile objects that fly within 200 kilometers of NATO territory,” Volker said. “This would be a direct and proportionate military response to Russia's willingness to threaten NATO populations.”

It might also carry more risk than the Europeans are willing to assume – even now. But several experts stressed that it was time for NATO to act with less concern about the Russian response.

“Russia is the aggressor and has been engaged in sabotage against and inside Europe for over a year,” said Fried, who also argued for imposing an air-defense zone. “Letting concerns over escalation dominate us allows Putin to set the terms of his escalation without concern over our response.”

Putin believes “that he can outlast whatever resolve there is in the West,” McLaughlin said. “A flaccid western response would say to Putin: the road is clear, push on. Some movement of forces, some material commitment, is required.”

How the U.S. responds also matters. Four weeks ago, President Trump welcomed Putin to Alaska, saying after their meeting that while “we didn’t get there (to a deal), we have a very good chance of getting there.” He also said that Putin and Zelensky would meet soon in the pursuit of peace.

But since the Alaska summit, Putin’s forces have dramatically stepped up their attacks on Ukraine, and have also struck an American factory in western Ukraine, two European diplomatic compounds and a key Ukrainian government building in Kyiv.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha, said after the drone incursions into Poland that the absence of any real penalties was having an effect. “Putin’s sense of impunity keeps growing,” Sybiha said in a message on X. “He was not properly punished for his previous crimes.”

Even Republican members of Congress are taking that view. “I think Russia is playing – they’re really playing us like a piano right now,” North Carolina Republican Senator Thom Thillis said this week.

After this week’s drone barrage, President Trump spoke with Poland’s President Karol Nawrocki and wrote on social media, “What’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones?” He closed his post with a cryptic three words: “Here we go!”

Trump has threatened Putin repeatedly in an “or else” fashion but to this point, Putin has reaped the benefits of American engagement without paying a price. No new sanctions, despite repeated threats to impose them, even as the Senate has prepared a bipartisan sanctions bill that would punish Moscow by imposing tariffs on countries importing Russian energy and applying secondary sanctions on firms seen as aiding Russia’s energy sector.

“I hear every week, it’s coming, it’s coming. I just think we ought to stop talking about it,” Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.) said after the Russian drones flew into Poland. Other Republican senators – including Senate Majority Whip John Barrasso (R-Wy) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) – support the measure and are pushing President Trump to do the same.

Senate Majority Leader John Thune said Wednesday that the Poland incursion had boosted momentum in Congress to pass what he called the “bone-crushing” sanctions bill. He described Russia’s actions as “provocative,” and aimed at testing the U.S. and NATO. But he also said he would only bring the bill to the floor once he received a clear signal of support from the president.

“The U.S. needs to develop a realistic and informed understanding of how Russia operates,” McLaughlin said Thursday. “When Steve Witkoff returned from the Alaska meeting saying Russia had agreed to Article 5-like deployments to Ukraine by a European security force, it was obvious that could not have been a serious Russian commitment, or that Witkoff had misunderstood. And Putin must have come away thinking he could do just about anything without provoking the U.S. to serious action.”

McLaughlin added that “realism, consistency, careful negotiation, and backstopping the Europeans seem the minimal requirements to keep future historians from concluding that the administration ‘lost’ Ukraine.”

Last month Trump met with Nawrocki, the newly minted Polish president (whose candidacy Trump supported) and lavished praise on him and pledged to keep American troops in Poland – no matter what Putin said about it. Now Nawrocki and other Polish officials want help in terms of their own defense, and a robust message of deterrence to Putin.

“The U.S. should denounce Russia’s escalation of aggression, increase economic pressure on Russia, increase arms deliveries to Ukraine, and step up military support for NATO’s Eastern front members and for the Coalition of the Willing,” Fried said. “Including by backing their developing plans for a mission in Ukraine.”

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Russia Pays the Price as Ukraine Targets Its Oil Refineries

OPINION — Following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Vladimir Putin expected a swift victory from his “special military operation.” Instead, it is Kyiv now conducting special air campaigns against Russia’s oil and gas industry. Ordinary Russians are beginning to feel the war’s costs more directly and the pressure on the Kremlin is growing.

Since late 2023, Ukraine has unleashed a drone offensive, targeting Russian oil refineries. By 2024, the Biden administration was upset at the impact Ukraine was beginning to have, as the US was sensitive to changes in oil prices.

But for Russia, oil and gas revenues help fund its ongoing war against Ukraine. Russia’s reliance on massive recruitment bonuses to sustain its war effort in Ukraine is straining its economy, driving up wages and inflation as the military competes with civilian industries for labor. According to a June survey by the independent Russian pollster Levada Center, 58% of Russians named rising prices as their top concern.

Drones have formed the backbone of Ukraine's defense, but now, they are increasingly used on the offensive against Russia. Over time, drone strikes became more effective. By 2025, Ukraine had built an extensive fleet of long-range drones and put them to use, targeting Russian oil, hitting Moscow where it hurts most. Kyiv believes these to be “kinetic sanctions,” since the West has been hesitant to target Russian oil for years. And for Putin, fuel prices are politically dangerous.

Since early August, Ukraine has carried out more than a dozen strikes on Russian oil refineries, knocking out as much as 20% of refining capacity – over 1 million barrels a day. According to The Economist, the attacks have forced rationing, sent wholesale petrol prices up by more than 50%, and pushed Russia to suspend gasoline exports. The attacks have continued into September.

The result is that Russians are stuck in long lines waiting for fuel. Some cities reportedly don’t have any fuel supplies left. Local government budgets are in freefall. All of Russia’s major oil companies have reported profit declines in 2025, with industry-wide earnings cut in half.

The shortages now dominate the headlines of Russian newspapers. By early September, Putin himself was forced to admit that Russia is facing a gas shortage. The result is growing social pressure within the country. One Russian war blogger wrote, “We've been half-dead here for months, digging mud in the trenches, under drones every day, counting bullets, while back home, oil refineries are burning down in batches.”

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The Kremlin’s official narrative has been that damage to refineries came from falling debris after drones were shot down. Yet at the same time, Russian authorities broadcast loudspeaker warnings urging citizens not to record footage of Ukrainian drones – an implicit admission that direct hits were occurring and to not broadcast the success of Kyiv’s efforts.

Things will continue to get worse for Russia. Ukrainian defense company Fire Point has recently unveiled two new ballistic missiles, the FP-7 and FP-9, with ranges of 200 km and 855 km respectively, as part of Kyiv’s push to strike deeper into Russian territory. Kyiv has also been deploying AI drone swarms. With time, this technology will be extended to long-range drones.

While these strikes alone may not determine the outcome of the war, they are shaping its trajectory. Ukraine has shown it can bring the fight deep into Russia’s economic heartland, weakening the very revenues that sustain Moscow’s military machine.

Putin would be wise to remember the lessons of Tsar Nicholas II during World War I: when the frontlines dragged on and domestic shortages mounted, social pressure at home proved as dangerous as the enemy abroad.

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Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Beyond Defense: Building a Strategic U.S.–Japan Cyber Partnership

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE / OPINION — As the U.S.–Japan alliance confronts an era where digital threats increasingly target economic stability and national security, integrating cyber strategy into the relationship is essential. The longstanding pillars of military, trade, and diplomacy have supported peace and prosperity. Still, the rise of cyberspace as a borderless, high-stakes domain demands that both nations make cybersecurity a foundational element of their partnership in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

For decades, the U.S.–Japan alliance has been defined by three core pillars: military security, trade, and diplomacy. These foundations have underpinned stability in the Indo-Pacific, deterred aggression, and supported one of the most prosperous economic relationships in the world. However, in the 21st century, another domain has emerged to equal importance; a domain with no borders, where attacks can compromise systems in seconds, and where economic vitality, national security, and democratic stability are all simultaneously at stake. That domain is cyberspace.

While cyber cooperation between the U.S. and Japan has grown in recent years, it still lags far behind the deep integration seen in our military, diplomatic, and economic ties. The next phase of our alliance should build on the progress already underway, notably Japan's elevation of cybersecurity in its 2022 National Security Strategy, the establishment of the new Active Cyber Defense Law, and the reimagining of the National Cybersecurity Office (NCO). This momentum must be sustained and accelerated, integrating cyber strategy as deeply into our bilateral relationship as defense treaties, economic agreements, and diplomatic coordination.

The reasons are urgent and undeniable.

The Indo-Pacific region is the most dynamic and contested cyber environment globally. State-sponsored actors are targeting U.S. and Japanese critical infrastructure, defense industrial bases, financial institutions, and research organizations. Cyber espionage campaigns seek not only military secrets but also advanced technologies, trade negotiations, and energy grid designs.

In the past decade, Japan has faced increasingly aggressive cyber intrusions. The U.S. has endured the SolarWinds compromise, the Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, and, more recently, the Volt Typhoon campaign, which highlighted the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to sustained state-sponsored intrusion.

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In this interconnected space, the distinction between a national security threat and an economic threat becomes meaningless.

Our adversaries see cyberspace as a strategic battleground, but this presents the U.S. and Japan with an opportunity. By working together proactively and strategically, we can shape the digital domain to our advantage rather than responding from behind.

To date, U.S.–Japan cyber cooperation has often taken the form of information sharing and ad hoc coordination during major incidents. These efforts are valuable but insufficient. What is needed now is a shift from coordination to proper integration, mirroring the way our military forces plan, train, and operate together, while fully incorporating the capabilities and expertise of private industry, which owns and operates much of the critical infrastructure at risk.

This integration should include:

Joint Strategic Planning – A bilateral cyber strategy that aligns threat assessments, policy objectives, and operational priorities across government and private-sector stakeholders.

Interoperable Cyber Defense Capabilities – Shared frameworks for incident response, intelligence analysis, and crisis communication that function in both peacetime and conflict, with seamless links between public agencies and corporate security teams.

Coordinated Deterrence Messaging – Public and private-sector channels working in tandem to signal to adversaries the costs of targeting either nation's digital infrastructure.

Integrated Supply Chain Security – Joint vetting of critical technology suppliers and coordinated responses to supply chain compromises, leveraging the visibility and expertise of both governments and industry, building on existing Quad supply chain initiatives.

Without a shared playbook, even the best intentions can falter under the pressure of a fast-moving cyber crisis. Integration, anchored by strong public-private collaboration, ensures that when, not if, a significant cyber incident hits, our two nations respond as one.

Cyber strategy is not only a defensive concern; it is also a fundamental economic priority. The United States and Japan are both global economic powerhouses. The prosperity of both nations depends on secure financial systems, uninterrupted data flows, and resilient supply chains that support their dynamic economies.

In the coming decade, our economies will be increasingly defined by advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G and 6G networks, and next-generation semiconductors. These technologies are both the engines of growth and the primary targets for theft and sabotage.

Consider semiconductors: Japan remains a critical supplier of advanced manufacturing equipment and materials; the U.S. is investing heavily in domestic production. A cyberattack on fabrication plants, intellectual property repositories, or logistics networks could ripple across both economies, shutting down industries and undermining strategic competitiveness.

An integrated U.S.–Japan cyber partnership would treat these risks with the same gravity as maritime chokepoints or energy supply vulnerabilities.

The U.S. and Japan each bring unique and complementary cyber capabilities. The U.S. possesses unparalleled cyber operational capabilities, both offensive and defensive, along with a robust ecosystem of cybersecurity companies and research institutions. Japan brings world-class expertise in operational technology (OT) security and precision manufacturing security, areas increasingly critical as cyber-physical attacks become more sophisticated.

Cyber strategies succeed with deep integration of the private sector. In both nations, a majority of critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated. A new framework for public-private cyber collaboration should include:

Bilateral Information Sharing Mechanisms – Building on models like Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) and other information-sharing organizations between the U.S. and Japan, can facilitate cross-border sector-specific threat intelligence sharing.

Joint Cyber Range Facilities – Establish shared testing environments where government and private sector teams from both nations can simulate attacks and refine defenses together.

Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure – Harmonize responsible disclosure processes to ensure critical vulnerabilities are addressed quickly without creating windows of exposure.

The shortage of skilled cybersecurity professionals is a challenge in both the United States and Japan. Each country faces gaps in its cyber workforce, making it critical to consider adopting a joint approach to talent development. A bilateral strategy could include building joint fellowship exchange programs, fostering university partnerships, creating systems for mutual recognition of professional certifications, and introducing collaborative mid-career training opportunities.

Progress must be measured. Response coordination between partners should move from slow, manual processes to near real-time collaboration. Threat intelligence sharing must become largely automated, with indicators exchanged quickly enough to ensure operational soundness. Joint exercises should consistently demonstrate year-over-year gains in effectiveness, reflecting lessons learned and applied. Private sector engagement needs to expand significantly, drawing in a broad network of companies to strengthen resilience. At the same time, workforce development programs must scale to produce a new generation of cyber professionals equipped to meet emerging challenges.

Continuing to integrate cyber strategy into the alliance cannot stall. Simultaneous attacks on both nations remain possible. More insidious is the persistent erosion of economic competitiveness, the undermining of public trust in institutions, and the normalization of continuous low-level cyber aggression.

This gradual degradation is harder to rally against, but no less dangerous. Each day of delay allows adversaries to probe deeper, steal more intellectual property, and embed themselves further into our critical systems. The 2024 Volt Typhoon campaign, which pre-positioned nation-state actors in critical infrastructure for potential future disruption, demonstrates that our adversaries are not waiting for our policies to catch up.

The U.S.–Japan alliance has continuously evolved to meet the challenges of each era. In the Cold War, it focused on military deterrence. In the post–Cold War period, it embraced trade liberalization and economic integration. Today, as digital systems form the backbone of national strength and influence, cyber strategy must stand alongside defense, trade, and diplomacy as an essential element of our partnership.

The stakes are not just bilateral but global. As two of the most technologically advanced democracies, the U.S. and Japan have both the capacity and responsibility to lead in shaping a secure, open, and resilient cyberspace. Our combined expertise, spanning Silicon Valley innovation, Japanese precision engineering, U.S. cyber operations, and Japan’s drive toward a human-centered, digitally integrated society, positions us uniquely to set global standards.

To do less would be to leave the next generation with an alliance that is strong in legacy domains but vulnerable in the one that is defining the century.

The choice is clear: we must move beyond incremental cooperation and build a strategic U.S.–Japan cyber partnership worthy of the challenges ahead.

The digital future demands nothing less than complete integration of our cyber strategies, capabilities, and ambitions. Together, we can ensure that the Indo-Pacific's digital transformation strengthens democracy, prosperity, and security for decades to come.

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Ensuring Stability in the Indo-Pacific Region and Beyond

OPINION — The recent summit of President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung further solidified a special relationship. It’s a relationship that goes back to the Korean War, when in June 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea, mistakenly thinking the U.S. was not interested in defending South Korea from an attack from the North. North Korea’s leader, Kim il Sung, was wrong. The U.S. came to the defense of South Korea and after three years of bloody fighting, with tens of thousands of casualties, an armistice was signed in July 1953, halting the fighting – but the war continues.

Given this legacy, the Trump-Lee summit had several deliverables — tariffs, trade, investments — but what understandably got the most enthusiastic attention was the prospect of Mr. Trump reengaging with Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea. Frankly, reengaging with North Korea and getting Mr. Kim to realize that a normal relationship with the U.S. – and hopefully with South Korea – is in North Korea’s interest should be our goal. Indeed, it would provide North Korea with international legitimacy and access to international financial institutions, and economic assistance for economic development purposes. It would be the beginning of a new era for North Korea – and the Korean Peninsula.

No doubt, Mr. Kim must have been impressed with China’s September 3^rd victory day parade celebrating the 80^th anniversary of the end of World War II. Standing next to China’s President Xi Jinping as he and Russian President Vladimir Putin reviewed the military parade exhibiting China’s modernized military must have pleased Mr. Kim. The parade and the displayed comradery between Messrs Xi, Putin and Kim were on display for the world to see. The additional 26 world leaders all heard Mr. Xi’s veiled criticism of the U.S. and his pronouncement that the world faces a choice between “peace and war, or dialogue or confrontation.”

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Tianjin, China on August 31 that preceded the gala military parade in Beijing was another convenient venue for Mr. Xi, in the presence of Mr. Putin and India’s Narendra Modi and 20 world leaders, to prioritize the “Global South” – a clear veiled criticism of the U.S. and its tariff policies. Mr. Xi announced a $1.3 billion fund for the SCO development bank and a clear message: “We must continue to take a clear stand against hegemonism and power politics, and practice true multilateralism.”

The message from China from these two major events -- the SCO summit and military parade -- in one week was that China is a global power and Mr. Xi is an alternative global leader, for a new world order, with its own rules, independent from Western standards.

Unfortunately, the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska on August 15 was a failure. Despite the outreach from Mr. Trump, Mr. Putin continued to escalate the bombing of Ukraine, with continued civilian casualties. Mr. Putin then proceeded to China for the SCO Summit and the 80^th anniversary military parade in Beijing to meet and confer with Messrs Xi, Putin, Kim and Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian, members of the axis of authoritarian states.

Mr. Xi’s comments in Tianjin at the SCO summit and at the military parade in Beijing were clear: either a new world order that condones Russia’s invasion of a sovereign state, Ukraine, despite 1994 security assurances to Ukraine in the Budapest memorandum, or nations that continue to abide by the rule of law and respect for the sovereign rights of all countries. .

Mr. Kim’s father and grandfather wanted a normal relationship with the U.S., as did Mr. Kim, in his meetings with President Trump in Singapore in 2018 and Hanoi in 2019. The talks between our countries should resume soonest, knowing that North Korea’s future is with a normal relationship with the U.S. and South Korea. The details can and will be addressed.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Joseph Detrani was first published in The Washington Times.

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Israeli Strike in Doha Shakes Regional Order

EXPERT INTERVIEW – The military operation dubbed ‘Summit of Fire’ by Israel Defense Forces targeting a Hamas delegation meeting in Doha, Qatar this week has complicated an already fragile ecosystem in The Middle East as experts assess the broader regional impact.

The operation carried out on Tuesday, reportedly killed five members of the delegation which had gathered to discuss a U.S.-backed ceasefire proposal to end Israel’s war against Hamas, but early reports indicate that the operation failed to kill senior Hamas leaders.

“What we're going to see is funerals roll out over the next few days, and that's going to be our indicator as to the Hamas members who survived and those who did not,” Norm Roule, former U.S. National Intelligence Manager for Iran told The Cipher Brief in an exclusive interview.

Regardless of the success of Israel’s operation, experts are already assessing the broader impact of the strike – the first of its kind against a member country of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

THE CONTEXT

Hamas, which launched a deadly terrorist attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, has maintained a political office in Doha since 2012.
The U.S. ceasefire proposal includes the release of all 48 remaining hostages in exchange for a ceasefire, a release of potentially 2,500-3,000 Palestinian prisoners, and the end of the Israeli operation in Gaza.
Since the strike in Doha, Hamas says it will not change its terms for a deal, including its demand for a total Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and rebuking calls to disarm.
After the strike, President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that his administration was notified by the U.S. military that Israel would strike Hamas in Doha. He was critical of the unilateral attack on a key U.S. ally, saying it runs counter to peace efforts and “does not advance Israel or America’s goals.” But he described eliminating Hamas as a “worthy goal.” He said he assured the Qatari leadership that such an attack would not happen again and reiterated the need for a Gaza peace deal.
Israel ordered a full evacuation of Gaza City on Tuesday, signaling that it is moving forward with a new military offensive there.
As of last Thursday, Israel controlled 40% of Gaza City. The Israeli military says it occupies 75 percent of Gaza, while the UN says 87% is either deemed a militarized zone or is currently under evacuation orders.

THE INTERVIEW

The Cipher Brief spoke with Norm Roule, former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI - who travels regularly to the region for meetings with senior officials – about the most likely regional impact of Israel’s latest attack. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

Norman T. Roule

Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I)\n at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.

The Cipher Brief: An Israeli attack inside of Qatar is a risky endeavor at this point in Israel’s war against Hamas. There has been a lot of conversation about whether the U.S. had a knowledge of this attack in advance and how the White House has responded since.

Roule: Well, the White House has stated that the Israeli government did provide advanced notice. That language is very important because although the president of the United States did give a final warning to Hamas - and the president's final warnings tend to indeed have some finality to them based upon previous examples - it is almost certain that the United States would not have participated in the planning of an operation against Qatar, virtually certain. And indeed the Israeli government would not have wanted the United States to be involved in something like this. But the Israeli government would've wanted to tell the United States, "Look, this is happening. So if your forces do see incoming aircraft, this is not an adversary's aircraft coming in. They should not see this as an attack on themselves."

The White House has stated that advanced notice was given, and I believe the reports state that the president instructed notification to the Qataris so that they themselves would have been able to understand that this is not, say, the Iranians conducting a strike. And also to understand that this strike had a very limited purpose. It was not part of a broader campaign, and that they themselves should not take any broader action to escalate the conflict.

The Cipher Brief: What does this attack mean for the region? It creates a lot more complications in an already incredibly complicated war against Hamas.

Roule: I think it's important that we first consider some of the perspective about what this means in the region as a whole. Prior to the October 7th war, Israel's security doctrine was ‘we have a great intelligence service’. The superb military and allies will stand with us. But that didn't do much to stop the October 7th war.

Since that conflict, their doctrine has changed and we've seen in this latest attack, the latest chapter in that doctrine, which now is that ‘we have a superb intelligence organization and it will identify our adversaries who were out to kill us, and our military is going to get to them first-no matter where they are. And we will take out high value targets using precision military technology that is far beyond the capability of any of our adversaries. And this will be anywhere, wherever our adversaries may be’. This started out in Beirut and moved to Syria and then it turned to Iran with the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in 2024. And we've seen it recently in Sana'a. And now we've seen within the GCC itself. This is a brand new Middle East in this regard.

For the Middle East, as they look at Israel and some have asked whether Israel is a disruptive actor, I think that's the wrong characterization. But it is a correct characterization to say that Israel will not tolerate the presence of aggressive lethal actors plotting the death of Israelis anywhere in the region any longer. And indeed, just two days ago, the same actors that Israel attacked in Doha were meeting the Iranian foreign minister, I think in the same location where the Israelis attacked.

Qatar has always been a very special location in this regard because Qatar was sort of like a Switzerland, if you can use that example. For several years, people could meet there; the Taliban, Hamas, and various U.S. administrations tolerated this. Indeed, the Israelis sent their own personnel to meet Hamas interlocutors there, and these Hamas interlocutors had blood on their hands. Clearly, that has now come to an end.

So now the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is no friend of Hamas and has had its own issues with Qatar, will deliberate this issue. They will want to see how the dust settles. They will have a common position. They do not want this to escalate. But at the same time, they're looking at a region that is increasingly sensitive to this new Israeli posture.

The Cipher Brief: Doha responded robustly, condemning the attack. How do you think the U.S. should be influencing events moving forward?

Roule: The Qataris condemned the attack, unsurprisingly. This is a violation of their sovereignty. They've described this as a cowardly attack. They will certainly withdraw from playing a role as an interlocutor with the Israelis, that's unsurprising. This also means that the Qataris will call upon the GCC to stand with them in this position. And that's likely to happen.

They will ask the United States to restrain Israel from conducting similar attacks in the future and the United States will certainly do so. The United States does not wish to have a challenge, a problem of this nature with the Qataris for a number of reasons, ranging from our military relationship, to our security relationship, to our investment relationships with the Qataris. There are a variety of different reasons.

But the Qataris are going to want to maintain their domestic security, and they're not going to want to raise this as a broader problem.

At the end of the day, there's a reality that the Qataris have to deal with, too. Their commercial relationship with Iran through the South Pars Gas Field, that's not going go away. So their gas relationship is going to stay, but their engagement with Hamas, it's probably not going to be the same in the future - if only because most of the Hamas leadership is gone and the talks aren't going to continue.

I think in many ways, that the Trump administration's approach to the Middle East has been quite consistent and quite clear. They seek to ensure that there is no conventional war in the Middle East that involves U.S. forces. And that includes a conventional war in the Middle East that is instigated by Israel, and they've stuck to that. They will, however, participate in military action if Iran moves towards nuclear weaponization or militaries or terrorist attacks against the United States. And we saw that in June, but again, they ended that conflict rather crisply.

They will also pursue diplomatic activity robustly speaking with almost anyone – including Hamas - even if Israel is unhappy about it. They will speak with Iran, even if Israel's unhappy about it. But these have to be genuine talks. And if the Trump administration believes that their time is being wasted, as the president has repeatedly stated, then hell will be paid. And he's been quite clear on that. He will also provide military capacity to regional partners to conduct their own defense or regional offensive activities to achieve what they believe is necessary for their protection. And that could be regional actors conducting their own work against Iranian proxies, but also Israeli activities to conduct what it sees as its own work.

I think you might see the United States in essence, say to the region, ‘over to you to handle your own work, your own issues, because it's your problems to sort out increasingly’. As long as it doesn't create a disruptive conflict that ignites the region, as a whole.

The Cipher Brief: A solution to the Gaza conflict really does seem distant. We've talked now for a couple of years about what does the end state look like for Israel and it doesn't feel like we're any closer to an answer. What are the elements you’ll be looking for to indicate that a solution is on the horizon?

Roule: Well, here's another element where I've got to praise the Trump administration for a very consistent Middle Eastern policy. Again, whatever one's political views are, I can't think of another political administration in modern times that has devoted so much time and energy to the Middle East since its first moments in office. And we have seen even recently with the visit of former prime minister, Tony Blair and former special Middle East envoy, Jared Kushner to the White House, that even now, you see layers within layers within layers of activity and engagement and diplomatic engagement to try and come up with solutions that are outside of the limelight of what is a very contentious and very well-trodden diplomatic path. I do believe that we can see how this chaos will end. I don't know whether it will end in the near term or if we will ever get there, but you can see some elements of what the region is looking for.

So first, we will see some sort of humanitarian solution to provide the long-suffering Palestinians of Gaza with the food, education and medical care that they so desperately need to resolve what is rightfully a stain on our generation. And this is an enormous challenge because we now have some years of a population that have been denied these capacities, which has transformed the nature of this society. And I don't think we yet understand what this means as to who they will become.

What does it mean when you have teenagers who have not been to school for three or four years, who have not had education, internet, medical care, and have watched the world around them go in this direction? Who do they become in three to five years if they immigrate to other countries? Who are these people?

And I think we're going to see some solution involving the Gulf States and involving Gulf funding. And you're going to see Saudi Arabia and the Emirates in particular, provide education reform for the Palestinian authority or its successor. A reform of the engagement of the government, of the Palestinian entity with these people and its population so payments are made that don't support militancy and that human reform in terms of hiring is done that doesn't promote militancy.

And last, you're going to see some sort of capacity against corruption. Because that has, in essence, undermined the effectiveness of the Palestinian authority. You've got some problems here. You've got the issue of what do you do about the Palestinian authority, which was only supposed to be around for a few months and is led by someone who is terribly unpopular and doesn't seem to want to leave?

How is he handled in that political construct in the future? That issue will have to be resolved. You'll have some replacement entity created, perhaps involving the Palestinian authority or a successor. would think if I were creating this as an Arab-European construct with American leadership, you would want to have this supported by Israel, but not as an Israeli idea, but not blocked as an Israeli idea.

You're going to have to have something done to handle problem of settlers and the West Bank issue so that a viable political entity is at least a construct in people's heads. But in the short term, the idea of a Palestinian state is something that is very popular to talk about by people who, in essence, have the time to talk about it at coffee shops and in think tanks. But don't have to say, "Well, how do you do this on the ground in a Gaza or in a West Bank without, in essence, creating the same mess we have today?" That is years from happening.

So I think creating a state-like structure and then building towards a state at some point in the future where the adults on the ground are going to say, "We'll let the political actors or the people with time in their hands yak about a state, but we just want to get things working so that we can feed people and give them a life and then build toward that state." I think what I've just talked about in this messy way, those elements are all going to appear. But we're not there yet because the violence of Gaza remains a process. And the Israeli government is committed to a military solution. It doesn't seem to have an end game yet for what it sees in Gaza. Hamas appears to be moving hostages into Gaza City itself because it sees that as a way of putting more pressure on the Israeli government. So, we are still in this crucible of blood and violence for the near term, unhappily.

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A Profound Loss: How Veteran Suicide Touches Us All

The Hidden Costs We All Share

Kristin Wood and Sarah Kneller are Co-Founders of August Interactive. They have spent much of the last two years speaking with the military and veteran community about the ongoing suicide epidemic.

OPINION — 10 September is World Suicide Prevention Day.

While all loss of life is tragic, we particularly want to draw attention to something not widely known outside of military circles: some 140,000 veterans have died by suicide since 2001, and suicide rates also have significantly increased in the active-duty population over the same period.

Each one leaves behind not just a grieving family, but a community forever altered. It's the kind of loss that cannot be contained. It reaches across dinner tables, classrooms, workplaces, and communities—sometimes without us even realizing it.

If you think this crisis doesn’t affect you—think again.

Every veteran and military service member is a thread in the tapestry of our society. When that thread is lost, the fabric weakens. The impact is more than emotional; it’s deeply practical and economic. Their absence means fewer experienced mentors in our workplaces, fewer volunteers in our neighborhoods, and fewer leaders in our communities. The loss of each veteran is also a loss to our economy—potential contributions, innovations, and wisdom that will never be realized.

Authors’ Note: Discussing the economic impact of veteran suicide is undeniably delicate—no number can ever reflect the true cost of a human life or the pain felt by loved ones left behind. Our intention is not to reduce this tragedy to dollars and cents, but to shed light on just how deeply these losses affect all of us, especially for those who may feel far removed from military life. By bringing this conversation into focus, we hope to inspire greater understanding, compassion, and action—because veteran mental health is a concern for every community, not just those in uniform.

The Ripple Effects—Seen and Unseen

The People We Lean On

Veterans and military service members often become the coaches, small business owners, first responders, and volunteers who make our communities strong. When we lose them, we all lose.

-When Vietnam veteran Harold Johnson passed away, hundreds in his neighborhood attended a memorial walk he started years earlier to support local charities. Former students, neighbors, and fellow veterans shared stories of how Harold’s mentorship and volunteerism shaped their lives. The event became an annual tradition, preserving his influence on the community.

Invisible Wounds, Visible Consequences

Each suicide sends ripples through families, units, and neighborhoods. Research tells us that every loss directly touches more than 100 people—friends, coworkers, neighbors—who carry the weight of grief, and sometimes, renewed risk.

-Retired Army sergeant Justin Anderson started offering free car snow plow services. His efforts strengthened trust and support among local residents, who later rallied to support him during his own health challenges. The story underscores the deep connections veterans can foster in their communities.

The Burden Carried by Families

Spouses, parents, and children often become caregivers long before a loss occurs, sometimes sacrificing their own dreams and financial security. When the worst happens, communities step in to help, but the support is rarely enough to fill the space left behind.

-Stacey Hawley, a 2024 Dole Caregiver Fellow, became the full-time caregiver for her son, a wounded veteran, and saw her savings dwindle to the point that she had to donate plasma to make ends meet. Her experience exemplifies the immense financial and emotional sacrifices made by more than 14 million military and veteran caregivers in the U.S., many of whom face poverty, food insecurity, and mental health challenges as they support their loved ones.

Diminished Voices in Our Democracy

Veterans vote, volunteer, and run for office at higher rates than most Americans. Their loss means quieter communities, with fewer voices willing to bridge divides or step up in times of need.

-A recent study by the Center for Effective Lawmaking suggests that veterans often foster unity and bipartisanship, bridging political divides and facilitating constructive dialogue on critical issues.

The Economic Impact Is Closer Than You Think

We can never put a true price on human life. Full stop. But thinking about the economic consequences for all of us show that they reach far beyond what we might initially see:

●Lost Productivity and Innovation: Each veteran or military member lost represents $1.4 to $2.1 million in potential economic contribution. Across 140,000 lives, this is nearly $200 billion in lost value—resources that would have supported families, started businesses, and built stronger communities.

●Healthcare and Social Costs: The costs of crisis care, medical treatment, and survivor support add up quickly—and are often borne by our shared healthcare and social service systems.

●Fewer Volunteers and Community Builders: Veterans give 25% more volunteer time than non-veterans. Their absence means millions of hours of community service and leadership never realized.

Why This Matters to All of Us

Military and veteran suicide are not just military issues or private tragedies—they are losses that quietly reshapes the communities we all share. When a veteran is lost, we lose a neighbor who might have coached Little League, a mentor who could have inspired a young entrepreneur, or a friend who would have stepped up in a crisis. We lose the unique perspectives and leadership that come from service and sacrifice.

This is why prevention matters—not just for those who served, but for all of us. Investing in mental health support, community connection, and honoring our national promise to veterans strengthens the very foundation of our society.

Moving Forward—Together

The numbers are sobering, but they only hint at the true cost. The empty seat at a community dinner, the missing voice in civic life, the innovation never born—these are losses we all feel, even if we never know the name or the story.

We all have a role to play. Reach out. Listen. Advocate for strong support systems. When we support veterans and their families, we are not only honoring their service—we are investing in the strength and resilience of our own communities.

Veteran suicide is a national crisis, but it is also deeply personal. It touches us all, whether we realize it or not.

And together, we can make a difference.

Statistics in this document are based on research and estimates from the CDC, Department of Veterans Affairs, and academic studies. While we strive for accuracy, the true human impact extends far beyond what any analysis can capture.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

A Test of Limits: Posse Comitatus and the National Guard

OPINION — “At the June 7, [2025] briefing, [Army North's Contingency Command Post Deputy Chief of Staff] Mr. [William] Harrington stated -- based on his experience and training within the Department of Defense -- ‘if any National Guard troops were federalized as part of the deployment [to Los Angeles], they would lose the ability to conduct law enforcement activities because of the Posse Comitatus Act.’…Among other instructions, Task Force 51[the California National Guard contingent of] troops were told that they could not impede vehicle or pedestrian traffic or block public roads, because these are law enforcement functions.”

That is an excerpt from the 52-page opinion of United States District Judge Charles R. Breyer in a case brought by California Governor Gavin Newsom, who objected to the Trump administration’s federalization of elements of his state’s National Guard. The opinion directly affected only 300 California National Guard troops remaining on duty, from the 4,000 originally called up.

On Wednesday, the Trump administration filed a notice to appeal the decision with the 9th U.S. Court of Appeals.

But Breyer’s opinion could have a nationwide impact if it survives appeals. That is because Trump’s original memorandum that called the California National Guard into federal service never specifically mentioned Los Angeles or California. To the contrary, as Breyer himself pointed out, “it instructed the Secretary of Defense ‘to coordinate with the Governors of the States and the National Guard Bureau in identifying and ordering into Federal service the appropriate members and units of the National Guard.’”

President Trump in the past has threatened to call up National Guard troops in Illinois, Maryland and other states with high crime rates and Democratic governors, but after Breyer’s opinion, Trump may be hesitating.

On Wednesday, during a meeting with Polish President Karol Nawrocki, Trump said, “Do we go to Chicago? Do we go to a place like New Orleans, where we have a great [Republican] governor, Jeff Landry, who wants us to come in and straighten out a very nice section of this country that’s become quite, you know, quite tough, quite bad.”

I will discuss below another legal issue involved in the case, but first I want to look at the Posse Comitatus violations mentioned above.

According to Breyer’s opinion, “Major General Scott Sherman, the deputy commanding general support for U.S. Army North and commander of Task Force 51, oversaw the training of Task Force 51. He testified [during Breyer’s court hearing] that his number two priority (after troops’ welfare and safety) was ‘to ensure that they followed the standing rules on the use of force exactly as was written.’ Accordingly, he ensured that Task Force 51 troops knew that ‘they weren’t allowed to do any law enforcement actions. Law enforcement had to do it themselves.’”

The Task Force 51 training slide shown Task Force 51 troops specified 12 law enforcement functions prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act but, according to Breyer’s presentation of the facts, the troops “were orally instructed that the four functions listed in red—security patrols, traffic control, crowd control, and riot control—were subject to a so-called constitutional exception to the Posse Comitatus Act.”

This latter oral instruction, Breyer wrote, came “all the way from the top of [the Department of Defense] down to Task Force 51,” according to court testimony.

Although the latter instruction was initially not put in writing, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth did so in a memorandum issued June 23, [2025] that explained the scope of the alleged constitutional exception to the Posse Comitatus Act.

Hegseth’s memorandum directed that “Task Force 51…may take reasonable measures to prevent the destruction or defacement of Federal Government property including crowd control, temporary detention, cursory search (such as safety-related searches for weapons incident to temporary detention), measures to ensure the safety of persons on the property, and the establishment of security perimeters reasonably necessary to protect the property,” according to Breyer’s opinion.

Breyer also wrote that the June 23, Hegseth memo, in a second bullet point, asserted “that wherever federal personnel go, Task Force 51 troops can accompany them and establish perimeter control, engage in crowd control, and otherwise perform any functions ‘necessary to ensure the execution of Federal functions and the safety of Federal personnel.’”

The June 23 memo reminded me that this was not the first time I had heard that Hegseth appeared to tell troops they did not have to follow legal advice.

During a November 2024 interview with podcaster Shawn Ryan, Hegseth described that when he was an Army officer in Iraq in 2005, his platoon got a briefing from a military lawyer in Baghdad on the rules of engagement. Hegseth said the lawyer told him and his troops that they could not shoot someone carrying a rocket-propelled grenade unless it was pointed at them.

Hegseth then told Ryan, “I remember walking out of that briefing, pulling my platoon together and being like, ‘Guys, we’re not doing that. You know, like if you see an enemy…engage before he’s able to point his weapon at you and shoot, we’re going to have your back.’”

Breyer’s opinion also listed times when he believed the California Guard violated Posse Comitatus saying, “The record is replete with evidence that Task Force 51 executed domestic law in these prohibited ways. Task Force 51 set up traffic blockades on roads at a residential enforcement operation in Long Beach, as part of Operation Excalibur at MacArthur Park.”

Breyer said, “Operation Excalibur involved federal law enforcement officials marching across MacArthur Park while Task Force 51 remained stationed on the outside of the park in military vehicles—Humvees and tactical vehicles—including at two traffic control points to prevent vehicular traffic along a stretch of Wilshire Boulevard.”

Breyer also pointed out, “Despite the risk associated with Operation Excalibur and the numerous rehearsals, DHS [the Department of Homeland Security which ran Operation Excalibur] planned to give LAPD [Los Angeles Police Department] only two hours’ notice of the operation.” Breyer said that illustrated Trump administration officials “lack of cooperation with their state and local counterparts [which] raises red flags,” and highlighted “the lack of any showing by Defendants [Trump officials] that state and local officials were unable or unwilling to execute the laws.”

Beyond the factual violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, according to Breyer’s opinion, Trump officials argued that same Act, which authorizes the federalization of National Guard units could be applied “whenever… the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.”

I should note here that the police power is the quintessential power that the Constitution reserves to the states. Local and state police are among the “regular forces to execute the laws” referred to above.

However, the Trump officials’ lawyers argued, “The [Posse Comitatus] Act does not even apply to the federalized National Guard,” because the Constitution’s so-called “Take Care” clause under Article II, Section 3 states, "he [the President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."

Breyer, in his opinion, pointed out, “the Court [Breyer] is unaware of any person—government lawyer, military or civilian official, court, or commentator—who has made this argument other than Defendants’ [Trump officials’] lawyers in this case.”

Breyer added that such an interpretation “would represent a marked shift in the balance of power between the Executive and the Legislature,” adding it “would create a loophole in the Posse Comitatus Act that would swallow the entire Act…[and] would place no meaningful guardrails on the federalization and use of National Guard troops.”

“If the President wants to avoid the Act’s restrictions,” Breyer said, “he must invoke a valid exception…along with its requisite showing that state and local law enforcement are unable or unwilling to act.”

In concluding his opinion, Breyer wrote that Trump officials “are not required to withdraw the 300 National Guard troops currently stationed in Los Angeles, nor are they barred from using troops consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act…Thus, for example, federal troops can continue to protect federal property in a manner consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act.”

But Breyer ordered that the remaining Guard troops could not engage in “arrests, apprehensions, searches, seizures, security patrols, traffic control, crowd control, riot control, evidence collection, interrogation, or acting as informants, unless and until Defendants satisfy the requirements of a valid constitutional or statutory exception, as defined herein, to the Posse Comitatus Act.”

As noted above, Trump officials have appealed Breyer’s opinion to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. On Thursday, a 9th Circuit three-judge panel froze the situation until it could have a court session and hear arguments in greater detail.

This appears to be another situation – here the President’s use of federalized National Guard troops -- where a Trump attempt to expand Presidential power may be headed to the Supreme Court.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

A Dangerous Precedent: What Happens If Military Lawyers Go Silent

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – When the U.S. launched a military attack against a speed boat traveling in international waters between Venezuela and Trinidad-Tobago, President Trump told reporters that the operation happened "over the last few minutes, (we) literally shot out a boat, a drug-carrying boat, a lot of drugs in that boat." While few may mourn the alleged 11 narco-traffickers who perished in the attack, all Americans should be concerned about how our military is being cut loose from its legal moorings by what appears to be the abandonment of the rule of law from the very top of our national chain of command.

What is equally – and perhaps even more troubling – is how an order to employ U.S. military power - arguably beyond the bounds of international and domestic law – made its way down a chain of command staffed with military commanders and legal advisors who are obligated to comply with these laws.

There is nothing surprising about a military operation generating significant legal and policy criticism. Critiquing such operations has, since September 11th, become a veritable cottage industry. What is however, surprising is the near-uniform consensus among former military legal experts that this operation violated both international and domestic law, a critique exemplified by retired JAGC Commander Mark Nevitt’s excellent commentary.

This was a lethal strike conducted outside the context of an ongoing armed conflict (distinguishing it from attacks like those directed against high-level al Qaeda or ISIS operatives) and without the justification derived from the exercise of self-defense in response to an imminent unlawful armed attack against the United States (or any other nation). And, as Nevitt notes, this attack deviated from decades of operational practice employed in response to such narco-trafficker activity (seize, detain, and prosecute).

Those supporting the administration will inevitably say that this legal handwringing misses the point; that these were ‘bad’ people who deserved the fate that befell them. But it is the failure to acknowledge the abandonment of the rule of law that really misses the point. More fundamentally, it is deeply concerning that military legal advisors at every level of the chain of command may have provided the proverbial green light for this attack, and perhaps even more concerning if they were cut out of the decision-making process (concerns exacerbated by Section 7 of the recently promulgated Executive Order 14215).

Military lawyers are integrated into the chain of command for the vital purpose of ensuring that the leverage of U.S. military power complies with international and domestic legal obligations. As commissioned officers, they bear a singular loyalty to the Constitution. And as members of the bar, they bear an ethical obligation to "exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice" on behalf of their client – the institution – not any particular commander.

Some may interpret that these obligations mean obedience to the orders of the President is absolute. This is mistaken. While such orders carry a powerful presumption of legality, loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law it represents trumps personal loyalty to the President or any individual within the chain of command.

When an order from any commander (even the President) is assessed as clearly unlawful, the military lawyer’s duty is clear: advise his or her commander to disobey, and if that advice is ignored, elevate the issue to the military or civilian lawyers at higher command levels.

Of course, when the order emanates from the President, there is no higher command, but there remains a continuing constitutional obligation that transcends the chain of command. While highly unusual and perhaps a chilling scenario, the lawyer – even one in uniform - has the legal, ethical, and constitutional obligation to advise commanders of the obligation to refuse to obey any order assessed as clearly violating domestic or binding international law, and the consequences of failing to do so.

The lawyer’s ethical obligation is completely aligned with this constitutional loyalty. While it may seem that a command legal advisor’s client is the commander, it is not. Instead, it is the ‘command’, then the military service, and ultimately, the nation that the lawyer represents. A commander is presumed to represent those entities, but the command lawyer does not owe a duty of loyalty and zealousness to the commander per se, but only as such a representative.

When the commander commits to a course of action inconsistent with the interests of the organization and the nation, the lawyer’s duty is clear: prioritize the latter. In more concrete terms, this means that a command legal advisor must object to any command decision inconsistent with binding legal obligations.

This points to the most troubling aspect of this recent attack: what happened to what is supposed to be ‘principled counsel’ (a term coined by the former Army Judge Advocate General to define the essential function of the military lawyer) at every level of command? Were there legal objections? And if there were, what happened in response? Were dissenting opinions ignored? Marginalized? Or perhaps even sanctioned?

These are questions every American should be asking. Why? Because if ‘principled counsel’ is steamrolled in this new Department of War, what will constrain the future abuse of military power?

Whether bolstering border security, backing up ICE agents, patrolling city streets, augmenting immigration courts, and now interdicting drugs with lethal force, it is increasingly apparent that this President sees the military as his favorite hammer, and every problem starts to look like a nail. That alone is reason for concern. When that tool can be employed with little to no regard for the law, there is really no telling where this road will take us.

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The Golden Dome Gamble: Space-Based Defense and the Future of Deterrence

CIPHER BRIEF REPORTING – The missile threat against the U.S. has quietly and significantly grown over the past four decades as U.S. adversaries have added more sophisticated missiles to their arsenals, investing in both the scope of their systems as well as their ability to reach the U.S. homeland, according to experts.

As one of his very first actions in office, President Trump issued an executive order to address it, calling it the Iron Dome for America. And while some experts believe the name itself is “unfortunate” because it creates unrealistic expectations of what the system can actually do, it also represents what many believe to be a “necessary and long overdue shift in thinking and policy to begin to better address” the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland.

The name itself, the Golden Dome, is meant to echo Israel’s battlefield-proven Iron Dome, the short-range rocket defense system that has proven incredibly effective at saving Israeli lives. Yet while Iron Dome protects a sliver of territory with ground-launched interceptors, Golden Dome is pitched as something far more audacious: a planetary shield in orbit, capable of destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from Russia or China, intercepting hypersonic glide vehicles, and blunting Iran’s growing arsenal.

The scale alone is staggering. Washington has signed off on $175 billion, most of which will flow to defense giants Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), and L3Harris, to design the satellites, interceptors, and ground systems. Billions more are headed to the U.S. Space Force and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which will be tasked with weaving the pieces into a functioning shield. The effort is less like Iron Dome and more like the Apollo program—a bet that space-based interceptors can alter the nuclear balance of power.

Since July, when President Trump unveiled the plan and appointed U.S. Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein to lead it, Golden Dome has begun to take shape. Early budget outlines, hints of which defense firms are poised to win contracts, and debates among scientists and strategists all point to the same conclusion: the United States is embarking on one of the most ambitious defense projects in modern history and as with ambitious endeavors, this one is not without risk.

What’s New: Price Tag, Commander, and a Sprint Schedule

At the May 20 White House launch, Trump vowed that Golden Dome would be operational before his term ends—a three-year sprint to bolt revolutionary technology onto legacy missile defenses. He also named states like Alaska, Florida, Georgia, and Indiana as benefitting from the program, indicating that the way it’s being implemented could be politically strategic as well.

These are not random mentions: Alaska hosts vital long-range radars, Florida provides launch ranges, Georgia is home to contractor and military facilities, and Indiana is a hub for advanced aerospace and defense manufacturing. In short, the rollout carries as much weight for domestic politics and jobs as it does for national defense.

The program itself relies on space-based interceptors (SBIs) and missile-tracking satellites linked to existing ground and sea defenses. An early sign of the complications associated with the program came from The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which promptly warned that the actual cost could exceed $540 billion over the next two decades.

Over the summer, the outlines have grown sharper: $40 billion for the Space Force, including $24.4 billion specifically for Golden Dome. Nearly $9.2 billion is allocated for tracking satellites, $5.6 billion for orbiting interceptors, and approximately $1 billion for integration and testing. Congress added another $25 billion through the fast-track “One Big Beautiful Bill Act.” The shortcut could accelerate prototypes—but with less oversight, which is not an unfamiliar gamble for big-ticket defense programs.

How It Would Work

Despite its evocative name, the Golden Dome is not a physical shield arching over pockets of the United States. It is a layered missile-defense architecture stitched together by artificial intelligence and rooted in a mix of space and ground systems. Here’s how the architecture is designed to function:

Spot and track: Satellites equipped with infrared sensors detect missile launches the moment engines ignite and then track their trajectories.

Boost-phase intercept (BPI): New space-based interceptors (SBIs) would attempt to destroy missiles in the first minutes after launch, before they can release decoys or split into multiple warheads.

Midcourse and terminal defenses: If anything gets through, existing systems fire. The Navy’s Aegis system launches Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) interceptors from ships at sea, while the Army relies on Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries and Patriot missiles closer to the ground.

The brain: A central hub known as Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) fuses satellite, radar, and electronic intelligence data, then assigns the best shooter to make a split-second kill decision.

In simpler terms, the system would begin by using satellites equipped with infrared sensors to detect launches and track missiles. Those satellites would feed data to interceptors in orbit, designed to strike in the “boost phase”— the brief moments right after a missile takes off, before it can release decoys or multiple warheads. If a missile makes it past that first layer, existing defenses would kick in: the Navy’s Aegis system with SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors, the Army’s THAAD batteries, and Patriots closer to the ground. A central command system would fuse data from satellites, radars, and electronic intelligence to make split-second engagement decisions.

"I think the real technical challenge will be building of the space-based interceptor,” said Space Force General Michael Guetlein shortly after being confirmed as head of the Golden Dome Program. “That technology exists, I believe. I believe we have proven every element of the physics [to the point] that we can make it work. What we have not proven is, first, can I do it economically, and then second, can I do it at scale? Can I build enough satellites to get after the threat? Can I expand the industrial base fast enough to build those satellites? Do I have enough raw materials, et cetera?"

Feasible but Costly

Experts agree that the most complex and most ambitious piece is the boost-phase intercept. Dr. Patrick Binning, a space-systems expert at Johns Hopkins, calls it the “holy grail” of missile defense. Taking out a missile right after launch gives the U.S. its best chance of success. But the hurdles are enormous: maintaining global satellite coverage, striking within seconds, and defending the system itself from cyberattacks, jamming, or anti-satellite weapons.

Binning calls the idea “quite feasible, but also likely quite costly.”

“Designing, developing, and deploying the space-based interceptors are the key technical risk,” he tells The Cipher Brief. In other words, the concept is sound, but building the hardware will be the real test.

Peter Garretson, Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council, argues that the technology is no longer science fiction.

“Completely feasible,” he tells The Cipher Brief, citing decades of progress: successful missile intercepts in space, proven battle-management systems like Aegis, miniaturized computing power, and advances in artificial intelligence. In his view, the building blocks for a space-heavy defense are finally in place.

The White House aims to have the Golden Dome operational within just three years. Binning, however, is blunt.

“Full operational capability in three years? Never going to happen,” he observes.

At best, he predicts, “the Golden Dome could conduct a sophisticated intercept test against an intercontinental ballistic missile test target using a newly orbiting space-based interceptor.”

Yet, turning a demonstration shot into a reliable shield will take far longer. But Garretson sees political risk in missing the target.

“Golden Dome must achieve both successful testing and initial deployments before the 2028 election,” he says. If that happens, “no political party will remove a missile shield from the U.S. public.”

But he warns that bureaucratic turf wars inside the Pentagon could be as dangerous as engineering setbacks.

Even if the politics align, the physics remain punishing. Building a shield in the sky is not just about winning budgets or inter-service battles—it’s about scale. Seeing everything—and firing first—requires massive constellations of satellites and interceptors. That scale creates two problems: launch bottlenecks and space debris.

Strategic Effects—And a Dual-Use Case

Golden Dome is meant to complicate the war plans of China and Russia while reducing leverage from Iran and North Korea. Garretson argues it could force adversaries to rethink their arsenals.

“It will cause their current force structure to be a wasting asset and cast doubt on their current investments,” he said. “They will be forced to massively overbuild to compensate and for their war plans to have similar confidence.” In time, he suggests, the pressure could open doors to new arms-control talks—just as President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) pushed the Soviet Union to the table.

Beyond deterrence and diplomacy, advocates see the Golden Dome serving another role: safeguarding the United States’ own presence in space. The conversation isn’t only about missile defense. Proponents argue that the Golden Dome could also guard the satellites that anchor U.S. power in space.

“The space-based interceptors will have a dual-use capability to also protect our critical space systems from anti-satellite interceptors being developed by our competitor nations,” Binning asserts.

In other words, Golden Dome might not only shield against nuclear attack—it could also defend the satellites that underpin U.S. communications, navigation, and intelligence.

Politics and Procurement

The administration has built political durability into the Golden Dome by spreading contracts across multiple states. Congress’s $25 billion “accelerator” allows the Pentagon to bypass some oversight in the name of speed. However, credibility will depend on rigorous testing—multiple simultaneous launches, decoys, and heavy jamming.

Garretson argues that management will matter as much as technology.

“Centralized leadership reporting directly to the President, with broad independence and exceptions from normal oversight,” will be needed, said Garretson. “Focus on sprints to incremental testing… Deploy in tranches and continuously upgrade… Focus on building and testing, not on studies and requirements documents.”

The core question isn’t whether Golden Dome can stop every missile. It is whether it can change how rivals think. A reliable boost-phase layer could force Beijing and Moscow to adjust their nuclear strategies. However, a fragile or easily compromised system could invite a preemptive attack.

For now, Washington hasn’t built a shield in space—it has placed a bet. The coming months will reveal whether defense contractors can turn promises into hardware, whether early tests prove the concept, and whether Congress will continue to write checks for a program on par with Apollo in terms of cost and ambition.

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Cutting Cyber Intelligence Undermines National Security

OPINION — America’s cyber intelligence capabilities are being eviscerated while the threats to national security emanating from cyber space are increasing. The latest cuts to the cyber capabilities within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) further undermine America’s ability to protect itself against the adversaries that use cyberspace to put American’s security at risk.

Russia, China, and Iran are targeting the United States through cyber means, attacking communications, energy, transportation, and water systems — putting the ability of Americans to access critical services at risk, not to mention raising questions about the Pentagon’s ability to quickly mobilize and transport military forces. And yet, since January, the executive branch has gutted critical defensive cyber and counter malign influence operations efforts across the government.

ODNI assets are now on the chopping block, with a plan to slash the intelligence processing and information sharing services that enable critical cyber capabilities and resiliency across public and private sectors. Last week, as part of an “ODNI 2.0” plan to “eliminate redundant missions, functions and personnel” Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard announced a downsizing of her staff by more than 40 percent by this October, including the termination of entire offices that are critical for coordination of cybersecurity intelligence.

Created after the September 11, 2001, attacks revealed what happens when intelligence is siloed across disparate agencies, ODNI is supposed to serve as the critical hub for coordination across the many agencies of the intelligence community, synthesizing and enriching the information. While the totality of ODNI 2.0 purports to save Americans $700 million annually, in the cyber realm, it threatens to send the nation back to pre-9/11 dysfunction.

The Cyber Initiatives Group Fall Summit on Wednesday, September 17 from 12p – 3p is convening experts to engage on the most pressing cybersecurity risks. Save your virtual seat now.

Specifically, the plan eliminates the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC). In addition to collating America’s exquisite intelligence, CTIIC ensures all intelligence bodies and civilian federal agencies had access to commercial threat intelligence. Rather than each federal agency separately purchasing commercial information, CTIIC’s Sentinel Horizon program negotiated a single contract, efficiently and cost-effectively ensuring all federal agencies had access to timely threat information and analysis.

CTIIC also disseminates government cyber intelligence to the private sector, which owns and operates the vast majority of U.S. critical infrastructure. CTIIC serves as the “focal integration point” between federal cyber intelligence and industry partners who are defending America’s most critical systems against nation-state threats — connecting and disseminating information in real time not only across federal agencies but also to the private sector.

Through its CI3 initiative, for example, the CTIIC brought together the intelligence community and other government threat experts to provide actionable, classified cyber threat intelligence briefings to critical infrastructure owners and operators. Occurring monthly, these briefings were providers’ lifeline to federally monitored cyber threat information, enhancing situational awareness and increasing collaboration between on-the-ground providers and the intelligence community. The initiative’s goal is to take “all the great information we have in the IC [intelligence community] and get it out to those people who need it on a day-to-day basis,” says Lauren Goldman, CTIIC’s former head of analysis and analytic integration, who left the agency earlier this year.

At the very least, these programs will be scaled back if not terminated with the impending closure of CTIIC. The center was already operating with reduced expertise with the departure of three of its most senior leaders earlier this year.

Five years ago, even before these latest successes in building public-private intelligence sharing, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission recognized the important role CTIIC plays in ensuring the government understands cyber threats and “providing analysis and coordination necessary for rapid and accurate attribution.” The congressionally mandated commission called on Congress to codify CTIIC in law and appropriate more funding to support its efforts. While doing the latter, Congress failed to codify the center, meaning lawmakers have fewer avenues to adjust Gabbard’s plan.

Gabbard is also closing the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC). While CTIIC focuses on cyber-specific intelligence integration, FMIC synthesizes intelligence related to both cyber and non-cyber efforts by foreign actors to influence the perspectives of the American public. FMIC played a critical role in uncovering online influence operations against the United States from Iranian, Russian, and Chinese threats throughout the 2024 election cycle. It worked with the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to release regular public updates debunking malign content circulated by adversaries. The director falsely equates FMIC’s work with censorship of American citizens. Instead, cuts to the center will reduce Washington’s ability to protect American citizens from the state-sponsored influence operations running rampant on the internet.

The ODNI was created to integrate and make sense of the massive amounts of threat information gathered by the U.S. intelligence community. There is no doubt value in some of the “ODNI 2.0” effort, but gutting the national cyber threat and foreign malign influence integration efforts is not where the savings should be harvested. America’s nation-state adversaries are moving into these mission areas; our intelligence community should not be moving out.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

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The Math of Moscow’s War: Five Thousand Kilometers, One Million Dead and Wounded

OPINION -- “Since January 2024, Russian forces have seized approximately 5,000 square kilometers [1,931 square miles] of additional Ukrainian territory, less than one percent of the country. In certain areas, such as Kharkiv, Russia’s rate of advance is as little as 50 meters [55 yards] per day on average. These incremental gains have come at the cost of heavy losses. This quarter [April 1, 2025-to-June 30, 2025], Russian casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war likely surpassed one million, including approximately 250,000 killed and 750,000 wounded, missing, or captured. Russian fatalities during three years of war against Ukraine are 15 times greater than those experienced during the Soviet Union’s decade-long war in Afghanistan.”

That is an excerpt from the 120-page Special Inspector General for Operation Atlantic Resolve Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, required by a provision in the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.

Released publicly August 12, 2025, the report [seventh in the series] summarized U.S. Government support to Ukraine and the broader response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, including support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), support for NATO partners, and U.S. military, diplomatic, and humanitarian activity.

I found the report, done jointly by the acting-Inspectors General of the Defense Department (DoD), State Department (DoS) and Agency for International Development (AID) – which is now part of DoS, contained interesting facts and analyses about U.S., Ukrainian, Russian and NATO country activities that I had not read elsewhere.

For example, according to the report, “The conflict continued to be characterized by exchanges of artillery and UAS (unmanned aircraft systems) strikes. Since last quarter, Russia’s artillery fire rate increased from approximately 23,000 rounds per day to between 27,000 and 28,000 rounds per day. Russia increased its expenditure of one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in one of its priority areas from 7,000 in April to 10,000 in May. The DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) said that, extrapolating from this one area, it is possible that Russia is expending up to 72,000 tactical UAVs per month in roughly nine main operational areas.”

On the front lines, the report said, a “novel Russian tactic is using UAVs to deliver grenades filled with riot control agents, such as CS gas and Chloropicirin [a tear gas]…Russia deploys these UAVs to clear UAF (Ukraine Armed Forces) from entrenched fighting positions and into more open or vulnerable areas. While these chemical agents are not considered lethal, Russia uses them to shape the battlefield and cause UAF casualties.”

Another Russian tactic, according to the report, is “a consistent increase in Russia’s jamming of Global Navigation Satellite Systems along its borders, with a notable focus in the Baltic Sea region. This activity is likely part of a broader force protection measure as Russia fields more weapon systems. However, it is also likely that the intensification of jamming in the Baltic region is a response to the Baltic states supporting Ukraine. The navigation jamming had a significant negative effect on commercial air and maritime traffic in the region.”

The report also shared some interesting numbers that help paint a picture of just how much this war is costing Russia’s military. “Since January 2024, Russia has lost roughly 1,149 armored fighting vehicles, 3,098 infantry fighting vehicles, 300 self-propelled artillery vehicles, and 1,865 tanks, according to a think tank analysis. Russian losses of these platforms have been significantly higher than Ukraine’s, at ratios varying from 5:1 to 2:1.”

As of June, according to the report, “Ukraine had lost control of roughly 20 percent of its overall territory. Russian forces recaptured all but a small portion of Russia’s Kursk region [which Ukraine invaded in August 2024] and gained control of hundreds of square kilometers [100 square kilometers equals 38.6 square miles] across Ukraine’s Sumy, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions since January, according to the DIA.”

The report described other Ukrainian challenges saying that this quarter, “the UAF had struggled with inadequate recruitment, desertions from the front line, refusals to fight, and undertrained personnel, resulting in most of its frontline brigades operating below combat strength…Despite those challenges, the Ukrainian government continued to reject calls to lower the conscription age from 25 to 18 due to the potential long-term demographic effects and public opposition. However, on July 29, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law increasing the maximum age for new recruits to 60.”

The reports states that “Ukraine sought to bolster its ranks by recruiting contract soldiers from abroad. In May, Ukraine opened a new recruitment center and launched a digital advertising campaign concentrated on recruitment in Latin America.” One result, the report said, “Veterans of Colombia’s drug war, trained in guerrilla tactics, represent a significant contingent of Ukraine’s volunteers. Ukraine has recruited approximately 27,000 soldiers per month, roughly 15,000 below Russia’s recruitment rate. By offering contracts of up to $3,000 per month, Ukraine aims to bolster this total by recruiting several thousand contract soldiers from abroad.”

The report also described the wide range of U.S. support provided to the area since the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022.

For example, since that date, the report said, “Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available $187 billion for OAR and the broader Ukraine response,” out of which “$30 billion remained available for obligation” as of June 30, 2025.

Of the above mentioned $187 billion, some $134 billion was considered “security related,” and included, the report said, $45.78 billion appropriated to the DoD to replace U.S. weapons and materiel donated to Ukraine; and $33.5 billion for programs Congress created to help Ukraine buy U.S. weaponry and otherwise provide for its self-defense.

The largest amount, $47.43 billion, was for forward-deployment of U.S. military forces and prepositioned stocks in Eastern Europe to deter aggression against NATO allies. I should note here, the report said that during this past quarter, the DoD maintained approximately 81,600 U.S. military and 7,400 civilian personnel in the European Command area of operations. These include rotating from the U.S. to Europe, generally for nine months, two armor brigade combat teams and one infantry brigade combat team.

The report notes: “None of the appropriation bills enacted in the current fiscal year [which ends September 30, 2025]…have provisions appropriating or rescinding appropriated funds specifically for OAR,” which I remind readers are for the military response to the Ukraine war.

However, the report said that the U.S. pause in Ukraine military assistance from March 3 to March 11, ordered by Trump in the wake of his confrontational Oval Office meeting with Zelensky, “had significant residual effects on the delivery of security assistance, including Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System proximity fuzes and 155mm high-explosive ammunition. The temporary halt in processing new requests led to materiel being held in place while awaiting further U.S. policy determinations.”

With the Trump administration withdrawing from leadership of the Ukraine support activities, the report noted that NATO personnel assumed control over logistics and remote maintenance co-located in Jasionka, Poland. As host nation, Poland assumed the lead once done by the U.S.

The U.S. and its international partners continued to provide varied training to the UAF at Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, as well as other locations in Europe. This quarter, Grafenwoehr opened a new trench system designed to replicate battlefield conditions.

The report also said that “The UAF faces a shortage of doctors, nurses, paramedics, and specialists, especially in frontline areas, leading to overwhelmed facilities and reduced access to care. The remaining healthcare workers are experiencing significant trauma and burnout, further exacerbating staffing issues.” In addition, “the UAF does not always employ trained medical personnel according to their specialty, and dentists are often employed as infantry soldiers,” according to the report.

State’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) leads the U.S. Government’s demining efforts in Ukraine. During the quarter, the report said, “State PM/WRA supported implementers and Ukrainian government operators in clearing 11,200 acres of land in Ukraine, most of which was agricultural, and in destroying 4,556 landmines and items of unexploded ordnance. The implementers also provided explosive ordnance risk education to 8,042 people living in or near minefields.”

State PM/WRA “also provided 104 sets of personal protective equipment, 151 detectors, and 52 vehicles to Ukrainian government deminers, strengthening their ability to conduct demining operations without external assistance,” the report said.

The report also provided some details on the impact of the Trump administration ending USAID programs, disclosing that of the 163 Ukraine foreign assistance programs for which State officials provided information, 85 were terminated, 76 continued unchanged, and two were amended.

One that was continued, according to the report, related to $45 million of USAID funds contracted out to the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Agency for a series of programs. One $25 million program was: “Procure, deliver, and install small-scale generators at select cities near Ukraine’s nuclear power plants to ensure reliable power generation to local critical infrastructure,” according to the report.

After pauses, the funds were made available and following the completion of the foreign assistance review, the DoE and the NNSA resumed activities related to distributed power generation and passive protection, including completing the full obligation of $45 million.

However, according to the report, as of July 1, State assumed responsibility for administering most foreign assistance, which involved approximately $1 billion in active awards and more than $3 billion in terminated awards that still require formal closeout. USAID Ukraine reported that nearly 80 percent of the mission’s technical and contract personnel had departed by June 25 in order to comply with the July 1 deadline for their separation from service.

“USAID Ukraine reported that nine American former USAID staff were being hired by State to manage assistance programs in Ukraine,” the report said, adding, “State reported that it plans to hire some former USAID foreign service nationals to manage assistance programs in Ukraine, but this had not yet occurred as of the end of the quarter.” As of mid-June, State had not yet formally identified contracting and grants officers for many USAID programs.

The Inspectors General in this report list plans for the current quarter, and among them is a State Department IG proposed “Evaluation of Department of State Administration of Foreign Assistance Program from the U.S. Agency for International Development” which will “describe State's administration of U.S. Agency for International Development foreign assistance programs and associated awards transferred to State.”

I look forward to reading that report, if and when it is released.

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The Cybersecurity Law that’s Quietly Keeping America Safe is About to Expire

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — The clock is ticking toward September 30, 2025, when one of America's most vital cybersecurity protections will expire unless Congress acts. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA 2015) has quietly become the backbone of our nation's cyber defense. Without creating any additional regulations, it enabled the rapid sharing of threat intelligence between government and businesses that has prevented countless cyberattacks over the past decade. The Act’s protections have facilitated threat warnings to thousands of organizations just this year. Its potential sunset threatens to unleash a wave of cyberattacks that will devastate the small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) that form a foundational part of our economy.

As someone who has worked on both sides—first leading public-private partnerships at the FBI and now facilitating industry collaboration—I've witnessed firsthand how CISA 2015 transformed our cybersecurity landscape. The law provides crucial liability protections that encourage companies to share threat indicators with the government and each other, while offering antitrust protection for industry-to-industry collaboration. Without these safeguards, the robust information sharing that has made American networks more secure simply stops.

The SMB Crisis Waiting to Happen

The consequences of letting CISA 2015 lapse will fall most heavily on America's small and medium-sized businesses. Recent data from NetDiligence’s 2024 Cyber Claims Study shows that ransomware cost SMBs an average of $432,000 per attack. These businesses don't have the cash reserves to weather extended downtime. At most, many can only survive three to four weeks of operational disruption before facing permanent closure.

According to industry analysis, small and medium enterprises represent 98% of cyber insurance claims while accounting for $1.9 billion in total losses, underscoring their vulnerability in today's threat landscape. CISA 2015’s expiration will significantly weaken the early warning system that has helped businesses stay ahead of emerging threats. Without the government's ability to share robust intelligence about new attack methods, SMBs become sitting ducks for cybercriminals who specifically target organizations that can't afford to lose days or weeks.’’

The Cyber Initiatives Group Fall Summit on Wednesday, September 17 from 12p – 3p is convening experts to engage on the most pressing cybersecurity risks. Save your virtual seat now.

Healthcare: Where Cybersecurity Becomes Life and Death

The stakes become particularly dire in healthcare, where ransomware attacks don't just threaten profits—they threaten lives. The University of Minnesota School of Public Health’s experts estimate that ransomware attacks killed 42 to 67 Medicare patients between 2016 and 2021. These numbers represent a horrifying trend: threat actors deliberately target hospitals because they know healthcare systems will pay quickly to avoid putting patients at risk.

If information sharing degrades after CISA 2015's sunset, hospitals–and all other critical infrastructure–very likely will lose crucial early warnings about ransomware variants and other attack methods. When a hospital's systems are threatened, rapid information sharing matters. Minutes count in medical emergencies, and delays can be fatal.

Economic Ripple Effects

The economic impact extends far beyond individual companies. SMBs make up the vast majority of (99%) businesses in the U.S., and employ nearly half of the private sector’s workforce. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, they’re responsible for 43.5% of our GDP, so their widespread failure would create devastating ripple effects throughout the economy.

More concerning, America's technological leadership depends on the robust threat intelligence sharing that CISA 2015 enables. Our cybersecurity companies lead the world precisely because they have access to comprehensive threat data that helps them develop superior products and services.

Other countries modeled its cybersecurity information sharing after our system, recognizing that America's approach gives us a competitive advantage. If we allow this framework to collapse, we're not just making individual businesses more vulnerable—we're undermining the foundation of American cybersecurity leadership that other nations seek to emulate.

The Path Forward: Clean Reauthorization Now

There's bipartisan agreement that CISA 2015 should be reauthorized, with experts from across the political spectrum recognizing its vital importance. DHS Secretary Kristi Noem has urgently called for reauthorization, emphasizing that public-private partnerships have grown stronger because of the information-sharing guidelines established in CISA 2015.

The cleanest path forward is a straightforward reauthorization while Congress works through any technical improvements. The core framework has proven its worth over a decade of operation, facilitating billions of dollars in prevented losses and creating a culture where information sharing is the default rather than the exception.

Beyond Politics: A National Security Imperative

In an era of political division, cybersecurity remains one of the few areas where Americans across the political spectrum can find common ground. We need to defend against constant attacks coming from the likes of Chinese actors using ransomware during SharePoint vulnerabilities to Iranian groups deploying ransomware as a political weapon to hundreds of criminal ransomware groups operating at any given time.

The solution isn't more regulation or government overreach. It's the collaborative approach that CISA 2015 has fostered. As I used to tell businesses when I was at the FBI: we can't help you if we don't hear from others, and we can't help others if we don't hear from you. This principle of mutual aid and shared defense has made America stronger, and we cannot afford to abandon it now.

Congress must act before September 30. If we allow our cybersecurity information sharing framework to collapse it will devastate small businesses, endanger the sick, and undermine America's position as the global leader in cybersecurity. The time for action is now, before the attacks that could have been prevented become the disasters we failed to stop.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Cynthia Kaiser was first published in Fortune.

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Myanmar’s Civil War Is Tearing the Country Apart

CIPHER BRIEF REPORTING – The military government ruling Myanmar designated a significant ethnic rebel group as a terrorist organization on Thursday, just months before December’s planned elections. It may seem like just another headline in a far away land but the move to quell the Karen National Union (KNU) is a sign of what’s at stake in Myanmar, and how what’s happening there is shaping regional dynamics.

The country’s long-simmering civil war exploded after the 2021 coup that saw the military overthrow of the elected government led by Aung Aan Suu Kyi, uniting pro-democracy forces and ethnic militias against the junta.

But Myanmar’s civil war is not just a humanitarian catastrophe—it’s a geopolitical fault line. The protracted conflict has displaced over 2.6 million people, fueled transnational arms and drug networks, and drawn in outside powers like China and Russia—yet it remains largely absent from international policy debates.

Analysts warn that continued neglect could destabilize Southeast Asia for years to come, potentially empowering malign actors across the region.

“The United States has long had an interest in peace, stability and development in Asia and preventing the rise of a regional hegemon. The ongoing conflict in Burma challenges all of these interests,” Derek Mitchell, Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, tells The Cipher Brief. “War and instability in a country at the cross-roads of Asia have cost the country billions of dollars in lost investment, led to cratering of the domestic economy, and unleashed an explosion of drug, human and weapons trafficking, infectious disease, and a humanitarian crisis that has driven millions into neighboring countries as refugees at the expense of regional stability and development.”

A Country in Collapse

Following the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, unleashed a violent crackdown on protestors. When bullets and fear emptied the streets, resistance went underground.

Today, that resistance has evolved into a full-fledged civil war encompassing a patchwork of People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and local militias.

Some of the most powerful EAOs, such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the north and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in the southeast, have aligned with the PDFs, forming temporary alliances against the common enemy. The junta, meanwhile, has regained territory in places like Nawnghkio, but at a high cost — both in casualties and growing resistance.

Just weeks ago, the junta said it transferred power to a civilian-led interim government and allowed the state of emergency in place since the coup, to expire ahead of elections set for December and January. The status quo hasn’t changed though, with coup leader Min Aung Hlaing retaining power. Western governments and several analysts have therefore dismissed the elections as a sham, expected to be dominated by military proxies and just a move to further entrench the military’s power.

“The conflict in Myanmar undermines ASEAN unity and dilutes U.S. influence in the region because ASEAN is a weaker partner as a result, and more beholden to authoritarian partners in light of the Myanmar junta’s realignment with Beijing,” Hunter Marston, an Indo-Pacific security analyst focused on U.S. alliances, strategy and Southeast Asian geopolitics, tells The Cipher Brief. “At the same time, the conflict has facilitated the proliferation of crime and illicit economies flourishing in Myanmar’s borderlands, which have targeted U.S. citizens as well as other countries around the globe, raking in billions of dollars each year.”

ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is a key regional bloc that the U.S. relies on to counterbalance China’s growing influence and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The Association, long hampered by internal divisions and non-interference norms, has not intervened in Myanmar. Recent efforts to re-engage with the junta have made little impact and only highlighted the bloc’s diminishing leverage. A fractured or weakened ASEAN, experts caution, not only hampers coordinated regional responses but also complicates Washington’s efforts to engage effectively on shared challenges, from maritime security to transnational crime.

However, this is no longer just an internal fight concerning Myanmar. As the war drags on, it has become a new front in the global struggle between democratic and authoritarian powers.

China, Russia, and the Battlefield of Influence

Myanmar’s geographic position, wedged between China, India, and the Bay of Bengal, makes it a critical node in Southeast Asia’s strategic architecture. It is also a country rich in rare earth minerals, oil, gas, and hydropower — assets that Beijing, in particular, is keen to control.

China, which has long courted the Burmese military, has navigated a delicate balance in the conflict. While officially calling for peace and dialogue, Beijing has supplied the junta with arms and political cover. Meanwhile, its access to rare earth supply chains through northern Myanmar has become even more valuable amid global competition for strategic resources.

“The junta receives direct and indirect financial support from its sales of oil and gas to China and Thailand, limited trade with other ASEAN states such as Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and direct cash transfers and assistance packages from China,” said Marston. “Its state-owned banks and companies also extract a great deal of revenue from natural resources across the country, as well as property taxes to a lesser extent in urban centers like Yangon and Mandalay.”

Russia, too, has deepened ties with the military regime. In recent years, Moscow has become a leading arms supplier and defense partner to the junta, eager to expand its influence in a region where Western alliances have weakened. Myanmar has reciprocated, with junta generals attending Moscow’s military parades and inviting Russian advisors into the country.

“This is no longer just a civil war — it’s an open door for authoritarian powers to gain a foothold in Southeast Asia,” one former U.S. official who worked on Myanmar policy tells The Cipher Brief.

Cross-Border Instability

The conflict’s repercussions are already spilling across Myanmar’s borders. In Thailand, shelling and firefights near the frontier have driven thousands of refugees into crowded border camps. In India’s northeast, cross-border insurgencies and weapons flows have revived longstanding security concerns. Bangladesh continues to shoulder the burden of over a million Rohingya refugees, with little prospect of safe repatriation as the military escalates its violence in Rakhine State.

Illicit arms trafficking, drug production in the Golden Triangle, and human smuggling have surged in tandem with the fighting. Some insurgent groups fund their campaigns through methamphetamine production and jade mining, while the junta leverages state-owned enterprises and military conglomerates to bankroll its war machine.

Mitchell emphasized that this has “also led to the proliferation of ‘scam centers’ along Burma’s border that are bilking Americans and others out of billions of dollars.”

“The violence and absence of an effective international response have created an opening for China to insert itself even further into the internal affairs of the country, corner its rare earths and broader resource market, and attempt to create a client state through which it would have strategic access to the Indian Ocean,” he added.

Washington’s Take

So, what is the United States government doing to address the Myanmar crisis?

The second Trump administration has taken a markedly different approach to Myanmar compared to the Biden era.

“The first Trump administration was slow to condemn the Myanmar military’s violent clearance operations against the Rohingya, which the Biden administration later confirmed met the criteria for genocide and crimes against humanity,” Marston said.

While sanctions against the military junta remain in place, the Trump administration has largely refrained from commenting on the country’s internal dynamics. Broadly, it has sharply reduced U.S. funding for democracy promotion, human rights, and independent media. American-backed outlets such as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia have been significantly affected—a move that Min Aung Hlaing publicly welcomed, expressing his “sincere appreciation” to President Trump.

In a notable diplomatic development in July 2025, President Trump sent a direct letter to Min Aung Hlaing regarding tariffs, which the junta interpreted as a form of public acknowledgment and a diplomatic victory, marking a departure from previous diplomatic isolation.

Furthermore, the Trump administration has enacted new travel restrictions, including a complete suspension of entry for Myanmar nationals as immigrants and non-immigrants, potentially preventing persecuted persons from reaching American soil.

This blend of continued sanctions with reduced democracy aid and a more transactional, direct communication approach with the junta underscores the Trump administration’s “America First” foreign policy, leaving the future of U.S. influence in Myanmar uncertain amidst the ongoing crisis.

There are, however, other efforts to bring Myanmar back into the limelight.

Recent legislative efforts, such as the “No New Burma Funds Act” introduced in July by Rep. Nikema Williams (D-GA), aim to curb indirect financial flows to the regime. These include revenues from natural gas exports involving foreign companies, fees paid to military-controlled infrastructure, and leakage from humanitarian aid operations in junta-held areas.

Additionally, Burmese gems and timber often reach U.S. markets via third countries, and digital platforms may unwittingly monetize content linked to the junta — all contributing to the regime’s financial lifeline.

According to Marston, “western countries could theoretically apply secondary sanctions on any country conducting business with Myanmar’s energy companies or state-owned banks, which would squeeze Thailand and Singapore in particular, along with China, but they have been unwilling to expend the political capital necessary to do so.”

“Furthermore, Washington has refrained from imposing the most comprehensive sanctions on Myanmar’s economy for fear of hurting the entire population and setting the country’s economic recovery back even further after previous rounds of sanctions in the 2000s,” he continued.

In addition, there is the “BRAVE Burma Act,” a bipartisan U.S. House bill introduced on May 5, 2025, by Representatives Bill Huizenga (R-MI) and Betty McCollum (D-MN), among other co-sponsors from both parties. This legislation, which has advanced in the House, aims to increase pressure on Myanmar’s military junta by requiring stronger sanctions on entities like state-owned enterprises and those involved in the jet fuel sector, and by establishing a U.S. Special Envoy for Burma.

“Right now, the administration should appoint a special envoy. Personnel is policy, and without a champion in Washington, US Burma policy will remain adrift,” Marston asserted.

Mitchell concurred that the Trump Administration “should appoint a special envoy based in the region to build closer relations with the (opposition) National Unity Government, ethnic leaders and other legitimate representatives of the Burmese people, and coordinate with our regional allies and partners on a common approach to the conflict.”

“The administration should make it clear that it does not consider the junta legitimate and that its pretensions to rule are unacceptable,” he continued. “To that end, it should tighten sanctions to shut off its access to money, weapons, and international legitimacy. Overall, the administration should recognize that China is taking advantage of our neglect and respond consistently with where developments in the country are trending.”

The Strategic Cost of Indifference

Entire towns have been razed. Schools and hospitals have been bombed. More than 18 million people—nearly a third of Myanmar’s population—now rely on humanitarian aid, according to the United Nations. The war has triggered one of the world’s largest internal displacements and turned Myanmar’s borderlands into a hotbed of organized crime, cyber scams, and weapons trafficking—networks that now reach far beyond Southeast Asia.

“The longer the U.S. stays disengaged, the more space there is for China and Russia to entrench themselves,” says Hunter Marston. “Without high-level diplomatic pressure or punitive measures, the junta will have no reason to pursue a negotiated solution, and the country’s collapse will continue to drag down the region.”

China has already endorsed Myanmar’s planned elections in December, despite ongoing civil war and widespread instability. In contrast, ASEAN has said elections should only follow a return to peace.

“Realistically, the only hope of pressuring the military to pursue peace talks is to win on the battlefield. Thus, it is essential to curb the military’s access to arms,” Marston stressed. “The only way to do that is by imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese weapons companies like NORINCO, which continue to provide munitions to the military. Doing so would put Beijing on notice that it no longer has carte blanche in Myanmar and would align with the goals of U.S. competition with China in checking China’s global military expansion.”

Mitchell also underscored that Washington’s only leverage for positive change lies in directly cutting off the junta’s financial streams. If Myanmar is allowed to fall fully into the grip of autocracy, crime syndicates, and foreign military powers, the consequences will not remain confined to its borders.

“Pressuring foreign banks (in Thailand and Singapore, for instance) into shutting off financial services to the junta, sanctioning Myanmar’s Central Bank, and imposing penalties on other banks inside and outside the country doing business with the junta can help shut off capital to the regime,” he said.

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Ex-NATO Commander Warns Western Inaction Built “Sanctuary” for Russia

EXPERT Q&A — Russia’s massive drone attack overnight on six Ukrainian regions, which hit energy and gas transport infrastructure and cut off power to over 100,000 people, is the latest sign that Moscow is nowhere near peace. Coupled with the Kremlin’s rejection of meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine, it’s clear that President Vladimir Putin is still pursuing his maximalist war goals. That doesn’t surprise General (Ret.) Philip Breedlove, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, who said the U.S. has been “completely deterred” by Putin for the last 11 years, across four presidents, which has built a "sanctuary" for Russia and allowed it to escalate in Ukraine unchecked.

Cipher Brief COO and Executive Editor of the Open Source Report, Brad Christian spoke with Gen. Breedlove about how that dynamic and is shaping the war and peace negotiations, as well as other global security challenges — from the threat posed by Iranian drones to the true relationship between members of the Axis of Authoritarians. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

The Cipher Brief: Let's start in the Middle East. Broadly speaking, how are you thinking about all of the changes and all of the action that is happening in the region and what it might be pointing to?

General Breedlove: I'm in the Middle East now and have been here for almost seven days. I'm in my second capital and we're working through some of the issues that are left over after the 12-day war such as how the Middle East is continuing to react to that and what we expect out of Iran following the pretty good beating they took. And then, what does that mean for our good friends and partners in the Middle East?

This is a time where I think many of the leaders of these nations are still reeling from what happened. I was talking with some very senior leaders today and I pointed out that in the first three and a half days of this 12-day war, Iran shot nearly 1,500 drones and missiles in the fight. And I asked them, "Is your country ready to defend against 1,500 rockets and missiles?" And of course, there's really only one nation in the Middle East that's set up for that and that's Israel, who was of course attacked. And so, others here in this region are trying to think this through.

And while these other countries are good, maybe even great partners of the U.S., we haven't fought together before. For example, how would they connect to the Navy ships and the US Air Force airplanes that have done so much in the Middle East in these recent challenges? And frankly, there's a lot of scratching of heads going on because those type’s of challenges can’t be solved overnight and nobody, including Israel, is ready to face that kind of onslaught without help from the United States.

So, there's a lot of concern and a lot of angst about how countries get ready for this? You've heard that the Axis of Evil countries, Iran and others, Russia, are starting to build these Shahed drones by the hundreds and thousands and starting new factories in South America. These adversarial nations are unable to use what we would call normal, Western style air power so they are substituting it with these drone attacks and it's a tough problem for many countries to defend against.

And then, frankly, while the nations I'm dealing with are not necessarily concerned about Israel attacking them, they are taken aback that Israel can launch aircraft, fly 1,000 miles and establish air superiority over a nation in two days. And so, there's a lot of people rethinking where they are and how it all works here based on the actions of the recent Israel-Iran conflict.

I think the good news is that the threat of Iran is somewhat diminished. Iran is going to spend some time rebuilding its defenses because especially its air defense network was pretty much decimated.

It's a busy time in the Middle East. It's a time where we need to find peace. It's a time where we don't need another distraction, as we're facing multiple theaters of conflict right now.

The Cipher Brief: On the topic of peace and some normalcy, what is the mood there? What’s happening in Gaza is both incredibly complicated and terribly upsetting to much of the world. Is there going to be a return to some regional normalcy in the relatively near future?

General Breedlove: I don't think I see or hear that right now. There's a lot of concern that the political situation, that the leadership of Israel is in with their own people and the desire for getting the hostages back either dead or alive is very much alive. And even inside of Israel, there are now protests against what's going on in Gaza. So, I can't imagine a more concerning and more confused situation and there is angst of how this is all going to work out. I must say that there is concern about how the people of Gaza have been treated. But I will tell you this, Brad, as I move around these capitals in this region, the recognized threat is Iran.

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The Cipher Brief: I want to shift gears a little bit here to the other topic that is dominating the national security space and that's Russia’s war with Ukraine. You've said consistently from the beginning of Russia’s full scale invasion that, "Mr. Putin has us deterred and we have not established deterrence over either Russia or Vladimir Putin." I'd just like to get your take on where we are with the negotiations. So many people seem to be scratching their heads at some of the things that we’re seeing play out in the public facing side of the negotiations. How are you thinking about it?

General Breedlove: Well, bottom line upfront, nothing has changed. We remain deterred. In the press you hear people talking about this war being three and a half years long. This war is over 11 years long. It started in the spring of '14 when I was still serving as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, and it hasn't stopped. It was hot for a few years and then it went warm. Russians were killing Ukrainians and Ukrainians were killing Russians on the line of contact. And then, after some six years or so of that warm war on the line of contact, Russia re-invaded, and I call this the third phase of the 11-year-long war.

This war has covered four presidents, Obama, Trump twice and Biden once, and all four of them have been nearly and completely deterred from the very beginning. We, as we always do in the military, offered options for how to address this conflict in Ukraine back in 2014. And the answer was, "We're not going to take any action because the war will escalate if we take action." Well, we gave them options from very small movements to larger more bellicose movements, they chose none of them and here we are. What we do know is we did not take action for fear of escalation. We were deterred and we didn't take action and Russia escalated anyway. And so our lack of action ended up in the escalation of the problem by the Russians. And that has repeated itself through four administrations for the past 11 years. We are still deterred. We have taken precious little action to stop the fight in Ukraine and we still find ourselves saying, "We're not going to do that because we've got to give peace a chance and we don't want to escalate the problem." And that formula is not working now and has not worked for 11 years.

We have virtually enabled the Russian war on Ukraine by our lack of action in a more severe way. Many of us from military backgrounds say that we have built sanctuary for Russia. From that sanctuary, we allow them to attack Ukraine. If you can think of a map, up in the northwest corner of the map is Belarus all the way to the east around through Russia all the way to the south, into the Black Sea and west across the Black Sea. We have allowed Russia to attack Ukraine from nearly 300 degrees on the map, and we still cannot determine that we should allow Ukraine to fire back deeply into Russia with our kit.

Mr. Elbridge Colby, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, at times seems to be out of sync with President Trump because the President recently said, "You can't win a war that way." And Mr. Colby, once again, announced in the last day or so that, "We're not going to let them do long-range fires with American kit." This is an absurd policy, and it's guaranteed to be a loser and we've got to get past being so completely deterred by Russia's threats. Their program of reflexive control is working excellent on our leadership and we've got to break free of it.

The Cipher Brief: The US and Europe could inflict significant pressure on Russia through the expanded use of sanctions, yet President Trump has not yet approved the use of the sanctions that could really bite. Would increasing sanctions really cause that much of a risk of escalation on the part of Russia?

General Breedlove: Folks who follow Putin and Russia will say something to the following effect, I actually say it all the time- Sanctions have never changed Putin's actions on the battlefield. Sanctions have hurt Russia. Sanctions have hurt the Russian people. Sanctions have hurt the Russian economy. All those things are true, but they have never changed Russian actions on the battlefield. And so, we either need to double and triple the really crushing sanctions and take all of the frozen Russian money and use it to help Ukraine. We've got to physically stop the Russian shadow fleet from moving oil around the world. There's a whole host of things we could do that would truly bring Russia to their knees and we haven't done it.

It's hard to understand. We're all hoping that the President will regain his gumption, like he did going into the conversation in Alaska with Mr. Putin. You remember it was very, very clear, he said it multiple times, "If we don't get a ceasefire, there is no second meeting." Well, we didn't get a ceasefire and now we're negotiating a second meeting. And there was also the 50-day that turned into 10 days that turned into 12 days. Well, those 12 days are gone. We don't have a ceasefire, and we haven't announced new sanctions. So, there are many tools that we haven't taken that we need to take. Mr. Putin is not going to stop. Mr. Putin will have to be stopped.

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The Cipher Brief: What are NATO and Ukraine's next best moves, given everything that's in play right now?

General Breedlove: It's a confusing issue about what America is going to do or not do in any possible peace-enforcement capacity. The best move right now, not under a NATO hat, because clearly, Mr. Putin believes he's in charge and he said there will be no NATO involvement, but if NATO or European Union nations were to volunteer for a coalition of the willing presence in Ukraine, then that's what, I think, needs to happen. We need the big nations- the UK, the French, the Germans, to step up but they're waiting and watching for American leadership. Is America going to be that backbone and offer what the president talked about in his post-talk news conference and so forth? We need for all of that to happen. We need for America to make a decision to supply air power, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, et cetera, those non-boots on the ground capabilities. And then, we need the European nations who've already intimated they may be willing to provide boots on the ground to get in there and get a stoppage of the fighting.

Mr. Putin’s entire objective however is to keep kicking the can to the right, run right up to the red line, wave a bright shiny object, get another red line, run right up to the red line, wave another shiny object, get another deadline. He is very good and has had great success at moving our red lines to the right.

The Cipher Brief: I want to ask if you could give us your best and worst-case scenario about how the axis relationship between China- Russia- Iran- North Korea could evolve over the next six months and what that might mean for America and our allies?

General Breedlove: I recently heard someone use a new construct that I had never heard, but it's beginning to make even more sense. This particular author labeled Russia as a proxy of China fighting against America. We've heard several times people describe Russia as the little brother, and China's going to use Russia, as opposed to Russia using China in this conflict. There does appear to be a definite relationship there where China is positioning Russia to do as much damage as they can to the United States' interests in the region. And so I think that we're going to see continued cooperation amongst these nations. They're doing this, every one of them, to benefit their nation. Russia's getting what they need from China by way of parts for the Shahed drones and other things.

Russia, of course, now is using three tranches of North Koreans to fight and to man their factories. And now, we hear they're even looking for women in South America who might want to come over and man factories. Russia is in trouble. I'd like to finish the conversation with the fact that I see Russia as losing the war against Ukraine now, not winning it.

But back to the cooperation. There's a lot of mutual benefit there for these countries. Iran has got to rebuild its air defenses; they were decimated by Israel. Russia desperately needs manpower. They can't staff their factories, and they still haven't totally retaken all the land that was taken by Ukraine and they're having to use North Koreans to help them do that. China needs them all because they want American power diminished, tied up, canceled, in any way they can, and they see Russia as a useful tool to do that. So, they all have their needs and desires and I think the mutual affray will only increase over time.

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Rearming a Fractured Ally: Should the U.S. Let Turkey Back Into the F-35 Program?

CIPHER BRIEF REPORTING — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is signaling fresh optimism that his country could once again acquire U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets—an unexpected twist in a long-running defense dispute that once fractured NATO unity.

After meeting with former President Donald Trump at the NATO Summit in The Hague earlier this summer, Erdogan told reporters that “technical-level talks” between Turkish and U.S. officials were already underway.

“We discussed the F-35 issue. We made payments of $1.3 to $1.4 billion for the jets, and we saw that Mr. Trump was well-intentioned about delivering them,” Erdogan said. Notably, he added that Turkey’s Russian-made S-400 air defense system—at the center of the years-long impasse—“did not come up” during the talks.

That detail matters. In 2019, the United States formally expelled Turkey from the multinational F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, citing the S-400 purchase as a direct threat to the aircraft’s stealth and intelligence safeguards. At the time, the decision was widely seen as a sharp rebuke to a NATO ally drifting closer to Moscow.

With a shifting geopolitical landscape and renewed U.S.-Turkey dialogue, the question returns: should Turkey be allowed back into the F-35 program?

Many national security experts argue that the risks of reintegration far outweigh the benefits—both technically and strategically.

“Turkey made its choice despite repeated warnings, advice, and pressure from allies. It went into this with eyes wide open and decided in 2019 to proceed with the S-400 missile defense system,” Sinan Ciddi, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Marine Corps University and Senior Fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, tells The Cipher Brief. “Given that, there’s no real upside to letting Turkey back into the F-35 program. The associated dangers are significant.”

Others contend that the potential upsides are worth considering.

“Bringing Turkey back into the F-35 program could strengthen NATO’s southern flank, where Turkey’s strategic position bordering Syria, Iran, and Russia matters. Its air force, stuck with aging F-16s, would gain fifth-generation stealth with the F-35, boosting NATO interoperability and deterrence against adversaries like China and Russia,” John Thomas, Managing Director of strategic advocacy firm, Nestpoint Associates, tells The Cipher Brief. “The deal could allow Turkish firms to make parts which could lower costs, saving US taxpayers billions.”

Ankara had invested approximately $1.4 billion into the project before its removal. Turkish defense contractors played a key role in manufacturing over 900 parts for the aircraft, many of which had to be relocated to U.S. and European facilities at considerable cost and logistical strain.

Yet even among advocates, most agree that reentry would need to be conditional and tightly controlled.

There is also a compelling strategic case. Geographically, Turkey straddles Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, offering air base access near conflict zones from Syria to the Caucasus and eastern Mediterranean.

Beyond hardware and geography, some view Turkey’s reintegration as a means to draw Ankara back from its increasingly independent defense path and closer to the West. Erdogan has hedged against U.S. sanctions by ramping up cooperation with Russia and accelerating development of a homegrown fifth-generation fighter, the KAAN, which completed its first test flight in early 2024.

The Risks That Haven’t Gone Away

Still, the concerns that led to Turkey’s original expulsion remain unresolved. Chief among them is the continued presence of the Russian S-400 system on Turkish soil.

“The S-400’s radars are a dealbreaker,” Thomas asserted. “Russian systems could collect data on the F-35’s stealth, risking leaks to Moscow, endangering American pilots and allies like Israel.”

Washington officials have repeatedly warned that operating both the S-400 and F-35s in the same environment poses an unacceptable risk to sensitive data and stealth technology.

“To restore trust, Turkey must fully decommission its S-400s—dismantling key components or transferring them to U.S. control at Incirlik. Legal guarantees, like a binding commitment not to procure Russian systems again, need to be non-negotiable,” Thomas continued.

While technical safeguards and legal commitments may help mitigate security risks, others caution that deeper strategic questions remain unresolved.

Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, tells The Cipher Brief that there are several questions Washington officials need to ask.

“How likely is it that Turkey would fight alongside the U.S. in a war or crisis with F-35s should they regain access to the program? In the past, they have even denied the U.S. even the ability to operate from Turkish bases, so there are reasons to be skeptical,” she said.

From her purview, Ankara should “give the S-400 system back to Russia if they are serious about reentering the F-35 program.”

“This is probably not feasible. Decommissioning the system might be sufficient, but in that case, Turkey’s access to the F-35’s classified technology should be limited,” Kavanagh said.

Although Turkish officials have hinted at a possible deactivation or sale of the S-400, no concrete steps have been taken.

Congressional Red Lines and Executive Authority

Reintegrating Turkey wouldn’t just be a military or diplomatic decision—it would require navigating deep skepticism on Capitol Hill. Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the U.S. imposed sanctions on Turkey’s defense procurement agency in 2020. Lifting those sanctions would likely require congressional approval, and opposition remains strong.

Senator Jim Risch, a senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has repeatedly stated that Turkey should not receive the F-35 as long as the S-400 is operational.

Moreover, in July, a bipartisan letter began circulating in the House, authored by Representatives Chris Pappas (D-NH), Gus Bilirakis (R-FL), Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY), and Dina Titus (D-NV). The lawmakers urged the administration to block any efforts they say would violate U.S. law and compromise national security policy. The State Department responded to the letter, saying: “We have expressed our displeasure with Ankara's acquisition of the S-400 system and have made clear the steps that should be taken as part of our ongoing assessment of the implementation of CAATSA sanctions.”

Ciddi pointed out, however, that there are ways to skirt Congress.

“The National Defense Authorization Act includes explicit language: as long as Turkey maintains the S-400 on its soil, it cannot receive the F-35. That’s been the case since 2019,” he explained. “Could that be bypassed? If the President were to invoke national emergency powers, there is a theoretical path around Congress.”

Beyond Congress, Ciddi continued, there are also “concerns from U.S. allies—Israel, Greece, Cyprus—who argue Turkey has repeatedly crossed red lines, not only by purchasing Russian missile systems but also by deepening strategic ties with Moscow and supporting groups like Hamas.”

“It’s not just about the S-400 anymore; it’s about a broader pattern,” he said. “Turkey isn’t just buying arms from Russia. It’s also building nuclear power plants with them, raising concerns about their eventual nuclear capability. And still, Erdogan hasn’t been held to account.”

There are also regional implications to consider. Israel, which relies heavily on its fleet of F-35s for maintaining its qualitative military edge, has historically been wary of advanced U.S. weapons flowing to rivals or unstable actors in the region. Although Turkey and Israel have recently taken cautious steps toward diplomatic normalization, tensions remain high over Ankara’s support for Hamas and its rhetoric against Israeli military operations.

At the same time, Turkey’s defense posture has shifted notably since its removal. It has forged stronger ties with Russia, expanded defense trade with Central Asian states, and emphasized sovereignty over strategic alignment. Erdogan’s government has leaned on nationalist rhetoric and positioned Turkey as a power broker, independent of both the U.S. and the EU. Analysts underscore that re-admitting Ankara without substantial guarantees risks validating this drift—and could erode the credibility of Western alliances.

A Conditional Path Back—If There Is One

Yet some analysts argue that the current geopolitical moment offers a narrow window for recalibration. The resurgence of great-power competition, coupled with Turkey’s economic strains and regional fatigue, may make Erdogan more inclined to engage in negotiations.

Yet, even limited reentry carries significant political and strategic risks. Whether Turkey is brought back in or kept at arm’s length, the decision will set a precedent not just for arms sales—but for how the U.S. manages defiant allies in an era of global fragmentation.

As the Defense Department emphasized in 2019, the F-35 program depends on mutual trust and alignment. The question now is whether those foundations can be restored—or whether reengagement without clear conditions will do more harm than good.

“Five U.S. administrations now have all sent the same message: that Turkey is too big to fail. No matter how Turkey undermines or acts against U.S. interests, it has barely ever faced any repercussions from Washington,” Blaise Misztal, Vice President for Policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, tells The Cipher Brief.

“To allow Turkey to get the F-35 now, without real steps to demonstrate it is willing to be a better ally, will only further convince Turkey that it can do whatever it wants without fear of U.S. pushback. Countries surrounding Turkey, meanwhile, whether U.S. partners or not, will only have their fears confirmed that they must prepare themselves to confront Turkey’s rising power.”

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Spy Versus Spy: Iran’s Playbook for Espionage in Israel

OPINION — Israel’s intelligence penetration of Iran played out in dramatic form over the course of the 12-day war this summer, but Iran is running an aggressive recruitment and spying operation of its own targeting Israel. And while the two espionage campaigns are not comparable in scale, scope, or success, Israel’s domestic security agency was sufficiently concerned that in the wake of the war it partnered with the country’s national public diplomacy directorate to launch a media campaign warning Israelis against spying for Iran.

Over the course of the war, Israeli intelligence treated Iran like its backyard playground, recruiting sources, both Iranian citizens and citizens of neighboring countries, and inserting its operatives to gather intelligence on the country’s most secret nuclear facilities, scientists, and officials. These efforts enabled covert operations, including the construction of remotely controlled missile and drone systems inside central Iran, that struck Iranian targets from within at the very outset of the 12-day war. Iranians recruited by Israel even helped smuggle “technologically modified vehicles” into the country, which were used to target Iranian air defense positions and clear a path for Israeli aircraft entering Iranian airspace.

In the weeks since the war ended, Iranian officials have carried out a domestic witch hunt, arresting thousands of individuals in their search for people who spied for Israel. Iran even executed one of its own nuclear scientists, alleging he spied for Israel. Now, Iran aims to turn the tables on Israel by increasing its own network of people in Israel recruited to spy for Iran.

It is now clear, however, that at the same time Israeli intelligence was recruiting sources and operatives in Iran, Iran was doing the same in Israel, just to a much smaller effect. While Iranian efforts to infiltrate and surveil targets in Israel date back to at least 2013, Israeli intelligence organizations have documented a significant surge in Iranian efforts to recruit both Israeli and non-Israeli citizens to spy for Iran, beginning in early 2020. Unlike Israel’s penetration of key Iranian intelligence and nuclear agencies, Iranian espionage in Israel remains at the edges, probing at the margins in its attempts to penetrate Israeli intelligence and society. These typically involve digital recruitment targeting Israelis in financial straits.

At first, Iran only tasked its recruits to collect basic information on the location of Israeli military bases and Israeli leaders, and to post anti-government signs and graffiti in public places to brew domestic dissent. Indeed, in the days before the 12-day war, Iranian officials boasted that the regime’s spy networks in Israel acquired sensitive documents about Israel's nuclear program. Iran’s minister of intelligence, Esmail Khatib, said that “complete nuclear files were obtained, along with documents related to [Israel’s] connections with the U.S., Europe, and other countries, as well as intelligence that strengthens Iran’s offensive capabilities.”

But starting in mid-2024–between the Iranian missile and drone attack on Israel in April and the ballistic missile attack in October– the Iranians started tasking recruits not only to carry out acts of espionage but also arson and even murder plots targeting Israeli scientists, journalists, security and military leaders, and senior politicians. Israeli officials described the spike in the number of plots as “unprecedented.” Israel Police Superintendent Maor Goren said, “If we go check the last years – the last decades – we can count on two hands how many people got arrested for this.”

While none of the murder plots came to fruition, Israeli authorities report that several came very close to being carried out and were thwarted at the last minute. And unlike pure espionage cases, which often take time to develop, some of the murder plots were being planned as soon as 9 days after initial recruitment. In other cases, Israeli authorities only discovered a cell of persons of Azeri descent who had been carrying out espionage operations as a team, some two years after they started spying on Israel. They were spotted when they moved from spying on military sites to conducting surveillance of a senior Israeli military figure they were told to kill.

The Washington Institute’s Iranian External Operations Map, which tracks Iranian plots abroad, has documented at least 31 plots carried out by Iranian-recruited Israelis in Israel. These recruits have sprayed graffiti and lit fires across Israel, in addition to collecting basic information on military bases, government officials, and nuclear scientists to send back to their handlers in Iran. However, Iranian efforts to recruit Israeli spies have not led to a single successful assassination or targeted attack in Israel. Iran conducts its recruitment primarily online via Telegram, WhatsApp, and social media platforms, although there are a few instances of Iranian handlers approaching potential recruits in person while abroad. Recruitment efforts appear to rely heavily on financial incentives while also exploiting existing social cleavages. Out of the 31 cases carried out by Israeli perpetrators documented by the Washington Institute, 20 involved some type of monetary compensation, usually via cryptocurrency.

While the Israeli perpetrators in 25 out of the 31 cases knew, or at least suspected, that they were working on behalf of the Iranians, many rationalized their actions as falling short of full-blown espionage. The tasks assigned to these individuals varied widely. Some were given relatively harmless assignments, such as tagging graffiti or putting up posters, while others appeared to be amateurish or unskilled in their roles. However, not all the recruits were unsophisticated. Several engaged in more serious activities, including intelligence collection and attempts to recruit others– sometimes even targeting their own family members to expand the network.

Consider the case of father and son, Bassem and Tahrir Safadi, residents of the Druze village of Mas'ade, who were arrested for spying on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force. At the request of his father, Tahrir would allegedly collect information on IDF movements in the Golan Heights and report to Hussam as-Salam Tawfiq Zidan, a journalist at Al-Alam News Network, an Iranian state-owned news outlet. Zidan, who lived in Damascus and worked for the Palestine division of the Quds Force, is accused of requesting Bassem and Tahrir to take photos of troops, tank movements, equipment, and more.

One of the most serious plots Israel thwarted is the 2024 assassination plot against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and former Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar. Moti Maman, a businessman with connections to Turkey and Iran, allegedly travelled to Turkey and Iran twice to meet with Iranian intelligence officials to further the plots against Netanyahu, Gallant, and Bar. Maman was also allegedly directed to intimidate Israeli civilians working for Iran who had failed to complete their missions, to find Russians or Americans who could be tasked with assassinating Iranian dissidents in the United States and Europe, and to attempt to recruit a Mossad officer to act as a double agent. Before leaving Iran for the second time, Maman received 5,000 euros from the Iranian intelligence agents for attending the meetings. According to the Shin Bet, Iranian officials viewed the assassination plots as acts of revenge for the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.

In total, The Washington Institute has documented 39 known Iranian plots in Israel from 2013-2025, 31 of which involved Israeli nationals, the rest involved Palestinians or other non-Israeli citizens. Several of these plots had multiple perpetrators, bringing the total number of Israeli participants in those 31 cases to more than 45 individuals. According to the National Public Diplomacy Directorate, indictments have been filed against 35 Israeli citizens involved in these cases. The age of the perpetrators ranges from 13 to 73, with over half in their teens or twenties. The individuals recruited came from a range of backgrounds, such as Azerbaijani or the Caucasus region, and the targets of their espionage efforts included both security infrastructure and broader social vulnerabilities, including the Iron Dome, government officials, Muhane Yehuda market, IDF bases, nuclear scientists and facilities, and malls and hospitals. The wide breadth of targets illustrates how Iranian intelligence sought to exploit financial, ideological, and personal incentives to build influence inside Israel.

Iranian Minister of Intelligence Esmail Khatib described Iranian espionage and sabotage plots in Israel as a key part of Iran’s broader war against Israel. "The Zionist regime must confront a strategy of internal aggression within itself,” he said a month after the 12-day war concluded, “and just as our armed forces' effective missiles compelled them to halt [the war], all intelligence and security agencies are also exerting effort, and in recent days, you have seen they were forced to conduct briefing sessions to counter the infiltration of intelligence services within the Zionist regime."

In response to Iranian recruitment efforts in Israel, the Shin Bet, in partnership with the National Public Diplomacy Directorate, launched a nationwide public-awareness campaign titled “Easy Money, Heavy Price,” to warn Israelis against spying for Iran. Running across radio, online platforms, and social media, the campaign warns that even modest payments from Iran, roughly $1,500, can result in severe consequences. The ads note that some who accepted money from Iran are now in prison, and that assisting Tehran can carry penalties of up to 15 years in jail.

Still, it's important to contextualize these plots. None came close to matching the level of operational complexity, strategic impact, or tradecraft displayed by Israel in its operations against Hezbollah or Iran. While Israel slowly vets and trains its potential recruits, the Iranians engage in shotgun recruitment online, with few recruits going to meet their handlers in places like Turkey or for training in Iran. The two sides are operating on completely different levels of intelligence capability and sophistication. Nevertheless, the Israeli authorities have treated these cases with appropriate seriousness, underscoring the potential long-term threat posed by Iran. “The war has not ended. We are in a state of temporary pause,” the head of the IRGC’s intelligence organization, Brigadier General Majid Khademi, warned last week. Iranian Intelligence Minister Khatib made his plans clear, calling for an “aggressive internal strategy” against Israel so that Israeli security agencies are forced to “confront a strategy of internal aggression” by Iranian agents within Israeli territory.

Alongside Israel’s demonstrated ability to penetrate Iran, the country’s security agencies now believe they will have to step up their game to counter Iranian spying in Israel. The public media campaign is surely just the beginning of a broader counter-espionage effort. What they have seen in the past year, Israeli officials maintain, represents a far greater espionage threat than anything they have seen before.

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Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Lies, Flattery, and Land-Grabs: Putin’s Tactics in Ukraine

OPINION — “The reason why I still remain pessimistic is that everything that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin says is he still wants those four territories…Eastern Ukraine. He hasn't achieved that yet. And he wants Ukraine to be at least subjugated to Russia, because he doesn't think that Ukraine's an independent country or independent nation. Ukrainians are just Russians with accents. That's his view. I've heard him talk about it personally. I've been in the room when he talks that way. And maximally he wants to bring it all into Russia. So, tragically, I think the only way he negotiates seriously is when he's stopped on the battlefield and his armies cannot march further west.”

That was Michael McFaul, President Obama’s Ambassador to Russia (2012-to-2014), speaking with Katie Couric August 18, on YouTube. McFaul, a Russian expert, is today a professor at Stanford University and Director of its Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

In the 53-minute conversation, McFaul provided a background to the Ukraine war, shared his views on the relations between Putin and President Trump, and talked about the possible future when it comes to the NATO and European Union nations and the United States.

Early in their conversation, McFaul provided an interesting background to the past and current fighting which has been taking place in eastern Ukraine, adjacent to Russia.

“So there are four regions that most of the fighting has been taking place,” McFaul said, “In each of those four regions [they] are partially occupied by the Russians today.”

Two of the four regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, together form what’s called the Donbas. Russia holds all of Luhansk and 75 percent of Donetsk. The other two regions are Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, where Russia has about 70 percent of the land.

McFaul said, “Two years ago Putin held a big ceremony where he said these new four regions are now part of the Russian Federation in addition to Crimea, which he annexed back in 2014…So five regions of Russia, five states if you will of the Ukrainian country Putin has already, you know, annexed.”

“On paper,” McFaul continued, Putin “had a big ceremony, there's parades, and the Kremlin and they say he had all these fictitious leaders from these places saying you're now part of Russia, right, but de facto on the ground in reality he doesn't control any of those places 100%.”

McFaul explained the “Donbas is rich in minerals. It's the industrial base of the country. So I think it's like eight or nine percent of the [Ukraine] population…but it's more like 15 percent of

the GDP [gross national product] of the entire country. So it would be a tremendous loss to Ukraine. That is true. Also, half parts of it have been occupied de facto by Russian surrogates

since 2014. So another important thing to realize is that once that happened, many hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians left that territory. They're living all over the place. I have friends from those regions that are living in Germany, living here in the United States, and living in parts, other parts of Ukraine.”

McFaul tied the Donbas to what happened when Trump met with Putin in Alaska on August 15, saying, “We never really got a good readout from what happened in Alaska, but to the best of our understanding, what Putin asked for in Alaska, pretty audacious. He said, Donbas, that's two of those regions, right? That's up in the northwest corner, northeast corner. He said, Mr. President, convince Zelensky to leave Donbas. Remember Ukrainian soldiers and Ukrainians now hold parts of Donbas as we speak…It's Ukrainian held territory and Putin says you got to convince Zelensky to give me those two regions and in return I will stop fighting in those other two regions that I just mentioned. Right? Kherson and Zaporizhzhia…So that's his deal.”

McFaul went on, “That's his offer. And the Ukrainians, you know, I talked to many Ukrainians afterwards. I mean, this is nonsense from them. The idea that they would give up territory that hasn't even been conquered is just a non-starter. But that's what Putin asked for.”

McFaul also set out what he thought the Ukrainians might settle for, while making clear Zelensky had never said it directly.

“I think,” McFaul said, “the part [of Ukraine] that was occupied since 2014 [Crimea, small sections of the Donbas] is a part that Ukrainian people and President Zelensky could live with giving up. Again, I want to stress, they're not going to recognize it as part of Russia, but they could recognize that they will only seek reunification through peaceful means. That's the language...That means that in reality it would be under Russia, you know, as long as Putin's in power.”

McFaul added, “But they're only going to do that if they have some guarantee from the West that by doing that they get something in return for their security. And so when you hear this phrase ‘land for peace,’ the Ukrainians keep saying, well, yeah, you guys keep asking us for land, but you never say what the peace part is. And that is what the conversation [Trump with Zelensky with European leaders] at the White House today [August 21] is, I think, principally focused on.”

Before talking about the Trump/Putin relationship, McFaul gave some interesting personal background about the Russian President.

“I can tell you Putin is an effective interlocutor,” McFaul said, “He is an effective speaker. He will go on and on about Russian history. He'll spin it in his own way. And if you don't know, you know, what happened in the 15th century, and even I don't, you know, so most presidents don't, it's hard to follow. In one meeting with Obama, he [Putin] went on for 58 minutes in the beginning of the meeting before President Obama even had the chance to speak. So that's the way he rolls. I just fear that Trump accepted his, you know, perverse notion of history.”

I saw an example of this side of Putin four years ago, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when a friend suggested I read a 10-page essay published by the Russian President on July 12, 2021, entitled, On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. It can still be accessed on Putin’s website.

Putin began it by writing, “During the recent Direct Line [a TV question-and-answer session with Putin] when I was asked about Russian-Ukrainian relations, I said that Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole. These words were not driven by some short-term considerations or prompted by the current political context. It is what I have said on numerous occasions and what I firmly believe. I therefore feel it necessary to explain my position in detail and share my assessments of today's situation.”

Putin continues to push that idea, as he did on August 16 in his joint press conference with Trump in Alaska, when he described Ukrainians as “a brotherly people, no matter how strange it may sound in today’s circumstances. We share the same roots, and the current situation is tragic and deeply painful to us. Therefore, our country is sincerely interested in ending this.”

At one point in their conversation, Couric asked McFaul, “Do you think that Donald Trump is being played by Putin?”

McFaul answered: “Honestly, I think he [Putin] thinks of Trump as being just a really weak leader and with a little bit of praise and a little bit of, you know, repeating things that are false

that Trump wants to hear, he can win him over…So in Alaska, Putin said, ‘I would have never invaded Ukraine had you been president.’ And that's exactly what Trump wanted to hear.”

McFaul went on, “And then behind closed doors, as we learned later in his conversation with Sean Hannity, Putin went on and on about how the 2020 elections was stolen because of mail-in ballots, because of mail-in voting, right?”

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I studied the Fox Hannity August 15 interview where Trump spoke of “one of the most interesting things” Putin had told him, which was, “Your [the U.S. 2020] election was rigged because of mail-in voting.” Trump then continued. “He [Putin] said mail-in voting, every election. He [Putin] said, no country has mail-in voting. It’s impossible to have mail-in voting and have honest elections.”

McFaul’s response to Trump’s description to Hannity of that portion of his exchange with Putin reflected what other Americans commentators have said.

“I just listened to the President [Trump] talk about that [Putin’s view of the 2020 election],” McFaul said, “and I just can't believe that he [Trump] would be so gullible. Honestly, I guess I should get used to it by now. But what an absurd thing for him [Putin] to claim…How does Putin know that that happened [in the 2020 election]? And no credible American organization, no investigative journalists have uncovered that. But somehow mysteriously the president of Russia knows that it was stolen because there was mail-in voting. And yet the President [Trump] just repeated that and that's how Putin has won him over.”

Three days later, on August 18, Trump messaged on Truth Social: “I am going to lead a movement to get rid of MAIL-IN BALLOTS…We are now the only Country in the World that uses Mail-In Voting. All others gave it up because of the MASSIVE VOTER FRAUD ENCOUNTERED.”

In fact, as reported by Politifact, a Sweden-based organization, Supporting Democracy Worldwide, in an October 2024 report found that at least 20 countries other than the U.S. allow some form of mail-in voting, including Austria, Australia, Japan, India, Canada, Ireland, Greece, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Towards the end of the interview, McFaul said there were two major things he hoped for.

“One,” he said was “the security guarantee that we've been talking about where European soldiers are deployed on Ukrainian territory to help keep the peace. Peacekeepers, you

know, tripwire. I don't really like that word tripwire, but where they're there to just keep that border, right?... And you go up to the border and you see all the soldiers there and you see the barbed wire that keeps the peace.”

The second thing McFaul hoped for involved “about $300 billion dollars of Russian central bank assets and other Russian assets that are in our banks. They were correctly, brilliantly frozen by the G7…back in 2022,” after Putin invaded Ukraine.

McFaul said, “The next move, those assets have to be given to Ukraine. Americans don't want to pay for reconstruction. Europeans don't want to pay for it. That's money is sitting right there.” It would be used, McFaul said, as “part of a sweetener” for Zelensky because “he's got to have something else to give the Ukrainian people” to keep fighting against the Russians.

McFaul’s closing point is worth remembering.

Referring to the NATO allies at the White House with Zelensky, McFaul said it should “remind everybody that Moscow, neither the Soviets or the Russians, have never attacked a NATO

country. So NATO expansion has helped to keep the peace especially in places like the Baltic states. But also NATO has never attacked the Soviet Union or Russia. And so we shouldn't buy into this argument that it's a threat to Russia. It's not a threat to Russia…We have to think about NATO as an alliance that preserves the peace rather than causes conflict.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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It’s Time to "Fight Like Hell" for Ukraine, Not Capitulate

OPINION — By now, much of the world has increasingly started to truly understand just how far Russia’s Vladimir Putin is from Ukraine and the West when it comes to wanting peace. The world has watched in horror as Putin’s military savages Ukraine’s cities, homes, schools, and hospitals. Every day brings new footage of children pulled from rubble, of civilians killed in missile strikes, of infrastructure bombed not for strategic value, but for the sole purpose of breaking Ukraine’s will. And yet—amid this brutality—some in the West continue to push for Ukrainian restraint, for a stop to the fighting on Russia’s terms, and for concessions that reward invasion with territory and more. Are we really going to let parts of Ukraine be gobbled up and crushed while lecturing its people about compromise?

Enough. It’s time to shift from timid appeasement to strategic dominance. That means helping Ukraine win.

Let’s be clear: helping Ukraine win does not mean rolling into Moscow. It means driving Russian forces out of Ukraine’s sovereign territory, restoring borders, and crushing the Kremlin’s ability to wage aggressive war. It means showing the world—especially Russia and China—that democracies won’t fold when authoritarian powers try to redraw maps by force.

Today, Russia’s forces are grinding forward in eastern Ukraine. They’re threatening key cities like Pokrovsk, gaining psychological momentum and physical ground. Their industrial war machine, now increasingly operating at scale, churns out killer drones and missiles with near impunity. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s defenders are struggling to hold the line, their supplies thin and their populations and cities vulnerable.

This must stop. The West has the tools to shift the war’s balance and, thereby, also re-position the terms of negotiations.

And this should appeal to the U.S. president who likes negotiating from a position of strength--with real teeth--that sets up an actual negotiated deal versus an endless series of meetings, threats, and peace plans, all while Ukraine bleeds and Putin makes gains at home and in Ukraine. And while China's Xi watches.

And here's a vital point: just talking about these measures shifts the strategic landscape, which occurred when the U.S. president said he was displeased with Putin and was going to enact secondary sanctions on Russia’s oil sales several weeks ago.

If the West shows that it’s truly serious, then even before the first missile flies or sanction bites, the pressure changes. Negotiations would no longer be about what Ukraine must give up, but what Russia must stop doing if it wants to survive economically and militarily. That’s how we change the West's and Ukraine's negotiating strength.

Marching Orders

Let’s start with the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets sitting in Western coffers. Right now, we allow the interest from that money to support Ukraine. That’s a timid half-measure. Instead, seize the principal—yes, all of it—over time for Ukraine’s war fighting, even greater arms industrialization, including for Western weapons manufacturers and suppliers to Ukraine, and eventual reconstruction. Ukraine should not have to beg for bullets while Putin builds still more drones and bombs, even if it is with money from his dwindling reserves and oil sales.

Second, flood Ukraine with advanced air defense systems—Patriots, IRIS-Ts, SAMP/Ts—and establish partnerships with Western defense manufacturers to scale up weapons production on European and U.S. soil in a substantial and even more rapid way. Some efforts have started; now it’s time to turbocharge them. Protect Ukraine’s people, skies, cities, and infrastructure with urgency—not over years, but in months or less.

Third, end the restrictions that prevent Ukraine from striking targets inside Russia. Right now, many of Moscow’s war factories, command and control facilities, logistics hubs, and more operate untouched—safe in the knowledge that Western-supplied weapons can’t reach them. That’s a strategic gift to the Kremlin. Let Ukraine hit back. Let Russia feel the ramifications of its monstrous violence and aggression.

Germany, for example, has long-range Taurus cruise missiles—precisely the type of weapons Ukraine needs to take out heavily defended targets inside Russian-occupied territory as well as Russian supply lines, command and control locations, and key choke points, such as bridges. Berlin has offered to help Ukraine develop long-range capability, but won’t supply the Taurus directly due to fears it could be used on Russian soil. Enough. Send the missiles. Give Ukraine the range, precision, and firepower to make continued Russian brutality and escalation come at a steep cost.

Fourth, oil—Putin’s lifeblood. Russia’s war machine runs on fossil fuel revenue. The West’s oil price cap has been riddled with loopholes and weak enforcement from the start. It’s time to fix that. Impose debilitating secondary sanctions and tariffs on every country that buys Russian oil in large quantities or above the price cap—without exception. No more free passes for China, India (against which Washington has imposed additional tariffs beginning later this month), NATO member Turkey, or any others, including European nations. Slash the price cap. Reduce the volume that can be sold. Make every barrel of oil that Moscow sells return even less with which it can kill Ukrainians.

And fifth, harshly go after Russia's economy across the board. As Ukraine’s Presidential Office Head, Andriy Yermak, recently argued in The Washington Post, the West must disconnect Gazprombank from SWIFT, and cut off Russia’s access to the international financial system if it really wants to change the ballgame. Also, target Rosatom, Roscosmos, and every other state agency enabling Russia’s war economy. Squeeze them out of global markets. Shut down dual-use technology transfers, and prosecute those enabling Russian logistics and cyber operations, including crypto infrastructure providers.

Teaching All Authoritarians a Lesson

Predictably, Russia will forcefully lash out. There will be even more aggression against Ukraine, and nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction saber-rattling, as well as increased "gray zone" attacks, cyber strikes and campaigns, information operations and propaganda, and much more.

Putin thrives on fear. But if we give in to it now, such as with one-sided territorial and other concessions on Putin's terms, we will pay much, much more later—in Ukraine, in Taiwan, in other parts of Europe, including the Baltics, and beyond.

The lesson to dictators must be this: war, rape, child abductions, torture, and genocidal conquest will not be tolerated. There will be powerful, punishing consequences and you will lose.

It’s time to stop hiding behind “avoiding escalation.” Russia escalated years ago when it invaded Ukraine not once but twice. It continues to escalate daily with every missile strike on civilians, every drone attack on power stations and other infrastructure, every load of kidnapped children taken to be “re-educated” and adopted in Russia.

We must make Putin pay the costs--gargantuan costs--that come with carrying out a war and brutality, thereby compelling him and his supporters to reel back and suffer, and causing other authoritarians and dictators considering a similar path to see their dreadful fate too.

History does not reward those who counsel surrender and accept an ill-conceived and dangerous precedent in the face of evil (e.g., Neville Chamberlain). It remembers those who fought back—and those who helped them win. Ukraine still has the will to fight. What it needs is for the West to match that will and action. Fight, fight, fight, as the U.S. president likes to say — and help Ukraine win.

This is the moment. No appeasement. No more half-measures. No more fear.

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Saudi Crown Prince Prepares for a Washington Reset — With Trillions at Stake

EXCLUSIVE EXPERT INTERVIEW -- Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is expected to visit Washington this November according to sources cited by Bloomberg, as the two countries work to finalize details around the hundreds of millions of dollars in business deals that were signed during the U.S. president’s visit to Riyadh in May.

Though the White House hasn’t publicly confirmed the meeting, it would mark the Crown Prince’s first visit to the U.S. since the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, and is expected to focus primarily on commitments to invest in artificial intelligence, defense and energy as well as regional stability concerns.

Beyond the business though, analysts say the meetings need to further deepen trust between Saudi Arabia and Washington at a time when alliances are having a significant impact in every region of the world.

“The time may well be coming when the U.S. and China will face off and we will need to ask our Gulf partners to stand with us in that tough moment,” former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI Norm Roule. “To do this, we need closer and more regular visits by the Saudi Crown Prince, as well as the Emirati President of the United Arab Emirates Mohammed bin Zayed.”

In a Cipher Brief exclusive expert interview, we asked Roule, who now works as an energy analyst and routinely travels to the Middle East for high-level talks with officials, about framing realistic expectations for a possible November visit.

Norman T. Roule

Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.

The Cipher Brief: What do you expect will be the key issues on the table during this meeting in November at the White House, if it does indeed happen?

Roule: The purpose of the trip is to complete the multiple commercial, economic, defense, and energy agreements developed during the unprecedented meetings by President Trump, U.S. cabinet ministers, and several dozen senior U.S. business leaders in the Kingdom in May 2025. These deals are viewed as socially and economically transformational agreements by the Kingdom. For the U.S., these deals will bring decades of valuable commercial engagement, worth somewhere between USD 600 billion and USD 1.5 trillion in trade to the U.S. The Crown Prince will travel to the U.S. as Prime Minister and a guest of the White House which requires a different protocol than in 2018. The schedule will likely be more formal. I would expect his visit, therefore, to be focused on the White House, Congress, and the Department of Commerce.

The Cipher Brief: We saw a number of agreements signed during President Trump’s visit to Riyadh in May, as you mentioned. How would you expect those agreements to be furthered during this trip? In other words, what would success look like in November?

Roule: For the U.S., it will be easy to look to the financial size of each deal, the number of jobs each brings, and where, and so on. Indeed, that’s important and I expect policymakers will cite these achievements. But we should also think about this architecturally. What will these investments mean to the associated industries of each country in the long term? The real benefits lay in the answer to that question because here we see how the success will transform the societies of each country.

Beyond business, the trip needs to deepen the relationship to allow us to turn to each other on other issues in the future. Events – good or bad – are all sitting on the horizon. They are best managed with partners we trust who are seen as stabilizing actors. The best way to build trust is to increase the frequency of contact between our various leaders.

The existing process of semiannual strategic dialogues is useful, but more of this is needed to build the trust and confidence needed to respond to the challenges our countries now confront. The time may well be coming when the U.S. and China will face off and we will need to ask our Gulf partners to stand with us in that tough moment. To do this, we need closer and more regular visits by the Saudi Crown Prince, as well as the Emirati President of the United Arab Emirates Mohammed bin Zayed.

Over the last decade, Gulf leaders have become routine players on the world stage. For example, over the last three years, around fifty world leaders have visited Riyadh, including those of the U.S., China, Russia, and India. Riyadh has hosted summits of leaders from Africa, Central Asia, the Caribbean, the GCC, the Arab League, and Islamic countries. The Crown Prince himself has visited around ten countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. And it was no coincidence that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy called the Saudi Crown Prince in the build-up to the meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin in Alaska.

The bottom line is that the issues we each confront, the investments we are making in each other, and the scale of our respective security commitments requires the sort of communication and relationship that can best be achieved by frequent personal interaction between Saudi leaders and our own public and private sector officials here in the U.S.

The Cipher Brief: Let’s go back to the May 2025 deals for a moment. How have follow-up discussions proceeded since those deals were announced? And beyond high-tech and energy, what other sectors of trade do you consider essential to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia?

Roule: We should look at this in two parts. First, Gulf and U.S. private sector partners have continued to meet. At least a half dozen major agreements have been concluded since May. In terms of the official management of the commercial and technical agreements, my understanding is that the Trump administration remains fully committed to doing whatever it can to fulfill the promises made by the President. In fairness, these deals are complicated, and the Department of Commerce has had quite a bit to do over the summer with tariff deals, but I expect the major issues will be sorted by November.

In terms of other sectors, it may not be the first thing that comes to mind, but we and the Saudis have significant shared interests in mining and critical minerals. Cooperation between Washington and Riyadh in the mining sector has grown significantly in recent years. It is a subject that touches national security, economic, energy, industrial development, China, Africa, private/public sector partnerships, state capital deployment, and other strategic issues that cut across government departments.

Mining license issuance has more than doubled in the Kingdom in the first half of this year alone as the Kingdom seeks local and foreign sources of lithium, copper, nickel, and other minerals needed to build renewable energy systems. This issue hasn’t been lost on the Trump administration, which signed an MOU on mining and mineral cooperation during the President’s visit for joint exploration, processing, and the integration of critical mineral supply chains essential for our manufacturing, defense technologies, and renewable energy sectors. The hope is that by aligning Saudi Arabia’s largely untapped mineral wealth with U.S. technology and training, the Kingdom will achieve its Vision 2030 goals while diversifying its supply chain by reducing China’s hold on critical minerals.

I don’t expect many surprises from the meeting in November, but I do think we should expect the Trump administration to be forward leaning in terms of engagement. We may see an expansion in the sale of significant military technology. If the U.S. believes the region needs to play a greater role in this area, sooner or later, we will need to sell them a military deterrent against Iran. If we can sell advanced military technology to Israel to deter Iran, many will reasonably argue that there is no reason why we shouldn’t be selling the same technology to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

The Cipher Brief: On the foreign policy front, with the ongoing Israeli operation in Gaza, how might the current Saudi role in Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese issues play out during the November trip?

Roule: The world can change many times between now and November, but at present, the visit is not expected to have any connection to Israel or the Palestinian issue. In terms of Saudi foreign policy in that area, it has been robust. The Saudis have maintained their posture as the leading diplomatic actor in the region, a difficult challenge given the intensity of the Gaza humanitarian issue, the complexity of Syrian and Lebanese politics, and the many different viewpoints within the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council. But I think we can point to several examples of successful Saudi foreign policy that are consistent with long-standing U.S. foreign policy goals.”

First, on Palestine, the Saudis played a leading role in a recent Arab League statement calling on Hamas to disarm and transfer control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority in a two-state solution with Israel that also calls for a freeze on Israeli settlement expansion. Riyadh recently signed several agreements with the Palestinian Authority in which it will assist with human resources development, education curriculum development, and the establishment of an electronic system by which Palestinians can access their payments from and administrative engagement with the Palestinian Authority. Seemingly mundane, this will allow reforms in areas that many have claimed have promoted the worst form of extremism and even terrorism within the Palestinian territories. The Kingdom has also committed $300 million to infrastructure assistance for Gaza and the West Bank.

On Syria and Lebanon, Riyadh has engaged both politically and economically with Beirut and Damascus for months and in close cooperation with Washington. It is no secret that the Saudis have sought to reduce Iran’s influence in these countries and see the revival of the Lebanese and Syrian economies and establishment of stable governments in these countries as the keys to doing so. Riyadh encouraged the Trump administration to lift sanctions on Syria and sent its investment minister, along with a number of business professionals to Damascus, accompanied by an offer of commitment of more than $6 billion in investment to spur Syrian employment. Riyadh and Doha also paid off Syria’s outstanding World Bank loans, enabling more funding to Damascus from that institution. This consistent attention to stability in the Levant has huge potential for the entire region and deserves our strongest support.

The Cipher Brief: We always close with a question on the Saudi economy and oil. Give us a quick run through on the status of the economy, its strengths, weaknesses, and near-term outlook.

Roule: Despite the downturn in oil prices and intense regional competition for foreign investment, the Kingdom’s economy is doing relatively well. The loss of revenue will delay some projects, but the Kingdom’s overall modernization strategy and the main projects seen as crucial to achieving that strategy remain unchanged. This unwavering focus and the level of planning behind each project – and some recent cost cutting – has been the secret of their overall success.

In terms of economic details, let me run through some numbers. Inflation is approximately 2.3 percent, unemployment about 2.8 percent, and women make up more than 36 percent of the workforce. Perhaps the best news in the recent IMF report was that youth and female unemployment have been cut in half over the past four years.

Non-oil is now more than half of the economy, in line with Saudi targets. Entertainment has been a particularly strong support. Liberalizing mortgages helped the local construction industry. And this month will see another E-sports world cup in the Kingdom. It remains ironic that the Kingdom has found success in a tourist event that is held during the hottest month of the year by recognizing that this event can only be held indoors. On sports, Riyadh continues to be keen on increasing its role in golf and tennis. I think we will hear more about this in the future as the associated leagues seem to be coming to terms with the Kingdom’s involvement. But Saudi economists won’t be able to take much for granted. Fortunately, Riyadh boasts some impressive economists and technical planners, so I don’t think this will be a significant problem.

Looking forward, oil will continue to account for a significant share of government revenue. This will gradually decline over time, but I suspect not as fast as Riyadh would like. Competition for foreign investment will continue to intensify in the region but such competition is good for everyone.

The challenge is that if revenue is maintained at a respectable level, spending won’t let up. Vision 2030 and Vision 2040 revenue demands probably seem insatiable to ministers. I don’t expect that to change. Deficits are likely to remain a new normal throughout this decade. And Riyadh will keep looking more to the private sector for local investment and liberalizing foreign ownership to encourage foreign investors. Careful borrowing is also expected to become the new normal.

In terms, of specific projects, ministers will work hard to expand local manufacturing in the automotive and semiconductor sectors to meet ambitious Vision 2030 goals. The Kingdom will also need to keep a close eye on giga projects to ensure they don’t drain capital and resources from the broader infrastructure development ecosystem.

All of this will be tough work. But my conversations with the Kingdom’s leaders tell me they are aware of these issues and believe they’re up to the task.

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It’s Time to Show Putin that the U.S. is Serious

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – As we reach a temporary ceasefire in diplomatic progress aimed at ending the war in Ukraine - a war that has cost the lives of more than a million people and has caused billions of dollars in damage – there is still a path we haven’t yet taken. One of maximum pressure. As of now, no agreement has been reached, no breakthrough achieved, no path forward identified, but the events of the past couple of weeks have made a few things crystal clear.

The first is that Russian President Vladimir Putin has no intention of ending the war he started on anything other than his own terms, which have not changed since the war began. Putin wants to occupy all of Ukraine and if that is not achievable through force alone, he will do his bet to turn the remainder of Ukraine into the 21st Century version of Vichy France.

Whatever contrary messaging Trump’s hopelessly overmatched envoy Steve Witkoff may have delivered, there can no longer be any doubt in the President’s mind of Putin’s intentions.

As Russia continues to bomb Ukrainian civilian targets throughout the period of negotiations including before and after the summit in Anchorage, Alaska, President Trump must now see clearly Putin’s love of brutality and his belief that he can win this war militarily.

It should also be clear to President Trump that his administration made a tactical and perhaps strategic blunder by granting Putin a meeting on U.S. soil with no concessions by the Russian side agreed to in advance. The U.S. move allowed Putin to end his diplomatic isolation, get a photo opportunity on U.S. soil for his constituents at home and seemingly disregard his history as an indicted war criminal.

In Putin’s mind, the summit was a meeting of equals and it was represented as such in the Russian press. This, despite Russia being a superpower only in that it possesses a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons. The U.S. is a superpower economically, militarily, and culturally. These are the reasons why Anchorage was a big win for Putin and an embarrassment for the U.S. But we can still fix this.

The White House meeting that followed the Trump-Putin talks, was an impressive display of allied solidarity that included Ukraine and senior European leaders. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky showed that he had learned some lessons from his previous visit to the Oval Office, this time, frequently and effusively praising President Trump and thanking him for the support the U.S. has provided since Russia’s full-scale invasion began.

Other NATO allies have clearly studied the playbook that Putin uses when manipulating Trump, managing to charm the U.S. president as they did during the NATO summit in the Netherlands earlier this summer. One hopes that President Zelensky and the other leaders effectively explained to President Trump the impossibility of Ukraine being able to accept Putin’s territorial demands, which aren’t only illegal under the Ukraine’s constitution but in Donetsk, they would mean abandoning carefully prepared defensive positions and the abandonment of over 200,000 Ukrainians to Russian occupation. For many, that would be a death sentence or rapid deportation to Russia’s gulags.

So far, the U.S. President has tried using flattery and accommodation bordering on appeasement to get Putin to end this war. It has not worked. He humiliated the Ukrainian President in the Oval Office to get him to do something he could not do—agree to what terms that to many, signify a surrender. The U.S. has cut off military and intelligence support to Ukraine. Still the Ukrainians fought on.

There is still time for the U.S. to act in a meaningful way.

The U.S. President has threatened Russia with “crushing” sanctions. But Putin played “rope-a-dope” and instead got a summit and postponement of sanctions for his efforts. President Trump has now set another deadline. The time for deadlines is over. It is time for action. The only path that has not been tried (but has only been threatened) is to put maximum pressure on Putin and the Russian Federation.

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Here’s how we get there: first, the President should immediately authorize the advancement of pending legislation in the U.S. Congress on sanctions on Russia and purchasers of Russian hydrocarbon products.

Second, the President should use his authority to advance the sale or “lend lease” of military support for Ukraine.

Third, the U.S. should remove any restrictions on Ukrainian use of weapons systems already provided or already committed to help Ukraine defend itself. Let Ukraine take the war to the Russian Federation and make it visible to the people of Russia what is happening. If Putin doesn’t like it, let him end the war and withdraw from Ukrainian territory.

And fourth, the U.S. should restore maximum diplomatic isolation of Russia and publicly call out Russia as the aggressor in this conflict.

In this context, the success President Trump had ending the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict should be leveraged to reduce Russian influence in the Republic of Georgia, long a bastion of pro-U.S. sentiment but recently put under a cloud of Russian interference.

Let the loss of influence in the Caucasus be added to the list of Putin’s strategic failures. Put it on the list right next to Finland and Sweden joining NATO.

Sanctions alone won’t influence Putin, but sanctions, renewed military and financial support for Ukraine, renewed diplomatic isolation, and strategic leverage on Russia’s periphery might.

The path ahead should be clear to the U.S. President, who must now know that he can’t trust Putin. The Russian president is the enemy of the U.S. in every fiber of his being and it’s time for him to pay the price of his folly.

Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Ordinary Russians are Paying for Putin's Poor Alaska Performance

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – The Russian state media's triumphant coverage of Vladimir Putin's August 15 meeting with Donald Trump in Alaska tells a familiar story: the great leader Putin has once again outmaneuvered the West, broken his international isolation, and secured recognition as an equal on the world stage. The reality, however, tells a different story entirely.

While Putin's propagandists work overtime to spin the Alaska meeting as a diplomatic victory, the facts reveal a Russian president who traveled thousands of kilometers only to return home empty-handed, his war machine no closer to achieving its objectives in Ukraine than it was before the meeting.

Thanks to what appears to be U.S. planning documents accidentally left on a hotel printer as reported by National Public Radio, we have a clearer picture of what Putin may have hoped to achieve in Alaska, and what he spectacularly failed to secure. The original itinerary included an expanded working lunch with senior U.S. economic officials, including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Steve Lutnik. Their presence would have signaled American willingness to discuss sanctions relief and expanded trade, the economic lifeline Putin desperately needs as his war economy strains under international pressure.

Instead, Putin found himself in abbreviated meetings with a U.S. president who refused to offer any meaningful concessions without concrete steps toward ending the war in Ukraine. No private tête-à-tête, no economic discussions, no promises of sanctions relief - just the same message the Kremlin has been hearing from the West for over three years now: end the war, then we can talk.

The contrast between Putin's return journey and Trump's is particularly telling. While Trump spent his flight consulting with European allies and announced that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would visit the White House just days later, Putin's "diplomatic triumph" consisted of a factory visit in provincial Magadan, and a phone call with his Belarusian vassal Alexander Lukashenko. For a man who once commanded attention on the global stage, this is a remarkably diminished itinerary.

The Kremlin's attempts to highlight increased U.S.-Russia trade since Trump's return to office only underscore Putin's weak position. These modest increases pale in comparison to the massive economic damage inflicted by three years of sanctions and international isolation.

Russia's economy remains fundamentally distorted by military spending, its demographic crisis deepened by mobilization and emigration, and its technological sector crippled by export restrictions.

What Putin received in Alaska was not recognition of Russian strength, but a final diplomatic opportunity that he appears to have squandered through his continued insistence on maximalist demands in Ukraine. Trump's willingness to meet, despite significant domestic political risks, represented exactly the kind of face-saving diplomatic opening that a more pragmatic Russian leader might have seized upon to begin extracting his country from an increasingly costly quagmire.

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Instead, Putin's intransigence has left him more isolated than ever. His remaining international partners -China, India, Turkey, and the UAE - continue to engage with Moscow primarily for their own economic interests, not out of respect for Russian power or Putin's leadership. But even these relationships are increasingly transactional, with partners carefully avoiding actions that might trigger secondary sanctions.

The most damaging aspect of Putin's missed opportunity in Alaska is not what he failed to achieve internationally, but what his empty-handed return signals domestically.

Three years into a "special military operation" that was supposed to last days, the Russian president has little to show his population beyond mounting casualties, economic hardship, and diplomatic isolation. His inability to secure meaningful concessions from the United States, even from a president theoretically more sympathetic to Russian concerns, exposes the fundamental weakness of his position.

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Putin's war has not made Russia stronger or more respected; it has made the country a pariah state dependent on increasingly costly relationships with authoritarian regimes. His Alaska journey, rather than marking Russia's return to great power status, instead highlights how far the country has fallen from its post-Soviet aspirations to rejoin the community of civilized nations.

The tragedy is that Putin's stubbornness is prolonging a war that is devastating not just Ukraine, but Russia itself. Every day the conflict continues, more Russian families lose sons and fathers, the economy becomes more distorted by military spending, and the country's international isolation deepens. The diplomatic window that Trump opened in Alaska may not remain open indefinitely, and Putin's next opportunity for a face-saving exit may come at an even steeper price.

For ordinary Russians watching state television celebrations of their president's "diplomatic victory," the question should be simple: if Putin won so decisively in Alaska, why is the war still grinding on, why are sanctions still crushing the economy, and why is Russia more isolated than ever? The answer, unfortunately, is that there was no victory at all - only another missed opportunity for a leader increasingly disconnected from both international realities and his own people's interests.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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