The Cipher Brief

DEEP DIVE – As audacious and complex as it was for the U.S. to extract Nicolas Maduro from Venezuela – and to do so without a single U.S. casualty – the challenges ahead may be even harder. “We’re gonna run it,” President Donald Trump said Saturday, referring to a post-Maduro Venezuela. The president gave few details and no specific time frame, saying only that the U.S. would “run the country” until a “safe, proper and judicious transition” could be arranged. U.S. oil companies would return to Venezuela, investing “billions and billions” of dollars to reboot the oil sector and the country’s economy. American “boots on the ground” might be deployed in the interim.

It was a remarkable series of statements from a president who has criticized past American nation-building projects, and it raised questions about how exactly the Trump Administration would “run” a country beset by profound challenges. Venezuela, a country twice the size of Iraq, has endured decades of authoritarian rule, corruption, drug-related violence, and economic pain. And for the moment at least, the country’s leader still pledges allegiance to Maduro.

Miguel Tinker Salas, a Venezuelan historian, Professor Emeritus at Pomona College and Fellow at the Quincy Institute, said that when Trump spoke those words – “we’re gonna run it” – he was stunned.

“Initially, my jaw dropped,” Salas told The Cipher Brief. “Even at the height of U.S. influence in Venezuela, in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, they never said they wanted to run the country. And I don't think the Trump administration comprehends the complexity that they're dealing with for a country as diverse and as big as Venezuela.”

Even those who cheered the U.S. military operation warned of the difficulties that lie ahead. Former National Security Adviser John Bolton, who pronounced himself “delighted” by Maduro’s ouster, told NewsNation the mission was “maybe step one of a much longer process. Maduro is gone but the regime is still in place.”

“Maduro’s fall is good for Venezuela and the United States,” Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security, posted on X. “It was a brilliant military operation and the world should be better off because of it. Whether it WILL in fact be better off depends on what happens next. One of the lessons of other regime-change operations is not to topple a government without a plan for what comes next. What comes next in Venezuela seems as vague as the plan for running postwar Gaza under a ‘Board of Peace’.”

The Venezuelans who might lead

At a news conference following Maduro’s capture, Trump said that Delcy Rodriguez, the regime’s vice president, would lead Venezuela as long as she “does what we want.” And he suggested the U.S. would enforce that arrangement at the barrel of a gun.

“We’re not afraid of boots on the ground,” Trump said, adding that the U.S. might deploy “a second wave” of forces if Venezuelan officials or troops don’t go along with Washington’s wishes. The U.S. naval presence near Venezuela remains in place – the largest such deployment in the region since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

A day later, Secretary of State Marco Rubio painted a slightly different picture of the U.S. role. “It’s not running — it’s running policy, the policy with regards to this,” he said.

But Rubio and Trump were clear about the overall approach: in essence, Do what we say, and things will be fine.

“We’re going to make decisions based on their actions and their deeds in the days and weeks to come,” Rubio told The New York Times. “We think they’re going to have some unique and historic opportunities to do a great service for the country, and we hope that they’ll accept that opportunity.”

It’s not clear that Rodriguez, the former Vice President, will be a pliant ally. She was sworn in Monday as interim president, after almost immediately accusing the U.S. of invading her country on Saturday. She called the operation “a barbarity,” and in an address to the nation said that Maduro was still Venezuela’s head of state.

“There is only one president in this country, and his name is Nicolás Maduro Moros,” Rodriguez said, with other senior officials at her side. Venezuela, she said, would never agree to being a U.S. "colony."

A day later she struck a less defiant note, calling on the U.S. to work with her government on an “agenda of cooperation oriented towards shared development.” She added that “we prioritize moving towards balanced and respectful international relations between the United States and Venezuela."

It’s not at all clear that’s what Trump has in mind; he insisted that Rodriguez would comply with his wishes – one way or another. "She had a long conversation with Marco [Rubio], and she said, 'We'll do whatever you need,'” Trump said. “I think she was quite gracious, but she really doesn't have a choice.” On Sunday he upped the ante, telling The Atlantic that if Rodriguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro.”

Experts said Rodriguez will have to navigate an almost impossible political tightrope.

“She claims to represent a socialist party opposed to U.S. intervention and to U.S. meddling in her internal affairs – so how does she rationalize this to her base?” Salas said. “This is a very difficult, challenging position for her to be in – to on the one hand promise social change reforms, a continuation of Maduro, and at the same time, now become compliant in providing oil to the United States.”

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Beyond Rodriguez, who serves as both Vice President and minister for oil, other Maduro regime leaders remain in place, including the military chief General Vladimir Padrino Lopez and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello. They have denounced Maduro’s abduction as well – Padrino vowed to resist “the most criminal military aggression” and ordered a mobilization of Venezuelan forces on land, sea, and air.

Experts have warned of splits within the army – between hardliners who may refuse to support anyone who bows to Trump’s demands, and others who will stand with Rodriguez no matter what. Such divides could lead to violence and – if Trump is true to his word – a deployment of U.S. “boots on the ground.”

Michael Shifter, a former president of the Inter-American Dialogue, said that while Rodriguez might be able to deliver on Trump’s demands to open up the oil sector, other critical tasks will prove more challenging.

“It will be exceedingly difficult if not impossible for her to tame the entrenched corruption and widespread criminality in the country while leaving the machinery of Chavista governance intact,” Shifter told The Cipher Brief, using a term for policies begun by Maduro’s predecessor Hugo Chavez. “The risks that chaos, violence and instability will ensue are high, and under that scenario the U.S. would have no choice but to send in troops to stabilize the situation.”

“Control of the military is essential for control of Venezuela, particularly in this unstable moment,” Salas said. “And so far, the commanding general of the military, Padrino, has shown no disposition to break with the PSUV [Maduro’s party].”

Absent in the Trump plans for now is any role for the Venezuelan opposition. The main opposition leader, Maria Corina Machado, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last month, issued a statement urging that her political ally, Edmundo Gonzalez, be recognized as Venezuela’s president. Gonzalez was widely seen as the rightful winner of the 2024 presidential vote. “Today we are prepared to enforce our mandate and take power,” Machado said.

But in his news conference after Maduro’s capture, Trump never mentioned Gonzalez, and threw cold water on the prospects of a role for Machado.

"I think it'd be very tough for her to be the leader," Trump said. "She doesn't have the support or the respect within the country. She's a very nice woman, but she doesn't have the respect."

Those remarks left Machado in the odd position of having won her goal of Maduro’s exit, while failing to win the backing of Washington. Salas said Venezuelans he had spoken with “were disillusioned about the fact that Trump essentially threw her under the bus.”

Asked Saturday which American officials would “run” Venezuela, Trump nodded to Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and General Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who flanked the president during his news conference. “The people that are standing right behind me, we’re going to be running it,” Trump said.

That drew a rebuke from Elliott Abrams, a Senior Fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations and longtime hawk in terms of U.S. policy in Latin America.

“Venezuelans wanted Maduro out and voted against him,” Abrams wrote on the organization’s website. “They did not vote for U.S. rule, and pursuing that path will create instability—exactly what Trump does not want.”

The oil factor

In the months-long runup to Maduro’s capture, as the U.S. deployed naval forces to the Caribbean and attacked alleged drug traffickers from the air, the Trump administration justified its actions by invoking the drug trade and the illegitimacy of Maduro’s rule. Oil was rarely mentioned.

Now, as U.S. officials explain their post-Maduro plans, oil is front and center.

Over the weekend, Trump accused Venezuela of seizing U.S. oil assets in the country, and said U.S. companies would return to operate Venezuela’s state-controlled oil reserves, “spend billions of dollars” and “start making money for the country.”

U.S. oil companies have a long history in Venezuela, dating to the early 20th century, when they came at the government’s invitation to explore and develop oil reserves. Gulf, Shell, and Standard Oil were among the early arrivals, in what proved to be a symbiotic relationship: the companies earned billions of dollars, and Venezuela grew rich; by the mid-1970s, oil revenues had helped make it the wealthiest nation, per capita, in Latin America.

In 1976, Venezuela nationalized its oil industry, creating a state-owned company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), that continued to partner with foreign companies. More than two decades later, President Hugo Chavez renegotiated contracts with foreign oil companies to boost Venezuela’s share of the profits, a move that prompted ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips to leave the country.

Ultimately, Venezuela’s oil sector and its broader economy suffered the consequences – a deteriorating oil infrastructure, and U.S. sanctions on Venezuela and the PDVSA. Today, Venezuela produces fewer than one million barrels of oil a day, down from roughly 3.5 million in 1997, and more than 90 percent of Venezuelans live in poverty.

“Venezuela has been a problem both for the United States and for the Venezuelan people for over 20 years,” Paul Kolbe, a former Director of The Intelligence Project at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, told The Cipher Brief. “For the Chavez years and then the Maduro years, they've driven a country that was once one of the wealthiest in the world, and certainly the wealthiest in South America…into the ground through corruption, poor leadership, poor decisions, and oppression of the people.”

Only one U.S. oil company – Chevron – has remained in Venezuela, operating under joint ventures with the PDVSA. Rubio’s and Trump’s remarks suggest that the U.S. intends to force Rodriguez, the interim leader, to offer favorable conditions to other American companies.

But experts aren’t sure the others will return.

Ali Moshiri, who oversaw Chevron’s operations in Venezuela until 2017, said the big oil firms won’t go back until they clear signs of change.

“Not many companies are going to rush to go into an environment where there’s not stability,” Moshiri told The New York Times. He also said that while Chevron and smaller operators could boost the country’s oil output slightly in the short term, a more robust expansion would take years, given the political situation, the state of the country’s oil infrastructure, and the time needed to reestablish operations in the country.

Salas echoed the point. “Exporting oil from Venezuela is a challenge,” he told The Cipher Brief. “The infrastructure has collapsed. The oil itself that has to be pumped out of the ground is heavy crude, which requires a lot of technology, and billions of dollars of investment. So I'm not convinced that American companies are going to be running in.”

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A long history of regime change

The Maduro mission came exactly 36 years after the surrender of another Latin American dictator – Panama’s Manuel Noriega – to face drug charges in the U.S. That operation had its detractors, but in the history of U.S. regime-change missions, it probably counts as a relative success story. The list of other cases is long – and while each episode had its own specific history, there have been few good outcomes.

To take three very different examples: The 2003 decapitation of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq – which involved a huge force of “boots on the ground” – was celebrated initially by President George W. Bush in a “Mission Accomplished” speech, only to unravel in a fierce domestic insurgency that lasted for years, cost more than 4,000 American lives, and led – indirectly – to the rise of the Islamic State. The Kennedy administration backed a coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963; Diem was later murdered, unrest followed, and in his memoirs, President Lyndon Johnson blamed the coup for the escalation of the Vietnam War. In Iran, the nationalization of the oil industry was at the heart of a coup orchestrated by the U.S. and Britain in 1953 to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. That led to the return to power of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi – and ultimately to the revolution that brought an Islamic theocracy to power in Tehran in 1979.

“I immediately am reminded of Iraq, where the military operation was well done and we removed Saddam Hussein pretty quickly in 2003, but then what came after was not great,” Glenn Corn, a former CIA Senior Executive, told The Cipher Brief. “So I hope we've learned that lesson and we're not going to repeat the mistakes we made there.”

Salas noted that one lesson of the Iraq War involved the perils of driving out the remnants of an ousted regime. “The lesson learned in Iraq was when they attempted to expunge the Ba’ath Party, they realized that they had utter chaos because there was no one there to run the government, no one with experience,” he said. “You had the nation fracture into particular sections, regions, strongmen, military individuals, and others. If that happened in Venezuela, it would be chaotic. The country's very big, very diverse. It has oil regions, it has urban areas, it has an industrial base. So you could imagine that happening on a national scale.”

To some, the Maduro operation was reminiscent of an earlier era of American “gunboat diplomacy,” when the U.S. military was deployed regularly to seize territory and resources. The New York Times’ David Sanger noted that Trump installed a portrait of William McKinley in the White House – and it was President McKinley who presided over the U.S. seizures of the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico.

“The U.S. operation, in seeking to assert control over a vast Latin American nation, has little precedent in recent decades,” Sanger wrote, “recalling the imperial U.S. military efforts of the 19th and early 20th centuries in Mexico, Nicaragua and other countries.”

What comes next

Given the uncertainties of the moment, experts said the next phase in Venezuela will hinge on answers to several core questions:

Does the Trump administration have an arrangement with Rodriguez and other Maduro regime officials to do the White House’s bidding? If not, how will the U.S. respond if they fail to oblige? Does the U.S. have a plan to remove those leaders? What might trigger that “second wave” Trump referred to, and the deployment of U.S. forces to the country?

What milestones must be met for the end of the interim period? Would elections follow – and would the U.S. organize or oversee those? What will the major U.S. oil companies do?

“Uncertainties abound in Venezuela about what comes next,” Shifter said. “For now, a framework of coerced cooperation between the Venezuelan regime, now led by Delcy Rodriguez, and the Trump administration, seems to be in effect. But it is far from clear whether that model is viable, much less sustainable.”

Fontaine said that “the default could well be to work with a compliant President Delcy and most of the existing government. It would be a head of state change more than regime change.” But he added that such an arrangement would do little to satisfy the opposition – the same people who have cheered the news of Maduro’s capture. “Many would-be supporters of this move hoped for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela, not just a different approach on drugs and oil.”

He also noted that Trump was hardly the first president to decry nation-building projects, only to wind up taking them on.

“For 25 years, every U.S. president has opposed nation-building abroad and then gotten involved in it,” Fontaine said. “Trump, with the commitment to run Venezuela, appears to be the latest. The welcome fall of Maduro is not the end, or the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.”

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I've Tracked Terrorist Networks for Decades. I've Never Seen Anything Like 764.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — In 2021, a fifteen-year-old in a small Texas town started something from his bedroom. He’d dropped out of school. He spent his days online, deep into violence and gore. He found others like him and built a network. He named it after his ZIP code: 764.

Within two years, it had spread to every continent. Members – a lot of them teenagers – were finding kids as young as nine on Minecraft and Roblox. They’d befriend them, earn their trust, then trap them. They forced children to hurt themselves on camera. To hurt animals. To do things I’m not going to describe here. That kid from Texas is serving eighty years now. But 764 didn’t stop. It splintered and kept growing.

The FBI currently has over 300 active cases in the U.S. – investigations running in every single field office across the country. They’re looking at more than 350 people tied to the network. Worldwide, authorities believe there are thousands of victims. Arrests connected to groups like 764 jumped nearly 500% in 2025 compared to 2024.

The FBI ranks 764 as a “tier one” threat. That’s the same level as ISIS. Last year, Canada became the first country to officially call 764 a terrorist organization. Not a crime ring. Not predators. Terrorists.

I ran the State Department’s programs against violent extremism. I’ve studied how terrorist groups find and recruit people for most of my career. Canada got this one right.

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What Canada Did

Calling something a terrorist organization isn’t just a label. It changes what governments can do. In Canada, the designation means that anyone who helps 764 – with money, with recruitment, with anything – is now committing a crime. Banks have to freeze assets. Immigration can block people at the border. Law enforcement gets access to tools they can’t use for regular crimes. It also sends a message. When a country puts a group on the same list as Hezbollah and the Islamic State, it tells allies, tech companies, and the public: this is serious. Pay attention.

Canada’s intelligence service says nearly one in ten of their terrorism investigations now involves a minor. Think about that. We’re not talking about kids as victims – we’re talking about kids as suspects in terrorism cases.

How They Find Kids

764 doesn’t stumble onto victims. They go looking for specific kinds of kids. Depressed kids. Lonely ones. Kids who get picked on at school. Kids who cut themselves or post about wanting to disappear. They hunt for these signs in Discord servers, on Roblox, in Minecraft – places your kid probably hangs out.

When they find someone, they’re patient. They don’t ask for anything. They just show up. They say “I get it” and “you’re not crazy” and “I’ve been there.” If you’re a thirteen-year-old who feels invisible, having someone actually listen? That hits different.

Weeks go by. Maybe months. They share darker stuff. Normalize it. Then they ask for a photo – something the kid wouldn’t want anyone to see. Once they have that, everything changes.

“Send more or we show everyone.”

Most blackmail is about money. Not 764. They want content. They make kids film themselves getting hurt. Humiliated. Some get pushed toward suicide attempts—on camera, while the network watches.

One mother told investigators her daughter carved a screen name into her arm with a razor blade. When she finished, the guy on the other end told her he loved her.

Her daughter said it back.

Victims Become Recruiters

Here’s what turns 764 from a bunch of predators into an actual network. Members earn status by producing “content.” The worse the content, the higher they climb. They keep files on their victims – records of what they made them do—and trade them like trophies. Kids who started as victims become perpetrators because that’s how you move up.

In Connecticut, a former honor roll student got caught up in 764. She ended up making bomb threats against her own school – threats phoned in by someone overseas who she thought was her friend. When police searched her devices, they found abuse images, photos of self-harm, and pictures of her paying tribute to the network. Her mom told ABC News, that “It was very difficult to process, because we didn’t raise her to engage in that kind of activity.” That’s the thing. Nobody raises their kid for this. These children get found, groomed, trapped, and turned. One researcher put it simply, “The most horrendous part is it’s minors doing this to minors.”

This Is Terrorism

I know – it sounds like the worst kind of predator ring. So why call it terrorism? Because it works exactly like the terrorist networks I’ve tracked for years. Find someone in pain. Give them a worldview that makes sense of that pain. Then get them to act on it.

764 finds broken kids and tells them the world deserves to burn. That cruelty is honesty. That hurting people is power. The ideology underneath is simple: chaos for its own sake. No political demands. No territory. Just destruction as the point.

Then they turn victims into recruiters – kids climb the ranks by trapping other kids. The ones who got groomed become the groomers. And it doesn’t stay online.

Last July, a 764 member in Minnesota stabbed a woman twenty times. In Germany, authorities arrested someone connected to the network on over 120 charges — including murder. In Finland, police are investigating whether two teen suicides are linked to 764. The network shares guides on how to plan real-world attacks. This isn’t abuse that sometimes leads to terrorism. It’s a terrorism pipeline that uses child abuse as its on-ramp.

Why the U.S. Hasn’t Moved

So Canada calls this terrorism. Why haven’t we? Our laws weren’t built for this. We’ve got tools to go after foreign terrorist groups. We’ve got tools to prosecute child predators. But 764 started in Texas, spread everywhere, and mixes exploitation with extremism in ways that confuse the system.

Right now, we’re going after these guys one at a time for the abuse. That puts individuals in prison. But it treats 764 like random criminals instead of a network with a shared playbook and a body count that keeps growing. The FBI calls it “one of the most disturbing things we’re seeing.” The Attorney General calls it “one of the most heinous online child exploitation enterprises we have ever encountered.” Meanwhile, kids keep getting trapped. The network keeps growing. And we keep treating each case like it exists in a vacuum.

Canada made a call. We should make the same one.

Cipher Brief Expert Dexter Ingram also publishes on Substack Code Name: Citizen

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Venezuela’s Key Takeaways for the World

CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT INTERVIEW – While the U.S. operation to detain Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro took just hours to execute, a full assessment of its global impact will take weeks or months to fully understand in part, because of the complicated dynamic connecting the country’s assets, allies and oil.

“Venezuela is what I would call one of those hyphenated accounts,” says Norm Roule, a global energy expert who also served as former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI. “Venezuela in and of itself is important, but it's also Venezuela/oil, Venezuela/Russia, Venezuela/China, Venezuela/Cuba. There are a lot of different accounts and issues that must be taken into consideration.”

Venezuela’s partners depend on it for various strategic reasons: Cuba for economic support, Iran for political alignment in Latin America, and China for a notable share of its oil imports. The United States, meanwhile, is signaling a major shift in how it intends to assert influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Cipher Brief Executive Editor Brad Christian talked with Roule, a leading global consultant on Middle East and Energy issues, about what is likely to happen next as the U.S. signals a major shift in how it intends to assert influence in the Western Hemisphere. Their conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

Norman T. Roule

Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I)\n at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.

THE INTERVIEW

The Cipher Brief: The Trump administration recently released an updated national security strategy that weighed heavily on the Western hemisphere. Are we seeing perhaps the first kind of inclination that this is going to actually be something to pay close attention to?

Roule: Absolutely. And I think the national security strategy is something that every one of the Cipher Brief's readers and listeners should pull out today. Look at it again, because I can assure you that policymakers around the world - in both our partner and adversary countries - are certainly doing so. If you look at events in Venezuela and read that national security strategy, a number of themes come forward.

The U.S. will be the dominant power in the Western hemisphere. In Venezuela, we saw a display of massive U.S. power and skill in the form of our military intelligence and technology. This is very similar to the display that the world witnessed in Iran last June. So, this is coming very, very close to two sets of actions. And I think this is meant to be seen also, as the president alluded to in his press conference, as a visible reset of what he described as a previous erosion of U.S. military power in his predecessor's administration.

This is also showing that the U.S. is now capable of executing what was described by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an extraordinarily large and complicated military and intelligence operation, without being leaked. This did not require foreign partners. And it also did not require the disruption of regional commercial air operations. If you listen to what the chairman talked about, this involved 150 aircraft from multiple locations descending upon another country. And other than closing the airspace for a short period of time, commercial air traffic was not disrupted. But you're seeing some other things that are also notable. The U.S. will undertake regime change when it perceives that the existing regime threatens core U.S. national security interests.

This also represents another U.S. blow against a Chinese partner in the Western hemisphere following the Trump administration's actions in Panama. The operation also took place on the anniversary of the killing of Iranian Quds Force leader General Qassem Soleimani in 2020 as well as the surrender of Manuel Noriega in 1990.

These are both examples of the long arm of the U.S. government. And certainly, the United States may have thought that the selection of this date would dampen any commemorations by the Iranian government for Soleimani's death in Tehran. Which would have been difficult enough given the ongoing demonstrations in Tehran. But the ripples from this Venezuela operation will be global. And I think the national security strategy puts some meat on the bone with this operation.

The Cipher Brief: Just looking at the intelligence that was needed to pull off an operations like this for a moment, what do you think this says about U.S. intelligence and what would have gone into that for this particular operation?

Roule: Well, it tells you a couple of things. It tells you that first, the intelligence was exquisite and up to date. But it also tells you that the intelligence was integrated into the military operation with an intimacy, with care, so that our military personnel were able to move with extraordinary speed to get to the location as quickly as humanly possible. We've seen this in the past with the operation against Osama bin Laden. This is just another example of the close integration between the U.S. intelligence communication and our amazing and extraordinary special forces personnel. I can't speak highly enough of those extraordinary and humble operators.

This also shows you the breadth of that intelligence community. The intelligence agencies that were cited included, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). So, you're getting a sense of some very broad intelligence capabilities which were brought to bear and then integrated.

The president, I believe, also mentioned that a house had been built in advance. I mean, you're just watching some incredible intelligence capability that was brought to bear by people on the ground over many months. It shows courage, it shows tenacity, it shows you the resources that were pulled together. And it also shows an ability to compartment this information and to prevent a leak. The U.S. government is doing what it's supposed to do. And in a world where we're often complaining about government, the American people and our partners should be gratified that our tax dollars are being well spent. And that the U.S. intelligence community and the military are performing superbly.

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The Cipher Brief: There's a lot of connective tissue between Venezuela and the rest of the world when you consider the oil industry, including China. As an energy expert, can you share what’s top of mind for you on the broader impact on the oil and energy markets?

Roule: Maybe the best way to answer that is to just explain a little bit about the Venezuelan oil system. First, the operation did not occur near Venezuelan oil production. Upstream oil operations are not located near Caracas, although exports and storage are highly sensitive to obviously, as you correctly put it, a U.S. maritime enforcement of a U.S. embargo.

Most of Venezuela's oil production, about two thirds, is derived from what is known as the Orinoco belt. And oil production from this Orinoco belt had fallen to about 498,000 barrels by the end of December, which is about a 25% drop from just a couple of weeks earlier. And it's been shutting down because they're running out of storage space because Venezuela can't export oil because of the blockade. So, they're trying to put the oil anywhere they can. They've put it in their own storage, they've put it in ships that are docked. They're putting it in almost in teacups at this point because they are running out of space to store the oil that they're producing.

Let's talk about the oil that is produced in Venezuela. They produce it from tar sands. It's extra heavy. It's a heavy type of crude oil and there are relatively few refineries that can process this grade of oil. It's difficult to extract. It's expensive to extract. Chinese refineries in 2025 tended to get a majority of Venezuelan exports. That amount ranged from 75 to 90% depending upon the amount. But even here, the Chinese tended to put much of that oil in their own storage. And China and Russia tend to be the two big players in Venezuela. For China, it is transactional. Chinese buyers look at it as a way to purchase cheap oil that they again put in storage. It's about 4% of China's exports and China again, has used a shadow fleet of intermediaries to purchase this oil. If China were to lose access to this, it's a problem. But because much of this has gone into storage and there are other suppliers out there in Saudi Arabia and other places, they could make this up.

Russia's a different story. Russia is an enabler of the Venezuelan oil industry. Because Venezuela's oil is so tar heavy, in essence, they need to import naphtha from Russia and this dilutes the ore and eco output and makes it blendable and then shippable. So, Russia sends in naphtha, it blends the stuff down and then stuff can then be exported. What would happen if suddenly Venezuela is opened up? Well, a couple of things.

First, because the oil market is relatively well supplied, people would look at it and ask, ‘where are the investment opportunities?’ If you look at the places where the world has changed suddenly and investment opportunities occurred, production didn't dramatically change. Let's take Iraq and Libya for example.

In Iraq, it took about a dozen years to get back to the level of pre-Saddam. And at that point, China was a major player. The U.S. is now returning to Iraq. In Libya, we're now a number of years after the fall of Gaddafi, and they are still about 25% below production levels under Gaddafi.

And again, the U.S. is returning. Much of it does depend upon the security of the country and the stability of the country. So, the president's comments about running Venezuela the right way really does strike at the heart of what happens in the oil industry.

The Cipher Brief: Devil’s Advocate here: how does it compete with Texas’ output? What does the U.S. do with that oil? Is it going to be sold to China?

Roule: The president and the Secretary of State have talked about stolen oil. What does this refer to? Is there a U.S. case there? I'll leave it to others to talk about the amounts and so forth but when this is talked about, this refers to a 2007 Venezuela expropriation of what I believe was then Conoco Phillips or ExxonMobil investments. That Venezuela did indeed expropriate. So, there is indeed a legal case of Venezuela nationalization of U.S. assets for which the U.S. was not compensated. If Venezuela's government did change and if U.S. oil companies were to go in, could the oil industry be dramatically changed? Yes, but it would depend upon security.

Maybe my final comment would be that Chevron has been heavily invested there, and they have maintained a very mature and stable outlook for the country. If you hear Chevron’s CEO speak about Chevron's investments, they've been very levelheaded and unflappable about national security events. So, I think you're going to see them stay there as well. And I think when you listen to the president's comments about how the U.S. would run Venezuela, he seemed fairly confident that the U.S. oil industry would play a role there. Which makes one think that there have been some sort of discussions in this regard playing out in some way in the background.

The Cipher Brief: At the most recent Cipher Brief Threat Conference, there was a lot of discussion around the idea of global conflict and some people believe that we are at the precipice of World War III. Certainly everyone agrees that global disruption is at fairly unprecedented levels. What is your thinking on this?

Roule: We are in a different world, but we're in a world of permanent gray zone conflict. But gray zone is defined and very, very differently. Gray zone was once defined by Iranian militias and it was defined by drone attacks or cyberattacks that were non-attributed. But we now have drone attacks or drone flights in Europe that come from God knows where, but they're Russian. We have Chinese routine harassment for more than a decade in the South China Sea. We have routine theft of intellectual property by China and North Korea, which in and of itself is a type of attack against our economy. But it's not necessarily a traditional gray zone attack. Because the people who are often involved in gray zone operations only see a certain number of colors on the palate. But the theft of intellectual property is just another form of attack.

We're in that kind of a world and the people who are running the countries, they don't need to launch a war per se. They need to launch a series of short, sharp conflicts. Or short, sharp attacks. Now they said these could lead to a war if people believe we don't care about certain areas. And I do think there is the issue of what could happen in Taiwan in 2026. That should be a worry for everyone.

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High Risk in Venezuela—To What End?

OPINION — “I knew the possible danger. It was a very dangerous operation. It was amazing that we had a few injured, but all are in good shape right now, but I knew there was great danger. You got off a helicopter. The helicopters were being shot out. They got on the ground amazing talent and tremendous patriotism, bravery. The bravery was incredible…They got off the helicopter and the bullets were flying all over the place. As you know, one of the helicopters got hit pretty badly, but that we got everything back. Got everything back and nobody killed,” meaning Americans.

That was President Donald Trump speaking Sunday aboard Air Force One on the way back from Florida about what he observed watching the early Saturday morning U.S. raid in Caracas that captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife.

While events in Venezuela are still unfolding and I will discuss some below, I use that quote because it illustrates that deaths of American service members is one thing I believe is high in Trump’s mind as he has in recent months undertaken a series of worldwide military actions.

Trump almost regularly points out that no Americans have been killed in the four months the U.S. has been blowing up alleged narco-trafficking boats. No Americans were lost in the bombing of Iran nuclear facilities.

And despite Trump’s threat that he could put U.S. boots-on-the-ground if needed to “run” Venezuela, there is no immediate indication he has plans to do that.

Instead, it appears Trump’s plan is to “run” Venezuela using what remains of the corrupt Maduro military/police hierarchy as long as they do what Trump wants. To me it recalls Trump as a builder working with questionable union leaders and construction firms to get jobs done.

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Just why has President Trump spent time and money, first to negotiate with Maduro to get him to leave, and finally to dramatically oust the Venezuelan President from office?

I divert for a moment.

On Friday, the original beginning of this column was, “Most fentanyl and methamphetamine trafficking into the U.S. occurs through official ports of entry along the southwest border, according to DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency).”

That was a quote from a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled, “Illicit Synthetic Drugs: Trafficking Methods, Money Laundering Practices, and Coordination Efforts,” that was sent to Congress and released publicly December 18, 2025.

The GAO’s report, including the finding cited above, focuses attention on fentanyl primarily coming into the U.S. through land ports of entry while the Trump administration made its anti-fentanyl focus on attacking narco-trafficking swift-boats initially from Venezuela, claiming they were headed for the U.S.

More recently, the attacks, and killing of those aboard, have been those in the eastern Pacific.

The New York Times published a story by Carol Rosenberg that discussed what happens when U.S. Coast Guard cutters intercept narco-trafficking boats, seize drugs and capture those aboard – but not kill 115 on 35 speedboats as the U.S. military did last year.

Putting together the December GAO report and the Times story raised some serious questions about the rationality of the Trump administration’s so-called anti-drug program.

Up to that time, interception of drug-carrying boats and interrogation of the crews gave valuable information on drug routes.

However, as The Times noted, “Attorney General Pam Bondi directed [U.S.] prosecutors in February to mostly stop bringing charges against low-level offenders in favor of bigger investigations.” According to The Times, “For the most part, people captured by the Coast Guard in the same smuggling routes the U.S. military is bombing are being repatriated -- either directly, before reaching the United States, or through deportation after briefly being questioned near U.S. ports.”

The Times noted that many earlier captured crew members were “poor, undereducated farmers or fishermen [who] would reach cooperation agreements that offered details of their engagement at the bottom rung of the drug smuggling business in exchange for possible leniency.”

The Times quoted Tampa-lawyer Stephen M. Crawford, who in the past had been assigned to represent defendants captured by the Coast Guard, who said the killing of crew members without prosecution amounted to very dangerous “political theater.”

I could say the same today for what I consider today’s ill-thought-out Trump actions in Venezuela.

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As many others have pointed out, returning democracy to the Venezuelan people was not uppermost in Trump’s mind.

On Saturday, in announcing the raid, Trump told reporters he had not been in contact with Venezuelan Opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado. He then went on to say, "I think it'd be very tough for her to be the leader. She doesn't have the support or the respect within the country. She's a very nice woman but she doesn't have the respect."

What I believe Trump meant was that the Maduro power structure – the Venezuelan Army, Bolivarian National Police and urban paramilitary networks known as colectivos -- remain active and it is they that don’t “respect” Machado.

They are also probably the reason there are no U.S. boots-on-the-ground.

Instead, Trump seems to believe that by keeping major U.S. military forces near Venezuela, he can threaten additional military attacks to keep the ex-Maduro crowd in line.

As Trump put it Sunday on Air Force One, “Venezuela thus far has been very nice, but it helps to have a force like we have. You know, we were ready for a second wave. We were all set to go, but we don't think we're going to need it.”

Apparently it is Venezuela’s oil which is primarily on Trump’s mind.

As with other matters, Trump seems to be living in the past as illustrated when he told reporters over the weekend, “We [the U.S.] had a lot of oil there [in Venezuela]. As you know they threw our companies out, and we want it back.”

Nationalization was the culmination of a decades-long effort by Venezuelan administrations of both the right and the left to bring under government control an industry that an earlier leader had largely given away.

American oil companies, including Exxon and Mobil, which merged in 1999, and Gulf Oil, which became Chevron in 1984, were hit hardest. The Dutch giant Shell was also affected. The companies, which had accounted for more than 70 percent of crude oil production in Venezuela, lost roughly $5 billion in assets but were compensated just $1 billion each, according to news stories from that period.

On Sunday, Trump said, “The oil companies are ready to go. They're going to go in, they're going to rebuild the infrastructure. You know, we built it to start off with many years ago.

They took it away. You can't do that. They can't do that with me. They did it with other presidents.”

According to several sources, major oil companies are not eager to spend the years and money at the present time to revive the Venezuelan oil industry, but as with much about the Venezuelan situation, there’s little yet that is predictable.

One potentially dangerous outcome, looming already, is how Trump reads what he so far considers his military success.

On Sunday he made open threats to both Colombia and Cuba.

He called Colombian President Gustavo Petro “a sick man who likes making cocaine and selling it to the United States. And he's not going to be doing it very long, let me tell you?”

And as for Cuba, Trump said, “Cuba always survived because of Venezuela. Now, they won't have that money coming in. They won't have the income coming in.”

He then went on to point out, “You know, a lot of Cubans were killed yesterday. You know that. A lot of Cubans were killed…There was a lot of death on the other side.”

But then Trump quickly added, as I have pointed out before, “No death on our side.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Human Agency in a Technology-Mediated World

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Occasionally, a speech does more than mark a leadership transition or outline institutional priorities. It captures, with unusual clarity, the nature of the moment we are living through and the choices it demands.

Blaise Metreweli’s recent inaugural address as Chief (or more colloquially, C) of the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service was one of those moments. Rather than offering a conventional tour of threats or capabilities, she chose a more demanding path. She spoke about human agency in a world increasingly shaped by machines. About trust, judgment, and integrity at a time when technology is accelerating every dimension of competition and conflict.

I had the pleasure of working with Metreweli while serving as Deputy Director of the CIA for Digital Innovation. I watched her navigate the intersection of operations and technology with a rare combination of rigor and imagination. Her speech reflects that same sensibility. It is operationally grounded, intellectually disciplined, and quietly ambitious in what it asks of an intelligence service. Just as it should be.

What struck me most, reading her remarks, was not simply their alignment with themes I have been working on for years, both inside government and since my departure in 2024. It was the way she wove those themes together into a coherent vision of intelligence suited to the world as it is, not the world we might wish it to be.

At the center of Metreweli’s speech is a proposition that may sound self-evident, yet is increasingly contested in practice: even in a technology-mediated world, human beings must still decide outcomes.

Artificial intelligence can surface patterns, illuminate possibilities, even accelerate analysis. It cannot decide what matters. It cannot weigh moral tradeoffs. It cannot assume responsibility for consequences. Intelligence, in her framing, remains a human endeavor, even as it becomes ever more technologically enabled.

This is a conclusion I reached years ago while leading digital transformation efforts inside the CIA. As our tools became more powerful, the temptation to treat output as authority grew stronger. We resisted that instinct deliberately. The most effective systems we built were those designed explicitly to support human judgment, not replace it. They forced users to ask better questions or to challenge assumptions, and to understand context before acting.

I have described this in multiple speeches and articles as human–machine partnering, and Metreweli’s speech reflects the same conviction. The future of intelligence is not technological supremacy alone. Nor is it the return to a romanticized vision of the intelligence mission before the digital revolution. It is the disciplined integration of technology into human decision-making, with clarity about where judgment must reside.

Metreweli is equally clear about the character of modern conflict. We are no longer operating in a world neatly divided between war and peace. Instead, we inhabit a persistent space between the two, where states seek advantage through pressure that is continuous, deniable, and often difficult to attribute.

Cyber operations, sabotage, influence campaigns, and coercive economic measures all live comfortably in this grey zone. They are designed to intimidate and to erode confidence without triggering a conventional response.

One aspect of this competition that deserves particular attention is the emergence of what I have called digital chokepoints. These are points of leverage embedded in digital infrastructure, data ecosystems, platforms, standards, and supply chains. They do not announce themselves boldly as instruments of power, yet they have increasingly come under attack in recent years as a tool of geopolitical competition. In 2024-2025 alone, there were numerous anomalous “incidents” that damaged or cut 13 undersea cables around Taiwan and the Baltic Sea.

Grey-zone conflict, viewed through this lens, is not episodic. It is cumulative. And we will see more of it. Intelligence services must therefore understand not just individual operations, but the architecture of pressure that builds quietly and persistently across domains.

The convergence of artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing, and the way these advances are reshaping both opportunity and risk was featured prominently in Metreweli’s speech. She avoids the dual traps of easy optimism and easy alarmism alike.

I have often framed technology as both shield and sword. It accelerates intent, but it does not generally determine outcomes. Technology itself is neutral. What matters is how it is governed, deployed, and constrained by human choice, as well as which values are encoded into its digital foundations

This distinction is not academic. The same AI system that accelerates medical discovery can enable surveillance at scale. The same digital infrastructure that connects societies can be (and is) used to monitor and control them. Metreweli’s speech is careful to emphasize mastery of technology alongside responsibility for its effects.

That balance is essential. Technological determinism strips leaders of agency and excuses poor judgment. Metreweli’s approach does neither.

One of the most sobering elements of Metreweli’s address is her discussion of trust. Information, once a unifying force, is now routinely weaponized. Falsehood spreads faster than fact. Algorithms reward outrage and reinforce bias. Shared reality seems increasingly elusive.

I have spent significant time in recent years examining the implications of synthetic media, deepfakes, and AI-enabled influence operations. Today, identity itself has become contested space. Voice, image, and presence can be fabricated convincingly and at scale. Seeing is no longer believing.

This presents intelligence services with challenges that extend well beyond traditional counterintelligence or cyber defense. When trust collapses, when one can no longer discern truth from fiction, societies risk losing much more than confidence in institutions. They risk losing the ability to reason collectively about the world they inhabit.

Metreweli’s insistence that defending the space where truth can still stand as a core intelligence mission reflects a deep understanding of what is at stake.

Another strength of Metreweli’s speech is her refusal to treat today’s challenges as isolated problems. She describes an interlocking threat landscape that spans physical and digital domains, from seabed cables to space systems, from code to cognition.

This holistic view is critical. Too often, Western governments have approached cross-domain issues in separate policy lanes. Next-generation communications, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, cyber intrusions, disinformation campaigns. All treated as distinct, individual issues. Our principal strategic competitor, the People’s Republic of China, has not made that mistake. These domains are understood as mutually reinforcing components of a comprehensive national digital strategy tied directly to a grand geopolitical ambition.

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I have argued for years that we must respond in kind, not by mirroring authoritarian models, but by approaching this competition in a more holistic fashion and by offering global partners a credible alternative. Countries around the world want to harness new technologies to accelerate development and improve lives. Many also want to protect sovereignty and human freedom. Meeting that demand requires seeing the digital contest as a whole, not as a collection of technical projects about which individual and disconnected policy decisions are made.

Though not stated in such terms, Metreweli’s framing reflects this reality.

As an operational commander who became a technical leader, Metreweli brings unusual authority to her discussion of technology within intelligence tradecraft. She envisions a service where officers are as comfortable using digital tools as they are recruiting and running human sources.

This is not about turning intelligence officers into engineers. It is about understanding technology as both a tool and a terrain. Digital literacy becomes foundational, not because everyone must code, but because everyone must grasp how technology shapes the operational environment and adversary behavior. In modern intelligence, ignorance of technology becomes a vulnerability.

Metreweli also speaks directly to the question of legitimacy. Intelligence services in democracies operate with extraordinary authorities. Their effectiveness ultimately depends on trust.

Her commitment to openness, where it can responsibly exist, is not about transparency for its own sake. It is about sustaining a relationship with the public rooted in shared values. Accountability, in her formulation, is a strength, not a constraint.

This is a principle I championed consistently inside the Agency and since my departure. In democratic societies, trust can never be taken for granted. It must be earned and maintained, especially as intelligence services operate in the shadows, out of view of the citizens they serve.

A particularly powerful portion of Metreweli’s speech focuses on audacity and “hustle,” reflecting a clear understanding of the environment intelligence services face today. In a world defined by exponential change, moving slowly does not preserve relevance. It accelerates decline.

I have spoken often about urgency, about the reality that institutions unwilling to adapt will become obsolete. That does not mean abandoning discipline or ethics. It means recognizing that delay carries its own significant risks. In today’s dynamic, high-threat landscape, inaction is perhaps the biggest risk.

Metreweli closes her speech where she began, with values. Courage. Creativity. Respect. Integrity. She recounts a conversation with a long-term foreign agent who worked with the UK precisely because of these values. This is not a sentimental anecdote. It is a strategic insight into how intelligence services in western democracies must navigate today’s complexity. Leveraging our core strength. Values.

We are living through the rise of digital authoritarianism, where technology is used to monitor, manipulate, and control populations at unprecedented scale. The most profound threat this poses is not technical. It is moral. It erodes human agency incrementally, often invisibly, until freedom becomes difficult to reclaim.

I have warned repeatedly that societies rarely lose freedom in dramatic moments. They lose it through systems that optimize for efficiency or security while stripping away consent, accountability, and choice.

Metreweli’s insistence that none of us have a future without values is therefore a statement of strategic reality, and it gets to the very heart of the issue.

Blaise Metreweli’s speech deserves close reading, not because it is eloquent (though it is), but because it is consequential. It articulates a vision of intelligence that is technologically fluent without being technologically captive, operationally aggressive without abandoning principle, and deeply human in a world that increasingly tempts us to forget what that means.

For intelligence professionals, policymakers, and citizens alike, it is a reminder that even as our tools evolve, the most important choices remain ours to make.

Read the full speech here.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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After Venezuela, What Is Next in 2026?

CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT Q&A — President Donald Trump said the U.S. is "in charge" in Venezuela after U.S. forces detained President Nicolas Maduro on charges related to drug trafficking. President Trump is also demanding "total access" to Venezuela's oil infrastructure. Venezuela's de-facto leader Delcy Rodriguez said Caracas is seeking "balanced and respectful international relations" with Washington.

Intelligence professionals are reacting to this major development as it will have far-reaching consequences far beyond Venezuela, for the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere amid heightened tensions with adversaries such as Russia and China. Cipher Brief Executive Editor Brad Christian spoke with former CIA Senior Executive Paul Kolbe about what Maduro's capture signals for the national security landscape in 2026. The conversation has been lightly edited for length.

Paul Kolbe

Paul Kolbe is former director of The Intelligence Project at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Kolbe also led BP’s Global Intelligence and Analysis team supporting threat warning, risk mitigation, and crisis response. Kolbe served 25 years as an operations officer in the CIA, where he was a member of the Senior Intelligence Service, serving in Russia, the Balkans, Indonesia, East Germany, Zimbabwe, and Austria.

Christian: How are thinking about what just happened in Venezuela? What's top of mind for you?

Kolbe: Venezuela has been a problem both for the United States and for the Venezuelan people for over 20 years. For the Chavez years and then the Maduro years, they've driven a country that was once one of the wealthiest in the world, and certainly wealthiest in South America, with unbelievable natural resources, particularly oil, and driven it into the ground through corruption, poor leadership, poor decisions, and oppression of the people. There's a reason eight million Venezuelans have fled the country. So, it's been a series of corrupt, horrible rulers. Not sorry to see Maduro go.

Venezuela has also been a foothold for Cuba. Very important for Cuba in terms of the oil that they get there, but also as a place to plant the flag and spread Cuban revolution throughout South America. It's been a base and source of money and money laundering for Hezbollah and Iran. Russia has had a long-standing relationship with Chavez and with Maduro, supporting them with weapons, with intelligence, with the Wagner Group. So, Venezuela has been both a thorn in the side of the U.S., and has been involved in so many different things that are against our interests — not sorry to see Maduro go.

Christian: Last year, President Trump had authorized covert activity in Venezuela. There had been talk even recently, just days ago, of the CIA being involved in a strike against a target in Venezuela. We don't often see a military operation of this complexity that goes this smoothly. What does that tell you about the intelligence that was at play here and the level of cooperation with the military?

Kolbe: Clearly it was highly professional and extraordinarily well-executed operation, both by the intelligence community and by the U.S. special operations forces that went in. Very pleased that there were no casualties, that we didn't suffer any losses. But the split that I would make is to ask if this is a very well-executed tactical operation that is without a larger strategy? And if there's a larger strategy, what is it? In particular, what's the follow-on? There's been a number of times where we've gone in and broken things and not done such a great job of fixing them or just leaving. You can look at Libya, at Iraq, and other places where that's not happened. Some folks will point to Panama and Grenada and try to use those as analogies for Venezuela, and they're very different cases. Venezuela's not Panama — much bigger, much different set of dynamics there — and it's certainly not Grenada.

So the follow-on of who's going to rule, what the transition is, how do you maintain stability? The narco-traffickers are still there, the narco-syndicates, the military is still there, the street gangs are still there. The paramilitaries, which have been supported by the military and have acted as the chief arm of oppression and brutality against the people, they're still there. There's a lot of generals that have an awful lot to lose. So, unless there's been a negotiated handover of power, I don't quite understand, yet, how we're going to run the country without boots on the ground or without a clear negotiated handover.

Christian: Russia's been described as a special type of enabler for Venezuela over the years. Russian officials have called the U.S. operation in Venezuela "unlawful'' and a violation of norms. There have been other Russia developments related to Venezuela recently. The ship, Bella 1, that the United States has been pursuing for the last couple of weeks was reported to have painted a Russian flag on it's hull on Dec 31, and Russia reportedly has asked the United States to stop pursuing it. What's your reaction to how Russia has publicly responded to these incidents?

Kolbe: I'll start with the irony of Russia's protestations against what they see as the invasion of sovereignty of another country and how awful that is put out there with no sense of irony. Russia is condemning something that is not analogous to what they've done in Ukraine, but also completely ignoring what they've done in Ukraine and the ongoing war that they continue to pursue against the Ukrainian people, against their infrastructure, against everything that stands there.

So, while Venezuela is going to capture a lot of attention over the next few days, I suspect that's also, perhaps, part of the purpose of it. It distracts from what I think is a far more strategic, far more important issue, i.e., What's going to happen in Ukraine in 2026? Will the U.S. abandon Ukraine? Will we stab them in the back, or will we be able to provide support that lets them fight Russia, preserve their sovereignty?

The story with the ship is a pretty interesting one. It feels like watching a sea-born version of OJ Simpson's escape in his Ford Bronco as this Coast Guard cutter trails this gigantic oil freighter, which is running away at the speed of 11 knots and is now in the North Atlantic and is claiming to have Russian protection. Russia has reportedly put out a diplomatic note dissuading the U.S. from taking any action on that. So it will be interesting to see what actually happens if the ship managed to make good on the escape or if we turn around and say, "Oh, nevermind."

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Christian: At the most recent Threat Conference back in October, there was a lot of talk of global conflict. And some people use the phrase, "World War III." Are we in it? Has it begun? There's been a lot of talk about gray zone, the level of gray zone activity, and the risk of major conflicts breaking out such as Taiwan or the situation in Europe growing beyond the borders of Ukraine. How are you thinking about the world as we start 2026 amid what is truly a dynamic national security backdrop?

Kolbe: I'm thinking about it as we're in a state of conflict without recognizing it. Just a couple of days ago over New Year’s, you saw China mount a blockade exercise, clearly practicing for a coming blockade of Taiwan. The signaling coming out of there is ever sharper and, it’s always been clear, but suggests a narrowing timeline for action on Taiwan. I don't believe anything's imminent, but clearly they're building the capability and then the intent, the decision, once they have the capability, can happen at any time.

Just a couple of days ago, we saw another communications cable cut between Estonia and Finland by a Russian ship that had left a Russian port that continues what is essentially low grade warfare on the European continent by Russia: sabotage, assassinations, misinformation, disinformation, and just a series of things which are clearly preparation of the battlefield, designed both to deter Europe and get Europe to self-deter, but also for the U.S., but also to put into place the capabilities that would be useful or used in conflict.

I think what is clear to me is that we, the US — as stated in the National Security Strategy that came out in December — are basically carving out Latin America as a U.S. area of influence and seeming to leave Europe and Central Asia to Russia and East Asia to China. And for me, that's very disturbing that America First looks to be coming to include South America First.

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Venezuela was a Surprise. What Could be Next?

CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT Q&A -- Deposed Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is scheduled to appear in a U.S. courtroom on Monday for the first time since being brought to New York to face narco-terrorism charges. The brief hearing will formally begin what is expected to be a lengthy legal battle over whether he can be prosecuted in the United States.

This, as intelligence professionals are considering what the seemingly flawless U.S. military operation to detain Maduro could mean for what’s next in the region. Cipher Brief Executive Editor Brad Christian spoke with former CIA Senior Executive Glenn Corn about the impact of the Venezuelan operation and what we still don’t know. Their conversation has been lightly edited for length.

Christian: Talk us through how you're reacting to the news of the last 72 hours.

Corn: If I had a hat, I'd take it off to our former partner colleagues in the intelligence community and the special operations community. I mean, great operation. Well planned and executed. I'm sure that the intelligence had to be very good. Honestly, I'm proud because it's good to have a reminder that the U.S. can do this kind of thing. I don't want to go into the international law piece. I'm not a lawyer. But really a great operation and thanks to the people that put it together. You probably remember that we talked recently about the importance of the Western Hemisphere and reasserting some of our influence there and reminding people that, this is our backyard. This administration has made the Western Hemisphere a priority and I think it's a good thing. And here's an example of something that the president is willing to do. I give the president credit - this is a pretty bold move. And the timing was interesting. The other thing I'll say is no leaks, right? Which is also very, very good news because we have a problem in Washington with leaks, and the administration was able to keep this one under wraps. I was completely surprised.

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Christian: What do you think are going to be some of the things that you're going to be watching most closely? President Trump has said that the United States is going to be involved in administering Venezuela in the near term. There's been a lot of talk about reviving Venezuela's oil industry. Obviously, that's not surprising. There's been some reaction from American adversaries, but everyone's still in a watch and wait mode yet for how China and Russia is going to respond to this. What are you paying attention to in terms of signals for this week?

Corn: The president's comments about some type of U.S. administration, at least in some kind of transitory period were interesting. I immediately am reminded of Iraq where the military operation was well done and we removed Saddam Hussein pretty quickly in 2003, but then what came after was not great. So, I hope we've learned that lesson and we're not going to repeat the mistakes we made there. Hopefully there is a plan in place. The president indicated that some people in the administration are going to be giving roles also to help administer.

And it’s interesting that President Maduro and his wife were detained, but it looks like everybody else is still in their roles which may be an indication that they learned the lesson from Iraq and our experience there.

By the way, if you're the Iranian supreme leader, you probably have to be very nervous right now. I went to bed thinking about Iran and what's happening there. And the president's comments that the U.S. will support those people that are coming out to peacefully protest and if they're... I forget his exact words, but basically, "We will punish those who use force against them or who killed protestors."

Christian: The way I interpreted that was that the U.S. was prepared to intervene militarily to protect the protestors.

Corn: And we may still be. Last week, I was very focused on Iran, then all of a sudden over the weekend, this operation went down. Now, whether that's the intent or not, I don't know, but it’s really interesting timing. What comes next will be very important. I've been saying for a while that this administration has had some very good foreign policy successes in the last year, since coming to office. Generally, I think they're doing well on the foreign policy front. They've done some bold things. Syria, Azerbaijan, Armenia. Now what comes next is important, and then consistency is important. Do we have the ability to see it through? We’ll have to see.

Christian: Russia is considered an ally to Venezuela. How might this impact Moscow’s foreign policy in the Western hemisphere, to include their planning and their ongoing operations as it relates to Venezuela or perhaps other parts of the Western hemisphere?

Corn: I think Putin has backed himself into a corner when it comes to a lot of these countries that he's aligned with. We saw that with Syria where he was overspent, and he really didn't have anything to help former President Bashar al-Assad when Assad was in crisis. And one of his main allies in the Middle East is no longer there.

In Venezuela, the Russians have come out with some statements in support of Caracas, of Maduro, but they really haven't done much. There was some reporting last year, that Moscow was shipping more air defense systems and weapons to Maduro and the regime as we were ratcheting up our military activity in the Caribbean. But none of that seems to have made a real difference. Putin has to understand right now that he's been unable to come to Assad's assistance and with Maduro, his ally has just been removed and detained. So, he's got to be watching Iran very nervously because that's his other main ally in the Middle East and they've invested a lot in that relationship, and it seems like the Supreme Leader is in trouble right now. The regime is in trouble.

With the President of the United States making bold comments about what the U.S. will do if the regime goes after protestors in Iran, it’s clear that Putin's influence is waning all over the world and he's eventually going to be unable to stand.

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The Russians used to like to brag that they stand by their allies when the U.S. abandons them. Actually, it's looking now like the Russians are abandoning their allies. And I assess that's partly because of this quagmire that Putin got himself into in Ukraine.

Maybe some of the Venezuelans who are celebrating the removal of their dictator should think about Ukraine and what the Ukrainians have done for them by stopping the Russian military the way they've done so effectively.

It also seems at first blush, that the intelligence services of Russia failed because it looks like this operation went down without any real warning to Maduro. And one would assess that if Putin is an ally of Maduro, he'd have tipped him off about the operation, which the Russians have tried to do in other circumstances in the past.

By the way, the Cuban bodyguards, what happened to them? Someone was telling me last week, that Maduro's main security force was made up of Cubans.

I think Putin has painted himself into a corner because I think he's afraid to really upset Trump because he knows that if Trump comes down hard on him on the Ukraine issue, he's in big trouble.

He's already in trouble. And many of us have assessed for a while that if President Trump decides that it's time to really ratchet up the heat on Moscow and the Kremlin, that will probably be a serious, serious blow to Putin and his power.

Christian: Do you believe that President Putin thinks he's backed into a corner in the way that you describe? And is it likely that there are people around him who may be telling him that?

Corn:. I don't even want to try to put myself in his head space. I've said for a long time, going back 10 years, that he's put himself in an information vacuum or echo chamber. So, who knows what he's thinking. But my guess is that he feels like he's backed into a corner. If you saw when the U.S. announced sanctions on Gazprom and Lukoil, the first thing Putin did was send a delegate to the United States in a rush. That showed me panic and fear. And I'm sure that people around Putin are upset and worried.

Now, let's watch Iran. I think Iran's a big piece on the chess board, and we should see what happens there. I don't think that the Russians are going to be able to help much if the Iranian regime starts to collapse.

Christian: The critics of the operation in Venezuela are saying things like, "This is a bad precedent to set. Other leaders around the world may decide, 'Okay, well, if the U.S. can do something like this...'" And obviously the criticism of this operation is it violates Venezuela's sovereignty. Do you worry about the knock-on effect and the second and third order effects of an operation like this being conducted by the United States, regardless of who's president, and being used in ways that may cause further instability in the world or being used by autocratic leaders or America's adversaries?

Corn: No, I think that ship sailed a long time ago. This is not the first time the United States has done something like this. This is not the first time other countries have done something like this. Countries have made land grabs, have assassinated leaders or tried to remove leaders, overthrow governments. So, there's nothing new here. There's no new precedent here that I see. We've already started down this very ugly road. And to me, now, what's important is to make sure that our national security structure and our intelligence community and armed forces are fully armed and capable of dealing with any threat to U.S. interests and to our allies.

Christian: At our most recent Cipher Brief Threat Conference in October, there was a lot of talk about global conflict. Some people use the phrase World War III. Do you believe it’s started and how are you thinking about 2026 from a national security standpoint?

Corn: Deterrence is critical right now. The U.S. has been deterred too much in the past, and we've been unable to deter our adversaries. It's very important that the U.S. maintains and demonstrates an ability to deter adversaries when they threaten our interests. The president is talking about U.S. oil companies going into Venezuela, rebuilding the infrastructure, reviving the Venezuelan oil industry, energy industry. I think this goes along with the administration's approach with commercial diplomacy, getting the U.S. business community actively involved around the world to help promote U.S. interests, which I support but you have to make sure that happens because you don't want vacuums to be created. A year ago in Syria, everybody was very excited about the opportunities, but those opportunities have been very hard to develop because of the realities on the ground. So, you need sustainment. You need the ability to really sustain and be patient and invest in taking advantage of opportunities and bringing some kind of economic development to regions that have suffered for a long time and are in very bad shape that are producing either jihadists or narco traffickers - probably because a lot of those people have no other choice to survive.

You and I have both served in countries where that is the case, where the majority of people are not bad people, but they have no choice. There's really no option. We want to give them something better, right? But we have to do it. And that's going to be the big challenge.

Again, kudos to the administration. This is part of a bigger game. I go back to the Reagan administration and the kind of rollback approach to the Soviet Union when Russia was challenging us around the world and Reagan finally responded to that by challenging them and calling out the Soviets where they were trying to poke on our interests.

I would say that the Trump administration seems to be doing that, which is good, but we've got to be very, very cognizant of the fact that it's going to take a lot of investment and a lot of persistent attention to do it.

If the Iranian regime collapses tomorrow, that could create a great opportunity or a vacuum. There’s a great opportunity in Venezuela right now. Let's take advantage of it.

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Building U.S. Drone Dominance Brick by Brick

OPINION — One of the things I loved about LEGO as a child was the ability to mix and match an endless amount of parts to create unique builds. Children (and some adults) gather around a bin of parts to create something new. Imagine being asked: “Build 10 houses in 30 minutes.” Everyone would come up with unique designs using various parts. Now, imagine a constraint: “You may only use red, 2x4, 2x2, and 1x2 bricks, white windows and doors, and it all has to fit on a green 32x32 baseplate.” Quickly, the limited supply causes a frantic scramble.

This scenario mirrors the recent call by the Department of War to field 300,000 drones over two years. The conflict in Ukraine exposed the U.S.'s lack of preparedness to equip forces with Purpose Built Attritable Systems (PBAS) at the scale of its peer competitors. Further, manufacturers are restricted by the requirement for critical components to be NDAA / BlueUAS compliant and, as of December 22nd, even more restrictions which demand non-critical components be U.S.-manufactured. The defense industrial base is struggling to meet unprecedented demand.

While numerous startups and giants have stepped up, the U.S. supply chain cannot sustain the required pace. Existing suppliers’ manufacturing capabilities are quickly surpassed as companies scramble to design, build, and market the requested systems.

sUAS are fundamentally basic, consisting of a flight controller (FC), electronic speed controller (ESC), motors, propellers, camera, radio/video transmitters, receivers, and a frame. The main problem is the availability of parts and, more critically, sub-components needed to make them. Manufacturers are all reaching into the same scarce “bin,” forcing suppliers to seek materials with increased vigor.

Motors, for instance, require neodymium and copper. The majority of motor production occurs outside of the U.S., where technology is mature, labor costs are lower, and the supply chain exists. However, the sUAS industry accounts for less than 8% of neodymium consumption in the U.S. Returning to the LEGO analogy, if a child asks for more 1x1 red bricks to make houses, LEGO, which (in this scenario) makes over 90% of its money on other parts, has little incentive to retool for large-scale 1x1 brick production.

Similarly, most FC and ESC boards are produced in Taiwan. While this was permissible under the original NDAA and BlueUAS frameworks, the new requirement for U.S. production necessitates standing up domestic manufacturing, likely to ensure production continues in the event that trade with Taiwan is disrupted. However, standing up U.S. companies, sourcing materials, hiring labor, and developing technology all create significant costs that are passed to the consumer. Since PBAS systems must remain attritable (affordable enough to be lost in combat), a higher cost per unit will force warfighters to be more judicious.

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Given the intense demand and additional domestic constraints, how can the U.S. remain competitive? There are a few ways.

Incentivize existing global manufacturers to stand up U.S.-based manufacturing. Companies with existing technology, design, manufacturing, and supply chains should be incentivized to establish domestic production of like products.

Encourage raw material companies to invest upstream. Critical material mining companies (e.g., for lithium and neodymium) currently lack incentive to ensure stable, consistent supply to manufacturers. Encouraging investment upstream offers supply chain guarantees for domestic manufacturing and additional revenue for investors.

Establish a “strategic reserve” of raw materials. The U.S. maintains strategic oil and gas reserves. For future conflicts, a strategic reserve of critical sUAS materials is vital given the global stranglehold countries like China have on the market to enable rapid manufacturing scale-up even if trade is disrupted.

Increase throughput of BlueUAS and NDAA compliant components from outside the U.S. Maintaining U.S. connectivity to the global sUAS marketplace is important. While the restrictions are righteous, isolating U.S. production strains the raw material supply chain, causes allies to follow suit, and increases the overall cost per unit, reducing attritability. The U.S. should use the BlueUAS framework, with increased throughput, to identify compliant vendors across a wide section of allies and trade partners.

Expedite current NDAA compliant components manufactured overseas through BlueUAS processes. As manufacturing shifts to the U.S., the U.S. could provide ‘provisional’ BlueUAS certifications with limited durations to cover companies during the transition.

Without a temporary easement or an adequate transitional period, the U.S. drone market is likely to shift abruptly. Many companies cannot afford to stand up U.S. production, or the cost of compliance would render their price points untenable. This situation would likely result in defense giants acquiring the IP/technology from smaller companies at a steep discount, leveraging their supply networks, lobbying, and significant capital advantage to continue development and manufacturing under their umbrella, returning the U.S. defense ecosystem to its former exclusive state, prior to the recent tranche of reforms.

The U.S. is at a critical inflection point in its quest for American Drone Dominance. The foundation it establishes will define its final strength and resilience. Care must be taken to avoid supply chain degradation, continue providing affordable solutions for the warfighter, and remain flexible and responsive in future crises. Incentivizing domestic production without isolation will ensure the U.S. has all the pieces it needs to build successfully, brick by brick.

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Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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A Trained Eye Sees Strategic Patterns in Venezuela

OPINION -- Venezuela presents a long-standing challenge tied to narcotics trafficking and transnational criminal networks. For years, the country has functioned as a major transit hub for illicit drug flows, money laundering, and organized crime, with direct consequences for U.S. domestic security and for stability across the Western Hemisphere. These realities alone justify sustained U.S. attention.

But criminal activity does not explain Venezuela’s full strategic significance. What distinguishes Venezuela today is not only the scale of illicit activity, but the conditions surrounding it: political isolation, economic dependence, weakened institutions, and contested legitimacy.

These conditions are familiar. These are precisely the environments external adversarial powers exploit in the gray zone to embed influence and preserve leverage without crossing the threshold of open conflict.

In such settings, influence is not imposed abruptly. It is embedded gradually, normalized through routine engagement, and retained for use when pressure mounts. That method, rather than any single triggering event - is what places Venezuela squarely within the scope of longer-term U.S. strategic concern.

Assessing Venezuela this way does not require assumptions about covert orchestration or crisis direction by outside states. It requires recognizing a recurring competitive approach that has played out repeatedly in fragile and isolated systems: establish access early, avoid responsibility for governance, and preserve optionality as conditions deteriorate.

A Pattern Observed Across Multiple Theaters

Recent Cipher Brief analysis has highlighted that strategic competition increasingly unfolds below the threshold of armed conflict. In states facing internal stress or external isolation, influence is rarely asserted through overt coercion. Instead, it is accumulated through sustained presence, access to institutions, and normalization of engagement — creating leverage that can be exercised selectively during moments of crisis.

This pattern is not theoretical. It is consistent across actors and regions, even where tactics differ.

China: Economic and Technical Presence as Strategic Infrastructure

China’s approach relies on economic and technical engagement as strategic infrastructure. Commercial projects, administrative systems, and digital platforms provide access long before crises emerge. Over time, this presence enables intelligence collection, political influence, and situational awareness without requiring overt security commitments or visible military footprints.

The value of this approach lies in patience. By embedding early and remaining engaged through periods of instability, China preserves optionality when political alignments shift or governance weakens. Influence accumulated quietly can later be activated to protect strategic equities, shape outcomes, or constrain competitors’ freedom of maneuver.

This model avoids ownership. It does not require Beijing to stabilize fragile states or assume responsibility for their internal failures. Access is sufficient. Optionality is the objective.

Russia: Security Engagement and Access Without Ownership

Russia applies a more security-centric variant of the same logic. Moscow’s engagement with sanctioned governments or non-recognized actors has repeatedly prioritized intelligence access, operational insight, and regional buffers rather than political alignment or long-term stabilization.

By maintaining relationships across formal and informal power structures, Russia ensures continued relevance during periods of transition or escalation. This posture allows Moscow to influence events without absorbing the costs associated with governance, reconstruction, or economic support.

Here again, the emphasis is not control but access. Engagement is calibrated to preserve leverage while avoiding entanglement — a model designed to expand or contract as circumstances dictate.

Iran: Network Persistence and Crisis Adaptability

Iran’s approach centers on the durability of networks rather than institutions. Elite cultivation, security penetration, and proxy relationships are established early and maintained quietly. When political systems weaken or collapse, these networks remain intact.

The advantage is resilience. Preexisting relationships allow rapid recalibration during crises without the need to rebuild influence under pressure. This approach is particularly effective in environments where authority is fragmented and legitimacy contested.

Across cases, Iran’s method demonstrates how influence survives regime change when it is rooted in people, systems, and incentives rather than formal state structures.

Key Analytic Distinction

Across these approaches, a central distinction applies: Presence and enablement do not equal operational control. But sustained presence creates optionality — the ability to act, influence, or constrain outcomes when conditions shift. That optionality, accumulated quietly over time, is what allows external powers to convert instability into strategic advantage without triggering direct confrontation.

Venezuela as a Permissive Strategic Environment

Venezuela now exhibits many of the conditions that have enabled this form of competition elsewhere. Politically, it remains isolated and internally polarized, with contested legitimacy and eroded institutions. Economically, it is dependent on external partners and vulnerable to leverage through finance, energy, and technology. Strategically, it occupies a sensitive position - proximate to the United States, central to regional migration flows, and endowed with significant energy resources.

Open-source reporting has documented sustained external engagement consistent with these vulnerabilities. Chinese firms maintain long-term financial and energy exposure, while Chinese technology has been linked to state administrative and digital systems. Russia has pursued military cooperation and security ties with the Maduro government over several years. Iran has expanded defense-related cooperation, including activities now cited in U.S. sanctions actions.

None of this establishes direct operational control over events in Venezuela. That distinction matters. Modern competition does not depend on command-and-control relationships. It depends on positioning — ensuring access, protecting equities, and shaping the environment so that options exist when pressure mounts.

From this perspective, Venezuela is not an abrupt escalation point. It is the maturation of a permissive environment.

U.S. National Interests at Stake

Viewed through this lens, the U.S. interests implicated extend beyond narcotics enforcement.

Security and Intelligence Access: Adversarial access or technical presence in the Western Hemisphere creates intelligence and counterintelligence risks. Proximity amplifies the strategic consequences, particularly during crises when early warning and situational awareness are decisive.

Regional Stability: Venezuela’s instability already fuels migration flows, strains neighboring states, and sustains criminal economies. External actors that selectively stabilize the regime — without addressing governance or legitimacy - risk prolonging instability while insulating it from internal pressure.

Energy and Economic Leverage: Venezuela’s energy sector remains strategically significant. External involvement that secures preferential access or shields operations from pressure can distort markets and complicate sanctions, reducing U.S. leverage over time.

Alliances and Credibility: Regional partners watch not only U.S. actions, but their durability. Episodic pressure without strategic continuity reinforces perceptions that U.S. engagement is temporary, a perception that competitors routinely exploit.

The Risk of Tactical Action Without Strategic Effect

Military or law-enforcement action can disrupt illicit networks and impose immediate costs. But disruption alone rarely dismantles the access structures external powers cultivate over years.

When political or economic stress intensifies, those structures often remain intact, allowing competitors to protect their equities and adapt quickly. Pressure that is not paired with a longer-term access-denial strategy risks plateauing or incentivizing deeper external involvement.

In Venezuela, criminal disruption addresses symptoms. It does not, by itself, degrade the political, economic, and intelligence ecosystems that enable adversarial positioning. Without sustained follow-through, tactical success can coexist with strategic stagnation.

Narrative, Legitimacy, and the Competitive Space

Competition below the threshold of war is also a contest over legitimacy. External powers rarely challenge U.S. actions on operational grounds alone. Instead, they exploit ambiguity, sovereignty narratives, and perceptions of disproportion.

These narratives gain traction when objectives appear narrow, temporary, or disconnected from a broader political strategy. Countering them does not require rhetorical escalation. It requires clarity, about purpose, duration, and the outcomes the United States seeks to prevent or enable.

Strategic Implications Going Forward

Venezuela should be assessed as part of a broader competitive environment in which external actors exploit fragility, isolation, and economic dependence to secure enduring access.

Experience from other regions points to several implications:

Denying durable access matters more than disrupting individual activities.

Time favors persistent presence over episodic pressure.

Clarity of purpose constrains adversarial narratives.

Regional confidence and allied coordination reduce competitive space.

In this environment, success is measured not only by disruption, but by whether competitors are prevented from converting instability into lasting advantage.

Venezuela reinforces a familiar reality: in an era of competition below the threshold of war, strategic outcomes are shaped less by single actions than by whether access, influence, and legitimacy are denied over time.

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Iran’s Protests Expose Deeper Fragility as Leaders Struggle to Contain Crisis

CIPHER BRIEF EXPERT INTERVIEW -- Economic grievances in Iran have sparked demonstrations for a fifth straight day, with protests surfacing in Tehran and multiple provincial cities as inflation, a collapsing currency, and worsening living conditions fuel public anger.

Reports from state-linked media, local officials, and rights groups confirm new clashes and at least one additional death, though accounts differ over whether the deceased was a member of a pro-government militia or a protester. Several other incidents of violence were reported in western and southern regions, but independent verification remains difficult.

President Masoud Pezeshkian, traveling in southwestern and eastern Iran, has acknowledged mounting public dissatisfaction and urged officials to address the population’s concerns, calling mismanagement - not foreign adversaries - the primary cause of the crisis. His remarks contrasted with harder-line figures who continue to blame unnamed “enemies” for the unrest.

The latest protests began after the Iranian rial plunged to record lows, prompting the resignation of Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin.

The broader economic backdrop is bleak: inflation remains above 40 percent, food and household costs have surged, and nearly every major sector outside oil is contracting.

“The ongoing, still relatively small, economic protests now unfolding in several cities in Iran are the latest indicator of the Islamic Republic's fragility,” Middle East Expert and former National Security Manager for Iran at ODNI, Norm Roule tells The Cipher Brief.

Roule explains in this exclusive Cipher Brief analysis, why he believes the latest protests are likely a sign of what could be waiting for Tehran in the new year.

Norman T. Roule

ANALYSIS -- “Since 2017, Tehran’s domestic oppression, persistent inflation, declining standards of living, international isolation, and weak domestic policy credibility have produced periods of sharp and widespread unrest. Iran’s security forces have responded brutally. But the protests have shattered the Islamic Republic’s political self-confidence. Tehran’s response to the ongoing demonstrations reflects that mood.

A regime that once boasted that its high national election turnout reflected the support of its people is now unable to hide historic low voter turnout and accepts the threat of destabilizing national unrest as an inevitable consequence of life in modern-day Iran. Economic challenges are not the regime’s only concern. Iran’s historic drought and other environmental problems persist. Winter saw a sharp decline in air quality in large areas of Tehran, Khuzestan, and Isfahan provinces. In early December, Iran’s health minister announced that ongoing air pollution problems had sent more than 170,000 Iranians to emergency wards with heart and respiratory problems.

Whether the current unrest expands or dissipates - like prior waves of protest - remains uncertain. What is clearer is that the underlying drivers are durable, making future episodes virtually certain. The more consequential question is whether disillusionment will remain confined to civilians or will begin to test the cohesion and confidence of the security forces the Islamic Republic has relied upon for so many years to contain dissent.

The ongoing collapse of Iran’s currency, the rial, ignited the protests this week. After the currency fell as low as 1.42 million per dollar, Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin resigned. The magnitude of the slide is best understood with some history: In 1979, the Iranian rial stood at 72 to the dollar. On July 14, 2015, the day the Iran nuclear deal was signed in Vienna, the Iranian rial was at 29,500 per dollar. When Farzin entered office in December 2022, the rial traded at about 430,000 to the dollar. Whatever the precise benchmarks, the trend is unmistakable: the rial’s weakness has become both a symbol of policy failure and a driver of unrest.

The currency’s decline has coincided with bleak economic signals. Except for anemic growth in the oil sector, every key sector of Iran’s economy is entering recession, foreshadowing higher unemployment. Industry and mining declined by 3.4%, construction by 12.9% and agriculture contracted by 2.9%. At the same time, inflation is growing. The Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) reported that Iran’s average annual inflation reached 42.2% in December. A close examination of this number indicates the significant impact of inflation on Iranian consumers. Food, tobacco, and beverages rose 72% year over year. This persistent high inflation erodes the purchasing power of Iranians and drives an increasing number into poverty.

Tehran’s options are few. Iran’s problems are deep and structural, and durable improvement would require political and ideological shifts beyond what the Pezeshkian administration is likely able to deliver. Even so, the government will be compelled to act on three fronts.

First, Farzin’s resignation provides the president with a convenient focal point for public anger, but it does nothing to address the issues that precipitated the crisis: fiscal mismanagement, sanctions pressure, and chronic credibility deficits. President Pezeshkian has reportedly selected 64-year-old former economy minister Abdolnaser Hemmati as Farzin’s successor.

Hemmati may at first seem a counterintuitive choice, given that the Iranian Parliament impeached him in March for failing in similar circumstances. However, he has a background that offers potential for stability. First, he is experienced. He led the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) from 2018 until late May 2021, during the Trump administration's earlier sanctions, and his work helped stabilize the foreign exchange market under similar difficult circumstances. He also qualifies as a regime insider with decades of experience with hardliners and more pragmatic conservatives. After beginning his career as an agricultural economist, he moved to Iran’s broadcasting organization, where he rose to become its political deputy and director general of news broadcasting. He then became the Director of Iran’s Central Insurance Corporation. Between 2006 and 2016, Hemmati led Sina Bank and Bank Mellat, banks with close ties to the Revolutionary Guard's Qods Force, to the extent that the U.S. and the European Union designated each. Hemmati attempted to enter the 2024 presidential election on a platform offering economic stabilization, but the Guardian Council rejected his candidacy. He instead became Pezeshkian’s economy minister, a position he held until his impeachment on 2 March 2024, following a spike in inflation and the rial's fall to 950,000 to the dollar. Ironically, that value would be seen as a significant improvement in its status today.

Hemmati will need to work quickly with Pezeshkian to propose measures to decelerate inflation, with an emphasis on protecting low-income and rural households. In the medium term, Hemmati will need to target Iran’s banking sector to strengthen balance sheets and prevent further failures. The downside of this last step is that it will inevitably involve some recognition of bad loans and credit tightening to prevent additional poor loan issuance.

Next, Pezeshkian will focus on budget reform. Details on his latest budget are limited, but we know that security and military entities remain well-resourced, which will constrain his options on the civilian side. He has proposed a 20% salary increase for public workers, but it will not keep up with inflation, and even here, he will struggle to find the funds. The budget debate will continue until 20 March 2026, and will likely remain contentious, given its emphasis on tax collection and subsidy cuts rather than oil revenues as a source of income.

Last, foreign policy will remain the most complicated aspect of Pezeshkian’s economic challenges. His government will do whatever it can to mitigate the impact of sanctions through engagement with Russia, China, and Africa, and will continue to seek talks with Washington. Initiating negotiations with the U.S., even without a prospect of an outcome, has in the past strengthened the rial. But if Pezeshkian would welcome talks with the West, the hardline actors within the regime responsible for Iran’s foreign policy remain focused on aggressive goals that remain one of the primary obstacles to peace in the region. The Quds Force shows every sign of seeking to rebuild its shattered proxies and establish new relationships with the Khartoum and other actors in Africa. The Trump administration’s approach to Tehran has been consistent. It will not waste time on talks that offer sanctions relief without seismic changes in the regime’s approach to nuclear, missiles, and regional issues. Gulf Arabs are willing to maintain a strategy of détente but will not consider rapprochement without an end to Qods Force activity in the region. Absent political rapprochement and a belief that capital invested in Iran will not be subject to terrorism or human rights sanctions, foreign investment for Iran will remain impossible.

Last, Iran’s leaders will inevitably recognize that this unrest is unfolding amid several hallmarks of a pre-revolutionary situation: institutional failure, fragmentation among the ruling elites, generational alienation, persistent fiscal crisis, widespread economic suffering, class antagonism, escalating and chronic protests, and the absence of a unifying state narrative. President Pezeshkian recently stated that his country was “in a full-fledged war with America, Israel, and Europe.” Such rhetoric will play to domestic hardline audiences while reinforcing Iran’s aggressive reputation abroad. During this sensitive period, Iran is unlikely to take actions that would further exacerbate its domestic fragility and instead seeks to gradually test Western red lines while navigating the Islamic Republic through what remains the regime's most sensitive and challenging economic and political period since the 1980s.”

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Putin Again Bungles Strategy: Why His War of Attrition will Sink Russia

OPINION — On February 14, 2022, with Russia poised to invade Ukraine, I questioned whether Vladimir Putin’s reign to that point had revealed him to be a strategic master or a strategic failure. Nearly four years later, the verdict is even more apparent. Putin, confident in his strategic calculus that the West would provide only token assistance to Ukraine, which would quickly fold under the weight and violence of Russian military might, fatefully launched his attack days later with disastrous consequences for Russia. The country he leads is now even poorer, more isolated, brittle, and dependent (on China) than before. Putin grossly underestimated Ukrainian will, overestimated the competence of his own military and intelligence apparatus, and misjudged Western cohesion. By the Fall of 2022, it was obvious even to Putin that his expected quick victory was unattainable. This was surely a bitter pill to swallow, but he quickly pivoted to a “wait and win” war strategy of grinding attrition, calculating that through sheer mass and perseverance--and Western impatience--time would be on his side. Most pundits, even those in the West, have tended to agree with him, much as they did in 2022 about the likelihood that Russia would quickly roll over Ukraine. This mindset, however--that time is on Russia’s side--risks a strategic misreading no less profound than his original blunder, because there is a strong argument to be made that Putin’s attrition strategy is eroding key foundations of Russian power faster and more deeply than it is eroding the Ukrainian front lines.

Thus far Russia has managed to sustain a high level of war spending, but there are growing signs of strain. Russia’s numerical troop advantage over Ukraine is maintained almost entirely through extraordinarily high financial incentives, but these are starting to drop steeply due to growing budget shortfalls, particularly in regional budgets on which such spending disproportionately falls. New contracts for soldiers in April-June 2025 were less than half the level of the same period in 2024, signaling a significant weakening in the effectiveness of financial inducements.

And it’s not just the money. The death toll for Russian soldiers is accelerating. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in July of this year that the number of Russian dead for the first half of 2025 alone exceeded 100,000. This has likely contributed to a sharp increase in desertions, estimated to have doubled in 2025 with approximately 70,000 desertions, or approximately 10% of the force in Ukraine. Russia is increasingly reliant on coerced recruits, harsh punishments for desertion, including torture and extrajudicial executions, all signs of a military struggling to maintain sustainable, motivated troop levels. While tactical adaptations have allowed Russian forces to regain some initiative on the battlefield, they rest on a manpower model that burns through human capital, i.e., human beings, at a pace no country with Russia’s demographic profile can long sustain.

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As the war drags on, Russia is also becoming even more dependent on China. Post-2022 trade patterns show a Russia increasingly locked into an asymmetric partnership in which Russia humiliatingly relies on China for critical imports of technology, while Beijing gains leverage through discounted energy purchases and control over supply chains, making Moscow increasingly vulnerable to Beijing’s whims over time. For a leader obsessed with sovereignty, the long-term trajectory Putin has embarked on contains a glaring paradox: the longer he fights to keep Ukraine out of the Western orbit, the more he locks Russia into a subordinate position in China’s. Talk about strategic irony.

These financial strains and deepening dependence on China are compounded by the continued tightening of international sanctions on the Russian energy sector, a general decrease in the price of oil and gas on which Russia is so heavily dependent as the global economy cools, and the heavy depletion of Russia’s “rainy day” sovereign wealth fund, which has dropped by almost 60% and now mostly consists of Chinese Renminbi and gold, having exhausted its hard currency holdings. Maintaining current defense spending will thus increasingly require either higher borrowing from domestic banks or visible cuts in social spending and civilian projects, further eroding living standards and stoking popular war fatigue.

Putin’s war-of-choice with Ukraine has only intensified Russia’s pre-war weaknesses. Russia’s economy, already underperforming relative to its resource base and human potential, must now deal with permanent war spending and sanctions-induced inefficiencies. Its demographics, already fragile, are being further hollowed out by horrific war casualties and the emigration of skilled workers. Russia’s civic life, already stunted, is being further smothered by wartime repression. Finally, Putin’s invasion not only failed to restore a pliant Ukrainian “little brother”, it locked Russia into a costly struggle against the second largest country in Europe, after itself, and one that is moreover more anti-Russian, better armed, and more deeply integrated with the West than before.

And now, by slow-rolling negotiations to end the conflict, Putin misreads the trajectory of this war in the same way he misread its opening act. He underestimates the cumulative effect of casualties and consequences of economic distortions and social fatigue inside Russia; he overestimates the degree that support of the Western democracies for Ukraine will collapse under the weight of their debates and divisions; and he also, again, overestimates his ability to break Ukraine by military force. In analyzing the arc of Putin’s rule, the war in Ukraine is not an aberration from Putinism, but its logical culmination. In strategic terms, it represents a transition from a condition of chronic underperformance to one of active and acute self-harm. Nearly four years after his decision to invade Ukraine, which more than anything else will define his reign, Putin is not outplaying history on a grand chessboard by doubling down on the war, he is sacrificing Russia’s future for the sake of victories and imperial fantasies that cannot be won, much less sustained. This is the definition of strategic failure.

As a self-proclaimed student of Russian history, Putin would be wise to remember the setting of Russia’s original regime-toppling “color revolution,” the February Revolution of 1917. This was the spontaneous Russian popular uprising that led to the abdication of the Tsar and formation of a Provisional Government, not the subsequent Bolshevik coup d’etat later that year. While popular discontent with the monarchy had long been rising, it was the accumulated privations of war that brought events to a boiling point. As with that war, time in this one is not on Putin’s side.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Pope Leo XIV Has an Opportunity with the 2026 World Day of Peace

OPINION — On January 1, 2026, in his planned first message for the 59th World Day of Peace, Pope Leo XIV will reflect on peace, justice, and global harmony.

On December 18, 2025, Pope Leo published his first major peace message themed “Peace be with you,” in preparation for his and the Catholic Church’s annual January 1st exhortation on World Peace. Pope Leo’s December message urged the faithful to not surrender to the idea that fear and darkness are normal, but to see peace as not only possible but necessary. “When we treat peace as a distant ideal, we cease to be scandalized when it is denied, or even when war is waged in its name… and to justify violence and armed struggle in the name of religion.” Pope Leo called on believers of all religions to guard against the temptation to weaponize words and religion to commit violence in its name. He ended with two searing eyewitness accounts of European horrors: the Bosnian war and the domestic terrorism that tormented Italy in the 1970s and 1980s.

The World Day of Peace is an annual Catholic observance celebrated each January 1. Established in 1968 by Pope Paul VI, it is an opportunity for each pope to write a peace message and to reflect on peace, justice, and global harmony. The messages offer moral guidance to the Church and the world on how to pursue peace in a contemporary context.

For his first message for the 59th World of Peace, Pope Leo chose the theme “Peace be with you” as a call not only to desire peace, but to make it a lived reality. Indeed, peace is not just the absence of war, but rooted in justice, trust, dialogue, forgiveness, and shared humanity.

Seeking peace in a world in disarray

The annual Preventive Priorities Survey, produced by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the more than six hundred American foreign policy experts who contributed to the survey, was just published and viewed five conflict-related scenarios as highly likely to emerge or escalate and to have high impact on U.S. interests in 2026.

The experts were most concerned about conflict-related risks in the Middle East and eastern Europe, including the potential for increased clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinians in the West Bank, renewed fighting in the Gaza Strip, and intensified attacks in the Russia-Ukraine war. Also, the possibility of direct U.S. military strikes in Venezuela and of an increase in political violence and popular unrest in the United States are similarly worrying scenarios.

Renewed armed conflict between Iran and Israel, artificial intelligence-enabled cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure and a cross-strait crisis between China and Taiwan are concerning. And North Korea was elevated to a Tier 1 concern for 2026 – a top-priority global threat due to its nuclear weapons, ballistic missile programs and potential to destabilize Northeast Asia.

“The world continues to grow more violent and disorderly. Last year’s unprecedented level of anxiety among experts about the rising risk of conflict remains undiminished, according to the director of the CFR survey.

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Pope Leo, the first American pope, has an opportunity to put words into action, in the pursuit of peace. Since his election in May 2025, “peace be with you all” has been the foundation for his peace mission. In October 2025, at an interreligious meeting in Rome, Pope Leo declared: “Peace is holy, not war”, urging religious leaders to act as “mothers” who encourage people to treat each other as family. And in December 2025 during a trip to Lebanon he met with Muslim and Druze leaders, stating that authentic unity and friendship are the only ways to “put aside the arms of war.”

Pope Leo could and should convene a meeting of interreligious leaders to draft a strategy to bring peace to a troubled world. This, obviously, would be a monumental task, seemingly beyond the reach of any person, nation, alliance, and religion. But a leader that has the respect of peers and the public could be the catalyst for such a “peace movement.”

Pope Leo has my vote.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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The World Leaders to Watch in 2026

OPINION — The recent release of President Trump’s new National Security Strategy (NSS), with its emphasis on “the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” and its resultant challenges, such as border security, migration, and narcotics trafficking, offer us an opportunity to closely examine leaders to watch in 2026. While previous similar columns in The Cipher Brief by this author had focused on adversaries such as Russia’s Putin, China’s Xi, North Korea’s Kim, and Iran’s Supreme Leader, today’s evolving geopolitical landscape (as described in the new NSS) suggests looking more closely at the motivations and leadership style of Venezuela’s adversary President Nicolas Maduro, Russia’s diplomatic emissary Kirill Dmitriev, and the deeply influential, newly elected Pope Leo XIV. And the gray zone is alive and well --- there are lots of ‘black swans’ flying around!

The influence of Pope Leo XIV, who has already shown himself to be a transformational Pope, is easily misunderstood. When Stalin famously quipped, “How many divisions does the Pope have,” today’s answer would be, 1.4 billion. Observers forget that the Vatican has one of the world’s oldest and formidable diplomatic and intelligence services. Several weeks ago, when Pope Leo visited the headquarters of the Italian Intelligence Service, he spoke eloquently, stating that intelligence professionals are entrusted with “the serious responsibility of constantly monitoring the dangers that may threaten the life of the Nation, in order above all to contribute to the protection of peace.”

Pope Leo – whose first words to the flock upon his appointment to the Papacy were “Peace be with you,” has shown himself to be an adept diplomat. American-born, raised, and educated, he then spent several decades in Peru, as well as 20+ years in Rome. Fluent in English, Spanish, and Italian, he is a true citizen of, and Pope for, this world.

His initial diplomatic meetings and trips, as well as his daily commentaries on Instagram and Twitter, have showcased his nuance, spirituality, faith, and promotion of diplomacy and interfaith dialogue as solutions to the world’s conflicts. In his first overseas trip to Turkey and Lebanon, he met with Turkey’s President Erdogan and emphasized Turkey’s role “as a bridge between East and West, Asia, and Europe.” The Pope’s statement highlights Turkey’s – and Erdogan’s – role (enhanced by his experienced Foreign Minister and former intelligence chief Hakan Fidan) as a potential mediator in conflicts such as Gaza and Ukraine.

Pope Leo has also weighed in on the current conflict between the United States and Venezuela, stating that President Trump should avoid a military solution, and instead utilize diplomatic and even economic pressure to resolve the conflict. Such statements are crucial, as earlier in the year, Pope Leo had met with Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio (both are Catholic) shortly after his election. Given the Pope’s vast influence, President Trump and his national security team should thereby borrow a page from President Ronald Reagan’s 1980s playbook and forge a new ‘Holy Alliance’ with Pope Leo and the Holy See, to seek peace in Ukraine, Venezuela, and the Middle East.

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What most media and think tank commentary has missed with respect to Kirill Dmitriev’s role in diplomatic negotiations between Russia and the U.S., is why Russia’s President Putin would utilize Dmitriev in such a role, and what this portends for Russia’s negotiating posture and future in a post-war Ukraine and Europe. Dmitriev, who is young and Ukrainian-born, spent nearly 20 years in the United States as a high school student and subsequent graduate of Stanford University and Harvard Business School. Later, he worked on Wall Street for Goldman Sachs, McKinsey, and Delta Capital, a U.S. government-funded investment fund, which later became the U.S.-Russia Business Fund. American businessmen whom I know who have worked with Dmitriev, describe him as brilliant, focused, and quite knowledgeable about the United States. In 2011, the latter entity became Russia’s Direct Investment Fund, which Dmitriev heads. It’s fair to say that this fund functions de facto as Putin’s ‘family office.’ This, along with Dmitriev’s closeness to Putin and his inner circle (Dmitriev’s wife and Putin’s daughter Katerina Tikhonova are close friends), along with his prolific use of social media (X), suggests a high level of trust, as Dmitriev has led delicate Ukraine peace negotiations with President Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. Putin’s use of Dmitriev in his current diplomatic role may hint at Putin’s aspirations of a renewed, strategic, post-war relationship with Russia and the United States, one focusing on a variety of business deals. I’d argue that it goes further, and that Dmitriev is being groomed for more senior leadership roles in a post-Putin Russia. So, he is most definitely a figure to watch in 2026.

Following America’s recent designation of Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as a foreign terrorist organization (as was done earlier with respect to the Venezuelan transnational criminal organization, Tren de Aragua), President Trump has adopted a forceful approach towards Venezuela’s leader, President Nicolas Maduro. With the largest U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean since Panama (1989), as well as a covert action authorization, President Trump has also hinted at the possibility of a diplomatic resolution to the conflict between Venezuela and America; President Maduro has suggested diplomatic talks. This begs the question whether Maduro – the leader of Venezuela since 2013 - can be negotiated with. The answer to this question – yes, in my opinion – requires a keen understanding of Maduro’s leadership style.

Maduro’s history is well-known. As a high school graduate with socialist roots, he came up through party ranks early in his career, working first as a bus driver and unionist. Numerous media reports also note his close association with Cuba and his linkages to Cuban intelligence services. After the late Hugo Chavez’s failed 1992 military coup, Maduro became linked with Chavez, Venezuela’s President from 1998-2013, and was ‘anointed’ by the charismatic, populist Chavez as his successor, winning a narrowly contested election in 2013. Maduro has often been seen as lacking in personality, charisma, or gravitas, as compared to Chavez. And many have missed his ruthlessness, cleverness, cunning, resilience, and cruelty, as he became a dictator, overturning the results of last year’s 2024 election, won by Venezuela’s opposition, led by the courageous Nobel Laureate – known as Venezuela’s ‘Iron Lady’ – Maria Corina Machado. And his incompetent socialist economic and political policies led Venezuela – once the thriving gem of Latin America, with its democratic spirit, oil riches, natural resources, and a thriving middle class - to economic ruin, penury, and a brain drain of over eight million Venezuelans. Maduro now leads a vast ‘narco state’ and criminal enterprise, funded by drugs, rare earths, minerals, gold, and oil, and beholden to criminal elements in the military, intelligence services, and transnational criminal networks, as well as his close ties to America’s adversaries such as Iran, Cuba, Russia, and China. Maduro’s criminality – America has even put a $50 million bounty on him - is what now keeps him in power.

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Maduro’s negotiation skills merit attention. Earlier this year, he showcased his negotiating prowess in releasing six American hostages after meeting with Trump’s special envoy Richard Grenell. Maduro has even written a recent letter to Pope Leo IV (who has called for dialogue and peace in Venezuela), stating, “I have great faith that Pope Leo, as I stated in the letter I sent him, will help Venezuela preserve and achieve peace and stability.”

President Trump has often shown a combination of negotiating flexibility with ‘Reaganesque’ strategic deterrence. Maduro must also be given an absolute deadline to shut down the Iranian drone base and to insist that all Iranian, Cuban, and Russian military and intelligence ‘advisors’ leave Venezuela within 24 hours --- or else! President Trump’s vast military buildup, military strikes on drug boats, seizure of Venezuela’s ‘shadow’ fleet of oil tankers, and designation of Venezuelan criminal organizations as foreign terrorist entities have boxed Maduro into a very tight corner. And America’s bold ‘exfiltration’ of Venezuela’s brave, courageous opposition leader and Nobel Laureate Maria Corina Machado sent a powerful, symbolic message to Maduro: we can get her out, and we can bring her back in, at will.

President Trump, as a former real estate CEO, can appreciate that regime change bears similarity to evicting a difficult tenant. Often, they must be bought out. Fortunately, there is ample precedent in American diplomacy in this regard. In 1991, America, working closely with the late Israeli diplomat Uri Lubrani and Ethiopia’s late Kassa Kebede (a former foreign minister and Ambassador to the UN/Geneva), paid $35 million ($83 million in 2025 dollars) – which was never fully accounted for! - to Ethiopia to allow 15,000 Beta Israel refugees to depart Ethiopia for Israel, and Ethiopia’s dictator Haile Mengistu to go into exile. Similar considerations might be considered with respect to Maduro, especially when America has spent over $1 billion USD in its current military buildup in the Caribbean.

So as 2026 approaches, all eyes are on President Trump. It’s his move. Given his and America’s prestige on the line, there is no margin for error.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Modeling the Earth with AI is Now a Strategic Intelligence Imperative

EXPERT OPINION / PERSPECTIVE — We are currently witnessing a mobilization of technical ambition reminiscent of the Manhattan Project, a realization that data and compute are the new defining elements of national power. I am deeply energized by recent bold moves in Washington, specifically the White House’s launch of the "Genesis Mission" this past November—an initiative designed to federate vast federal scientific datasets for integrated AI training—alongside the real-world deployment of GenAI.mil.

Yet, when I look at the velocity of the commercial sector—from OpenAI launching its dedicated Science division and NVIDIA attempting to simulate the planet with Earth-2, to Google DeepMind aggressively crossing their AI breakthroughs into the geospatial domain—it becomes clear that we are still aiming too low. These projects are not just modeling data; they are attempting to model reality itself. American technical leadership is paramount, but that leadership is meaningless if it is not ruthlessly and immediately applied to our national security framework. We must take these massive, reality-simulating concepts and focus them specifically on the GEOINT mission.

A perfect example of this is that earlier this year, in July 2025, the geospatial world shifted. Google DeepMind released the AlphaEarth Foundations (AEF) model, and through the hard work of the Taylor Geospatial Engine (TGE) and the open-source community, those vector embeddings are now publicly available on Source Cooperative.

From Google

The excitement is justified. AlphaEarth is a leap forward because it offers pixel-level embeddings rather than the standard patch-level approach. It doesn’t just tell you “this 256x256 square contains a city”; it tells you "this specific pixel is part of a building, and it knows its neighbors."

But as I look at this achievement from the perspective of national security, I see something else. I see a proof of concept for a capability that the United States is uniquely positioned to build—and must build—to maintain decision advantage.

Google has the internet’s data. But the intelligence community holds the most diverse, multi-physics, and temporally deep repository of the Earth in human history.

It is time for the United States to propose and execute a National Geospatial-Intelligence Embedding Model (NGEM).

The Proposal: Beyond RGB

The AlphaEarth model is impressive, but it is limited by its training data—primarily commercial optical imagery. In the national security domain, an optical image is just the tip of the spear. We don't just see with light; we see with physics.

I am proposing that we train a massive, pixel-level foundation model that ingests all of its holdings. We aren't talking about just throwing more Sentinel-2 data at a GPU. We are talking about a model that generates embeddings from a unified ingest of:

Multi-INT Imagery: Electro-optical (EO), Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Infrared/Thermal, Multispectral, and Hyperspectral.
Vector Data: The massive stores of Foundation GEOINT (FG)—roads, borders, elevation meshes.
The Critical Missing Modality: Text. We must embed the millions of intelligence reports, analyst notes, and finished intelligence products ever written.

The Approach: "The Unified Latent Space"

The approach would mirror the AlphaEarth architecture—generating 64-dimensional (or higher) vectors for every coordinate on Earth—but with a massive increase in complexity and utility.

In AlphaEarth, a pixel’s embedding vector encodes "visual similarity." In an NGA NGEM, the embedding would encode phenomenological and semantic truth.

We would train the model to map different modalities into the same "latent space."

If a SAR image shows a T-72 tank (through radar returns), and an EO image shows a T-72 tank (through visual pixels), and a text report describes a "T-72 tank," they should all map to nearly the same mathematical vector.
The model becomes the universal translator. It doesn't matter if the input is a paragraph of text or a thermal signature; the output is a standardized mathematical representation of the object.

The Outcomes: What Does This Give Us?

If we achieve this, we move beyond "computer vision" into "machine understanding."

1. The "SAM Site" Dimension In the AlphaEarth analysis, researchers found a "dimension 27" that accidentally specialized in detecting airports. It was a serendipitous discovery of the model's internal logic. If we train NSEM on NGA’s holdings, we won’t just find an airport dimension. We will likely find dimensions that correspond to specific national security targets.

Dimension 14 might light up only for Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) sites, regardless of whether they are camouflaged in optical imagery, because the thermal and SAR layers give them away.
Dimension 42 might track "maritime logistics activity," integrating port vectors with ship signatures.

2. Cross-Modal Search (Text-to-Pixel) Currently, if an analyst wants to find "all airfields with extended runways in the Pacific," they have to rely on tagged metadata or run a specific computer vision classifier. With a multi-modal embedding model, the analyst could simply type a query from a report: "Suspected construction of hardened aircraft shelters near distinct ridge line." Because we embedded the text of millions of past reports alongside the imagery, the model understands the semantic vector of that phrase. It can then scan the entire globe’s pixel embeddings to find the mathematical match—instantly highlighting the location, even if no human has ever tagged it.

3. Vector-Based Change Detection AlphaEarth showed us that subtracting vectors from 2018 and 2024 reveals construction. For the intelligence community, this becomes Automated Indications & Warning (I&W). Because the embeddings are spatially aware and pixel-dense, we can detect subtle shifts in the function of a facility, not just its footprint. A factory that suddenly starts emitting heat (thermal layer) or showing new material stockpiles (hyperspectral layer) will produce a massive shift in its vector embedding, triggering an alert long before a human analyst notices the visual change.

The Intelligence Use Cases

Automated Order of Battle: Instantly generating dynamic maps of military equipment by querying the embedding space for specific signatures (e.g., "Show me all vectors matching a mobile radar unit").
Underground Facility Detection: By combining vector terrain data, gravity/magnetic anomaly data, and hyperspectral surface disturbances into a single embedding, the model could "see" what is hidden.
Pattern of Life Analysis: Since the model is spatiotemporal (like AlphaEarth), it learns the "heartbeat" of a location. Deviations—like a port going silent or a sudden surge in RF activity—become mathematical anomalies that scream for attention.

Conclusion

Google and the open-source community have given us the blueprint with AlphaEarth. They proved that pixel-level, spatiotemporal embeddings are the superior way to model our changing planet.

But the mission requires more than commercial data. It requires the fusion of every sensor and every secret. By building this multi-modal embedding model—fusion at the pixel level—we can stop looking for needles in haystacks and start using a magnet.

This is the future of GEOINT. We have the data. We have the mission. It’s time to build the model.

Follow Mark Munsell on LinkedIn.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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A Bold 2025 National Security Strategy

OPINION — Out with a “rules-based international order” and in with “U.S. core national interests”, according to the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2025. The NSS was not well-received by many of the 32 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Indeed, saying good-bye to the U.S. as the guarantor of global order will be difficult for many of our allies and partners, who will be expected to contribute more to their own defense and security.

Europe and the Middle East received lower priority in the NSS, with minimal criticism of Russia. The Western Hemisphere, however, is the primary security region for the U.S., under a modern “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine”, with a focus on border control, mass migration, narco-trafficking and international crime and terrorism as principal threats to our nation’s security.

The NSS correctly in my view focused on the importance of the Indo-Pacific region. It called for expanding commercial and other relations with India to contribute to Indo-Pacific security. The NSS called on the Quad – Australia, Japan, India and the U.S., — to align its actions with allies and partners to prevent the domination by any single competitor nation. The NSS cited the need for the U.S. to invest in research to preserve and advance our advantage in cutting-edge military and dual-use technology, to include undersea, space, nuclear, AI, quantum computing and autonomous systems and the energy to fuel these domains.

The NSS correctly focused on Taiwan and its dominance of semiconductor production and, also, Taiwan’s direct access to the Second Island Chain, splitting Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters, and the one-third of global shipping that passes annually through the South China Sea and its implications for the U.S. economy. The NSS is clear in stating that deterring a conflict over Taiwan is a priority, making it clear that the U.S. does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

The NSS calls on our allies and partners to allow the U.S. military greater access to their ports and other facilities, to spend more on their own defense, and most importantly to invest in capabilities aimed at deterring aggression.

Japan and South Korea are encouraged to increase defense spending, with new capabilities to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain. The NSS says the U.S. will harden and strengthen our military presence in the Western Pacific. Indeed, preventing conflict requires a vigilant posture in the Indo-Pacific, a renewed defense industrial base, greater military investment from us and from allies and partners, and winning the economic and technological competition over the long run.

The Indo-Pacific is the source of almost half the world’s GDP and will grow over the century. It will be “among the next century’s key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds.”

The conventional wisdom, as cited in the NSS, is that China duped us into believing that by opening our markets to China and encouraging American business to invest in China, starting in 1979 when China was a poor and backward nation, we would facilitate China’s entry into the so-called “rules-based international order.” And as the NSS mentions: “This did not happen. China got rich and powerful and used its wealth and power to its considerable advantage.”

But there were leaders in China in the 1980s and 1990s who believed in democratization and the rule of law and open elections. Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was removed from his leadership position because he, like his predecessor, Hu Yaobang, believed in democracy and the rule of law. Mr. Zhao was removed in June 1989 because he supported the student demonstrators at Tiananmen, and Mr. Hu was removed, also by Deng Xiaoping, for indulging in bourgeois liberalization and advocating democracy. A few years later, Premiers Wen Jiabao and Zhu Rongji, like Messrs. Hu and Zhao before them, were advocates for democratization and free and fair elections. Currently, there may be other senior officials in China who advocate for democratization and the rule of law.

The NSS is a powerful document, focusing on the Western Hemisphere and the security threat to the U.S. emanating from that region. And the U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific region and deterring aggression in the First Island Chain while ensuring no unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait are clear and unambiguous goals of the Trump Administration. Getting the support of regional allies and partners will be an important part of this national security strategy.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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Why the ‘Double Tap’ Incident Matters Far Beyond a Single Strike

EXPERT OPINION — For about a week we experienced significant controversy over the first military attack on alleged narco-trafficker small boats off the coast of Venezuela (and later Ecuador). The controversy began with news that the Secretary of Defense had ordered the Special Operations Command Task Force commander to, “Kill them all.” This was linked to reports that the boat was attacked not once, but twice; the second attack launched with full knowledge that two survivors from the first attack were hanging on the capsized remnants.

Critical commentary exploded, much of it based on the assumption that the “kill them all” order had been issued, and that it was issued after the first strike. Even after the Admiral who ordered the attacks refuted that allegation, critics continued to assert that the attack was, ‘clearly’ a war crime as it was obviously intended to kill the two survivors.

The public still does not know all the details about these attacks. What is known, however, is that Congress held several closed-door hearings that included viewing the video feed from the attacks and testimony from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Admiral who commanded the operation.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reaction to these hearings has crystalized along partisan lines. Democratic Members of Congress and Senators have insisted they observed a war crime and called for public release of the video. Republicans, in contrast, have indicated they are satisfied that the campaign is based on a solid legal foundation and that nothing about the attacks crossed the line into illegality.

What is less obvious than the partisan reaction is how what began as a problem for the administration has ended up becoming a windfall. When Senator Roger Wicker, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, announced after the second closed door briefing that he was satisfied with the administration’s legal theory and saw no evidence of a war crime, it provided a signal to the administration that this Congress is not going to interfere with its military campaign. Democrats will try: they will continue to demand hearings, they have asserted violation of the War Powers Act and propose legislation requiring immediate termination of the campaign, and they will continue to insist the U.S. military has been ordered to conduct illegal killings. But so long as the Republican majority is tolerant of this presidential assertion of war power, there is virtually nothing to check it. This so-called ‘double tap’ tested the political waters, and it turns out they are quite favorable for the President.

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From a legal perspective, the reaction to this incident has reflected overbreadth and misunderstanding from both ends of the spectrum. For example, characterizing the second attack as a war crime – or rejecting that conclusion – implicitly endorses the administration’s theory that it is engaged in an armed conflict against Tren de Aragua, an interpretation of international law that has been rejected by almost all legal experts. Equally overbroad has been the assumption that the second attack must have been intended to kill the survivors from the first attack – an assumption that renders that attack nearly impossible to justify, even assuming it was conducted pursuant to a valid invocation of wartime legal authority. But even release of the video would be insufficient to answer a critical question in relation to this assumption: was the second attack directed against the survivors, or against the remnants of the boat with knowledge it would likely kill the survivors as a collateral consequence? Only the Admiral and those who advised him can answer that question. And if the answer is, ‘the remnants, not the survivors’, other difficult questions must be addressed: what was the military necessity for ‘finishing off’ the boat? And, most importantly, why wasn’t it operationally feasible to do something – perhaps just dropping a raft into the water – to spare the survivors that lethal collateral effect?

But the true significance of this incident and the reaction it triggered extends far beyond the question of whether that second attack was or was not lawful; it is the implicit validation of the foundation for the legal architecture the administration seems to be erecting to justify expanding the conflict to achieve regime change in Venezuela. In this regard, it is important to recognize that the Trump Administration is implicitly acknowledging it must situate its campaign and any extension of this campaign within the boundaries of international law, even as it seeks to expand them beyond their rational limits. Understanding this consequence begins with two essential considerations. First, the Trump Administration’s consistent invocation of international legal authority for its counter-drug campaign - albeit widely condemned as invalid – indicates that any expansion of this campaign will be premised on a theory of international legality. Second, that theory will have to align with the very limited authority of a state to use military force against another state enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

That limited authority begins with Article 2(4) of the Charter, which prohibits a state’s threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other United Nations member state. This prohibition is not, however, conclusive. Instead, the Charter recognizes two exceptions allowing for the use of force. First, military action authorized by the Security Council as a measure in response to an act of aggression, breach of the peace, or threat to international peace and security. Such authorizations have been used since creation of the U.N., one example being the use of force authorization adopted in 2011 to establish humanitarian safe areas in Libya; the authorization that led to the Libyan air campaign. The reason such authorizations have been infrequent is because any one of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) may veto any resolution providing for such authorization for any reason whatsoever. It is inconceivable the U.S. could garner support for such authorization to take military action in and/or against Venezuela, much less even seek such an authorization.

The second exception to the presumptive prohibition on the threat or use of force is the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. That right arises when a state is the victim of an actual or imminent armed attack. Furthermore, the understanding of that right has evolved in the view of many states – and certainly the United States – to apply to threats posed by both states and non-state organized armed groups like al Qaeda.

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From the inception of this counter-narcotics campaign the Trump administration has asserted that the smuggling of illegal – and all too often deadly – narcotics into the United States amounts to an ‘armed attack’ on the nation. This characterization – coupled with the more recent designation of fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction – is obviously intended to justify an invocation of Article 51 right of self-defense. As with the assertion that TdA is engaged in an armed conflict with the United States, this invocation has been almost universally condemned as invalid. But that seems to have had little impact on Senators like Wicker or Graham and other Republicans who have indicated they are satisfied that the campaign is on solid legal ground.

To date, of course, the campaign based on this assertion of self-defense has been limited to action in international waters. But President Trump indicated in his last cabinet meeting that he intends to go after ‘them’ on the land – ostensibly referring to members of TdA. So, how would an assertion of self-defense justify extending attacks into Venezuelan territory, and what are the broader implications for potential conflict escalation?

The answer to that question implicates a doctrine of self-defense long embraced by the United States: ‘unable or unwilling.’ Pursuant to this interpretation of the right of self-defense, a nation is legally justified in using force in the territory of another state to defend itself against a non-state organized armed group operating out of that territory when the territorial state is ‘unable or unwilling’ to prevent those operations. It is, in essence, a theory of self-help based on the failure of the territorial state to fulfill its international legal obligation to prevent the use of its territory by such a group. And there have been numerous examples of U.S. military operations justified by this theory. Perhaps the most obvious was the operation inside Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden. Many other drone attacks against al Qaeda targets in places like Yemen and Somalia are also examples. And almost all operations inside Syria prior to the fall of the Asad regime were based on this theory.

By implicitly endorsing the administration’s theory that the United States is acting against TdA pursuant to the international legal justification of self-defense, Republican legislators have opened the door to expanding attacks into Venezuelan territory. It is now predictable that the administration will invoke the unwilling or unable doctrine to justify attacks on alleged TdA base camps and operations in that country. But, unlike other invocations of that theory, it is equally predictable that the territorial state – Venezuela, will reject the U.S. legal justification for such action. This means Venezuela will treat any incursion into its territory as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, triggering its right of self-defense.

In theory, such a dispute over which state is and which state is not validly asserting the right of self-defense would be submitted to and resolved by the Security Council. But it is simply unrealistic to expect any Security Council action if U.S. attacks against TdA targets in Venezuela escalate to direct confrontation between Venezuela and the U.S. Instead, each side will argue it is acting with legal justification against the other side’s violation of international law.

What this means in more pragmatic terms is that there is a real likelihood a U.S. invocation of the unable or unwilling doctrine could quickly escalate into direct hostilities with the Venezuelan armed forces. At that point, we should expect the administration will treat any effort by Venezuela to interfere with our ‘self-defense’ operations as a distinct act of aggression, thereby justifying action to neuter Venezuela’s military capability.

It is, of course, impossible to predict exactly what the administration is planning vis a vis Venezuela. Perhaps this is all part of a pressure campaign intended to avert direct confrontation by persuading Maduro’s power base to abandon him. But the history of such tactics does not seem to support the expectation Maduro will depart peacefully, or that any resulting regime change will have the impact the Trump Administration might desire. One need only consider how dictators like Saddam Hussein and Manuel Noriega resisted such pressures and clung to power even when U.S. military action that they had no chance of withstanding became inevitable. Or perhaps the administration will bypass the ‘unable and unwilling’ approach and simply initiate direct action against Venezuela to topple Maduro based on an even more dubious claim of self-defense now that he has been designated part of another foreign terrorist organization.

One thing, however, is certain: the options for extending this military campaign to Venezuela are built upon the feeble foundation that the U.S. is legitimately exercising the right of self-defense against TdA. And now, because of an attack that triggered congressional scrutiny, the administration is in a stronger position politically than ever thanks to Republican legislators endorsing this theory of international legality.

The real issue that was at stake during those closed door hearings was never really whether a possible war crime occurred, although the deaths that have resulted from the ‘second strike’ (like all the deaths resulting from this campaign) are highly problematic. The real issue was and remains the inherent invalidity of a U.S. assertion of wartime legal authority and a congressional majority that seems all too willing acquiesce to an administration that seems willing to bend law to the point of breaking to advance its policy agenda.

Nicolas Maduro is a tyrant who has illegitimately clung to power contrary to the popular will of the Venezuelan people. His nefarious activities and anti-democratic rule justify U.S. efforts to force him out of power and enable restoration of genuine democracy in that country. What it does not justify is constructing a legal edifice built on an invalid foundation to justify going to war against Venezuela to achieve that goal. But now that the Trump administration has tested the political waters, that seems more likely than ever.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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The Push and Pull Between Washington and Beijing in the South China Sea

OPINION — China uses a layered approach in the South China Sea that blends military power, paramilitary forces, legal instruments, and political signaling. Beijing has asserted “historic rights” over most of the waterway in the past two decades or so, via the nine-dash line strategy. This strategy overlaps the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of several Southeast Asian states. A 2016 international law tribunal convened under UNCLOS ruled overwhelmingly against these claims. However, China rejected the ruling and continues to behave as before, trying to assert de facto control in the area. This strategy is reinforced by the use of 'official maps', textbooks, and diplomatic statements aiming to slowly set down the notion that the territorial waters there are under a Chinese sphere.

In the Spratly and Paracel Islands, China has transformed reefs since the early to mid 2010s into large artificial islands, where it constructs airfields, ports, radars, and missile sites, dramatically expanding China’s ability to monitor and, if necessary, contest and harass surface and air traffic across much of the South China Sea. They also serve as logistics hubs that support the constant presence of Coast Guard, navy, and militia vessels.

China is testing just how much military risk the United States is willing to face in order to protect its regional allies. Their primary target? The Philippines, an avid American ally in the region.

Chinese coercion directed at Manila is carried out daily not just by destroyers but by white-hulled Coast Guard ships and ostensibly civilian vessels organized as a maritime militia. These platforms ram, water-cannon, block, or sideswipe Philippine vessels and increasingly use tools like signal jamming and close-in maneuvers against Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal and patrols near Scarborough Shoal. Actions are calibrated to be intimidating, sometimes injurious, but still below the threshold of what most governments would label “armed attack.”

These efforts go beyond short-term tactics. They are strategic in nature. China appears less focused on legal recognition than on practical control. If foreign militaries and commercial operators must factor in Chinese reactions for transiting, fishing, or exploration, Beijing achieves much of what formal sovereignty would deliver.

For Beijing, the South China Sea is part of the “near seas” in Chinese maritime doctrine, making it a defensive bastion that must be secured. But by employing artificial island bases and sending out to sea a number of maritime patrols, China seeks to disrupt American and allied activities in the South China Sea while advancing its own power projection further east and south, into the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

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Control over “blue national territory” is tightly linked to Chinese Communist Party narratives of national rejuvenation. By standing firm in the South China Sea, it bolsters PRC leadership legitimacy and makes compromise politically costly internally. Essentially, Xi Jinping appears to be aiming for a Sino-centric maritime order in which neighboring states de facto - if not de jure at some point - accept Chinese rule as a fact of life and where outside powers operate only on terms that Beijing deems acceptable.

Washington’s declared aims in the South China Sea are the preservation of the freedom of navigation and overflight according to international law.

To achieve these goals the United States uses a combination of naval power, alliance creation and military capability development. The United States Navy ships often come close to Chinese-held land and other maritime areas that China or others claim illegally. It does the latter to demonstrate that America will not tolerate any of these claims. These are high-profile but relatively short-lived operations. The above policy is enforced by the U.S. 7th Fleet (based in Japan). There are also more bases throughout the region in partnership with the Philippines.

Big, complicated exercises and joint patrols with the Philippines, Japan, Australia and others build interoperability as well as signal that any serious conflict would not take place strictly on a bilateral basis.

American officials who point out to the 2016 decision, stress that disagreements must be settled in compliance with international law and publicly reiterate that the United States - Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty pertains to American armed forces, public ships or aircraft coming under attack in the South China Sea. This has been a more frequent trend in recent years.

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What the U.S. Should Do

The United States should embed U.S. presence in sensitive missions, when Manila consents. Instead of sending out stand-alone destroyer transits, the U.S. ought to incorporate freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) as part of logistics missions or surveillance patrols and multilateral exercises. Publicly, Washington should continue to declare that significant attacks on Philippine government ships and aircraft comes under the Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. should reiterate privately to Chinese officials what responses it may evoke from the United States - economic sanctions, change in military posture, joint deployments - so that Chinese leaders know where they are headed if they keep these tactics up.

In addition to donating patrol boats, the United States and allies should also assist the Philippines and potentially other claimant states in fielding new coastal defense missiles, unmanned systems and integrated maritime domain awareness networks. Such instruments make it easier for frontline states to detect and respond to incursions with both greater speed and credibility.

China likes to negotiate one on one — and that’s when it has its own leverage. The United States needs to cultivate overlapping coalitions rather than a simple hub-and-spoke model. Institutionalize 'mini-lateral' groupings; U.S. - Japan - Philippines and U.S. - Australia - Philippines patrols, exercises, and intelligence-sharing agreements would make it more difficult for China to pressure any one state without having to face several others.

Communication links with Beijing such as political and operational hotlines should be tested to ensure they will work under stress. The aim is to be predictable and resolute, to minimize the chances that miscalculation leads to uncontrolled escalation.

The South China Sea has turned into a laboratory for the interaction among power, law and norms in an age of strategic contention. China’s use of maritime power looks to transform disputed waters into a zone over which China can make effective, if not legally exclusive, rules and enforce them through militarized outposts, continuous presence, and the narrative fiction of historical rights.

U.S. policy has preserved core principles - freedom of navigation and treaty commitments - but has not prevented Beijing from strengthening its position or normalizing gray-zone coercion. Washington’s task is not to contain China in absolutist terms, but to ensure that coercive changes to the status quo do not become the region’s operating default. That requires more concrete deterrence at key flashpoints, deeper empowerment of frontline states, and a denser web of regional cooperation - combined with realistic crisis planning to manage the risks that come with sustained great-power competition at sea.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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This is Perhaps Ukraine’s Most Dangerous Time

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — Each of my eight trips to Ukraine since retiring from the CIA in the summer of 2023 has been filled with unique challenges. Each time I’ve witnessed first-hand the sacrifices the Ukrainians are making on a daily basis to fight for their country’s independence. And while each trip has been physically exhausting, each one has also been highly inspiring because the Ukrainians are fighting to protect many of the traditional American values that I grew up believing in, including the right to self-determination, liberty and national sovereignty.

But my latest visit to Ukraine was by far the most difficult. Not just because the Russians are significantly increasing their air attacks on Ukrainian towns and cities or because Ukraine is once again going through a very cold winter while facing significant power shortages caused by Moscow’s attacks against energy infrastructure targets. But mainly because for the first time, I heard Ukrainians questioning my country’s commitment to helping them defend their country. Because I heard Ukrainian interlocutors conclude that the U.S. was not a reliable partner and because Ukrainians who are fighting to protect their country, questioned whether the U.S. was willing to abandon support for their cause in order to secure potential business deals with Russian dictator Vladimir Putin and his regime.

Remembering all the Americans I had served with over the years, especially those who made the ultimate sacrifice defending liberty and the honor of our country, it is extremely painful to consider the possibility that my country might choose to placate someone like Putin and, in doing so, turn its back on those who have suffered from Putin’s aggression.

After more than 10 years of being at war, the Ukrainians are clearly fatigued. Russia's constant attacks against civilian targets are taking a toll. Families throughout the country are living without regular access to electricity and are subjected to daily mass Russian drone and missile attacks.

Ukraine's own internal corruption challenges, including the "Operation Midas" investigation, which resulted in the resignation of President Zelensky’s longtime advisor and head of the Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, have raised questions among many Ukrainians about Zelensky and his Administration. The scandal also opened the door for many of the opponents of continued support to Ukraine to claim that Ukraine is a corrupt country led by corrupt leaders.

Of course, these critics forget that the Midas investigation is actually evidence of Ukraine’s efforts to deal with corruption and a development that highlights Kyiv’s determination to create a more transparent government based on “rule of law” principles. And there is no comparison between Ukraine’s efforts to deal with corruption, and Russia’s lack of transparency and complete rejection of “rule of law” governance.

Ukrainian fears about being abandoned by Washington are linked to the perception that the U.S. is going to end its support for Kyiv. Fears that are amplified by the recent leaking of the "28 Point Plan" that was initially presented to Kyiv by the U.S. as part of Washington’s efforts to bring the war to an end and revelations that the bulk of the plan was written by the Kremlin and then delivered to the U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East and Russia Steve Witkoff by Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund head Kiril Dmitriyev.

These leaks bore many of the hallmarks of a Russian disinformation campaign, and whether or not the Kremlin leaked this information, there is little doubt that Moscow is using the leaks to undermine the U.S. internationally; to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies in Europe; to undermine the morale of the Ukrainian population; and to deceive international and domestic audiences into believing Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to find a peaceful resolution to the war that he started.

Moscow has worked relentlessly to create the impression in Washington, Brussels and Kyiv - that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are on the verge of collapse, and it is only a matter of time before Putin achieves his military objectives.

The Ukrainians, on the other hand, are trying to counter this narrative and demonstrate that the Russians continue to make minimal battlefield gains while paying a tremendous price in terms of personnel and resources.

While people are tired, few appear ready to surrender or give up. Many equate surrender to betrayal of the memories of those Ukrainians who have died since 2014 fighting to defend the country from Russia.

Putin’s effort to control the narrative on Ukraine is partially linked to his desire to cover up how bad his own hand is at present. Putin does not want the West to focus on how the Russian military continues to struggle to take small amounts of territory, while suffering high casualty rates. He does not want others to focus on Russia’s own struggles with growing financial, economic and social problems that threaten the long-term stability of his regime and the future of Russia itself.

In recent years, the Kremlin has shifted its limited financial resources to the Military-Industrial complex, resulting in cutbacks to social spending and bringing an end to support of critical civilian infrastructure projects. While this policy has resulted in an increase in defense production, it is bankrupting the country and in recent months even Russia’s defense industry has had to implement spending cutbacks. Many factories and production sites across Russia are unable to pay workers and have been forced to reduce their work week to three or four days per week.

The money that Putin was once able to use to incentivize Russians to join the military and fight Ukraine is drying up, forcing him to once again consider mobilization plans, which will no doubt be highly unpopular with many Russians, especially with the “elites” living in the country’s main population centers.

The war has also drained off workers, resulting in significant labor shortages. Putin’s war is threatening to plunge Russia into the chaotic and painful social and economic conditions that the country faced in the early and mid-1990s.

Before leaving on my latest trip to Ukraine, I was asked to speak at an event in Washington D.C. focused on the future of U.S.-European relations. During that event, one attendee told me that recent polling in the U.S. showed that - since President Trump’s January 2025 inauguration - support for Ukraine among Republicans had risen significantly. This claim was supported by a report published by Defense One based on polling conducted by the Ronald Reagan Institute and a previous report published by the Chicago Institute on Global Affairs. These signs are heartening. In a system where the population’s interests should be considered by elected leaders, this means that the United States Government should be continuing its support for Ukraine.

The growing public support for Ukraine should give Ukrainians some hope that the U.S. is not going to abandon them. But it is hard for the Ukrainians to hear that message when it is often drowned out by much more negative news about alleged backroom deals made between Putin’s couriers and individuals close to President Trump and the very real possibility that those couriers are using their access to actively pursue a whisper campaign to influence the President and his policy decisions. That, combined with targeted leaks and distortions of facts to exaggerate the perception that Washington now prefers Moscow to Ukraine and the Europeans is painting a Russian-preferred narrative.

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It is correct when President Trump says that he inherited a terrible situation in Ukraine. I also agree that as the elected leader of the most powerful country in the world, President Trump has a responsibility to try to end the bloody and senseless conflict.

The President deserves credit for trying, although I do not agree with his periodic claims that the Ukrainians, or their President, are guilty of starting the war - or that Kyiv does not want to end the war. Vladimir Putin is guilty of starting the conflict and despite all of President Trump’s efforts and the Ukrainians willingness to try to find a compromise, Putin has continued to make maximalist demands and drag out the conflict in hopes of stealing more of Ukraine’s territory and feeding Russia’s defense industrial complex, which is now the sole functioning part of Russia’s struggling economy.

It appeared President Trump recognized this reality in October, when he canceled plans to meet with Putin in Budapest and levied new sanctions on the Russian Energy sector. Unfortunately, the President allowed Putin to manipulate the U.S. team into thinking Putin was ready to negotiate in November, opening the door to a lot of Russian disinformation and information warfare designed to undermine the U.S., Ukraine and its allies - but not designed to bring the war to an end.

Over the past year, I have seen the level of political infighting within Ukraine increase. During a discussion with one Ukrainian General in September of 2024, the General opined that historically, Ukraine had never lost a war to Russia but had lost many wars to itself. He warned that internal political struggles in the country allowed the Russians to identify and exploit the political ambitions of some leaders and use these ambitions to divide the country and undermine national unity.

Ukraine is again facing the threat of serious internal divisions that the Kremlin will manipulate and use to achieve its military and political objectives. It appears likely that the Ukrainian government will hold elections in 2026, and the U.S. and the West should be ready to help Kyiv protect those elections from Russian interference. There is also little doubt that Russia itself will not hold fair elections in 2026 or as long as Putin remains in power.

As an American, I pray that our elected leaders will not repeat the mistakes made by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain when trying to deal with Adolf Hitler. The appeasement of Hitler by forcing allies to cede territories to the Nazi regime in Berlin did not lead to “Peace in our Time”. It led to a much greater and more horrific World War that could have been stopped if the English and French had taken decisive action against Hitler at that time.

To “Make America Great Again”, Americans need to stand up for what is right. Right - is not appeasing Putin. Justice is not allowing Putin to get away with stealing large portions of Ukraine’s territory and then benefit from killing more than a million Ukrainian and Russian citizens in a war that was designed to protect Putin’s personal power and re-establish an empire that has collapsed twice in the last 150 years.

As an American, I pray that we find our way through this very confusing and troubled period, hold the aggressor, Putin, accountable for his crimes, and successfully bring this war to an end while protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and America’s reputation in the world.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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What It Means Now that Fentanyl is Designated a “WMD”

OPINION — “There's no doubt that America's adversaries are trafficking fentanyl into the United States in part because they want to kill Americans. If this were a war, that would be one of the worst wars. I believe they killed over the last five or six years, per year, 200-to-300,000 people. You hear about a 100,000, which is a lot of people, but the number is much higher than that. That's been proven.”

That was President Trump in the Oval Office on December 15, explaining why he was signing an Executive Order (EO) designating “illicit fentanyl and its core precursor chemicals as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).”

Notice Trump’s use of the word “war,” and the vast exaggeration of numbers of fentanyl drug deaths in the U.S. -- actually 48,000 in 2024. Also, does anyone really think that the cartels are pushing fentanyl into this country “to kill Americans?” Or is the real reason they are doing it is to make money – as is the case with most drug dealers.

I am focusing on this rather odd EO because to me it is another sign that President Trump is bringing the U.S. military into yet another essentially domestic American problem, drug use. I also see it as the Trump administration regularizing employment of the U.S. military to be a normal response to control civil issues.

Remember, President Trump has employed some 9,000 active and National Guard service members on the U.S. southern border to block what he termed an invasion of illegal immigrants. He has also federalized National Guard troops in U.S. cities like Washington, D.C. claiming they were needed to combat crime, and required hundreds of Marines and originally 4,000 California National Guard personnel in Los Angeles to put down protests against immigration raids.

There was even a military atmosphere in the Oval Office on December 15, because the President used that same meeting to make the first awards of a Mexican Border Defense Medal to 13 Army and Marine service members who provided military support to the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

In the Oval Office meeting, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth explained that the newly-issued medal exactly replicated the 1918 Mexican Border Defense Medal, but that one went to U.S. troops who patrolled the border during 1916-1917, when fear was of a German-inspired invasion by the paramilitary forces of Francisco "Pancho" Villa as part of the Mexican Revolution.

While President Trump said that “to kill Americans” was a purpose of trafficking fentanyl, the EO itself said there was a more complex goal. The EO said, “The production and sale of fentanyl by Foreign Terrorist Organizations and cartels fund these entities’ operations — which include assassinations, terrorist acts, and insurgencies around the world — and allow these entities to erode our domestic security and the well-being of our Nation.”

Here, this EO seeks to link up with one of President Trump’s first EOs, signed on January 20, that designated unspecified cartels as Foreign Terrorists Organizations to make them subject to laws Congress passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks.

The new December 15 EO goes on to say, “The two cartels that are predominantly responsible for the distribution of fentanyl in the United States engage in armed conflict over territory and to protect their operations, resulting in large-scale violence and death that go beyond the immediate threat of fentanyl itself.”

Inexplicably, the EO does not name those two cartels.

However, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in its 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment makes it clear who they are by saying, “The Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartels, in particular, control clandestine [fentanyl] production sites in Mexico, smuggling routes into the United States, and distribution hubs in key U.S. cities.”

Then both the new EO and 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment carry the exact same following sentence: “Further, the potential for fentanyl to be weaponized for concentrated, large-scale terror attacks by organized adversaries is a serious threat to the United States.”

It turns out that back in the 1990s, a number of countries investigated using fentanyl as part of an incapacitating agent, including the U.S. Defense Department. The U.S. dropped the idea because of a margin of safety issue – the difference between a dosage that would incapacitate and one that would kill a person.

However the Russians did create a fentanyl-based incapacitating agent and used it in October 2002, when 40 Chechen terrorists seized Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater and held some 800 people hostage. Russians finally released the fentanyl-based gas to incapacitate those in the theater and it killed some 130 of them.

Fentanyl is an FDA-approved synthetic opioid used medically as a pain reliever and anesthetic. It is close to 100 times stronger than morphine. Two milligrams of fentanyl -- equivalent to 10-to-15 grains of table salt – can be lethal. Unlike other illegal drugs such as cocaine, wholesale traffickers distribute fentanyl by the kilogram, equal to 2.2 pounds.

The DEA has found wide U.S. usage of illicit, manufactured, counterfeit fentanyl pills ranging from .02 to 5.1 milligrams, the latter more than twice the lethal dose depending on a person’s body size, tolerance and past usage.

Fentanyl illegal drug use has been a major problem in the U.S. since 2021 when overdose deaths reached 71,000. But as shown above overdose fentanyl deaths are on the way down. President Trump even recognized fentanyl use had gone down saying in the Oval Office on December 15, “We've also achieved a 50% drop in the amount of fentanyl coming across the border and China is working with us very closely and bringing down the number and the amount of fentanyl that's being shipped…We've got it down to a much lower number.” But Trump added, “Not satisfactory, but it will be satisfactory soon.”

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The term “weapon of mass destruction” has specific legal definitions, typically tied to nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons that are designed to cause large-scale death or bodily harm.

Under the Trump WMD EO, implementation calls for Defense Secretary Hegseth and Attorney General Pam Bondi to determine if the U.S. military is needed to enforce 10 U.S.C. 282, a post-9/11, 2002 counterterrorism law covering emergency situations involving weapons of mass destruction.

If they agree the military is needed, under 10 U.S.C. 282 Hegseth and Bondi are to “jointly prescribe regulations concerning the types of assistance that may be provided,” and “describe the actions that Department of Defense personnel may take in circumstances incident to the provision of assistance.”

There are provisions in 10 U.S.C. 282 prohibiting the military from authority to arrest individuals, directly participate in searches or seizures of evidence related law violations or collection of intelligence for law enforcement – but those provisions also can also be waived.

In addition, under the Trump EO, Hegseth is to consult with Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem to “update all directives regarding the Armed Forces’ response to chemical incidents in the homeland to include the threat of illicit fentanyl.”

I go into all these details because I believe something other than fentanyl is involved here. Others are questioning the December 15 EO, such as Andrew McCarthy in National Review on December 20.

McCarthy wrote, “President Trump may despise ‘forever wars,’ but he sure seems to like pretend wars. The point of the fentanyl ‘designation’ is to shore up his case for using military force against drug traffickers — although its relevance to high seas around Venezuela is hard to fathom since fentanyl is neither produced nor imported from there. At any rate, fentanyl, a dangerous drug but one with legitimate medical uses, is a narcotic, not a weapon of mass destruction akin to a chemical or biological bomb.”

Yesterday, Military.com pointed out, “The [December 15] Executive Order does not spell out a specific military mission, and Pentagon officials have not yet stated whether the armed forces will take on a direct role under the new designation.”

Nonetheless, the EO creates yet another new, domestic area for military operations within the homeland, and what emerges needs to be watched.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Trying to Impose a Loser’s Peace on Ukraine Is a Dead End

OPINION — The fate of territory in eastern Ukraine remains the “most difficult” sticking point in the ongoing peace talks, President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged over the weekend as U.S. negotiators held separate meetings with Ukrainian and Russian officials. In pursuit of peace, the Trump administration is pushing Ukraine to bend to maximalist Kremlin demands that Russia has failed to impose militarily, while promising Kyiv “platinum standard” security guarantees to sweeten the deal.

This approach is unlikely to succeed — and may prove harmful. The administration would be wise to focus instead on pressing Russia to soften its terms.

Putin Demands Victory He Hasn’t Earned

As one of his conditions for peace, Vladimir Putin insists that Ukrainian troops withdraw from the roughly 23 percent of the eastern Donetsk region they still control. He vows that if Kyiv refuses, his military will take that territory anyways. Putin seems convinced that Russia eventually can grind down Ukraine’s undermanned forces.

Some U.S. officials have echoed those arguments, apparently believing that pressuring Kyiv into concessions offers the surest path to peace. As President Donald Trump recently put it, Russia is “much bigger” than Ukraine, and “at some point, size will win.” Ukraine is “losing,” Trump contended, so it must “accept” Russian demands. An initial U.S. peace plan released in November, drafted with Russian input, called for Ukraine to cede the remainder of Donetsk, which would become a “demilitarized buffer zone,” which Washington is now pitching as a “free economic zone.”

In fact, it’s anything but certain that Russian forces can conquer the rest of Donetsk. They would need to seize a so-called “fortress belt” of cities and towns, just one of which — Pokrovsk — has taken Russia over a year to capture despite advantages in manpower and materiel. Despite improvements in drone warfare, Russia has remained unable to achieve a major breakthrough. That’s partly due to degraded force quality, which is unlikely to recover while large-scale hostilities continue. Russia can continue inching forward so long as it can recruit enough men to throw into the “meatgrinder.” Since 2023, Moscow has maintained a surprisingly strong recruitment rate thanks to ever-larger financial incentives. But that can’t last forever.

Although Ukrainian forces are weary and short on infantry, they are not on the verge of breaking. Ukraine continues to put up a stout defense, relying chiefly on Ukrainian-made drones to inflict disproportionate casualties. The decline in American aid has hurt. But even a complete cutoff probably wouldn’t trigger a collapse, though it would mean more Ukrainian lives lost and infrastructure destroyed.

In short, Putin is demanding that Ukraine accept defeat despite the inconvenient fact that Russia hasn’t defeated Ukraine on the battlefield and is unlikely to do so. As long as that remains the case, lopsided peace plans will be a dead end.

This is not a “Zelensky problem.” Recent polling indicates that the Ukrainian people still overwhelmingly reject ceding more territory, seen as synonymous with capitulation. Many in the Ukrainian military are understandably loathe to cede defensible terrain for which Ukrainians have bled for nearly four years. No Ukrainian leader will agree to a deal that would mean political suicide. Even if Zelensky did try to capitulate, it could ignite domestic political instability and undermine morale, which Russia would seek to exploit.

Beware Empty Promises

In part to convince Kyiv to swallow territorial concessions, the Trump administration has been surprisingly forward-leaning on security guarantees for Ukraine. Although Washington has made clear it won’t allow Ukraine to join NATO, U.S. officials touted an “Article 5-like” commitment during recent talks in Berlin. This has enthused Ukrainian and European officials, who are rightly concerned Russia will violate any peace agreement it signs.

The White House, though, should take care not to make empty promises. Ukraine must not be left with another 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which gave Kyiv hollow security assurances in exchange for relinquishing nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union.

While the administration has released few details regarding the specific commitments it made in Berlin, press reports indicate elements of the plan are sensible. The Ukrainian Armed Forces would be permitted to maintain a peacetime strength of 800,000 troops and would receive Western training and equipment, defying Moscow’s demand for Ukrainian demilitarization. A U.S.-led international monitoring and verification mechanism would ensure compliance with a ceasefire, and a deconfliction mechanism would work to prevent escalation.

However, earlier media leaks, as well as a European statement released following the Berlin talks, suggest Washington may also be offering a non-committal promise to respond with measures up to and including “armed force” if Russia re-invaded Ukraine. The Trump team says it will grant Kyiv’s request to seek Senate approval to make this pledge legally binding. Even so, the threat of U.S. military intervention lacks credibility. Both Trump and his Democratic predecessors have eschewed direct conflict with Russia over Ukraine. That’s unlikely to change under a future president, especially since Washington is trying to focus on deterring China.

If the White House is betting its bluff won’t be called, it should think again. However the current war ends, it’s unlikely to resolve Russia’s decades-long struggle to dominate Ukraine and reshape the European security order. Moscow will be racing to reconstitute its army, drawing on lessons learned in Ukraine and expanded defense-industrial capacity. Another Russian invasion is a distinct possibility. And if America’s “Article 5-like” guarantee is revealed to be hollow, it could undermine the credibility of the actual Article 5, weakening NATO deterrence.

As another part of the security guarantee package, the Trump administration apparently has agreed to support a British- and French-led multinational force in Ukraine. After hostilities cease, countries from the so-called “Coalition of the Willing” would help police Ukraine’s skies, clear naval mines, and regenerate the Ukrainian army. This would include deployments of Europe troops to Ukraine (though far from the front lines) — an idea which Moscow vehemently opposes. Other than ruling out putting American boots on the ground, the administration hasn’t publicly specified how it would support this force (likely involving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and possibly other so-called “strategic enablers”). Nor has Washington publicly agreed to provide an air-power “backstop” if that force were attacked. If a ceasefire looks shaky and no U.S. backstop is committed, European countries will be more reluctant to put troops in Ukraine.

Another problem is that tying the force’s deployment to a ceasefire incentivizes Russia to prolong the war. Putin invaded Ukraine precisely to reverse its Westward drift, and Moscow insists that any peace settlement must bar Western troops from the country — a demand that earlier drafts of the U.S. peace plan sought to satisfy. As British scholar Jack Watling has argued, Europe could obviate the Russian veto commencing with air policing and training in western Ukraine now, before the war ends. Yet European capitals remain unwilling to do so, wary of escalation with Russia. That same fear undermines the force’s deterrent value in the first place.

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Path to Peace

Rather than gunning for a quick but lopsided deal, Washington should patiently focus on shifting the Kremlin’s calculus. Moscow has made clear that its ambitions go well beyond Donetsk. In essence, Putin seeks a settlement that locks Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence. Given the maximalist nature of Putin’s demands, peace will remain impossible unless Moscow reduces its expectations considerably. Ukraine will also have to make concessions, including on its NATO aspirations. But Russia is the primary obstacle.

Perversely, pressuring Ukraine to cede more territory could put a deal farther from reach. By attempting to strong-arm Kyiv, echoing Kremlin arguments about the inevitability of Russian advances, and reducing military aid for Ukraine, Washington risks hardening Putin’s intransigence.

The consequences could also extend beyond Ukraine. Since the Second World War, the United States has led the free world in opposing the acquisition of territory by military means. Discarding that now could shake allied trust in America while emboldening adversaries such as China. President Trump is right to push for peace in Ukraine, but the medicine must not be worse than the disease.

So long as Putin is overconfident in his military prospects and feels no sense of urgency to end the war, he is unlikely to make the necessary compromises. The Russian autocrat must be made to realize that more war will bring nothing but pain. The European Union just took an important step by pledging 90 billion euros to shore up Kyiv’s state budget through 2027. The United States should do its part, too. Washington could bolster Ukraine’s bargaining position by surging military assistance, much of which could be financed by Europe. This effort should include support for Kyiv’s air defense and long-range strike capabilities, helping Ukraine endure the winter and impose greater costs on Russia.

In addition, Washington should stringently enforce and build on its recent sanctions targeting Russia’s top oil companies. The Treasury Department should target unsanctioned Russian oil suppliers as well as other entities, vessels, and infrastructure that help bring that oil to market. Western countries could further ramp up the pressure by replacing the Biden-era price cap on Russian oil flows with a full ban on providing shipping or financial services for those exports.

Lastly, Kyiv’s Western partners should encourage the Ukrainian military to fight smarter. Ukraine must stop wasting precious manpower clinging to semi-encircled towns or counterattacking to reclaim insignificant positions. This penchant stems in part from concerns that admitting to battlefield setbacks would discourage U.S. support and fuel calls for territorial concessions.

The Ukrainians aren’t going to give Russia more than it can take by force of arms. Rather than trying to do Putin’s dirty work for him, Washington should put its energies into convincing Moscow to accept realistic terms.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business.

X’s Location Feature Exposes a Real Problem, but Does Not Fix It

OPINION — A new location transparency feature on X is revealing foreign influence on American discourse just as federal agencies designed to deal with such threats are being dismantled.

Toward the end of November, X began listing account locations in the “About this account” section of people’s (or bots’) profiles. X also can list the platform through which users access the social media site, such as the web app or a region-specific app store.

With these new transparency features, X exposed that major MAGA influencers are likely operating from Eastern Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia. And while anti-Trump profiles posing as Americans on X haven’t made headlines, the authors found one listing itself in Charlotte, NC that X indicates connected via the Nigeria App Store.

One factor driving foreign accounts to masquerade as domestic political commentators could be commercial gain. Heated political debate, abundant in the United States, drives engagement, which can be monetized. Account owners posing as Americans may also be funded or operated by America’s adversaries who seek to shape votes, increase social divisions, or achieve other strategic goals.

The problem of foreign adversaries pretending to be American is not new. During the cold war, Soviet KGB agents even posed as KKK members and sent hate mail to Olympic athletes before the 1984 summer Olympics. What is different now is the scale and speed of influence operations. The internet makes it dramatically easier for foreign adversaries to pose as Americans and infiltrate domestic discourse.

The past decade provides countless examples of Russia, China, and Iran targeting Americans with online influence operations. In 2022, a Chinese operation masqueraded as environmental activists in Texas to stoke protests against rare earth processing plants. Iran posed as the Proud Boys to send voters threatening emails before the 2020 elections. In 2014, Russia spread a hoax about a chemical plant explosion in Louisiana.

X’s new country of origin feature is a step in the right direction for combatting these operations. Using it, a BBC investigation revealed that multiple accounts advocating for Scottish independence connect to the platform via the Iran Android App. On first blush, this makes little sense. But Iran has a documented history of promoting Scottish independence through covert online influence operations and a track record of sowing discord wherever it can.

Disclosing origin alone paints an incomplete picture. Identifying an account’s location does not always tell you who directs or funds the account. For example, Russia has previously outsourced its attempts to influence Americans to operators in Ghana and Nigeria. America’s adversaries continue to leverage proxies in their operations, as seen in a recently exposed Nigerian YouTube network aggressively spreading pro-Kremlin narratives.

Additionally, malign actors will likely still be able to spoof their location on X. Virtual private networks (VPNs) mask a user’s real IP address, and while X appears to flag suspected VPN use, the platform may have a harder time detecting residential proxies, which route traffic through a home IP address. Sophisticated operators and privacy enthusiasts will likely find additional ways to spoof their location. For example, TikTok tracks user locations but there are easy-to-find guides on how to change one’s apparent location.

The additional data points provided by X’s transparency feature, therefore, do not provide a shortcut to attributing a nation-state or other malign actor behind an influence operation. Proper attribution still requires thorough investigation, supported by both regional and technical expertise.

Social media platforms, private companies, and non-profits play a significant role in combatting online influence operations. Platforms have access to internal data — such as emails used to create an account and other technical indicators — that allow them to have a fuller picture about who is behind an account. Non-profits across the United States, Europe, Australia, and other aligned countries have also successfully exposed many influence operations in the past purely through open-source intelligence.

The U.S. government, however, plays a unique role in countering influence operations. Only governments have the authority to issue subpoenas, access sensitive sources, and impose consequences through sanctions and indictments.

Washington, however, has significantly reduced its capabilities to combat foreign malign influence. Over the past year, it has dismantled the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force, shut down the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, and effectively dismantled the Foreign Malign Influence Center at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. These changes make it unclear who — if anyone — within the U.S. government oversees countering influence operations undermining American interests at home and abroad.

X’s new transparency feature reveals yet again that America’s adversaries are waging near-constant warfare against Americans on the devices and platforms that profoundly shape our beliefs and behaviors. Now the U.S. government must rebuild its capacity to address it.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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We Need More Than Just a Command Shakeup in the U.S. Military

EXPERT OPINION — Reports came out last week that claim the Chairman of Joint Staff, General Dan Caine, is preparing a new unified command plan (UCP) that will reorganize and consolidate the regional combatant commands. According to press reports, the proposal, which is to go to the Secretary and the President soon, would combine U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command under a new U.S. International Command. U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command would be combined as U.S. Americas Command. For now, the functional commands, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Space Command, U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Indo Pacific Command would remain the same.

If this happens, it would be the biggest command shake up in decades. However, to truly have the greatest effect, more needs to happen than just a reorganization and consolidation of combatant commands. The work to change and upgrade the combatant commands must be more consequential.

For this to happen, these commands must have all the tools at their disposal to develop military relationships and oversee operations in their regions. To be most effective, that means that their intelligence and their interagency arms must be bolstered.

On the intelligence side, Washington should push out the work to the combatant commands that the analysts, targeters and operators are doing in D.C. Before the early 2000s, the combatant commands hired their intelligence professionals through the services. In the early 2000s, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) took over the requirement to integrate all the combatant commands’ intelligence professionals and those professionals became DIA employees.

There has been great success with increased and more consistent training and more sophisticated intelligence work at the combatant commands. More defense intelligence enterprise professionals now have a first-hand understanding of providing support to military activities. However, there is much more work to do in this area. A vast majority of the Washington DIA employees do not have direct experience working with warfighters on tactical issues or have forgotten their experience in this area. There is also often a duplication of efforts on analysis, reporting, and collection between DIA headquarters and the combatant commands.

This all can be streamlined by pushing those DC-based professionals to the combatant commands. DIA headquarters should be small and highly focused on manning, training, equipping, and integrating. The analysts, operators and targeters should be working directly with the warfighters under the direction of the combatant commander or at the Pentagon directly for the Chairman, Joint Staff.

More specifically, DIA headquarters should provide the HR, the training programs, the data, and the technology for the rest of the DIA enterprise to support each combatant Commander and his warfighters directly.

In the early 2010s, there was a discussion in policy circles about how to make combatant commands more effective. A key role for Combatant Command senior leaders is to develop relationships with military partners in their region. This will become more difficult as a Combatant Commander’s geographic outreach grows. Each Commander will need more tools and senior professionals to help develop those relationships. To assist in this and to underscore the need for interagency coordination, Combatant Commands should have dual leadership from the civilian sector and military.

Most regional commands now have a senior foreign policy advisor, usually at Ambassador rank, who advises the commander on foreign relations. This position needs to be enhanced to a true deputy position vice an advisor. At the same time, the combatant commands need senior representatives from major government departments such as the Department of Homeland Security, Treasury, Commerce, and FBI. This will enhance the U.S.’ ability to compete against our adversaries by offering tools to use with foreign governments that are integrated and coordinated across the U.S. government.

The time is right to make more consequential changes to a system that needs to modernize.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

A Blueprint for Next-Generation Defense Production

OPINION — The Pentagon’s push to overhaul its slow, specification-driven procurement system is an overdue acknowledgment that our defense industrial base has become too narrow, too fragile, and too dependent on foreign supply chains. America’s defense establishment is finally waking up to a critical weakness that has metastasized in recent decades: we have drifted away from the industrial might that once formed the bedrock of our economy and allowed us to out-produce any adversary in the world.

While there are many warning signs, one symptom of the problem is unmistakably clear: the United States is not producing what it needs at the speed and scale modern conflict demands. Recent reporting shows the U.S. Army is still struggling to meet its 155mm artillery-shell production goals after years of effort. Across the spectrum—from advanced missile interceptors to something as basic as black powder—we are falling dangerously behind in both production capacity and supply-chain resilience. For now, these shortfalls are appearing in conflicts that don’t directly involve American troops, but the truth is that a major war will see the United States forced to ration materials and munitions, deploying untested prototypes on the battlefield while the defense industrial base races to catch up. We must act now to prevent this from happening.

If we are serious about winning the next war—or better yet, deter it—we must rethink both how we buy military equipment and weapons, and how fast we can make them. We don’t need another half measure or a fully government solution. Instead, the government should leverage the private sector to build a nationwide network of multifaceted, resilient manufacturing nodes that can surge production of everything from drones, vehicles, and body armor to medicine, munitions, and microelectronics in times of crisis, while sustaining production lines for commercial products in peacetime. The power of the U.S. economy can, and should, be leveraged to solve this problem.

This network of production centers, or campuses, would bring together startups and established manufacturers in the same ecosystem, enabling the kind of rapid prototyping, pilot production, and full-rate manufacturing the Pentagon is urgently seeking. Each of these campuses would be designed for flexibility, with modular production capabilities that can be rapidly upgraded, and shared heavy infrastructure such as test beds, utilities, and analytical systems. Furthermore, these facilities would be part of a connected national network, leveraging the regional strengths of each part of the country while avoiding the single points of failure commonly found in today’s highly concentrated manufacturing hubs.

Today, the gap between a successful prototype and real-world production is often a chasm in the defense industrial base. Major firms are often tied up maintaining legacy systems while cash-strapped startups cannot afford to build compliant, capital-intensive factories without production contracts. These startups are often told that contracts won’t come until they prove they can manufacture at scale. So promising technologies stall in a chicken-or-egg limbo while delays snowball. The Pentagon’s renewed embrace of OTAs helps, but money alone won’t fix a physical bottleneck. We need places where cutting-edge firms can scale quickly, and affordably.

A national network of industrial campuses is designed to fill this gap. Under this model, companies wouldn’t pay construction costs up front; lease payments would begin only after they move in and start generating revenue. Layering into the model a certain number of shared facilities—initially funded by the Pentagon—would reduce risk, accelerate development, and dramatically shorten production timelines. Young companies gain room to grow. Established firms gain access to fresh innovation - and taxpayer dollars go further.

This is not a radical idea. It is an evolution of the model that once made America unstoppable. In World War II, factories across the economy—automotive, textile, consumer goods, and more—transformed to support the war effort. That surge capacity happened because the United States had an existing industrial ecosystem ready to mobilize. Today, we no longer have one.

Decades of offshoring, consolidation, and a fixation on short-term efficiency have left our industrial base brittle and full of holes. COVID-19 made that painfully clear when the world’s largest economy found itself dependent on foreign suppliers for PPE and basic supplies. Semiconductor shortages still slow defense and automotive lines. Meanwhile, our adversaries are turning basic industries into warfighting assets. Russian bakeries are producing drones and China is treating its manufacturing capabilities as a strategic weapon while in America, we’ve been treating our manufacturing base like an accounting exercise.

The government must shift course. Manufacturing is a strategic asset—every bit as important as ships, planes, satellites, or submarines. Washington should fund shared industrial infrastructure, de-risk private investment, and let market forces drive efficiency.

The math is simple. In some cases, companies piloting these programs have delivered 4:1 to 25:1 returns on tax dollars, generating major gains for minimal government investments. With a defense budget exceeding $800 billion, the Pentagon can easily afford to invest a sliver of that—well under one percent—to send a clear, unambiguous demand signal to the private sector that America is rebuilding its industrial backbone, and doing it now.

History shows what happens when we do. Modest seed capital during World War II and the Apollo program unlocked massive private investment and generated hundreds of innovations that have come to define the modern age. These campuses would be more than factories—they would be hubs where manufacturers, universities, investors, and federal partners build self-sustaining ecosystems capable of accelerating innovation, fostering talent, and producing critical goods at scale. They would restore American industrial depth, innovation, and flexibility—our most reliable, most underestimated tools of deterrence.

America is racing into the next complex era of great-power competition with a defense industrial base limping along from the last era; one that is simply too small, too fragile, and too slow. We can invent extraordinary technologies, but what use are they sitting in a lab if we can’t produce them at scale? If that doesn’t change, the United States risks discovering—too late—that innovation without industrial power is a hollow advantage.

Rebuilding American manufacturing will be difficult. But the cost of inaction is far higher. A nation with a deep, flexible industrial base can surge production, absorb economic shocks, and outlast any adversary, on the battlefield and the home front. A nation without one is forced to ration weapons, delay deployments, and scramble to keep its supply chains functioning.

We can build this network now or we can wait for a crisis to expose, once again, how fragile our industrial base has become. In the next conflict, the world’s strongest military must be able to depend on its factories to keep up.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief, because national security is everyone’s business.

2025: 10 Events That Changed the World

SPECIAL REPORT — In a turbulent year, one of the biggest national security stories came in the form of a document.

The administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS), released earlier this month, upends longstanding U.S. policy toward allies and adversaries alike. It ranks drug trafficking and illegal immigration as top threats to U.S. security, places a heavy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, criticizes Europe and downplays security challenges from China and Russia.

Eight years ago, Trump's first NSS said that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” The new NSS doesn’t name Russia as a threat to the U.S. – stating instead that “strategic stability with Russia” is a goal of American policy. Europe is presented as a bigger challenge; the U.S. should “help Europe correct its current trajectory,” which the NSS says has been damaged by immigration and a risk of “civilizational erasure.”

As for China, the document focuses on economic competition – trade, infrastructure, and technology. References to Taiwan and the South China Sea come later, and they include warnings that other Asian nations must carry a greater burden; “the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone.”

“The north star of great-power competition with China and Russia—around which the first Trump administration built bipartisan consensus—is gone,” Rebecca Lissner, Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote of the new NSS. The objective now, she said, is a “mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.”

Not surprisingly, European leaders were furious about the pivot to a more Russia-friendly posture, and what the European Council President called “political interference” in the affairs of Europe.

Glenn Corn, a former CIA Senior Executive, called the document’s treatment of Europe a “shock.”

“Europeans are not the enemy,” Corn told The Cipher Brief. “And I doubt the Russians will stand side by side with us on the battlefield and support us the way that our European partners have done.”

The new NSS won praise from at least one global capital. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said its emphasis on restoring strategic stability with Moscow “correspond in many ways” to Russia’s own vision.

Infographic with a map of the Americas showing the areas where the United States has carried out attacks against alleged drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean since September 2, 2025, as well as the number of people killed in these attacks, as of December 16 (Graphic by AFP via Getty Images)

Missiles on the Water

While the focus on narcotrafficking was clear from the early days of Trump’s second term, the heavy U.S. military deployments and air strikes in the Caribbean took experts by surprise. The aerial campaign began with a September missile attack on a small boat that killed 11 people; a second strike that day took the lives of two survivors who were clinging to the upturned vessel. The follow-on strike sparked criticism in Congress – including from Republicans – and charges that it might have violated maritime laws.

As of mid-December, at least 25 strikes had followed, including some in the Pacific, resulting in the deaths of more than 90 people alleged to have been smuggling drugs on the water. The Trump administration justified the attacks as necessary to stem a flow of fentanyl – which Trump labeled “a weapon of mass destruction” that has killed tens of thousands of Americans. Legal experts questioned whether passengers in these boats — even if they were found to have been carrying narcotics — could be considered enemy combatants. Others noted that fentanyl and its precursors are sourced primarily from China and Mexico — not Venezuela.

A separate question loomed, as the year wound down: were the strikes a prelude to military action against Venezuela, and its president, Nicolas Maduro?

Beyond the U.S. military buildup, there were several signs in December that a move against Venezuela may be in the offing: reports that the U.S. was exploring “day-after” scenarios in the event of Maduro’s ouster; the seizure of a Venezuelan tanker that was said to be transporting sanctioned oil to Iran; and President Trump’s December 16 announcement of a naval blockade of sanctioned oil tankers from Venezuela.

“Maduro has become the epicenter for a range of activities the U.S. is determined to roll back,” Ambassador Patrick Duddy, Former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, told The Cipher Brief. “Seizure of the oil tanker signals that the U.S. has decided to take more active measures to achieve its goals.

Infographic with a map showing the location of strikes carried by Israel against Iran since June 13, 2025, according to data reported by the ISW (Graphic by AFP) (Graphic by VALENTINA BRESCHI,SYLVIE HUSSON,OLIVIA BUGAULT/AFP via Getty Images)

The U.S. and Israel Attack Iran

It would have been unthinkable only two years ago: a U.S.-Israeli war against Iran that provoked almost no meaningful response.

The attacks came in June – Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites and military infrastructure that were followed by American airstrikes on three nuclear installations. Iran fired missiles at a U.S. base in Qatar but its overall retaliation was minimal, a consequence of earlier Israeli campaigns that weakened Iranian air defenses and its various militias in the Middle East. The 12-day war damaged elements of Iran’s nuclear program and laid bare a tectonic shift in the region: Iran and its “axis of resistance” had been badly weakened.

For decades, war-gaming scenarios had warned that any attack against Iran would carry risks of a conflagration, given the likelihood of a coordinated response from Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthi militia in Yemen. Now the paradigm has shifted.

“The U.S. joined Israel in military operations and people thought that had been a red line in the past,” Norman Roule, a former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI, told The Cipher Brief. “For the nuclear negotiations and other talks going forward, Iran now has to deal with a new world where there is this precedent.”

As the year ended, Iran remained a shell of what it had been, and reports suggested its leaders were conflicted about the way forward. Would the country recognize its weaknesses and move towards a rapprochement with the West — a move that might bring sanctions relief and usher in a new security dynamic in the region? Or would hardliners carry the day, resorting to one of the last levers Iran has – its nuclear program?

“If you're in Iran, you have to make a strategic decision,” Roule said. “‘If we restart the program, will the United States and Israel attack?’ They've got to ask, ‘If we do this, will we survive?’”

U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky meet in the Oval Office at the White House on February 28, 2025 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)

Zelensky’s Oval Office Blowup – and the Rollercoaster that Followed

For Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, 2025 brought wild swings of fortune, on the battlefield and in the global halls of power.

An Oval Office meeting on February 28 marked the low point – the encounter during which President Trump and Vice President JD Vance berated Zelensky for what they saw as insufficient gratitude towards the U.S. and – in Trump’s words – a failure to understand that Ukraine “has no cards” in the war against Russia.

The meeting “was a horrible disappointment and almost a shock to the system,” former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Philip Breedlove told us that day. “There was only one winner…and that is Vladimir Putin.”

But fortune’s wheel took turns in Zelensky’s favor. Trump’s subsequent meetings with Zelensky – at the Vatican in April and the June NATO summit – warmed the relationship; the NATO summit itself saw Trump pivot back toward the alliance and its support for Ukraine; and then – in a startling outburst – Trump in July turned his ire towards Russian President Vladimir Putin. “We get a lot of bull**** thrown at us by Putin,” Trump said.

Alas for Zelensky, at year’s end the pendulum looked to have swung back once more. Trump’s envoys were again pushing Russia-friendly peace proposals, which included the surrender of territory beyond what Russia has already occupied. In an interview with Politico, Trump said of Zelensky, “He’s gonna have to get on the ball and start accepting things…cause he’s losing.” It sounded like a gentler version of the treatment Zelensky had gotten on that February day in the Oval Office.

Photo by Wojtek Laski/Getty Images

A Tu-95 bomber aircraft takes off for a night patrol flies out of Engels-2 airbase on August 7, 2008 in Engels, Russia. (Photo by Wojtek Laski/Getty Images)

Operation “Spiderweb” – and What Came After

It was Ukraine’s greatest military success in 2025 – and it happened far from Ukrainian territory. An operation dubbed “Spiderweb” smuggled 117 drone weapons into Russia and unleashed them against several airfields on June 1, damaging or destroying dozens of Russian warplanes. The mission was months in the planning, the drones were smuggled on prefabricated cabins disguised as hunting lodges, and unsuspecting Russians were paid to drive the trucks that moved the cabins.

“Spiderweb” showcased Ukraine's special operations capabilities and was followed by more long-range sabotage. As The Cipher Brief reported, subsequent attacks targeted Russian refineries and other sites tied to the oil sector.

“It’s very impressive,” Balazs Jarabik, a former European Union diplomat and analyst for RPolitik, told The Cipher Brief. The energy-sector attacks, he said, were “making the Russian war effort more expensive, and creating shortages so the Russian people feel the pain of the war.”

By year’s end, Ukraine had carried out an estimated 160 strikes on Russia’s oil sector – the campaign reached as far as the Siberian city of Tyumen, some 1200 miles east of Moscow, and included strikes against vessels alleged to be working in Russia’s so-called "shadow fleet” of tankers carrying sanctioned oil.

“Ukraine’s theory of victory now includes destroying Russia’s energy sector,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe, told The Cipher Brief. “They’ve developed capabilities that can reach great distances with precision, exposing Russia’s vulnerability – its inability to protect critical infrastructure across its vast landscape.”

Palestinians flock to the Netzarim Corridor to receive limited food supplies as hunger deepens across Gaza amid ongoing Israeli attacks and blockade, on August 4, 2025. (Photo by Hassan Jedi/Anadolu via Getty Images)

A Peace Deal for Gaza

It was President Trump’s signature diplomatic achievement: a truce in Gaza reached just days before the two-year anniversary of Hamas’ October 7, 2023 massacre.

The deal’s first phase took hold, albeit in violent fits and starts – the return of hostages, the freeing of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, and a fresh flow of international aid for Gaza. But that may have been the easy part. As the year drew to a close, there were sporadic breaks in the ceasefire, and the fate of the deal’s next phases remained unclear.

The Trump administration’s plan for Gaza included the deployment of an international stabilization force and creation of an international “Board of Peace” (led by Trump himself) to oversee the implementation of the next phases – the transition of governance to Palestinians not affiliated with Hamas, and the beginning of a multi-billion-dollar reconstruction. The deal also included language offering a conditional pathway to Palestinian autonomy over its territories.

But as of mid-December, the announcement of the Board had been delayed, and the New York Times reported that while the U.S. was pressing other nations to contribute troops to a 8,000-member force for Gaza, it had yet to win any commitments. Countries were said to be worried their troops might be ensnared in fresh fighting; and the UN Security Council resolution to deploy the force gave no precise terms of engagement. Nor was there agreement on the makeup of a transitional government.

As these hurdles appeared, reports suggested Hamas was rebuilding its presence in the territory.

“Who’s really calling the shots there?” Ralph Goff, a former CIA Senior Executive, asked at The Cipher Brief’s annual Threat Conference, speaking of the uncertainty inside Gaza. “I remain pretty pessimistic on the idea of any kind of internal governing force being able to compete with Hamas at this point.”

By year’s end, two things were clear: the Gaza ceasefire itself was a welcome achievement after two years of carnage; and uncertainty hung over the truce’s critical next phases. This was one major story that will continue to unfold — with hope but also apprehension — well into 2026.

The commissioning and flag-presenting ceremony of the Fujian, China's first aircraft carrier equipped with electromagnetic catapults, is held at a naval port in Sanya City, south China's Hainan Province, on Nov. 5, 2025. (Photo by Li Gang/Xinhua via Getty Images)

China's Military Boom

China held a “Victory Day” parade in September – its way of marking 80 years since the end of World War II – and it was above all a show of military prowess. 12,000 troops marched alongside an arsenal of newly-minted battle tanks and rocket launchers, drone weapons and hypersonic missiles, and more. It was a fitting symbol for a year in which China turbocharged its military buildup.

As The Cipher Brief reported, China took a “leap forward” in drone weaponry in 2025: a huge new “stealth endurance drone,” mosquito-sized “micro drones,” and the deployment of a new “drone mothership.” The latter, known as the Jiu Tian, was billed as the world’s largest drone carrier – an 11-ton aircraft that is itself an uncrewed aerial vehicle. According to the South China Morning Post, the Jiu Tian can hold 100 smaller UAVs and carry them more than 4,000 miles.

“They have the production, they have large inventory and now they also have the AI,” Dr. Michael Raska, a professor at the Military Transformation Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told The Cipher Brief. “With all these combined, they have been experiencing a leap forward in the quality and quantity of all their drones.”

China also made leaps in maritime power. In November, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned the 80,000-ton Fujian, the country’s third aircraft carrier and largest to date. A week later came news that the Sichuan, one of the world’s largest amphibious assault ships, would be ready for deployment next year.

Retired Rear Admiral Mike Studeman, a former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, told The Cipher Brief that China had achieved its longstanding goal of building “a world-class Navy,” which had surpassed the size of the U.S. fleet.

“It's not just not in the numbers, it's in the quality,” RADM Studeman said. “These ships are modern by any standard.”

“It's impressive,” another former Rear Admiral, Mark Montgomery, told The Cipher Brief. “They're building a hundred merchant ships for every one we build, and two warships for every one we build.”

The Trump Administration issued an executive order in April to jumpstart the U.S. shipbuilding industry and restore “American maritime dominance,” but experts said the U.S. faces an uphill road. As The Cipher Brief reported, China is on track to have a 425-ship fleet by 2030, while the U.S. Navy currently has fewer than 300 deployable battle-force vessels – a total which may drop as aging ships are retired faster than new ones are put to water.

Police cars are seen on November 17, 2025 close to the railways that were damaged in an explosion on the rail line in Mika, next to Garwolin, central Poland, after the line presumably was targeted in a sabotage act. (Photo by Wojtek Radwanski/AFP via Getty Images)

Europe Wakes Up to the “Gray-Zone” War

2025 was the year when Europe formally recognized – and began to respond to – a growing threat from the east: the so-called “gray-zone” war attributed to Moscow.

These attacks mushroomed in 2025 – from cyberattacks to railway bombings, the cutting of undersea cables to drone incursions into Poland and the Baltic states, and more. Experts said they were designed to be difficult to trace, and non-kinetic, so as not to draw a military response; as The Cipher Brief reported, the Kremlin was likely “aiming to create disruption without triggering escalation.”

But there were also signs that European leaders were waking up to the gravity of the threat.

NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte warned repeatedly of the dangers, and the alliance moved to improve detection and deterrence measures.

Nations took steps of their own. Finland acquired hundreds of drone jammers and outfitted border forces with high-end drone detectors; leaders from Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states said they might shoot down Russian aircraft if Moscow continued its provocations; in a September speech to the United Nations, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski went so far as to warn Moscow that “if another missile or aircraft enters our space without permission, deliberately or by mistake, and gets shot down and the wreckage falls on NATO territory, please don’t come here to whine about it.”

Even nations far from the Russian frontier were waking up to the dangers; Ireland unveiled a €1.7 billion, five-year defense plan that included systems to counter drones and protect undersea cables from Russian sabotage. And in her first public speech, MI6 chief Blaise Metreweli described the gray-zone threat bluntly: “The new frontline is everywhere,” she said.

Writing in The Cipher Brief, former Senior CIA Executive Dave Pitts stressed the need “to change the risk calculation.”

“We need to think of deterrence and response as a team sport - an Article 5 mindset,” Pitts wrote. “Gray-zone attacks that go unanswered reward our adversaries and reinforce the idea that there are more gains than risk…and encourage more attacks.”

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Heavy trucks haul earth and rock at the construction site of Wubian Xiangshang Reservoir on the top of Pandao Mountain in Zhangye, China, on March 3, 2025. (Photo by Costfoto/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

America’s Rare Earth Crisis

Not long ago, rare earth minerals rarely made global headlines. 2025 was the year when that changed. And for the U.S. government, it was also the year in which rare earths took center stage.

Two basic facts underscored the urgency: rare earths are essential building blocks for everything from smart phones to home appliances to cars to all manner of military equipment and weapon systems; and China now produces an estimated 60 percent of the world’s rare earths and processes nearly 90 percent of them. The U.S. Geological Survey said that in 2024, the U.S. imported more than 95 percent of the total rare earths that it consumed.

Those realities spurred multiple U.S. efforts to change the dynamic: deals with Australia and Japan; negotiations with other resource-rich countries, including Congo, Indonesia, Kazakhstan and Malaysia; and threats to annex mineral-rich Greenland. Even the negotiations with Russia and Ukraine reportedly included plans for U.S. firms to invest in rare-earth extraction in Russia.

China’s imposition of rare-earth export restrictions only heightened the concerns – and while those were lifted as part of a deal with Washington, the message was clear: China’s rare-earths dominance now poses a huge problem for the U.S., and gives China a powerful lever in any future negotiations with Washington.

Susan Miller, a Former Assistant Director of the CIA’s China Mission Center, called the rare earth access “vital” to U.S. technology and national security.

“We democracies must do more to assure we have continuous access to these metals, and we also need to start producing more,” Miller told The Cipher Brief. “All democracies must focus on this issue; we must act now.”

Then-National Security Agency Director General Timothy Haugh, FBI Director Kash Patel, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe, and then-Defense Intelligence Agency Director Jeffrey Kruse appear during a Senate Committee on Intelligence Hearing on March 25, 2025 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Andrew Harnik/Getty Images)

The Overhaul of the Intelligence Community

Before his return to the White House, Donald Trump promised to remake the U.S. intelligence community (IC). “We will clean out all of the corrupt actors in our national security and intelligence apparatus,” Trump said soon after the 2024 election.“The departments and agencies that have been weaponized will be completely overhauled.”

In 2025, it was a promise he kept.

There were widespread cuts in staffing at the CIA, FBI, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the biggest reductions appeared to come at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which coordinates the 18 agencies of the IC. Roughly 40% of ODNI staff were cut, including the elimination or consolidation of the Foreign Malign Influence Center and some cyber threat units into other agencies.

Other high-level dismissals drew particular attention: National Intelligence Council acting head Mike Collins was fired after presenting an assessment on Venezuela that contradicted the White House line; and NSA Director Gen. Timothy Haugh lost his job after Trump “influencer” Laura Loomer questioned his loyalty to the administration.

Depending who you asked, the changes were a much-needed streamlining of a bloated intelligence apparatus; a reorganization to focus less on Russia and China and more on border security and drug trafficking; or a Trump-driven retaliation against institutions and individuals he had blamed for investigations or views with which he disagreed.

The high-level firings troubled several experts. Jon Darby, a longtime NSA veteran who served as director of operations, told The Cipher Brief he was “very disheartened” by Gen. Haugh’s ouster. “We need an explanation of the underlying rationale,” he said.

Beth Sanner, a Cipher Brief expert who served as Deputy Director for National Intelligence at ODNI, warned of a broader politicization of the IC.

“The intelligence community is not like asking people to hit the easy button and the ‘I agree with you’ button,” she said. “That's not our role. Our role is to say what we think and why we think it…The intelligence community isn't always right. But when done correctly and behind closed doors, I cannot understand why anybody would say that presenting an intelligence assessment that disagreed with policy needed to stop, or was an example of deep state. It's not. And it's really important.”

All that said, the nature of the IC makes it difficult, even at the end of a tumultuous year for the various agencies, to know precisely what the impact of the “overhaul” has been – or will be in the future.

Fingers on laptop. (Photo by Silas Stein/picture alliance via Getty Images)

A Cybersecurity “Watershed”

It seemed like a headline from a science fiction journal. An artificial intelligence system had conducted a large-scale espionage operation.

But it wasn’t science fiction – or fake news. The AI giant Anthropic confirmed the first real-world case of the use of an AI system to do exactly that.

“Today marks a watershed in cybersecurity,” Jennifer Ewbank, a former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Digital Innovation, told The Cipher Brief. “AI has now crossed from tool to operator,” Ewbank said, “blurring the line between human intent and machine execution...a threshold has been crossed.”

Anthropic said that Chinese state-sponsored hackers had exploited its Claude AI system to carry out cyberattacks on corporations and foreign governments in September, and that the hackers had succeeded with only minimal human oversight. Anthropic’s threat intelligence chief said the campaign had targeted about 30 entities, and represented a new level of AI-enabled hacking. The hackers posed as security auditors and successfully breached several systems, accessing privileged accounts and private data before being blocked.

The good news? The number of breaches and scale of the damage appeared small, and no U.S. government agencies were compromised. But the incident gave ammunition to doomsayers who have warned of AI nightmares – and showed that AI is already a valuable tool for hackers and state-backed cyber operations.

Experts called it the latest code-red warning for securing AI systems and deploying effective cyber defenses. As Ewbank put it, “This is no longer a hypothetical threat being researched in a lab.”

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The Next Nuclear Proliferation Crisis Is Already Here

OPINION — Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened that Russia might use nuclear weapons if its sovereignty or territory is threatened, as it enters the fourth year in its war of aggression in Ukraine. The Russian Federation has revised its nuclear doctrine and lowered the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. And given the lethality of nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear weapons in any large-scale exchanges would kill tens or hundreds of millions of people.

The 1963 Cuban missile crisis brought us close to a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. It was the basis for President John F. Kennedy’s concern that more countries with nuclear weapons would create an unstable world with nuclear war more likely. President Kennedy feared that by 1970 there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of the four – the U.S. Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France – and by 1975 there could be as many as 10 or 20 nuclear weapons states. It would be “the greatest possible danger and hazard to contemplate – a nuclear arms race on a multipolar basis.” President Kennedy’s concerns are the concerns we have today, with the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and in East Asia.

The Cuban missile crisis contributed to several arms control efforts, like the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) banning atmospheric and underwater tests and the creation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed, the NPT established a global framework for the 190-member counties to stop non-nuclear states from getting nuclear weapons.

There are now nine nuclear weapons states and concern that more countries will seek the resources necessary to produce their own nuclear weapons or to buy them.

In East Asia, North Korea has increased its stockpile of nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons of mass destruction. The Korea Institute for Defense Analysis recently publicly stated that North Korea has between 127 and 150 nuclear weapons and by 2030 they will have 200 nuclear weapons. And given the likely assistance North Korea is receiving from Russia with its nuclear and missile programs, it’s possible that South Korea and Japan, threatened by a belligerent North Korea, will conclude that they need their own nuclear deterrent programs, rather than relying on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence commitments. Indeed, a recent poll in South Korea had over 70% of the people saying they needed their own nuclear weapons program, rather than relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

South Korea and Japan are watching what happens to Ukraine, a sovereign country invaded by a Russia that disregarded its security guarantees to Ukraine, with the 1994 Budapest Memorandum also signed by the U.S. and the United Kingdom. Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons for security assurances that Russia ignored. Will the U.S. and NATO be there for Ukraine this time, or should Ukraine pursue its own nuclear deterrent?

The U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear sites Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz in June 2025 was in response to Iran’s continued enrichment of uranium at 60% or higher and Iran’s unwillingness to permit International Atomic Energy Agency monitors to inspect nondeclared suspect enrichment sites. Thus since 2003, when Iran said they ceased their nuclear weapons program, Iran has been a threshold nuclear weapons state, months away from being able to produce nuclear weapons if the U.S. and the European Union didn’t comply with Iran’s demands.

Given this reality, and if Iran produces or acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt would rush to create their own nuclear weapons programs. The June 2025 U.S. bombing of these nuclear sites in Iran was an effort to ensure that Iran did not go nuclear, with the likelihood that these countries would also establish their own nuclear deterrent programs.

President Kennedy’s expressed concerns about a nuclear arms race during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was prophetic. Sixty-three later, there is real concern by a few non-nuclear-weapon states that they would need their own nuclear weapons to address the nuclear threat from North Korea and Iran, and the rhetoric from Mr. Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, who warned that Russia is prepared to use nuclear weapons if it faces defeat in Ukraine.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

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What Would Follow a Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation?

DEEP DIVE — On November 24, 2025, President Trump launched a process to designate Muslim Brotherhood chapters in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).

Citing fresh intelligence that these specific affiliates provided material support to Hamas after the October 7 attacks on Israel, the White House gave Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent a tight 30-day deadline to produce a formal report. The goal, administration sources say, is to sever the financial arteries — from charitable fronts to hawala networks — that have kept the Brotherhood’s regional machinery alive.

The decision comes at a moment when the Brotherhood’s once carefully cultivated image as the respectable face of political Islam lies in tatters. Days before Trump’s executive order, Texas Governor Greg Abbott made his state the first to label both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) as terrorist entities, vowing to target what he called “radical extremists.” Florida Governor Ron DeSantis followed the move by Texas with his own similar executive order. With federal momentum now behind him, the designations threatens to cascade across the region—and potentially beyond.

“Hamas was founded as the Egyptian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood and has made this very clear in its Charter of 1987,” Hans-Jakob Schindler, Senior Director of the Counter Extremism Project, tells The Cipher Brief. “The political statement of Hamas of 2017 did not mention this link specifically, but it also did not state that Hamas would be independent. Hence, Hamas remains part of the Muslim Brotherhood network.”

Roots of a Transnational Shadow

To grasp the stakes, the story must begin in Ismailia, Egypt, in 1928, when schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna founded the Ikhwan al-Muslimin as a movement of Islamic revival and social reform. What started with Quranic lessons and charity work exploded into a mass organization of hundreds of thousands by the 1940s, complete with a secret paramilitary wing, the Special Apparatus, that carried out bombings and assassinations against British forces and Jewish targets. Egypt banned the group in 1948; al-Banna was assassinated shortly afterward, almost certainly by state security.

Heavy-handed crackdowns, periods of accommodation, and notable ideological shifts have defined the Brotherhood’s trajectory since then.

Officially, the Brotherhood renounced violence in the 1970s, and it built an unrivaled network of mosques, clinics, schools, and labor unions. The 2011 Arab Spring briefly catapulted it to power: Mohamed Morsi became Egypt’s first elected president in 2012. Fourteen months later, mass protests and a military coup ended the experiment. Egypt declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization in 2013, killed more than 1,000 supporters in a single day at Rabaa Square, and imprisoned tens of thousands more. Exiled, splintered, and radicalized, remnants went underground or looked to Gaza.

Fernando Caravajal, executive director at The American Center for South Yemen Studies and an expert in Sudanese affairs, tells The Cipher Brief that the Brotherhood’s ideological flexibility allows it to reemerge in power vacuums, but cautions that the potential United States terrorist designation likely stems from outside interests.

“Notice the timing: these statements came a week after the meeting with Saudi,” he said. “It wasn’t announced during the meeting, so we can’t say Saudis are openly pushing it, but they clearly have a hand behind it because of the timing, because of the content. It mentions Jordan and Lebanon — those are Saudi priorities.”

Riyadh’s priorities center on containing Islamist movements and curbing Iranian influence in the Levant, making Jordan and Lebanon key arenas for Riyadh’s regional security strategy.

Across the region, local chapters adapted in different ways. Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF) became the kingdom’s most organized opposition, running hospitals and schools and holding parliamentary seats. Lebanon’s looser network operates in Palestinian camps alongside Hezbollah. Both insist they are peaceful and gradualist.

“It is important to understand that the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and violence is a tactical one,” Schindler said. “It can change at any point if the network feels that violence would be useful for its position and influence.”

Past American attempts to designate the entire Brotherhood collapsed amid pushback from Qatar, Turkey, and some European allies. This time, the White House has chosen a surgical strike. According to Schindler, the White House’s endeavor to focus on individual chapters is an optimal approach because it targets “chapters in countries that have themselves banned and/or designated the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt, Jordan) and on Lebanon, where the distinction between Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas is hard to make.”

The October 7 Reckoning

The trigger, ultimately, was October 7 and the events that followed. In Lebanon, the most explicit public demonstration came when a Brotherhood-affiliated militia calling itself the al-Fajr Forces fired rockets into northern Israel days after Hamas’s massacre.

“Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Gaza and the West Bank. It calls itself such. However, it operates independently,” Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and Former DHS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy, Thomas Warrick, tells The Cipher Brief. “Its revenues were derived from control of Gaza’s governance: taxes, donations from outside governments, and criminal activities from which it profited. Other MB chapters are small in budgets and manpower compared to Hamas.”

In Jordan, the IAF organized some of the largest pro-Hamas demonstrations in the Arab world.

“The clearest demonstrated ‘link’ between Hamas and the specified Muslim Brotherhood chapters is that a Brotherhood-affiliated group in Lebanon, al-Fajr Forces, launched rockets into Israel following the October 7 2023 Hamas terrorist attack,” Rose Kelanic, director of the Middle East Program at Defense Priorities, tells The Cipher Brief, stressing that “the Muslim Brotherhood is not a terrorist threat to the United States.”

In Egypt, underground networks — despite Sisi’s repression — funneled money and propaganda into Gaza. Yet Schindler specifically highlights Lebanon’s darker role in Hamas’s external operations.

“According to German court documents, the Hamas cell that was arrested in Germany and the Netherlands in December 2023, which had planned and prepared for terror attacks in Germany, was led by Hamas handlers in Lebanon,” he noted. “Given the close connection between Hamas and the wider Muslim Brotherhood network, it is therefore likely that such contacts also exist in Lebanon.”

The real power of the designation, however, lies in America’s arsenal of financial warfare. Once listed, any bank worldwide that touches Brotherhood money in dollars risks losing access to the United States market.

“Disrupting the ability of large-scale extremist and terrorist networks, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to have unhindered access to the global financial system is, of course, a very effective way to hinder their overall operations,” Schindler explained. “Hence, any country where this access is more restricted is, of course, a problem for such networks as it will increase their operational costs.”

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Allies on the Brink

Jordan is already on edge. Dependent on $1.5 billion in annual U.S. aid and facing street fury over Gaza, King Abdullah II banned the Brotherhood in April 2025 — yet the IAF still functions. While Schindler sees Washington’s possible move as reinforcement that will “aid in the efforts of the Jordanian government in countering Muslim Brotherhood structures in the country,” Kelanic warns of unintended consequences.

“The only scenario I worry about is if the U.S. insists on applying the FTO designation to the IAF, because that amounts to major meddling in Jordanian politics,” she noted. “The last thing the U.S. needs is another failed state in the Middle East.”

Turkey, experts point out, is perhaps the bigger headache. Schinder asserts that Turkey “is indeed an important network hub for Hamas,” in particular when it comes to the group’s financial systems.

“Turkey is in a unique position to pressure Hamas to give up its weapons and power in Gaza and leave the Strip,” he continued. “Unfortunately, so far, the Turkish government does not seem to have done so.”

According to Warrick, “what Turkey will do in response to the U.S. designation is not yet clear.”

“Supporting Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in the region is a core policy of the Turkish government, but President Erdoğan is mindful that his relationship with President Trump is strong and is valuable,” he explained. “The Turkish government is aware of the Trump administration’s hostile attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood but is not likely to change its approach except in countries that the U.S. government has formally designated Brotherhood branches as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”

A senior U.S. intelligence official, speaking to The Cipher Brief on background, described the administration’s delicate balancing act.

“The President comes out with a statement where he’s clearly trying not to offend the Qataris too much, but at the same time satisfying the UAE and the Saudis and the Egyptians,” the insider noted. “He’s riding the fence on this but skewing more to the anti-side.”

Washington is particularly wary of antagonizing Doha because Qatar remains a critical mediator with Islamist movements and an indispensable interlocutor in hostage, de-escalation, and regional crisis negotiations. The Qatar-based Brotherhood chapter formally disbanded in 1999, and Doha has repeatedly denied formal support for the Muslim Brotherhood, despite continued investigations indicating the group’s ongoing financial backing and praise from the likes of Hamas.

That same insider predicted domestic ripple effects: “If we suddenly see a ton of states passing laws against the Brotherhood and CAIR, then we start to have some real domestic impacts.”

CAIR has long faced allegations of historical ties to the Muslim Brotherhood because some of its early founders were involved with U.S.-based organizations linked to Brotherhood-affiliated networks, and because it was named as an “unindicted co-conspirator” in the 2007 Holy Land Foundation case. Critics cite these associations as evidence of ideological or organizational overlap. However, no criminal charges were ever brought against CAIR, and no direct operational link to the Brotherhood has been proven. CAIR denies any affiliation, and most of the evidence remains circumstantial, dated, and heavily disputed.

Analysts also point out that Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which already list the Brotherhood as terrorists, are quietly celebrating. But not everyone agrees that an FTO designation is a step in the right direction.

“Doing a blanket listing of ‘the Muslim Brotherhood’ is a huge risk for the U.S.,” Caravajal said. “It allows people to be arrested simply for going to the wrong mosque.”

For a movement that has survived bans, coups, and massacres for almost a century, this is only the latest test.

“The problem with designating the Muslim Brotherhood is that it never was a unitary organization or even a franchise organization like Al-Qaeda or Da’esh,” Warrick added. “This is why the solution the Trump administration came up with is the correct one. By working with partners that have already outlawed or sanctioned the Muslim Brotherhood chapters in their countries, the U.S. government can work cooperatively with those countries. This approach also gives some clarity to people in those countries, which groups they need to avoid in order not to be sanctioned by OFAC.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Anti-Semitism is a National Security Issue: It’s Time to Treat it Like One

EXPERT OPINION / PERSPECTIVE -- Less than three months ago, two people were killed in a terrorist attack on Jewish people in a synagogue in Manchester, UK, on the most solemn day of the Jewish religious calendar.

Three days ago, a large crowd of Jewish people in Sydney, Australia, celebrated Hanukkah on Bondi Beach. Two Islamic terrorists, father and son, fired at them from a nearby bridge. Sixteen innocent Jewish people were murdered, including a Holocaust survivor and a ten-year-old child.

The point of a terrorist attack is that even a relatively contained engagement spreads widespread fear. This is particularly the case with the Jewish community. The background for Jews is centuries of persecution culminating in the indescribable horror of the Holocaust. Even since then Jews for many years have lived in fear.

I was friendly with an Israeli diplomat in Turkey thirty years ago. He could not travel in his own car, hopping around Istanbul instead by taxi (dangerous enough), and no one knew where he lived.

Synagogues and Jewish schools in the UK have the sort of security I was used to in Kabul. There is even a charity trust, CST, dedicated purely to the security of Jewish people here. When a terrorist incident happens, most Jews ask themselves “Are we safe here?”

So, terrorism is working well against Jewish people and western governments need to show that they are serious about opposing terrorism. You can’t have a democracy when terrorism against one community is tolerated. Not least, because assuredly if we give up on the security of Jewish people others will be next. That is why anti-semitism must be seen as a national security imperative.

When the UK united against Islamic terrorism in the aftermath of the murder of 52 Londoners in 2005, we realised that it was not enough simply to pursue possible terrorists and to be prepared for possible attacks. We realised that we needed to understand and combat the hatred that drove these attacks and to stop it infecting vulnerable people who might be tempted by the Al-Qaeda message.

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Much of the focus on the Jewish community since the Sydney attack – and it has been gratifying to see the media at last seriously focused on anti-semitism – has been about the need to “protect” Jews. That was the message of British prime minister Keir Starmer. That is fine but the solution for Jewish people, as the terrorists know, is not about even more security systems around their synagogues and schools, about armoured cars transporting schoolkids around north London or about how safe it is to be publicly identifiable as Jewish. “Safety concerns” have been used to ban an Israeli football team from playing in Birmingham, and non-political Jewish entertainers from appearing in Edinburgh. Jews are likely to conclude that this is no life, and there must be safer places to live: and you have lost your battle against terrorism.

The only solution to defeat this terror is declaring war on anti-semitism. Lots of people will tell me how difficult this would be. How do you distinguish “legitimate” criticism of Israel from criticism that uses conscious or unconscious anti-semitism? Couldn’t a state-backed campaign against anti-semitism have the opposite effect to the desired one, leading to even more isolation and hatred of the Jewish community?

These are serious risks: no one is saying this is easy. But the status quo is no longer acceptable.

One more mass casualty attack – let's say in some European or American city on Passover, 2026 – and the Jewish community is going to be packing its bags. And you have lost your battle against terrorism. Anti-semitism is a national security priority.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

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How the U.S. Military’s Top Officer is Looking at the World’s Hotspots

OPINION — “Our [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] job is to present and my job with the Joint Chiefs and others is to present the range of [military] options that this President or any President should consider with all of the secondary and tertiary considerations that go into those options, so that a President can make whatever decision he wants to make -- and then we deliver.”

That was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine early in a 30-minute “fireside chat” with CNBC’s Morgan Brennan before an audience at the Reagan National Defense Forum on December 6, at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California.

I want to analyze Caine’s remarks, because they received almost no public coverage, and as Joint Chiefs Chairman, his stated views are worth recording – as were his predecessors’ during the first Trump administration.

Caine, who is extremely cautious in his public remarks, was originally asked by CNBC’s Brennan early in the chat, “How are you advising the President on Venezuela?” His first answer was, “Carefully,” which drew a laugh, but then he went on with the serious answer above.

I picked that opening quote because most senior military officers would have answered just that they gave options, but in my experience few would have added the part about “all of the secondary and tertiary considerations that go into those options.” In short, I believe what Caine said in giving military options to President Trump, was that he gave both the upsides and downsides of what could happen with each option.

In giving the above answer, Caine went on to say, “I wouldn't want to share any particular advice or options that we're giving, but we present a lot of them.”

Again I would point out that Caine carefully noted he would not spell out any “advice or option” he has given Trump, but the fact that so far the President has not yet followed through on his threat to attack ground targets in Venezuela may be because of the “secondary or tertiary considerations” Caine said would be the outcome associated with undertaking such overt actions.

The public reactions to the 25 narco-boat attacks with their 95 associated deaths has been bad enough. But they also raise questions about where Caine stood on that issue.

In fact, CNBC’s Brennan started the conversation with Caine asking his views about “these Caribbean strikes and the reporting around them.”

Caine diverted from the question saying he was struck by the “sort of loss of confidence in the American military by the American people and that's deeply concerning to me.” He then said he wanted to add one detail to what Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had earlier told the Reagan Forum about the boat strikes.

That detail, Caine said, was that it was his idea along with Adm. Frank (Mitch) Bradley, the operational commander who ordered the so-called second strike on September 2, “to go up and

share the information that we could share with the Congress.” The two gave classified briefings to leaders of the House and Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees, as well as military appropriators, on December 4, according to The New York Times.

Caine told the Reagan Forum they had done it “so that we could continue to sustain and scale that trust that we must earn every day from the American people through the Congress.”

Throughout the 30-minute conversation, Caine avoided talking about Trump administration policy, just two days after Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) had been released.

For example, when CNBC’s Brennan asked, “How do you see the alliance with Europe evolving?” – a controversial subject in the Trump NSS, Caine responded, “We don't do policy in the Joint Force. We execute those policies.”

Caine did recognize the NSS’s new policy emphasis on the Western Hemisphere.

“Protecting the homeland is not just a term that we say anymore. It's a real thing and homeland security is national security,” Caine said. “I won't get into the operational matters, but there's plenty of visible examples…on where we are going to protect our neighborhood and do that pursuant to the things that we're able to do to make sure America is a safe and secure country.”

Caine then added, “We have not, if you look back over the arc of our deployment history over the last few years, we haven't had a lot of American combat power in our own neighborhood. I suspect that's probably going to change. We'll see what we're ordered to do and of course we follow that guidance.”

But Caine did focus on traditional threats saying, “From a military perspective, military alone, our relationships are good in Europe, and I'll let my bosses talk about the policy there.”

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Caine was more open when it came to NATO. “Allies and partners are key and critical to us as we fight together,” Caine told the Reagan Forum. “NATO remains a key important ally for us. They are, I think, going to own European security both through NATO and bilaterally and individually. The military leaders that I talked to are encouraged by the defense spending that's happening inside their countries. I would say, and have said to them, the same narrative around their defense and national industrial bases as we try to scale European defense so Europe can own Europe.”

Caine added, “The SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] over there, [U.S.] General [Alexus G.] Grynkewich, is carrying the same message through his EUCOM [U.S. European Command] hat. But that said, allies and partners remain a key part as laid out in the national security strategy.”

When it came to the fighting in Europe, Caine told the Reagan Forum, “I want to be pretty cautious about commenting on Ukraine because of the ongoing negotiations. And I'm mindful that anything that I say could get spun one way or the other. I think, for me, I believe that we always want to be striving for peace and what's happened in Europe there is a tragedy out on the Ukrainian front lines. So I'm going to be pretty cautious given the meetings that are going on.”

He did say, “What the Ukraine industrial base has done to create tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of drones is extraordinary. Those are the kinds of entrepreneurial lessons that we want to take from that fight.”

Caine also talked of a military lesson from Ukraine.

“It's another case study in the importance of the ability to put air power over a battlefield,” he said. “And when you look at the fixed and frozen lines that we've seen out in Ukraine, it's an opportunity for us to learn about the importance of protecting the force on the ground. And having been one of those guys on the ground earlier in my life, I value greatly the ability to have an air force or some kind of capability that can come in there and put an adversary in a particular place of pain. We haven't seen that out there in Ukraine.”

Caine said, “One of the lessons out of Ukraine is going to be mass. And there's a lot of exchanges going on. And when I think about war fighting in the future, I see a lot of exchanges, both in the kinetic and non-kinetic space, that is probably unprecedented. So we're going to need a high-low mix that we've not seen before…but we are also going to need significantly more attritable [loseable] things that can create multiple simultaneous dilemmas for the commanders on another side of a fight than for us.”

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While the Trump NSS hardly mentioned China, Caine did.

“When we look at the rise of the Chinese military,” Caine said, “what our goal in the Joint Force is to create multiple simultaneous dilemmas for all of the adversaries around the world, so that they are very cautious and concerned about doing something that would bring any sense of threat to the American people.”

Caine went on, “I think China's competing on the global scale. I know that from the U.S. perspective we've got an economic relationship now that is looking positive and trending fine. We see China still creating a lot of combat capability and capacity at scale, and as the National Security Strategy says, we owe it to the nation to deliver a free Indo-Pacific and a free and safe and prosperous Indo-Pacific. So when I think about actions in the Pacific, mindful of the President's guidance, that's how we think about it.”

As for the Middle East, Caine called it still “critical,” and said, “It's still I think undecided. I carefully watch through the CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) commander what's happening in Gaza. I remain as always concerned about what Iran's intentions are down there. These are conflicts that have been going on for a long, long, time. I'm hopeful for peace but need to be prepared for any number of eventualities there.”

As for here at home, Caine told the Reagan Forum, “What the American system, as it's been running for a long time now, is really good at is buying behind the technology development curve [emphasis added]. And what we need to do is get in front of the technology development curve. And that's going to require the best of the military, the best of the Congress, the best of the private sector, and the best of not just the defense industrial base, but the national industrial base.

Caine explained, “Back in my life, I ran a small mom and pop machine shop in Denton, Texas, that made parts for America's aerospace and defense industry. And I'll tell you that everybody needs to up their game here.”

He went on, “We have to change the culture inside the [Defense] Department. We have to change the culture inside companies. And I've been in both. So I can see both of these things. We have to create and sustain and maintain competitive forces out there in the market where we are driving innovation in our corporate structures and systems that are going to give better combat capability to the Joint Force.”

In addition, Caine said, “The military and the government need to be better buyers and we have to write better contracts. I am still on step one of my 12-step recovery process from selling to the government when I was a part-timer in the military. I think we have to find a way to share risk between us and the private sector.”

Caine was an unusual choice by President Trump, who had first met Caine back in December 2018 in Iraq. The President claimed during a 2019 political speech he had met an Army officer, “Razin Caine,” who had worn a MAGA hat, said he’d “kill for Trump,” and claimed in Iraq he could defeat the ISIS terrorist group in Syria “in less than four weeks,” three Trump statements Caine later denied in interviews and during his 2025 Senate confirmation hearing.

When I first wrote about Caine last March, I was drawn to the facts that beginning August 2005 he served a year as a White House Fellow at the Agriculture Department and later, from October 2006 to January 2008, was Policy Director for Counterterrorism and Strategy for President George W. Bush’s White House Homeland Security Council. Caine’s last military post before resigning from the Air Force in 2024 was three years as Associate Director for Military Affairs at the CIA.

However, at the Reagan Forum, Caine confessed, “I actually served at the Agency [CIA] twice. One is in my bio, one is not in my bio.” What’s that all about?

Caine clearly is a person the public needs to follow more closely.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Winter is Coming to Ukraine as it Faces a New Kind of War and Uncertainty About a Key Ally

EXPERT INTERVIEW — Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky was in Berlin on Monday for an intense round of diplomacy with top U.S. and European officials, part of a fast-moving push to find a workable plan to end the war. His meetings follow an unusually long session on Sunday with President Donald Trump’s envoys, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, who claimed significant progress in their discussions.

Meanwhile, a stream of European leaders - including Finland’s president, Britain’s prime minister, France’s president, and NATO’s secretary general are joining the talks. Russia was not invited.

The major sticking point among Western partners remains what concessions Ukraine might be asked to make. Washington has floated the idea of Kyiv giving up some territory Russia has not yet taken, a suggestion Ukraine rejects and most European leaders fear would reward Russian aggression.

Zelensky has signaled a willingness for Ukraine to pause its bid to join NATO if the U.S. provides firm security guarantees against future Russian attacks. European leaders are generally supportive of a deal that allows Ukraine to keep the territory it currently controls while securing long-term protection from Washington.

The mood in Ukraine, meanwhile, is bleak. Former Senior CIA Executives Ralph Goff and Glenn Corn, both of whom are also Cipher Brief Experts, just returned from a 5-day trip in the country. We caught up with them in Krakow, Poland for some on the ground insights about both the mood and maneuvering inside Ukraine, as President Zelensky navigates a harrowing political environment. Our interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

THE INTERVIEW

Kelly: Having traveled to Ukraine with you both in the past, I am imagining that this latest trip must have felt like some of the most difficult days that Ukraine has faced in terms of how this war may come to a conclusion. What is the mood like there? What are people talking about?

Corn: The mood in Ukraine is not great. The Ukrainians are very concerned about a number of issues. One, they feel a lot of pressure from the U.S. to make a deal, which many Ukrainians are confused about. They’re trying to understand what's going on. And of course, they're not pleased with their own internal political situation. The Operation Midas corruption scandal was a blow, so there's a lot swirling around and it's clearly impacting the people that we spoke with. They're trying to keep a brave face, given what they're facing. They’ve been at war since 2014, and since February 2022, they've been in a horrific war, a full scale war, and they're just trying to keep their nose above water right now. And as one Ukrainian officer told me, we just have to get through the winter and survive these dark times.

Goff: There's also disappointment amongst our Ukrainian allies with the United States. Not all of it is unexpected, but at the same time they've got this war to fight, so there's a very business-like attitude like, ‘Okay, we're still going to fight this thing’. And what's interesting is that they're not asking for anything new. They’ve made the same requests over and over. They need air defense weapons. There was a night when the Russians launched 84 missiles at Ukrainian territory and more than 500 drones in one night. We heard air raid sirens every night that we were there. The attacks are spread out across the country. It's clearly a campaign of terror by the Russian side.

And at the same time, the nature of the front - the battle - has changed completely from what it was just six months to a year ago. This is not the same war that was fought in 2022 or 2023 or 2024. This is a new war, and so the Ukrainians are asking for air defense weapons. They're asking for money. We can talk later about the idea of getting reparations money from the seized Russian assets, which they need. But at no point have they said they need troops. At no point have they asked for NATO’S Article Five to be invoked. They still want to fight this thing on their own, but they need help from the West.

Kelly: The battlefront has changed so much just in the past few months. Could you describe what it's like now?

Corn: Every Ukrainian we spoke with, whether it was civilians, military people in the defense industry, they all said that this war is being fought by drones, by FPVs [first-person drones] and some artillery. Intelligence is critical, electronic warfare is critical. But the troops on the ground and the concept of infantry has changed completely. The Ukrainians continue to innovate very quickly, but as they've warned for the last year, the Russians are also innovating very quickly and they're scaling that innovation in a way that the Ukrainians can’t because of a lack of resources and maybe a lack of depth.

Goff: That's correct. It is no longer an infantry man's war. The front is changed considerably. For 20 kilometers on either side of the front line, it’s almost a no-go lethal zone for humans. It's all electronic warfare. All drones and counter drones. I spent a day near the Zaporizhzhia front and even 40 kilometers back from the front lines, you're seeing drone netting set up everywhere and military vehicles using camouflage and taking extra precautions. So it’s completely different from when we visited there just a few months ago. But the losses continue.

For instance, in a single day recently, the Russians lost close to 1,300 soldiers. In one day. So Putin is still using pure raw manpower to his advantage, whereas Ukrainians have a manpower shortage. In one month, they recruited over 30,000 fighters, but out of that number, they're lucky if they can produce even a small percent of that. I'm not going to say the number because it's classified, but they're very lucky if they can get a decent number out of that. So it's tough for Ukrainians and they have to conserve their troops. They have to fight in a combat style that preserves human lives.

Kelly: In another way that we know the battlefield has changed, soldiers are now verifying kills or takedowns of targets, whether they're other drones, whether they're tanks on the ground, and they're using points earned from those drone missions to purchase equipment that is then delivered to them on the front. What can you tell us about the other ways in which the battlefield is evolving?

Corn: Battlefield integration has got to be seamless. The Ukrainians are working on that. We've spoken to a couple of people that are directly involved with that, and they're doing an incredible job. And one thing I was struck by during our last two or three visits is that now, more than ever, almost everyone we spoke with in a leadership position has no prior military experience. They're coming from private industry. Bankers, investment bankers. One guy we spoke with was running a tour agency overseas when he came back to fight. Now it’s computer programmers, IT folks, and they're all in the fight now. I spoke with one guy who was in a very senior government position before the war, and he told that he was 47-years-old before he put on a uniform, and he is leading a lot of the innovation stuff, and it's really impressive to see. We heard last time we were in Ukraine in September that the United States needs to pay attention to this and figure out how to integrate civilians into the military structure very quickly like Ukrainians have had to do.

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Goff: Suzanne, this is all about data integration. This is all about integrating all the information that comes from your airborne sensors, your ground sensors, your human observation, pulling intelligence into that. Tracking the emitters on the Russian side and then putting that all into a combat picture, particularly for the Ukrainians because they're fighting with reduced resources. So like I said, every human life is precious, but every weapon, every shot is also precious. In the old days when an artillery piece could maybe fire a hundred rounds in a day, now because they have to be so careful about being spotted when they're in action, they might fire 30 or 40 rounds. That means those 30 or 40 rounds really have to be on target. So it's all about the data. It's all about data management. And the Ukrainians, as Glenn said, are doing amazing work in that field. The biggest problem is that they're undercapitalized.

Kelly: President Zelensky has been in Europe gathering support from the Europeans as he tries to navigate a complicated series of pressures to end this war. Is the feeling on the ground in Ukraine that that will be enough?

Corn: I would say that the Ukrainians are in a bit of shock to see that the United States seems to be walking away - or their sense is that the United States is walking away. Let's hope that's not the case. But they're concerned that there is a rift between Europe and the United States. I think they appreciate what the Europeans are doing, but almost every discussion we’ve had centers on the fact that they need the United States here. They need the United States to provide some kind of long-term security guarantees. And by the way, the Ukrainians have been saying for over a year that they are ready to come to an agreement. They are ready to be realistic and compromise. It's the Russians that are not doing that. It's the Russians that continue to push maximalist demands and that continue to scuttle the peace process, not the Ukrainians. And the Ukrainians are very frustrated that they seem to be being made the bad guys in this struggle when their country was the one that was attacked. Their cities are being bombed, their children are being killed, their schools are being destroyed, their infrastructure is being destroyed, and they don't really understand what's going on right now. And I hope that we can get back to the position of the United States where we've traditionally been, which is the U.S. standing with people who are fighting for their freedom and their sovereignty against a much larger and more dangerous dictatorship.

Goff: And of course, the recent high-level scandal involving the primary advisor to the President, Andriy Yermak, and his resignation has now been turned around by the Russians who are pointing a finger at this country, and it's resonating within certain circles in the United States. But that's laughable. This is coming from a country - Russia - which is a kleptocracy. Some have said that Ukraine is more corrupt than Russia. That's absurd. Russia is a kleptocracy. It's more like an organized criminal gang than anything else. And the idea that they would accuse Ukraine of being worse than them is crazy. But amongst Ukrainians, I think there's almost this kind of hope that this is some sort of a bad dream that will go away, that America will wake up at some point before it's too late and come riding to the rescue. But at the same time, the pragmatists here realize that maybe that's not going to happen, and it's time for Europe to step up. It's just like Putin gave the Ukrainians their national identity by invading them. The Trump administration is giving Europe the challenge to step up and take charge of their destiny.

Kelly: With Andriy Yermak stepping down as President Zelensky’s chief advisor we know that there's another way of looking at this, which is that Ukraine has set up these independent institutes to investigate and root out corruption at every level and it looks like they’re determined to do that which is an indicator that Ukraine's own anti-corruption efforts are working to some degree, but that message seems to be completely lost.

Corn: Yes. We've heard for a while now, that anyone who knows Ukraine, knows they have a problem with corruption. I've always said that it's baked into their system. The Russians baked this into the system going back hundreds of years, so you have to be realistic. They know it, and they talk about it, and they often talk about it openly. Having worked in Russia, it doesn't happen that way. People don't talk about it. They don't go to the streets and protest without being arrested and basically disappearing or being thrown out of windows. In Ukraine, there is a civil society element here. There is some control over the government, over the presidency, and there has been opposition and resistance to steps that were taken to try and squash the anti-corruption efforts. So, you have to give the Ukrainians credit because they're fighting a war, a horrendous war, and they are also trying to bring the country out of this ugly reality of corruption, which every country has and faces. But to deal with it, when you're in a full-scale war, it's something special. So in my opinion, we need to give 'em credit, and we also need to be clear-eyed and realistic and understand that without the United States' support, they're going to have a hell of a time making the changes that they need to make, and that many, many Ukrainians want to see made. They want their children to grow up in a country which has much less corruption and much more transparency.

Goff: This is a country where national polling has shown that people are more concerned about corruption than they are about the war at present. For the first time, polls have shown that corruption's a bigger problem than the war itself. That shows the awareness of the Ukrainian people. Corruption - we're not trying to downplay it - is a problem, clearly. But there are people who have exaggerated it to the point where if corruption were as bad as some would say it is, they would've lost this war three years ago, because that stuff has to get to the front. It's all going into the pockets of ministers.

Kelly: Has there been anything on this particular trip that surprised you or that you didn't expect?

Corn: Well, I mean for me personally, just I think the shock of the recent release of the National Security Strategy and the sense that somehow Europe is a problem or Europe is the enemy. I don't know if that was the intent of that document, but that worries the Ukrainians, and of course it worries many of our European partners. For those people, I have to say, yeah, we have our differences with Europe, and as an American I've often felt that the Europeans should be doing a lot more, but the Europeans have also done a lot with us over the years, and for all the Europeans out there, for those I've worked with over the years, I am very appreciative of everything that you did to support the United States in many, many hard parts of the world where we served side by side together. So, Europeans are not the enemy, and by the way, we've never done that with the Russians, and I doubt we ever will. I doubt the Russians will stand side by side with us on the battlefield and support us the way that our European partners have done.

Goff: I think my biggest surprise here was the fact that the lights are still on. With all the bombings, like I said, we had air raids every night. Every few nights the pattern seems to be that the Russians husband their missiles and drones so that at least once or twice every five to seven days, they have a massive attack of 50, 60 missiles accompanied by 400, 500, 600 drones. And they're going after the energy infrastructure here. The lights are still on but with reduced power. There are some places that are down to a few hours a day, but you know what? They've still put up Christmas lights. They've still put up decorations. People are still trying to cling to some sense of normalcy for the season to get through this winter, and that just shows that these people are incredibly resilient.

Kelly: What are you sensing will happen next based on who you've talked to and what you've seen since you've been on the ground in Ukraine?

Corn: I think the Russians are not going to make a peace agreement unless they get everything they want, and let's hope that we don't give them everything they want because they don't deserve it, they haven't earned it, and they're not in a position to accomplish it by the means that Putin keeps threatening to do it, which is military force. The Ukrainians have proven that they can hold the line. That's number one.

Number two, I hope that we come around to understanding that basically the right side here is the side of the Ukrainians. The Russians should be ashamed of themselves for what they're doing. They need to stop what they're doing, and we need to stand with the Ukrainians and teach Vladimir Putin a lesson as well as other dictators or potential autocrats like Putin and aggressors, that we're not going to stand on the sidelines, and we're not going to punish those people that try and defend themselves and support those people that aggress other people.

We have common values with the Ukrainians, which I was raised to believe in. I'm not speaking as a former intelligence professional. I'm speaking as an American, whose father served in the Army, whose brother served in the Army, and who dedicated his life to the United States of America. We did that because we believe in the values that the Ukrainians are fighting for right now, every day - in terrible conditions - and we shouldn't abandon them.

Goff: I think we're going to see some type of mobilization, an increased mobilization on the Russian side. Their losses are high while their territorial gains remain low and the Russian economy is faltering and Putin has not been able to browbeat the Ukrainians to give in and come to the table to seek just any deal. Ukrainians will come to the table. This is where I think the administration is making a mistake. The Ukrainians will come to the table if there is a more fair deal. The ideal arrangement will be where both sides are unhappy, but at this point, despite all the negative pressure on the Ukrainians, they're not going to just sign any deal that gets to the table, and that's going to put more pressure on Putin to continue the war. He's got to show some gains. So I think we're going to see some sort of mobilization on the Russian side.

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The Cipher Brief's Recommended Reads for the Holidays

BOOK REVIEWS & RECOMMENDATIONS -- Welcome to our annual holiday book review and recommendations list, where we highlight some of the terrific books that have been reviewed and featured in The Cipher Brief in recent months. Since our summer newsletter, we've covered and reviewed more than 35 books – often sliced and diced by world-class subject matter experts. In this newsletter, we’ve singled out about a dozen that received our highest four out of four “trench coat” rating. As always, the books reviewed in The Cipher Brief represent an eclectic mix of topics ranging from the history of past wars to the prospects of future ones. We’ve included both fiction and non-fiction faves.

FICTION FAVORITES:

Tops on many folks’ list is The Persian: A Novel by veteran CIA analyst David McCloskey. For this one, we turned once again to Joe Zacks, a veteran of four-plus decades of government service, to offer his take. Zacks writes that The Persian may be the finest of McCloskey’s four spy novels to date (high praise given how well the first three were received). For this one, Zacks calls McCloskey’s novel “a sophisticated and multidimensional depiction of human nature and the motivations that propel people to action. It brings the HUMINT discipline to life, vividly portraying how a sophisticated intelligence service identifies, targets, and ultimately recruits and handles an agent while plumbing the depths of the agent’s psyche and inner conflicts.” To learn even more about the book – and its author – Cipher Brief CEO & Publisher Suzanne Kelly did a debrief with McCloskey in this fun-filled Cover Stories podcast.

To review veteran spy novelist Daniel Silva’s 25^th book, An Inside Job, we turned to a couple of CIA veterans – Anne and Jay Gruner. The latest Silva book brings back skilled art restorer and former Mossad chief Gabriel Allon, in a fast-paced tale involving art theft, European crime and corruption – and a newly elected Pope. The Gruners’ review declares that Silva has once again demonstrated that he is a master of his craft.

While Gabriel Allon, the hero of Silva’s novel, is a fictional former Mossad officer, a genuine Mossad alumni, Yariv Inbar, is also a prolific novelist. His latest book, Behind the Trigger, was reviewed for us by Dr. Ken Dekleva, a novelist in his own right and a former Regional Medical Officer/Psychiatrist for the State Department. With that background, Dekleva was quick to spot Inbar’s skill in describing the human, emotional, and psychological aspects of espionage. The book features two central female characters and a Middle East canvas.

Not all of the novels that won plaudits on The Cipher Brief came from long-time authors. There was the thriller The Moldavian Gambit by first-time novelist Brad Meslin about a man-portable nuclear device that goes missing at the time the Soviet Union was coming apart in the early 1990s and may have fallen into the hands of a terrorist -- and possibly smuggled into Paris. We asked James Lawler, a former CIA officer with deep experience in thwarting rogue state weapons proliferators and the author of several well-received novels himself to review it. Lawler gave Meslin high marks for technical accuracy and heart-stopping story telling. Meslin also joined us on a Cover Stories podcast to discuss what inspired him to write the novel and his sources and methods for keeping readers on the edge of their seats.

THE NON-FICTION BOOKS THAT ROCKED CIPHER BRIEF REVIEWERS:

With Latin American counternarcotics operations much in the news, a timely read is After Escobar: Taking Down the Notorious Cali Godfathers and the Biggest Drug Cartel in History reviewed by veteran government lawyer Terence Check. Written by former DEA agents Chris Feistl and Dave Mitchell with an assist from Jessica Balboni, the book tells the two-year saga in the mid-1990s of the investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of the leading “godfathers” of the Cali drug cartel (aka “Cocaine, Inc.”) one of the biggest multi-billion-dollar drug trafficking enterprises of all time. In his review, Check writes that After Escobar “is really a story about diplomacy, and the power it has as a force multiplier for our law enforcement and military….(showing) the reader the importance of the diplomatic cadre in helping to bring down the Cali Cartel by doing the hard work of negotiating with the Colombian government.”

The criticality of diplomacy was at the forefront of another book this fall. Great Power Diplomacy: The Skill of Statecraft from Attila the Hun to Kissinger by A. Wess Mitchell. The book was reviewed for The Cipher Brief by retired U.S. Ambassador Gary Grappo. In his review Grappo describes the book as “part history lesson and part instruction manual for national leaders and diplomats, reprising the tactics, strategies, methods and actions of previous major state leaders and diplomats who found themselves confronting similar great power contests.” Grappo lauds the book for being a: “resounding reaffirmation of the value and importance of diplomacy as an indispensable component of national power not just in the past but even more so today. The skills of its practitioners may need rejuvenating. But there is no denying that diplomacy ultimately holds solutions to the problems of today.”

Several books we will highlight here offer fresh looks at past history. Let’s start with one from Yale University Press: No More Napoleons: How Britain Managed Europe from Waterloo to World War One. The book was written by Andrew Lambert and one of our most prolific reviewers, Jean-Thomas Nicole, a Policy Advisor with Public Safety Canada, reviewed it. Nicole praised the book for its reminder of “the enduring utility of maritime power, the virtues of restraint, and the necessity of maintaining influence without overreach.” Nicole notes that these themes resonate strongly with today’s global challenges.

World War II and the events that led up to and followed it are often good fodder for books. Among those that stood out for us this year was “The Spy and the Devil” by Cipher Brief expert Tim Willasey-Wilsey. Journalist and author Michael Smith reviewed it for us and called it “one of the greatest untold stories of the Second World War intelligence.” It is the story of a Lithuanian-born ‘Baltic-German’ who ended up working for British intelligence and managed to penetrate the highest Nazi circles prior to the war including having several meetings with Adolf Hitler himself. Willasey-Wilsey also joined us on a Cipher Brief Cover Stories podcast to talk about this remarkable story.

In October, we published a review of The Traitor’s Circle: The True Story of a Secret Resistance Network in Nazi Germany – and the Spy Who Betrayed Them by Jonathan Freedland. Australian writer Susan Gorgioski reviewed it and told us the book reads like a detective novel but tells the real story of a “little-known group of opponents to the Nazi regime in Germany who were willing to sacrifice careers, social position, money, and ultimately for some, their lives.”

And then there was Rain of Ruin: Tokyo, Hiroshima and the Surrender of Japan by Richard Overy and reviewed by former senior CIA clandestine service officer (and Cipher Brief expert) Sonya Seunghye Lim. In her review, Lim praises Rain of Ruin for being a “thought-provoking and disturbing book” and its explanation for “why armed conflicts will continue to plague the world: dehumanizing the enemy, depersonalizing killings by making attacks as remote as possible, and glamorizing combat serve to palliate our collective conscience and to justify the persistence of jingoism.”

But not all the good stuff came from ancient history. CNN anchor Jake Tapper published a book in October called Race Against Terror: Chasing an Al Qaeda Killer at the Dawn of the Forever War. So, we turned to someone with deep expertise – Joe Zacks who was just wrapping up a 42-year career - half in the Army and half as a CIA officer - and whose final post was Deputy Assistant Director of the CIA for Counterterrorism, to review it for us. Perfect credentials to evaluate Tapper’s book which Zacks describes as “ a mix of detective story and legal drama” about a six-year odyssey of tenacious federal prosecutors trying to bring an al Qaeda terrorist to justice.

Some of our best received books were about future intelligence challenges. For example, there is The Fourth Intelligence Revolution: The Future of Espionage and the Battle to Save America by Anthony Vinci. We tapped Cipher Brief expert and principal with the Cyber Initiatives Group Glenn Gerstell to review that one for us. In his review, Gerstell describes the book as examining “the confluence of increasingly complex geopolitical challenges and of global technological advances” and tells us that the conclusion is that “America’s spy agencies must not merely adapt but also dominate this dynamic if we are to blunt (if not defeat) our adversaries.”

But no matter how good the technology is going forward, you’re gonna need people to make it all work right – and they need to be people who can get a security clearance. So, what do you need to know in order to try and do that? Fortunately, there’s a book for that. Trust Me: A Guide to Secrets: Who Gets Them and Why We Have Such a Mixed Track Record with Them by Lindy Kyzer. We trusted retired CIA Deputy Director for Analysis (and current Cipher Brief Expert) Linda Weissgold to review it. Weissgold is also a professor at Texas A&M’s Bush School of Government and Public Service in Washington, DC and says she now recommends the book to her students who want to understand the opaque yet crucial process of getting a security clearance. The book offers practical and philosophical advice that seeks to demystify the process.

While a little harder to give as holiday gifts, there are some podcasts interviews we highly recommend as well, including:

A discussion with Marine and CIA ground branch veteran – and award-winning writer Elliot Ackerman discussing his latest novel Sheepdogs.
A deep dive into North Korean matters with Ambassador Joe DeTrani on his memoir The North Korean Threat: Intelligence and Diplomacy.
A discussion with journalist and Marine veteran Chas Henry about a devastating Pacific cyclone that triggered a horrendous fire at Marine Corps Base in Japan.
And even a book by a publishing expert, Jane Friedman, who offers essential advice on how YOU can write your own book. Get her guide, The Business of Being a Writer, and maybe in a couple of years The Cipher Brief will be carrying a review of your book.

Before we go – we should note that some of our reviewers are really tough graders – and there are dozens of other books we’ve reviewed that came in with slightly under the four trench coat rating that we are certain you would enjoy. So, be sure to check out the complete list of reviews here.

Happy Holiday shopping and reading!

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