The Cipher Brief

CIPHER BRIEF REPORTING – The missile threat against the U.S. has quietly and significantly grown over the past four decades as U.S. adversaries have added more sophisticated missiles to their arsenals, investing in both the scope of their systems as well as their ability to reach the U.S. homeland, according to experts.

As one of his very first actions in office, President Trump issued an executive order to address it, calling it the Iron Dome for America. And while some experts believe the name itself is “unfortunate” because it creates unrealistic expectations of what the system can actually do, it also represents what many believe to be a “necessary and long overdue shift in thinking and policy to begin to better address” the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland.

The name itself, the Golden Dome, is meant to echo Israel’s battlefield-proven Iron Dome, the short-range rocket defense system that has proven incredibly effective at saving Israeli lives. Yet while Iron Dome protects a sliver of territory with ground-launched interceptors, Golden Dome is pitched as something far more audacious: a planetary shield in orbit, capable of destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from Russia or China, intercepting hypersonic glide vehicles, and blunting Iran’s growing arsenal.

The scale alone is staggering. Washington has signed off on $175 billion, most of which will flow to defense giants Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), and L3Harris, to design the satellites, interceptors, and ground systems. Billions more are headed to the U.S. Space Force and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which will be tasked with weaving the pieces into a functioning shield. The effort is less like Iron Dome and more like the Apollo program—a bet that space-based interceptors can alter the nuclear balance of power.

Since July, when President Trump unveiled the plan and appointed U.S. Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein to lead it, Golden Dome has begun to take shape. Early budget outlines, hints of which defense firms are poised to win contracts, and debates among scientists and strategists all point to the same conclusion: the United States is embarking on one of the most ambitious defense projects in modern history and as with ambitious endeavors, this one is not without risk.

What’s New: Price Tag, Commander, and a Sprint Schedule

At the May 20 White House launch, Trump vowed that Golden Dome would be operational before his term ends—a three-year sprint to bolt revolutionary technology onto legacy missile defenses. He also named states like Alaska, Florida, Georgia, and Indiana as benefitting from the program, indicating that the way it’s being implemented could be politically strategic as well.

These are not random mentions: Alaska hosts vital long-range radars, Florida provides launch ranges, Georgia is home to contractor and military facilities, and Indiana is a hub for advanced aerospace and defense manufacturing. In short, the rollout carries as much weight for domestic politics and jobs as it does for national defense.

The program itself relies on space-based interceptors (SBIs) and missile-tracking satellites linked to existing ground and sea defenses. An early sign of the complications associated with the program came from The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which promptly warned that the actual cost could exceed $540 billion over the next two decades.

Over the summer, the outlines have grown sharper: $40 billion for the Space Force, including $24.4 billion specifically for Golden Dome. Nearly $9.2 billion is allocated for tracking satellites, $5.6 billion for orbiting interceptors, and approximately $1 billion for integration and testing. Congress added another $25 billion through the fast-track “One Big Beautiful Bill Act.” The shortcut could accelerate prototypes—but with less oversight, which is not an unfamiliar gamble for big-ticket defense programs.

How It Would Work

Despite its evocative name, the Golden Dome is not a physical shield arching over pockets of the United States. It is a layered missile-defense architecture stitched together by artificial intelligence and rooted in a mix of space and ground systems. Here’s how the architecture is designed to function:

Spot and track: Satellites equipped with infrared sensors detect missile launches the moment engines ignite and then track their trajectories.

Boost-phase intercept (BPI): New space-based interceptors (SBIs) would attempt to destroy missiles in the first minutes after launch, before they can release decoys or split into multiple warheads.

Midcourse and terminal defenses: If anything gets through, existing systems fire. The Navy’s Aegis system launches Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) interceptors from ships at sea, while the Army relies on Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries and Patriot missiles closer to the ground.

The brain: A central hub known as Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) fuses satellite, radar, and electronic intelligence data, then assigns the best shooter to make a split-second kill decision.

In simpler terms, the system would begin by using satellites equipped with infrared sensors to detect launches and track missiles. Those satellites would feed data to interceptors in orbit, designed to strike in the “boost phase”— the brief moments right after a missile takes off, before it can release decoys or multiple warheads. If a missile makes it past that first layer, existing defenses would kick in: the Navy’s Aegis system with SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors, the Army’s THAAD batteries, and Patriots closer to the ground. A central command system would fuse data from satellites, radars, and electronic intelligence to make split-second engagement decisions.

"I think the real technical challenge will be building of the space-based interceptor,” said Space Force General Michael Guetlein shortly after being confirmed as head of the Golden Dome Program. “That technology exists, I believe. I believe we have proven every element of the physics [to the point] that we can make it work. What we have not proven is, first, can I do it economically, and then second, can I do it at scale? Can I build enough satellites to get after the threat? Can I expand the industrial base fast enough to build those satellites? Do I have enough raw materials, et cetera?"

Feasible but Costly

Experts agree that the most complex and most ambitious piece is the boost-phase intercept. Dr. Patrick Binning, a space-systems expert at Johns Hopkins, calls it the “holy grail” of missile defense. Taking out a missile right after launch gives the U.S. its best chance of success. But the hurdles are enormous: maintaining global satellite coverage, striking within seconds, and defending the system itself from cyberattacks, jamming, or anti-satellite weapons.

Binning calls the idea “quite feasible, but also likely quite costly.”

“Designing, developing, and deploying the space-based interceptors are the key technical risk,” he tells The Cipher Brief. In other words, the concept is sound, but building the hardware will be the real test.

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

Peter Garretson, Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council, argues that the technology is no longer science fiction.

“Completely feasible,” he tells The Cipher Brief, citing decades of progress: successful missile intercepts in space, proven battle-management systems like Aegis, miniaturized computing power, and advances in artificial intelligence. In his view, the building blocks for a space-heavy defense are finally in place.

The White House aims to have the Golden Dome operational within just three years. Binning, however, is blunt.

“Full operational capability in three years? Never going to happen,” he observes.

At best, he predicts, “the Golden Dome could conduct a sophisticated intercept test against an intercontinental ballistic missile test target using a newly orbiting space-based interceptor.”

Yet, turning a demonstration shot into a reliable shield will take far longer. But Garretson sees political risk in missing the target.

“Golden Dome must achieve both successful testing and initial deployments before the 2028 election,” he says. If that happens, “no political party will remove a missile shield from the U.S. public.”

But he warns that bureaucratic turf wars inside the Pentagon could be as dangerous as engineering setbacks.

Even if the politics align, the physics remain punishing. Building a shield in the sky is not just about winning budgets or inter-service battles—it’s about scale. Seeing everything—and firing first—requires massive constellations of satellites and interceptors. That scale creates two problems: launch bottlenecks and space debris.

Strategic Effects—And a Dual-Use Case

Golden Dome is meant to complicate the war plans of China and Russia while reducing leverage from Iran and North Korea. Garretson argues it could force adversaries to rethink their arsenals.

“It will cause their current force structure to be a wasting asset and cast doubt on their current investments,” he said. “They will be forced to massively overbuild to compensate and for their war plans to have similar confidence.” In time, he suggests, the pressure could open doors to new arms-control talks—just as President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) pushed the Soviet Union to the table.

Beyond deterrence and diplomacy, advocates see the Golden Dome serving another role: safeguarding the United States’ own presence in space. The conversation isn’t only about missile defense. Proponents argue that the Golden Dome could also guard the satellites that anchor U.S. power in space.

“The space-based interceptors will have a dual-use capability to also protect our critical space systems from anti-satellite interceptors being developed by our competitor nations,” Binning asserts.

In other words, Golden Dome might not only shield against nuclear attack—it could also defend the satellites that underpin U.S. communications, navigation, and intelligence.

Politics and Procurement

The administration has built political durability into the Golden Dome by spreading contracts across multiple states. Congress’s $25 billion “accelerator” allows the Pentagon to bypass some oversight in the name of speed. However, credibility will depend on rigorous testing—multiple simultaneous launches, decoys, and heavy jamming.

Garretson argues that management will matter as much as technology.

“Centralized leadership reporting directly to the President, with broad independence and exceptions from normal oversight,” will be needed, said Garretson. “Focus on sprints to incremental testing… Deploy in tranches and continuously upgrade… Focus on building and testing, not on studies and requirements documents.”

The core question isn’t whether Golden Dome can stop every missile. It is whether it can change how rivals think. A reliable boost-phase layer could force Beijing and Moscow to adjust their nuclear strategies. However, a fragile or easily compromised system could invite a preemptive attack.

For now, Washington hasn’t built a shield in space—it has placed a bet. The coming months will reveal whether defense contractors can turn promises into hardware, whether early tests prove the concept, and whether Congress will continue to write checks for a program on par with Apollo in terms of cost and ambition.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

Cutting Cyber Intelligence Undermines National Security

OPINION — America’s cyber intelligence capabilities are being eviscerated while the threats to national security emanating from cyber space are increasing. The latest cuts to the cyber capabilities within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) further undermine America’s ability to protect itself against the adversaries that use cyberspace to put American’s security at risk.

Russia, China, and Iran are targeting the United States through cyber means, attacking communications, energy, transportation, and water systems — putting the ability of Americans to access critical services at risk, not to mention raising questions about the Pentagon’s ability to quickly mobilize and transport military forces. And yet, since January, the executive branch has gutted critical defensive cyber and counter malign influence operations efforts across the government.

ODNI assets are now on the chopping block, with a plan to slash the intelligence processing and information sharing services that enable critical cyber capabilities and resiliency across public and private sectors. Last week, as part of an “ODNI 2.0” plan to “eliminate redundant missions, functions and personnel” Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard announced a downsizing of her staff by more than 40 percent by this October, including the termination of entire offices that are critical for coordination of cybersecurity intelligence.

Created after the September 11, 2001, attacks revealed what happens when intelligence is siloed across disparate agencies, ODNI is supposed to serve as the critical hub for coordination across the many agencies of the intelligence community, synthesizing and enriching the information. While the totality of ODNI 2.0 purports to save Americans $700 million annually, in the cyber realm, it threatens to send the nation back to pre-9/11 dysfunction.

The Cyber Initiatives Group Fall Summit on Wednesday, September 17 from 12p – 3p is convening experts to engage on the most pressing cybersecurity risks. Save your virtual seat now.

Specifically, the plan eliminates the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC). In addition to collating America’s exquisite intelligence, CTIIC ensures all intelligence bodies and civilian federal agencies had access to commercial threat intelligence. Rather than each federal agency separately purchasing commercial information, CTIIC’s Sentinel Horizon program negotiated a single contract, efficiently and cost-effectively ensuring all federal agencies had access to timely threat information and analysis.

CTIIC also disseminates government cyber intelligence to the private sector, which owns and operates the vast majority of U.S. critical infrastructure. CTIIC serves as the “focal integration point” between federal cyber intelligence and industry partners who are defending America’s most critical systems against nation-state threats — connecting and disseminating information in real time not only across federal agencies but also to the private sector.

Through its CI3 initiative, for example, the CTIIC brought together the intelligence community and other government threat experts to provide actionable, classified cyber threat intelligence briefings to critical infrastructure owners and operators. Occurring monthly, these briefings were providers’ lifeline to federally monitored cyber threat information, enhancing situational awareness and increasing collaboration between on-the-ground providers and the intelligence community. The initiative’s goal is to take “all the great information we have in the IC [intelligence community] and get it out to those people who need it on a day-to-day basis,” says Lauren Goldman, CTIIC’s former head of analysis and analytic integration, who left the agency earlier this year.

At the very least, these programs will be scaled back if not terminated with the impending closure of CTIIC. The center was already operating with reduced expertise with the departure of three of its most senior leaders earlier this year.

Sign up for the Cyber Initiatives Group Sunday newsletter, delivering expert-level insights on the cyber and tech stories of the day – directly to your inbox. Sign up for the CIG newsletter today.

Five years ago, even before these latest successes in building public-private intelligence sharing, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission recognized the important role CTIIC plays in ensuring the government understands cyber threats and “providing analysis and coordination necessary for rapid and accurate attribution.” The congressionally mandated commission called on Congress to codify CTIIC in law and appropriate more funding to support its efforts. While doing the latter, Congress failed to codify the center, meaning lawmakers have fewer avenues to adjust Gabbard’s plan.

Gabbard is also closing the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC). While CTIIC focuses on cyber-specific intelligence integration, FMIC synthesizes intelligence related to both cyber and non-cyber efforts by foreign actors to influence the perspectives of the American public. FMIC played a critical role in uncovering online influence operations against the United States from Iranian, Russian, and Chinese threats throughout the 2024 election cycle. It worked with the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to release regular public updates debunking malign content circulated by adversaries. The director falsely equates FMIC’s work with censorship of American citizens. Instead, cuts to the center will reduce Washington’s ability to protect American citizens from the state-sponsored influence operations running rampant on the internet.

The ODNI was created to integrate and make sense of the massive amounts of threat information gathered by the U.S. intelligence community. There is no doubt value in some of the “ODNI 2.0” effort, but gutting the national cyber threat and foreign malign influence integration efforts is not where the savings should be harvested. America’s nation-state adversaries are moving into these mission areas; our intelligence community should not be moving out.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

The Math of Moscow’s War: Five Thousand Kilometers, One Million Dead and Wounded

OPINION -- “Since January 2024, Russian forces have seized approximately 5,000 square kilometers [1,931 square miles] of additional Ukrainian territory, less than one percent of the country. In certain areas, such as Kharkiv, Russia’s rate of advance is as little as 50 meters [55 yards] per day on average. These incremental gains have come at the cost of heavy losses. This quarter [April 1, 2025-to-June 30, 2025], Russian casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war likely surpassed one million, including approximately 250,000 killed and 750,000 wounded, missing, or captured. Russian fatalities during three years of war against Ukraine are 15 times greater than those experienced during the Soviet Union’s decade-long war in Afghanistan.”

That is an excerpt from the 120-page Special Inspector General for Operation Atlantic Resolve Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, required by a provision in the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.

Released publicly August 12, 2025, the report [seventh in the series] summarized U.S. Government support to Ukraine and the broader response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, including support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), support for NATO partners, and U.S. military, diplomatic, and humanitarian activity.

I found the report, done jointly by the acting-Inspectors General of the Defense Department (DoD), State Department (DoS) and Agency for International Development (AID) – which is now part of DoS, contained interesting facts and analyses about U.S., Ukrainian, Russian and NATO country activities that I had not read elsewhere.

For example, according to the report, “The conflict continued to be characterized by exchanges of artillery and UAS (unmanned aircraft systems) strikes. Since last quarter, Russia’s artillery fire rate increased from approximately 23,000 rounds per day to between 27,000 and 28,000 rounds per day. Russia increased its expenditure of one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in one of its priority areas from 7,000 in April to 10,000 in May. The DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) said that, extrapolating from this one area, it is possible that Russia is expending up to 72,000 tactical UAVs per month in roughly nine main operational areas.”

On the front lines, the report said, a “novel Russian tactic is using UAVs to deliver grenades filled with riot control agents, such as CS gas and Chloropicirin [a tear gas]…Russia deploys these UAVs to clear UAF (Ukraine Armed Forces) from entrenched fighting positions and into more open or vulnerable areas. While these chemical agents are not considered lethal, Russia uses them to shape the battlefield and cause UAF casualties.”

The Cipher Brief brings expert-level context to national and global security stories. It’s never been more important to understand what’s happening in the world. Upgrade your access to exclusive content by becoming a subscriber.

Another Russian tactic, according to the report, is “a consistent increase in Russia’s jamming of Global Navigation Satellite Systems along its borders, with a notable focus in the Baltic Sea region. This activity is likely part of a broader force protection measure as Russia fields more weapon systems. However, it is also likely that the intensification of jamming in the Baltic region is a response to the Baltic states supporting Ukraine. The navigation jamming had a significant negative effect on commercial air and maritime traffic in the region.”

The report also shared some interesting numbers that help paint a picture of just how much this war is costing Russia’s military. “Since January 2024, Russia has lost roughly 1,149 armored fighting vehicles, 3,098 infantry fighting vehicles, 300 self-propelled artillery vehicles, and 1,865 tanks, according to a think tank analysis. Russian losses of these platforms have been significantly higher than Ukraine’s, at ratios varying from 5:1 to 2:1.”

As of June, according to the report, “Ukraine had lost control of roughly 20 percent of its overall territory. Russian forces recaptured all but a small portion of Russia’s Kursk region [which Ukraine invaded in August 2024] and gained control of hundreds of square kilometers [100 square kilometers equals 38.6 square miles] across Ukraine’s Sumy, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions since January, according to the DIA.”

The report described other Ukrainian challenges saying that this quarter, “the UAF had struggled with inadequate recruitment, desertions from the front line, refusals to fight, and undertrained personnel, resulting in most of its frontline brigades operating below combat strength…Despite those challenges, the Ukrainian government continued to reject calls to lower the conscription age from 25 to 18 due to the potential long-term demographic effects and public opposition. However, on July 29, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law increasing the maximum age for new recruits to 60.”

The reports states that “Ukraine sought to bolster its ranks by recruiting contract soldiers from abroad. In May, Ukraine opened a new recruitment center and launched a digital advertising campaign concentrated on recruitment in Latin America.” One result, the report said, “Veterans of Colombia’s drug war, trained in guerrilla tactics, represent a significant contingent of Ukraine’s volunteers. Ukraine has recruited approximately 27,000 soldiers per month, roughly 15,000 below Russia’s recruitment rate. By offering contracts of up to $3,000 per month, Ukraine aims to bolster this total by recruiting several thousand contract soldiers from abroad.”

The report also described the wide range of U.S. support provided to the area since the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022.

The Cipher Brief Threat Conference is happening October 19-22 in Sea Island, GA. The world's leading minds on national security from both the public and private sectors will be there. Will you? Apply for a seat at the table today.

For example, since that date, the report said, “Congress has appropriated or otherwise made available $187 billion for OAR and the broader Ukraine response,” out of which “$30 billion remained available for obligation” as of June 30, 2025.

Of the above mentioned $187 billion, some $134 billion was considered “security related,” and included, the report said, $45.78 billion appropriated to the DoD to replace U.S. weapons and materiel donated to Ukraine; and $33.5 billion for programs Congress created to help Ukraine buy U.S. weaponry and otherwise provide for its self-defense.

The largest amount, $47.43 billion, was for forward-deployment of U.S. military forces and prepositioned stocks in Eastern Europe to deter aggression against NATO allies. I should note here, the report said that during this past quarter, the DoD maintained approximately 81,600 U.S. military and 7,400 civilian personnel in the European Command area of operations. These include rotating from the U.S. to Europe, generally for nine months, two armor brigade combat teams and one infantry brigade combat team.

The report notes: “None of the appropriation bills enacted in the current fiscal year [which ends September 30, 2025]…have provisions appropriating or rescinding appropriated funds specifically for OAR,” which I remind readers are for the military response to the Ukraine war.

However, the report said that the U.S. pause in Ukraine military assistance from March 3 to March 11, ordered by Trump in the wake of his confrontational Oval Office meeting with Zelensky, “had significant residual effects on the delivery of security assistance, including Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System proximity fuzes and 155mm high-explosive ammunition. The temporary halt in processing new requests led to materiel being held in place while awaiting further U.S. policy determinations.”

With the Trump administration withdrawing from leadership of the Ukraine support activities, the report noted that NATO personnel assumed control over logistics and remote maintenance co-located in Jasionka, Poland. As host nation, Poland assumed the lead once done by the U.S.

The U.S. and its international partners continued to provide varied training to the UAF at Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany, as well as other locations in Europe. This quarter, Grafenwoehr opened a new trench system designed to replicate battlefield conditions.

The report also said that “The UAF faces a shortage of doctors, nurses, paramedics, and specialists, especially in frontline areas, leading to overwhelmed facilities and reduced access to care. The remaining healthcare workers are experiencing significant trauma and burnout, further exacerbating staffing issues.” In addition, “the UAF does not always employ trained medical personnel according to their specialty, and dentists are often employed as infantry soldiers,” according to the report.

State’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) leads the U.S. Government’s demining efforts in Ukraine. During the quarter, the report said, “State PM/WRA supported implementers and Ukrainian government operators in clearing 11,200 acres of land in Ukraine, most of which was agricultural, and in destroying 4,556 landmines and items of unexploded ordnance. The implementers also provided explosive ordnance risk education to 8,042 people living in or near minefields.”

State PM/WRA “also provided 104 sets of personal protective equipment, 151 detectors, and 52 vehicles to Ukrainian government deminers, strengthening their ability to conduct demining operations without external assistance,” the report said.

The report also provided some details on the impact of the Trump administration ending USAID programs, disclosing that of the 163 Ukraine foreign assistance programs for which State officials provided information, 85 were terminated, 76 continued unchanged, and two were amended.

One that was continued, according to the report, related to $45 million of USAID funds contracted out to the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Agency for a series of programs. One $25 million program was: “Procure, deliver, and install small-scale generators at select cities near Ukraine’s nuclear power plants to ensure reliable power generation to local critical infrastructure,” according to the report.

After pauses, the funds were made available and following the completion of the foreign assistance review, the DoE and the NNSA resumed activities related to distributed power generation and passive protection, including completing the full obligation of $45 million.

However, according to the report, as of July 1, State assumed responsibility for administering most foreign assistance, which involved approximately $1 billion in active awards and more than $3 billion in terminated awards that still require formal closeout. USAID Ukraine reported that nearly 80 percent of the mission’s technical and contract personnel had departed by June 25 in order to comply with the July 1 deadline for their separation from service.

“USAID Ukraine reported that nine American former USAID staff were being hired by State to manage assistance programs in Ukraine,” the report said, adding, “State reported that it plans to hire some former USAID foreign service nationals to manage assistance programs in Ukraine, but this had not yet occurred as of the end of the quarter.” As of mid-June, State had not yet formally identified contracting and grants officers for many USAID programs.

The Inspectors General in this report list plans for the current quarter, and among them is a State Department IG proposed “Evaluation of Department of State Administration of Foreign Assistance Program from the U.S. Agency for International Development” which will “describe State's administration of U.S. Agency for International Development foreign assistance programs and associated awards transferred to State.”

I look forward to reading that report, if and when it is released.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

The Cybersecurity Law that’s Quietly Keeping America Safe is About to Expire

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — The clock is ticking toward September 30, 2025, when one of America's most vital cybersecurity protections will expire unless Congress acts. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA 2015) has quietly become the backbone of our nation's cyber defense. Without creating any additional regulations, it enabled the rapid sharing of threat intelligence between government and businesses that has prevented countless cyberattacks over the past decade. The Act’s protections have facilitated threat warnings to thousands of organizations just this year. Its potential sunset threatens to unleash a wave of cyberattacks that will devastate the small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) that form a foundational part of our economy.

As someone who has worked on both sides—first leading public-private partnerships at the FBI and now facilitating industry collaboration—I've witnessed firsthand how CISA 2015 transformed our cybersecurity landscape. The law provides crucial liability protections that encourage companies to share threat indicators with the government and each other, while offering antitrust protection for industry-to-industry collaboration. Without these safeguards, the robust information sharing that has made American networks more secure simply stops.

The SMB Crisis Waiting to Happen

The consequences of letting CISA 2015 lapse will fall most heavily on America's small and medium-sized businesses. Recent data from NetDiligence’s 2024 Cyber Claims Study shows that ransomware cost SMBs an average of $432,000 per attack. These businesses don't have the cash reserves to weather extended downtime. At most, many can only survive three to four weeks of operational disruption before facing permanent closure.

According to industry analysis, small and medium enterprises represent 98% of cyber insurance claims while accounting for $1.9 billion in total losses, underscoring their vulnerability in today's threat landscape. CISA 2015’s expiration will significantly weaken the early warning system that has helped businesses stay ahead of emerging threats. Without the government's ability to share robust intelligence about new attack methods, SMBs become sitting ducks for cybercriminals who specifically target organizations that can't afford to lose days or weeks.’’

The Cyber Initiatives Group Fall Summit on Wednesday, September 17 from 12p – 3p is convening experts to engage on the most pressing cybersecurity risks. Save your virtual seat now.

Healthcare: Where Cybersecurity Becomes Life and Death

The stakes become particularly dire in healthcare, where ransomware attacks don't just threaten profits—they threaten lives. The University of Minnesota School of Public Health’s experts estimate that ransomware attacks killed 42 to 67 Medicare patients between 2016 and 2021. These numbers represent a horrifying trend: threat actors deliberately target hospitals because they know healthcare systems will pay quickly to avoid putting patients at risk.

If information sharing degrades after CISA 2015's sunset, hospitals–and all other critical infrastructure–very likely will lose crucial early warnings about ransomware variants and other attack methods. When a hospital's systems are threatened, rapid information sharing matters. Minutes count in medical emergencies, and delays can be fatal.

Economic Ripple Effects

The economic impact extends far beyond individual companies. SMBs make up the vast majority of (99%) businesses in the U.S., and employ nearly half of the private sector’s workforce. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, they’re responsible for 43.5% of our GDP, so their widespread failure would create devastating ripple effects throughout the economy.

More concerning, America's technological leadership depends on the robust threat intelligence sharing that CISA 2015 enables. Our cybersecurity companies lead the world precisely because they have access to comprehensive threat data that helps them develop superior products and services.

Other countries modeled its cybersecurity information sharing after our system, recognizing that America's approach gives us a competitive advantage. If we allow this framework to collapse, we're not just making individual businesses more vulnerable—we're undermining the foundation of American cybersecurity leadership that other nations seek to emulate.

The Path Forward: Clean Reauthorization Now

There's bipartisan agreement that CISA 2015 should be reauthorized, with experts from across the political spectrum recognizing its vital importance. DHS Secretary Kristi Noem has urgently called for reauthorization, emphasizing that public-private partnerships have grown stronger because of the information-sharing guidelines established in CISA 2015.

The cleanest path forward is a straightforward reauthorization while Congress works through any technical improvements. The core framework has proven its worth over a decade of operation, facilitating billions of dollars in prevented losses and creating a culture where information sharing is the default rather than the exception.

Beyond Politics: A National Security Imperative

In an era of political division, cybersecurity remains one of the few areas where Americans across the political spectrum can find common ground. We need to defend against constant attacks coming from the likes of Chinese actors using ransomware during SharePoint vulnerabilities to Iranian groups deploying ransomware as a political weapon to hundreds of criminal ransomware groups operating at any given time.

The solution isn't more regulation or government overreach. It's the collaborative approach that CISA 2015 has fostered. As I used to tell businesses when I was at the FBI: we can't help you if we don't hear from others, and we can't help others if we don't hear from you. This principle of mutual aid and shared defense has made America stronger, and we cannot afford to abandon it now.

Congress must act before September 30. If we allow our cybersecurity information sharing framework to collapse it will devastate small businesses, endanger the sick, and undermine America's position as the global leader in cybersecurity. The time for action is now, before the attacks that could have been prevented become the disasters we failed to stop.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Cynthia Kaiser was first published in Fortune.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

Myanmar’s Civil War Is Tearing the Country Apart

CIPHER BRIEF REPORTING – The military government ruling Myanmar designated a significant ethnic rebel group as a terrorist organization on Thursday, just months before December’s planned elections. It may seem like just another headline in a far away land but the move to quell the Karen National Union (KNU) is a sign of what’s at stake in Myanmar, and how what’s happening there is shaping regional dynamics.

The country’s long-simmering civil war exploded after the 2021 coup that saw the military overthrow of the elected government led by Aung Aan Suu Kyi, uniting pro-democracy forces and ethnic militias against the junta.

But Myanmar’s civil war is not just a humanitarian catastrophe—it’s a geopolitical fault line. The protracted conflict has displaced over 2.6 million people, fueled transnational arms and drug networks, and drawn in outside powers like China and Russia—yet it remains largely absent from international policy debates.

Analysts warn that continued neglect could destabilize Southeast Asia for years to come, potentially empowering malign actors across the region.

“The United States has long had an interest in peace, stability and development in Asia and preventing the rise of a regional hegemon. The ongoing conflict in Burma challenges all of these interests,” Derek Mitchell, Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, tells The Cipher Brief. “War and instability in a country at the cross-roads of Asia have cost the country billions of dollars in lost investment, led to cratering of the domestic economy, and unleashed an explosion of drug, human and weapons trafficking, infectious disease, and a humanitarian crisis that has driven millions into neighboring countries as refugees at the expense of regional stability and development.”

A Country in Collapse

Following the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, unleashed a violent crackdown on protestors. When bullets and fear emptied the streets, resistance went underground.

Today, that resistance has evolved into a full-fledged civil war encompassing a patchwork of People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and local militias.

Some of the most powerful EAOs, such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the north and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in the southeast, have aligned with the PDFs, forming temporary alliances against the common enemy. The junta, meanwhile, has regained territory in places like Nawnghkio, but at a high cost — both in casualties and growing resistance.

Just weeks ago, the junta said it transferred power to a civilian-led interim government and allowed the state of emergency in place since the coup, to expire ahead of elections set for December and January. The status quo hasn’t changed though, with coup leader Min Aung Hlaing retaining power. Western governments and several analysts have therefore dismissed the elections as a sham, expected to be dominated by military proxies and just a move to further entrench the military’s power.

The Cipher Brief Threat Conference is happening October 19-22 in Sea Island, GA. The world's leading minds on national security from both the public and private sectors will be there. Will you? Apply for a seat at the table today.

“The conflict in Myanmar undermines ASEAN unity and dilutes U.S. influence in the region because ASEAN is a weaker partner as a result, and more beholden to authoritarian partners in light of the Myanmar junta’s realignment with Beijing,” Hunter Marston, an Indo-Pacific security analyst focused on U.S. alliances, strategy and Southeast Asian geopolitics, tells The Cipher Brief. “At the same time, the conflict has facilitated the proliferation of crime and illicit economies flourishing in Myanmar’s borderlands, which have targeted U.S. citizens as well as other countries around the globe, raking in billions of dollars each year.”

ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is a key regional bloc that the U.S. relies on to counterbalance China’s growing influence and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The Association, long hampered by internal divisions and non-interference norms, has not intervened in Myanmar. Recent efforts to re-engage with the junta have made little impact and only highlighted the bloc’s diminishing leverage. A fractured or weakened ASEAN, experts caution, not only hampers coordinated regional responses but also complicates Washington’s efforts to engage effectively on shared challenges, from maritime security to transnational crime.

However, this is no longer just an internal fight concerning Myanmar. As the war drags on, it has become a new front in the global struggle between democratic and authoritarian powers.

China, Russia, and the Battlefield of Influence

Myanmar’s geographic position, wedged between China, India, and the Bay of Bengal, makes it a critical node in Southeast Asia’s strategic architecture. It is also a country rich in rare earth minerals, oil, gas, and hydropower — assets that Beijing, in particular, is keen to control.

China, which has long courted the Burmese military, has navigated a delicate balance in the conflict. While officially calling for peace and dialogue, Beijing has supplied the junta with arms and political cover. Meanwhile, its access to rare earth supply chains through northern Myanmar has become even more valuable amid global competition for strategic resources.

“The junta receives direct and indirect financial support from its sales of oil and gas to China and Thailand, limited trade with other ASEAN states such as Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and direct cash transfers and assistance packages from China,” said Marston. “Its state-owned banks and companies also extract a great deal of revenue from natural resources across the country, as well as property taxes to a lesser extent in urban centers like Yangon and Mandalay.”

Russia, too, has deepened ties with the military regime. In recent years, Moscow has become a leading arms supplier and defense partner to the junta, eager to expand its influence in a region where Western alliances have weakened. Myanmar has reciprocated, with junta generals attending Moscow’s military parades and inviting Russian advisors into the country.

“This is no longer just a civil war — it’s an open door for authoritarian powers to gain a foothold in Southeast Asia,” one former U.S. official who worked on Myanmar policy tells The Cipher Brief.

Cross-Border Instability

The conflict’s repercussions are already spilling across Myanmar’s borders. In Thailand, shelling and firefights near the frontier have driven thousands of refugees into crowded border camps. In India’s northeast, cross-border insurgencies and weapons flows have revived longstanding security concerns. Bangladesh continues to shoulder the burden of over a million Rohingya refugees, with little prospect of safe repatriation as the military escalates its violence in Rakhine State.

Illicit arms trafficking, drug production in the Golden Triangle, and human smuggling have surged in tandem with the fighting. Some insurgent groups fund their campaigns through methamphetamine production and jade mining, while the junta leverages state-owned enterprises and military conglomerates to bankroll its war machine.

Mitchell emphasized that this has “also led to the proliferation of ‘scam centers’ along Burma’s border that are bilking Americans and others out of billions of dollars.”

“The violence and absence of an effective international response have created an opening for China to insert itself even further into the internal affairs of the country, corner its rare earths and broader resource market, and attempt to create a client state through which it would have strategic access to the Indian Ocean,” he added.

Washington’s Take

So, what is the United States government doing to address the Myanmar crisis?

The second Trump administration has taken a markedly different approach to Myanmar compared to the Biden era.

“The first Trump administration was slow to condemn the Myanmar military’s violent clearance operations against the Rohingya, which the Biden administration later confirmed met the criteria for genocide and crimes against humanity,” Marston said.

While sanctions against the military junta remain in place, the Trump administration has largely refrained from commenting on the country’s internal dynamics. Broadly, it has sharply reduced U.S. funding for democracy promotion, human rights, and independent media. American-backed outlets such as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia have been significantly affected—a move that Min Aung Hlaing publicly welcomed, expressing his “sincere appreciation” to President Trump.

In a notable diplomatic development in July 2025, President Trump sent a direct letter to Min Aung Hlaing regarding tariffs, which the junta interpreted as a form of public acknowledgment and a diplomatic victory, marking a departure from previous diplomatic isolation.

Furthermore, the Trump administration has enacted new travel restrictions, including a complete suspension of entry for Myanmar nationals as immigrants and non-immigrants, potentially preventing persecuted persons from reaching American soil.

This blend of continued sanctions with reduced democracy aid and a more transactional, direct communication approach with the junta underscores the Trump administration’s “America First” foreign policy, leaving the future of U.S. influence in Myanmar uncertain amidst the ongoing crisis.

There are, however, other efforts to bring Myanmar back into the limelight.

Recent legislative efforts, such as the “No New Burma Funds Act” introduced in July by Rep. Nikema Williams (D-GA), aim to curb indirect financial flows to the regime. These include revenues from natural gas exports involving foreign companies, fees paid to military-controlled infrastructure, and leakage from humanitarian aid operations in junta-held areas.

Additionally, Burmese gems and timber often reach U.S. markets via third countries, and digital platforms may unwittingly monetize content linked to the junta — all contributing to the regime’s financial lifeline.

According to Marston, “western countries could theoretically apply secondary sanctions on any country conducting business with Myanmar’s energy companies or state-owned banks, which would squeeze Thailand and Singapore in particular, along with China, but they have been unwilling to expend the political capital necessary to do so.”

“Furthermore, Washington has refrained from imposing the most comprehensive sanctions on Myanmar’s economy for fear of hurting the entire population and setting the country’s economic recovery back even further after previous rounds of sanctions in the 2000s,” he continued.

In addition, there is the “BRAVE Burma Act,” a bipartisan U.S. House bill introduced on May 5, 2025, by Representatives Bill Huizenga (R-MI) and Betty McCollum (D-MN), among other co-sponsors from both parties. This legislation, which has advanced in the House, aims to increase pressure on Myanmar’s military junta by requiring stronger sanctions on entities like state-owned enterprises and those involved in the jet fuel sector, and by establishing a U.S. Special Envoy for Burma.

“Right now, the administration should appoint a special envoy. Personnel is policy, and without a champion in Washington, US Burma policy will remain adrift,” Marston asserted.

Mitchell concurred that the Trump Administration “should appoint a special envoy based in the region to build closer relations with the (opposition) National Unity Government, ethnic leaders and other legitimate representatives of the Burmese people, and coordinate with our regional allies and partners on a common approach to the conflict.”

“The administration should make it clear that it does not consider the junta legitimate and that its pretensions to rule are unacceptable,” he continued. “To that end, it should tighten sanctions to shut off its access to money, weapons, and international legitimacy. Overall, the administration should recognize that China is taking advantage of our neglect and respond consistently with where developments in the country are trending.”

The Strategic Cost of Indifference

Entire towns have been razed. Schools and hospitals have been bombed. More than 18 million people—nearly a third of Myanmar’s population—now rely on humanitarian aid, according to the United Nations. The war has triggered one of the world’s largest internal displacements and turned Myanmar’s borderlands into a hotbed of organized crime, cyber scams, and weapons trafficking—networks that now reach far beyond Southeast Asia.

“The longer the U.S. stays disengaged, the more space there is for China and Russia to entrench themselves,” says Hunter Marston. “Without high-level diplomatic pressure or punitive measures, the junta will have no reason to pursue a negotiated solution, and the country’s collapse will continue to drag down the region.”

China has already endorsed Myanmar’s planned elections in December, despite ongoing civil war and widespread instability. In contrast, ASEAN has said elections should only follow a return to peace.

“Realistically, the only hope of pressuring the military to pursue peace talks is to win on the battlefield. Thus, it is essential to curb the military’s access to arms,” Marston stressed. “The only way to do that is by imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese weapons companies like NORINCO, which continue to provide munitions to the military. Doing so would put Beijing on notice that it no longer has carte blanche in Myanmar and would align with the goals of U.S. competition with China in checking China’s global military expansion.”

Mitchell also underscored that Washington’s only leverage for positive change lies in directly cutting off the junta’s financial streams. If Myanmar is allowed to fall fully into the grip of autocracy, crime syndicates, and foreign military powers, the consequences will not remain confined to its borders.

“Pressuring foreign banks (in Thailand and Singapore, for instance) into shutting off financial services to the junta, sanctioning Myanmar’s Central Bank, and imposing penalties on other banks inside and outside the country doing business with the junta can help shut off capital to the regime,” he said.

This is exclusive Subscriber+Member content.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts. Subscribe now.

Ex-NATO Commander Warns Western Inaction Built “Sanctuary” for Russia

EXPERT Q&A — Russia’s massive drone attack overnight on six Ukrainian regions, which hit energy and gas transport infrastructure and cut off power to over 100,000 people, is the latest sign that Moscow is nowhere near peace. Coupled with the Kremlin’s rejection of meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine, it’s clear that President Vladimir Putin is still pursuing his maximalist war goals. That doesn’t surprise General (Ret.) Philip Breedlove, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, who said the U.S. has been “completely deterred” by Putin for the last 11 years, across four presidents, which has built a "sanctuary" for Russia and allowed it to escalate in Ukraine unchecked.

Cipher Brief COO and Executive Editor of the Open Source Report, Brad Christian spoke with Gen. Breedlove about how that dynamic and is shaping the war and peace negotiations, as well as other global security challenges — from the threat posed by Iranian drones to the true relationship between members of the Axis of Authoritarians. Our conversation has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

The Cipher Brief: Let's start in the Middle East. Broadly speaking, how are you thinking about all of the changes and all of the action that is happening in the region and what it might be pointing to?

General Breedlove: I'm in the Middle East now and have been here for almost seven days. I'm in my second capital and we're working through some of the issues that are left over after the 12-day war such as how the Middle East is continuing to react to that and what we expect out of Iran following the pretty good beating they took. And then, what does that mean for our good friends and partners in the Middle East?

This is a time where I think many of the leaders of these nations are still reeling from what happened. I was talking with some very senior leaders today and I pointed out that in the first three and a half days of this 12-day war, Iran shot nearly 1,500 drones and missiles in the fight. And I asked them, "Is your country ready to defend against 1,500 rockets and missiles?" And of course, there's really only one nation in the Middle East that's set up for that and that's Israel, who was of course attacked. And so, others here in this region are trying to think this through.

And while these other countries are good, maybe even great partners of the U.S., we haven't fought together before. For example, how would they connect to the Navy ships and the US Air Force airplanes that have done so much in the Middle East in these recent challenges? And frankly, there's a lot of scratching of heads going on because those type’s of challenges can’t be solved overnight and nobody, including Israel, is ready to face that kind of onslaught without help from the United States.

So, there's a lot of concern and a lot of angst about how countries get ready for this? You've heard that the Axis of Evil countries, Iran and others, Russia, are starting to build these Shahed drones by the hundreds and thousands and starting new factories in South America. These adversarial nations are unable to use what we would call normal, Western style air power so they are substituting it with these drone attacks and it's a tough problem for many countries to defend against.

And then, frankly, while the nations I'm dealing with are not necessarily concerned about Israel attacking them, they are taken aback that Israel can launch aircraft, fly 1,000 miles and establish air superiority over a nation in two days. And so, there's a lot of people rethinking where they are and how it all works here based on the actions of the recent Israel-Iran conflict.

I think the good news is that the threat of Iran is somewhat diminished. Iran is going to spend some time rebuilding its defenses because especially its air defense network was pretty much decimated.

It's a busy time in the Middle East. It's a time where we need to find peace. It's a time where we don't need another distraction, as we're facing multiple theaters of conflict right now.

The Cipher Brief: On the topic of peace and some normalcy, what is the mood there? What’s happening in Gaza is both incredibly complicated and terribly upsetting to much of the world. Is there going to be a return to some regional normalcy in the relatively near future?

General Breedlove: I don't think I see or hear that right now. There's a lot of concern that the political situation, that the leadership of Israel is in with their own people and the desire for getting the hostages back either dead or alive is very much alive. And even inside of Israel, there are now protests against what's going on in Gaza. So, I can't imagine a more concerning and more confused situation and there is angst of how this is all going to work out. I must say that there is concern about how the people of Gaza have been treated. But I will tell you this, Brad, as I move around these capitals in this region, the recognized threat is Iran.

Prefer to watch The Cipher Brief interview with former NATO Supreme Allied Commander General (Ret.) Philip M. Breedlove? Check it out by subscribing to The Cipher Brief's YouTube channel.

The Cipher Brief: I want to shift gears a little bit here to the other topic that is dominating the national security space and that's Russia’s war with Ukraine. You've said consistently from the beginning of Russia’s full scale invasion that, "Mr. Putin has us deterred and we have not established deterrence over either Russia or Vladimir Putin." I'd just like to get your take on where we are with the negotiations. So many people seem to be scratching their heads at some of the things that we’re seeing play out in the public facing side of the negotiations. How are you thinking about it?

General Breedlove: Well, bottom line upfront, nothing has changed. We remain deterred. In the press you hear people talking about this war being three and a half years long. This war is over 11 years long. It started in the spring of '14 when I was still serving as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, and it hasn't stopped. It was hot for a few years and then it went warm. Russians were killing Ukrainians and Ukrainians were killing Russians on the line of contact. And then, after some six years or so of that warm war on the line of contact, Russia re-invaded, and I call this the third phase of the 11-year-long war.

This war has covered four presidents, Obama, Trump twice and Biden once, and all four of them have been nearly and completely deterred from the very beginning. We, as we always do in the military, offered options for how to address this conflict in Ukraine back in 2014. And the answer was, "We're not going to take any action because the war will escalate if we take action." Well, we gave them options from very small movements to larger more bellicose movements, they chose none of them and here we are. What we do know is we did not take action for fear of escalation. We were deterred and we didn't take action and Russia escalated anyway. And so our lack of action ended up in the escalation of the problem by the Russians. And that has repeated itself through four administrations for the past 11 years. We are still deterred. We have taken precious little action to stop the fight in Ukraine and we still find ourselves saying, "We're not going to do that because we've got to give peace a chance and we don't want to escalate the problem." And that formula is not working now and has not worked for 11 years.

We have virtually enabled the Russian war on Ukraine by our lack of action in a more severe way. Many of us from military backgrounds say that we have built sanctuary for Russia. From that sanctuary, we allow them to attack Ukraine. If you can think of a map, up in the northwest corner of the map is Belarus all the way to the east around through Russia all the way to the south, into the Black Sea and west across the Black Sea. We have allowed Russia to attack Ukraine from nearly 300 degrees on the map, and we still cannot determine that we should allow Ukraine to fire back deeply into Russia with our kit.

Mr. Elbridge Colby, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, at times seems to be out of sync with President Trump because the President recently said, "You can't win a war that way." And Mr. Colby, once again, announced in the last day or so that, "We're not going to let them do long-range fires with American kit." This is an absurd policy, and it's guaranteed to be a loser and we've got to get past being so completely deterred by Russia's threats. Their program of reflexive control is working excellent on our leadership and we've got to break free of it.

The Cipher Brief: The US and Europe could inflict significant pressure on Russia through the expanded use of sanctions, yet President Trump has not yet approved the use of the sanctions that could really bite. Would increasing sanctions really cause that much of a risk of escalation on the part of Russia?

General Breedlove: Folks who follow Putin and Russia will say something to the following effect, I actually say it all the time- Sanctions have never changed Putin's actions on the battlefield. Sanctions have hurt Russia. Sanctions have hurt the Russian people. Sanctions have hurt the Russian economy. All those things are true, but they have never changed Russian actions on the battlefield. And so, we either need to double and triple the really crushing sanctions and take all of the frozen Russian money and use it to help Ukraine. We've got to physically stop the Russian shadow fleet from moving oil around the world. There's a whole host of things we could do that would truly bring Russia to their knees and we haven't done it.

It's hard to understand. We're all hoping that the President will regain his gumption, like he did going into the conversation in Alaska with Mr. Putin. You remember it was very, very clear, he said it multiple times, "If we don't get a ceasefire, there is no second meeting." Well, we didn't get a ceasefire and now we're negotiating a second meeting. And there was also the 50-day that turned into 10 days that turned into 12 days. Well, those 12 days are gone. We don't have a ceasefire, and we haven't announced new sanctions. So, there are many tools that we haven't taken that we need to take. Mr. Putin is not going to stop. Mr. Putin will have to be stopped.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

The Cipher Brief: What are NATO and Ukraine's next best moves, given everything that's in play right now?

General Breedlove: It's a confusing issue about what America is going to do or not do in any possible peace-enforcement capacity. The best move right now, not under a NATO hat, because clearly, Mr. Putin believes he's in charge and he said there will be no NATO involvement, but if NATO or European Union nations were to volunteer for a coalition of the willing presence in Ukraine, then that's what, I think, needs to happen. We need the big nations- the UK, the French, the Germans, to step up but they're waiting and watching for American leadership. Is America going to be that backbone and offer what the president talked about in his post-talk news conference and so forth? We need for all of that to happen. We need for America to make a decision to supply air power, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, et cetera, those non-boots on the ground capabilities. And then, we need the European nations who've already intimated they may be willing to provide boots on the ground to get in there and get a stoppage of the fighting.

Mr. Putin’s entire objective however is to keep kicking the can to the right, run right up to the red line, wave a bright shiny object, get another red line, run right up to the red line, wave another shiny object, get another deadline. He is very good and has had great success at moving our red lines to the right.

The Cipher Brief: I want to ask if you could give us your best and worst-case scenario about how the axis relationship between China- Russia- Iran- North Korea could evolve over the next six months and what that might mean for America and our allies?

General Breedlove: I recently heard someone use a new construct that I had never heard, but it's beginning to make even more sense. This particular author labeled Russia as a proxy of China fighting against America. We've heard several times people describe Russia as the little brother, and China's going to use Russia, as opposed to Russia using China in this conflict. There does appear to be a definite relationship there where China is positioning Russia to do as much damage as they can to the United States' interests in the region. And so I think that we're going to see continued cooperation amongst these nations. They're doing this, every one of them, to benefit their nation. Russia's getting what they need from China by way of parts for the Shahed drones and other things.

Russia, of course, now is using three tranches of North Koreans to fight and to man their factories. And now, we hear they're even looking for women in South America who might want to come over and man factories. Russia is in trouble. I'd like to finish the conversation with the fact that I see Russia as losing the war against Ukraine now, not winning it.

But back to the cooperation. There's a lot of mutual benefit there for these countries. Iran has got to rebuild its air defenses; they were decimated by Israel. Russia desperately needs manpower. They can't staff their factories, and they still haven't totally retaken all the land that was taken by Ukraine and they're having to use North Koreans to help them do that. China needs them all because they want American power diminished, tied up, canceled, in any way they can, and they see Russia as a useful tool to do that. So, they all have their needs and desires and I think the mutual affray will only increase over time.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

Rearming a Fractured Ally: Should the U.S. Let Turkey Back Into the F-35 Program?

CIPHER BRIEF REPORTING — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is signaling fresh optimism that his country could once again acquire U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets—an unexpected twist in a long-running defense dispute that once fractured NATO unity.

After meeting with former President Donald Trump at the NATO Summit in The Hague earlier this summer, Erdogan told reporters that “technical-level talks” between Turkish and U.S. officials were already underway.

“We discussed the F-35 issue. We made payments of $1.3 to $1.4 billion for the jets, and we saw that Mr. Trump was well-intentioned about delivering them,” Erdogan said. Notably, he added that Turkey’s Russian-made S-400 air defense system—at the center of the years-long impasse—“did not come up” during the talks.

That detail matters. In 2019, the United States formally expelled Turkey from the multinational F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, citing the S-400 purchase as a direct threat to the aircraft’s stealth and intelligence safeguards. At the time, the decision was widely seen as a sharp rebuke to a NATO ally drifting closer to Moscow.

With a shifting geopolitical landscape and renewed U.S.-Turkey dialogue, the question returns: should Turkey be allowed back into the F-35 program?

Many national security experts argue that the risks of reintegration far outweigh the benefits—both technically and strategically.

“Turkey made its choice despite repeated warnings, advice, and pressure from allies. It went into this with eyes wide open and decided in 2019 to proceed with the S-400 missile defense system,” Sinan Ciddi, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Marine Corps University and Senior Fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, tells The Cipher Brief. “Given that, there’s no real upside to letting Turkey back into the F-35 program. The associated dangers are significant.”

Others contend that the potential upsides are worth considering.

“Bringing Turkey back into the F-35 program could strengthen NATO’s southern flank, where Turkey’s strategic position bordering Syria, Iran, and Russia matters. Its air force, stuck with aging F-16s, would gain fifth-generation stealth with the F-35, boosting NATO interoperability and deterrence against adversaries like China and Russia,” John Thomas, Managing Director of strategic advocacy firm, Nestpoint Associates, tells The Cipher Brief. “The deal could allow Turkish firms to make parts which could lower costs, saving US taxpayers billions.”

Ankara had invested approximately $1.4 billion into the project before its removal. Turkish defense contractors played a key role in manufacturing over 900 parts for the aircraft, many of which had to be relocated to U.S. and European facilities at considerable cost and logistical strain.

Yet even among advocates, most agree that reentry would need to be conditional and tightly controlled.

There is also a compelling strategic case. Geographically, Turkey straddles Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, offering air base access near conflict zones from Syria to the Caucasus and eastern Mediterranean.

Beyond hardware and geography, some view Turkey’s reintegration as a means to draw Ankara back from its increasingly independent defense path and closer to the West. Erdogan has hedged against U.S. sanctions by ramping up cooperation with Russia and accelerating development of a homegrown fifth-generation fighter, the KAAN, which completed its first test flight in early 2024.

The Risks That Haven’t Gone Away

Still, the concerns that led to Turkey’s original expulsion remain unresolved. Chief among them is the continued presence of the Russian S-400 system on Turkish soil.

“The S-400’s radars are a dealbreaker,” Thomas asserted. “Russian systems could collect data on the F-35’s stealth, risking leaks to Moscow, endangering American pilots and allies like Israel.”

Washington officials have repeatedly warned that operating both the S-400 and F-35s in the same environment poses an unacceptable risk to sensitive data and stealth technology.

“To restore trust, Turkey must fully decommission its S-400s—dismantling key components or transferring them to U.S. control at Incirlik. Legal guarantees, like a binding commitment not to procure Russian systems again, need to be non-negotiable,” Thomas continued.

While technical safeguards and legal commitments may help mitigate security risks, others caution that deeper strategic questions remain unresolved.

Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, tells The Cipher Brief that there are several questions Washington officials need to ask.

“How likely is it that Turkey would fight alongside the U.S. in a war or crisis with F-35s should they regain access to the program? In the past, they have even denied the U.S. even the ability to operate from Turkish bases, so there are reasons to be skeptical,” she said.

From her purview, Ankara should “give the S-400 system back to Russia if they are serious about reentering the F-35 program.”

“This is probably not feasible. Decommissioning the system might be sufficient, but in that case, Turkey’s access to the F-35’s classified technology should be limited,” Kavanagh said.

Although Turkish officials have hinted at a possible deactivation or sale of the S-400, no concrete steps have been taken.

Congressional Red Lines and Executive Authority

Reintegrating Turkey wouldn’t just be a military or diplomatic decision—it would require navigating deep skepticism on Capitol Hill. Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the U.S. imposed sanctions on Turkey’s defense procurement agency in 2020. Lifting those sanctions would likely require congressional approval, and opposition remains strong.

Senator Jim Risch, a senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has repeatedly stated that Turkey should not receive the F-35 as long as the S-400 is operational.

Moreover, in July, a bipartisan letter began circulating in the House, authored by Representatives Chris Pappas (D-NH), Gus Bilirakis (R-FL), Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY), and Dina Titus (D-NV). The lawmakers urged the administration to block any efforts they say would violate U.S. law and compromise national security policy. The State Department responded to the letter, saying: “We have expressed our displeasure with Ankara's acquisition of the S-400 system and have made clear the steps that should be taken as part of our ongoing assessment of the implementation of CAATSA sanctions.”

Ciddi pointed out, however, that there are ways to skirt Congress.

“The National Defense Authorization Act includes explicit language: as long as Turkey maintains the S-400 on its soil, it cannot receive the F-35. That’s been the case since 2019,” he explained. “Could that be bypassed? If the President were to invoke national emergency powers, there is a theoretical path around Congress.”

Beyond Congress, Ciddi continued, there are also “concerns from U.S. allies—Israel, Greece, Cyprus—who argue Turkey has repeatedly crossed red lines, not only by purchasing Russian missile systems but also by deepening strategic ties with Moscow and supporting groups like Hamas.”

“It’s not just about the S-400 anymore; it’s about a broader pattern,” he said. “Turkey isn’t just buying arms from Russia. It’s also building nuclear power plants with them, raising concerns about their eventual nuclear capability. And still, Erdogan hasn’t been held to account.”

There are also regional implications to consider. Israel, which relies heavily on its fleet of F-35s for maintaining its qualitative military edge, has historically been wary of advanced U.S. weapons flowing to rivals or unstable actors in the region. Although Turkey and Israel have recently taken cautious steps toward diplomatic normalization, tensions remain high over Ankara’s support for Hamas and its rhetoric against Israeli military operations.

At the same time, Turkey’s defense posture has shifted notably since its removal. It has forged stronger ties with Russia, expanded defense trade with Central Asian states, and emphasized sovereignty over strategic alignment. Erdogan’s government has leaned on nationalist rhetoric and positioned Turkey as a power broker, independent of both the U.S. and the EU. Analysts underscore that re-admitting Ankara without substantial guarantees risks validating this drift—and could erode the credibility of Western alliances.

A Conditional Path Back—If There Is One

Yet some analysts argue that the current geopolitical moment offers a narrow window for recalibration. The resurgence of great-power competition, coupled with Turkey’s economic strains and regional fatigue, may make Erdogan more inclined to engage in negotiations.

Yet, even limited reentry carries significant political and strategic risks. Whether Turkey is brought back in or kept at arm’s length, the decision will set a precedent not just for arms sales—but for how the U.S. manages defiant allies in an era of global fragmentation.

As the Defense Department emphasized in 2019, the F-35 program depends on mutual trust and alignment. The question now is whether those foundations can be restored—or whether reengagement without clear conditions will do more harm than good.

“Five U.S. administrations now have all sent the same message: that Turkey is too big to fail. No matter how Turkey undermines or acts against U.S. interests, it has barely ever faced any repercussions from Washington,” Blaise Misztal, Vice President for Policy at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, tells The Cipher Brief.

“To allow Turkey to get the F-35 now, without real steps to demonstrate it is willing to be a better ally, will only further convince Turkey that it can do whatever it wants without fear of U.S. pushback. Countries surrounding Turkey, meanwhile, whether U.S. partners or not, will only have their fears confirmed that they must prepare themselves to confront Turkey’s rising power.”

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

Spy Versus Spy: Iran’s Playbook for Espionage in Israel

OPINION — Israel’s intelligence penetration of Iran played out in dramatic form over the course of the 12-day war this summer, but Iran is running an aggressive recruitment and spying operation of its own targeting Israel. And while the two espionage campaigns are not comparable in scale, scope, or success, Israel’s domestic security agency was sufficiently concerned that in the wake of the war it partnered with the country’s national public diplomacy directorate to launch a media campaign warning Israelis against spying for Iran.

Over the course of the war, Israeli intelligence treated Iran like its backyard playground, recruiting sources, both Iranian citizens and citizens of neighboring countries, and inserting its operatives to gather intelligence on the country’s most secret nuclear facilities, scientists, and officials. These efforts enabled covert operations, including the construction of remotely controlled missile and drone systems inside central Iran, that struck Iranian targets from within at the very outset of the 12-day war. Iranians recruited by Israel even helped smuggle “technologically modified vehicles” into the country, which were used to target Iranian air defense positions and clear a path for Israeli aircraft entering Iranian airspace.

In the weeks since the war ended, Iranian officials have carried out a domestic witch hunt, arresting thousands of individuals in their search for people who spied for Israel. Iran even executed one of its own nuclear scientists, alleging he spied for Israel. Now, Iran aims to turn the tables on Israel by increasing its own network of people in Israel recruited to spy for Iran.

It is now clear, however, that at the same time Israeli intelligence was recruiting sources and operatives in Iran, Iran was doing the same in Israel, just to a much smaller effect. While Iranian efforts to infiltrate and surveil targets in Israel date back to at least 2013, Israeli intelligence organizations have documented a significant surge in Iranian efforts to recruit both Israeli and non-Israeli citizens to spy for Iran, beginning in early 2020. Unlike Israel’s penetration of key Iranian intelligence and nuclear agencies, Iranian espionage in Israel remains at the edges, probing at the margins in its attempts to penetrate Israeli intelligence and society. These typically involve digital recruitment targeting Israelis in financial straits.

At first, Iran only tasked its recruits to collect basic information on the location of Israeli military bases and Israeli leaders, and to post anti-government signs and graffiti in public places to brew domestic dissent. Indeed, in the days before the 12-day war, Iranian officials boasted that the regime’s spy networks in Israel acquired sensitive documents about Israel's nuclear program. Iran’s minister of intelligence, Esmail Khatib, said that “complete nuclear files were obtained, along with documents related to [Israel’s] connections with the U.S., Europe, and other countries, as well as intelligence that strengthens Iran’s offensive capabilities.”

But starting in mid-2024–between the Iranian missile and drone attack on Israel in April and the ballistic missile attack in October– the Iranians started tasking recruits not only to carry out acts of espionage but also arson and even murder plots targeting Israeli scientists, journalists, security and military leaders, and senior politicians. Israeli officials described the spike in the number of plots as “unprecedented.” Israel Police Superintendent Maor Goren said, “If we go check the last years – the last decades – we can count on two hands how many people got arrested for this.”

While none of the murder plots came to fruition, Israeli authorities report that several came very close to being carried out and were thwarted at the last minute. And unlike pure espionage cases, which often take time to develop, some of the murder plots were being planned as soon as 9 days after initial recruitment. In other cases, Israeli authorities only discovered a cell of persons of Azeri descent who had been carrying out espionage operations as a team, some two years after they started spying on Israel. They were spotted when they moved from spying on military sites to conducting surveillance of a senior Israeli military figure they were told to kill.

The Washington Institute’s Iranian External Operations Map, which tracks Iranian plots abroad, has documented at least 31 plots carried out by Iranian-recruited Israelis in Israel. These recruits have sprayed graffiti and lit fires across Israel, in addition to collecting basic information on military bases, government officials, and nuclear scientists to send back to their handlers in Iran. However, Iranian efforts to recruit Israeli spies have not led to a single successful assassination or targeted attack in Israel. Iran conducts its recruitment primarily online via Telegram, WhatsApp, and social media platforms, although there are a few instances of Iranian handlers approaching potential recruits in person while abroad. Recruitment efforts appear to rely heavily on financial incentives while also exploiting existing social cleavages. Out of the 31 cases carried out by Israeli perpetrators documented by the Washington Institute, 20 involved some type of monetary compensation, usually via cryptocurrency.

While the Israeli perpetrators in 25 out of the 31 cases knew, or at least suspected, that they were working on behalf of the Iranians, many rationalized their actions as falling short of full-blown espionage. The tasks assigned to these individuals varied widely. Some were given relatively harmless assignments, such as tagging graffiti or putting up posters, while others appeared to be amateurish or unskilled in their roles. However, not all the recruits were unsophisticated. Several engaged in more serious activities, including intelligence collection and attempts to recruit others– sometimes even targeting their own family members to expand the network.

Consider the case of father and son, Bassem and Tahrir Safadi, residents of the Druze village of Mas'ade, who were arrested for spying on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force. At the request of his father, Tahrir would allegedly collect information on IDF movements in the Golan Heights and report to Hussam as-Salam Tawfiq Zidan, a journalist at Al-Alam News Network, an Iranian state-owned news outlet. Zidan, who lived in Damascus and worked for the Palestine division of the Quds Force, is accused of requesting Bassem and Tahrir to take photos of troops, tank movements, equipment, and more.

One of the most serious plots Israel thwarted is the 2024 assassination plot against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and former Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar. Moti Maman, a businessman with connections to Turkey and Iran, allegedly travelled to Turkey and Iran twice to meet with Iranian intelligence officials to further the plots against Netanyahu, Gallant, and Bar. Maman was also allegedly directed to intimidate Israeli civilians working for Iran who had failed to complete their missions, to find Russians or Americans who could be tasked with assassinating Iranian dissidents in the United States and Europe, and to attempt to recruit a Mossad officer to act as a double agent. Before leaving Iran for the second time, Maman received 5,000 euros from the Iranian intelligence agents for attending the meetings. According to the Shin Bet, Iranian officials viewed the assassination plots as acts of revenge for the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.

In total, The Washington Institute has documented 39 known Iranian plots in Israel from 2013-2025, 31 of which involved Israeli nationals, the rest involved Palestinians or other non-Israeli citizens. Several of these plots had multiple perpetrators, bringing the total number of Israeli participants in those 31 cases to more than 45 individuals. According to the National Public Diplomacy Directorate, indictments have been filed against 35 Israeli citizens involved in these cases. The age of the perpetrators ranges from 13 to 73, with over half in their teens or twenties. The individuals recruited came from a range of backgrounds, such as Azerbaijani or the Caucasus region, and the targets of their espionage efforts included both security infrastructure and broader social vulnerabilities, including the Iron Dome, government officials, Muhane Yehuda market, IDF bases, nuclear scientists and facilities, and malls and hospitals. The wide breadth of targets illustrates how Iranian intelligence sought to exploit financial, ideological, and personal incentives to build influence inside Israel.

Subscriber+Members have exclusive access to the Open Source Collection Daily Brief, keeping you up to date on global events impacting national security. It pays to be a Subscriber+Member.

Iranian Minister of Intelligence Esmail Khatib described Iranian espionage and sabotage plots in Israel as a key part of Iran’s broader war against Israel. "The Zionist regime must confront a strategy of internal aggression within itself,” he said a month after the 12-day war concluded, “and just as our armed forces' effective missiles compelled them to halt [the war], all intelligence and security agencies are also exerting effort, and in recent days, you have seen they were forced to conduct briefing sessions to counter the infiltration of intelligence services within the Zionist regime."

In response to Iranian recruitment efforts in Israel, the Shin Bet, in partnership with the National Public Diplomacy Directorate, launched a nationwide public-awareness campaign titled “Easy Money, Heavy Price,” to warn Israelis against spying for Iran. Running across radio, online platforms, and social media, the campaign warns that even modest payments from Iran, roughly $1,500, can result in severe consequences. The ads note that some who accepted money from Iran are now in prison, and that assisting Tehran can carry penalties of up to 15 years in jail.

Still, it's important to contextualize these plots. None came close to matching the level of operational complexity, strategic impact, or tradecraft displayed by Israel in its operations against Hezbollah or Iran. While Israel slowly vets and trains its potential recruits, the Iranians engage in shotgun recruitment online, with few recruits going to meet their handlers in places like Turkey or for training in Iran. The two sides are operating on completely different levels of intelligence capability and sophistication. Nevertheless, the Israeli authorities have treated these cases with appropriate seriousness, underscoring the potential long-term threat posed by Iran. “The war has not ended. We are in a state of temporary pause,” the head of the IRGC’s intelligence organization, Brigadier General Majid Khademi, warned last week. Iranian Intelligence Minister Khatib made his plans clear, calling for an “aggressive internal strategy” against Israel so that Israeli security agencies are forced to “confront a strategy of internal aggression” by Iranian agents within Israeli territory.

Alongside Israel’s demonstrated ability to penetrate Iran, the country’s security agencies now believe they will have to step up their game to counter Iranian spying in Israel. The public media campaign is surely just the beginning of a broader counter-espionage effort. What they have seen in the past year, Israeli officials maintain, represents a far greater espionage threat than anything they have seen before.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Lies, Flattery, and Land-Grabs: Putin’s Tactics in Ukraine

OPINION — “The reason why I still remain pessimistic is that everything that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin says is he still wants those four territories…Eastern Ukraine. He hasn't achieved that yet. And he wants Ukraine to be at least subjugated to Russia, because he doesn't think that Ukraine's an independent country or independent nation. Ukrainians are just Russians with accents. That's his view. I've heard him talk about it personally. I've been in the room when he talks that way. And maximally he wants to bring it all into Russia. So, tragically, I think the only way he negotiates seriously is when he's stopped on the battlefield and his armies cannot march further west.”

That was Michael McFaul, President Obama’s Ambassador to Russia (2012-to-2014), speaking with Katie Couric August 18, on YouTube. McFaul, a Russian expert, is today a professor at Stanford University and Director of its Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

In the 53-minute conversation, McFaul provided a background to the Ukraine war, shared his views on the relations between Putin and President Trump, and talked about the possible future when it comes to the NATO and European Union nations and the United States.

Early in their conversation, McFaul provided an interesting background to the past and current fighting which has been taking place in eastern Ukraine, adjacent to Russia.

“So there are four regions that most of the fighting has been taking place,” McFaul said, “In each of those four regions [they] are partially occupied by the Russians today.”

Two of the four regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, together form what’s called the Donbas. Russia holds all of Luhansk and 75 percent of Donetsk. The other two regions are Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, where Russia has about 70 percent of the land.

McFaul said, “Two years ago Putin held a big ceremony where he said these new four regions are now part of the Russian Federation in addition to Crimea, which he annexed back in 2014…So five regions of Russia, five states if you will of the Ukrainian country Putin has already, you know, annexed.”

“On paper,” McFaul continued, Putin “had a big ceremony, there's parades, and the Kremlin and they say he had all these fictitious leaders from these places saying you're now part of Russia, right, but de facto on the ground in reality he doesn't control any of those places 100%.”

McFaul explained the “Donbas is rich in minerals. It's the industrial base of the country. So I think it's like eight or nine percent of the [Ukraine] population…but it's more like 15 percent of

the GDP [gross national product] of the entire country. So it would be a tremendous loss to Ukraine. That is true. Also, half parts of it have been occupied de facto by Russian surrogates

since 2014. So another important thing to realize is that once that happened, many hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians left that territory. They're living all over the place. I have friends from those regions that are living in Germany, living here in the United States, and living in parts, other parts of Ukraine.”

McFaul tied the Donbas to what happened when Trump met with Putin in Alaska on August 15, saying, “We never really got a good readout from what happened in Alaska, but to the best of our understanding, what Putin asked for in Alaska, pretty audacious. He said, Donbas, that's two of those regions, right? That's up in the northwest corner, northeast corner. He said, Mr. President, convince Zelensky to leave Donbas. Remember Ukrainian soldiers and Ukrainians now hold parts of Donbas as we speak…It's Ukrainian held territory and Putin says you got to convince Zelensky to give me those two regions and in return I will stop fighting in those other two regions that I just mentioned. Right? Kherson and Zaporizhzhia…So that's his deal.”

McFaul went on, “That's his offer. And the Ukrainians, you know, I talked to many Ukrainians afterwards. I mean, this is nonsense from them. The idea that they would give up territory that hasn't even been conquered is just a non-starter. But that's what Putin asked for.”

McFaul also set out what he thought the Ukrainians might settle for, while making clear Zelensky had never said it directly.

“I think,” McFaul said, “the part [of Ukraine] that was occupied since 2014 [Crimea, small sections of the Donbas] is a part that Ukrainian people and President Zelensky could live with giving up. Again, I want to stress, they're not going to recognize it as part of Russia, but they could recognize that they will only seek reunification through peaceful means. That's the language...That means that in reality it would be under Russia, you know, as long as Putin's in power.”

McFaul added, “But they're only going to do that if they have some guarantee from the West that by doing that they get something in return for their security. And so when you hear this phrase ‘land for peace,’ the Ukrainians keep saying, well, yeah, you guys keep asking us for land, but you never say what the peace part is. And that is what the conversation [Trump with Zelensky with European leaders] at the White House today [August 21] is, I think, principally focused on.”

Before talking about the Trump/Putin relationship, McFaul gave some interesting personal background about the Russian President.

“I can tell you Putin is an effective interlocutor,” McFaul said, “He is an effective speaker. He will go on and on about Russian history. He'll spin it in his own way. And if you don't know, you know, what happened in the 15th century, and even I don't, you know, so most presidents don't, it's hard to follow. In one meeting with Obama, he [Putin] went on for 58 minutes in the beginning of the meeting before President Obama even had the chance to speak. So that's the way he rolls. I just fear that Trump accepted his, you know, perverse notion of history.”

I saw an example of this side of Putin four years ago, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when a friend suggested I read a 10-page essay published by the Russian President on July 12, 2021, entitled, On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. It can still be accessed on Putin’s website.

Putin began it by writing, “During the recent Direct Line [a TV question-and-answer session with Putin] when I was asked about Russian-Ukrainian relations, I said that Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole. These words were not driven by some short-term considerations or prompted by the current political context. It is what I have said on numerous occasions and what I firmly believe. I therefore feel it necessary to explain my position in detail and share my assessments of today's situation.”

Putin continues to push that idea, as he did on August 16 in his joint press conference with Trump in Alaska, when he described Ukrainians as “a brotherly people, no matter how strange it may sound in today’s circumstances. We share the same roots, and the current situation is tragic and deeply painful to us. Therefore, our country is sincerely interested in ending this.”

At one point in their conversation, Couric asked McFaul, “Do you think that Donald Trump is being played by Putin?”

McFaul answered: “Honestly, I think he [Putin] thinks of Trump as being just a really weak leader and with a little bit of praise and a little bit of, you know, repeating things that are false

that Trump wants to hear, he can win him over…So in Alaska, Putin said, ‘I would have never invaded Ukraine had you been president.’ And that's exactly what Trump wanted to hear.”

McFaul went on, “And then behind closed doors, as we learned later in his conversation with Sean Hannity, Putin went on and on about how the 2020 elections was stolen because of mail-in ballots, because of mail-in voting, right?”

Subscriber+Members have exclusive access to the Open Source Collection Daily Brief, keeping you up to date on global events impacting national security. It pays to be a Subscriber+Member.

I studied the Fox Hannity August 15 interview where Trump spoke of “one of the most interesting things” Putin had told him, which was, “Your [the U.S. 2020] election was rigged because of mail-in voting.” Trump then continued. “He [Putin] said mail-in voting, every election. He [Putin] said, no country has mail-in voting. It’s impossible to have mail-in voting and have honest elections.”

McFaul’s response to Trump’s description to Hannity of that portion of his exchange with Putin reflected what other Americans commentators have said.

“I just listened to the President [Trump] talk about that [Putin’s view of the 2020 election],” McFaul said, “and I just can't believe that he [Trump] would be so gullible. Honestly, I guess I should get used to it by now. But what an absurd thing for him [Putin] to claim…How does Putin know that that happened [in the 2020 election]? And no credible American organization, no investigative journalists have uncovered that. But somehow mysteriously the president of Russia knows that it was stolen because there was mail-in voting. And yet the President [Trump] just repeated that and that's how Putin has won him over.”

Three days later, on August 18, Trump messaged on Truth Social: “I am going to lead a movement to get rid of MAIL-IN BALLOTS…We are now the only Country in the World that uses Mail-In Voting. All others gave it up because of the MASSIVE VOTER FRAUD ENCOUNTERED.”

In fact, as reported by Politifact, a Sweden-based organization, Supporting Democracy Worldwide, in an October 2024 report found that at least 20 countries other than the U.S. allow some form of mail-in voting, including Austria, Australia, Japan, India, Canada, Ireland, Greece, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Towards the end of the interview, McFaul said there were two major things he hoped for.

“One,” he said was “the security guarantee that we've been talking about where European soldiers are deployed on Ukrainian territory to help keep the peace. Peacekeepers, you

know, tripwire. I don't really like that word tripwire, but where they're there to just keep that border, right?... And you go up to the border and you see all the soldiers there and you see the barbed wire that keeps the peace.”

The second thing McFaul hoped for involved “about $300 billion dollars of Russian central bank assets and other Russian assets that are in our banks. They were correctly, brilliantly frozen by the G7…back in 2022,” after Putin invaded Ukraine.

McFaul said, “The next move, those assets have to be given to Ukraine. Americans don't want to pay for reconstruction. Europeans don't want to pay for it. That's money is sitting right there.” It would be used, McFaul said, as “part of a sweetener” for Zelensky because “he's got to have something else to give the Ukrainian people” to keep fighting against the Russians.

McFaul’s closing point is worth remembering.

Referring to the NATO allies at the White House with Zelensky, McFaul said it should “remind everybody that Moscow, neither the Soviets or the Russians, have never attacked a NATO

country. So NATO expansion has helped to keep the peace especially in places like the Baltic states. But also NATO has never attacked the Soviet Union or Russia. And so we shouldn't buy into this argument that it's a threat to Russia. It's not a threat to Russia…We have to think about NATO as an alliance that preserves the peace rather than causes conflict.”

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

It’s Time to "Fight Like Hell" for Ukraine, Not Capitulate

OPINION — By now, much of the world has increasingly started to truly understand just how far Russia’s Vladimir Putin is from Ukraine and the West when it comes to wanting peace. The world has watched in horror as Putin’s military savages Ukraine’s cities, homes, schools, and hospitals. Every day brings new footage of children pulled from rubble, of civilians killed in missile strikes, of infrastructure bombed not for strategic value, but for the sole purpose of breaking Ukraine’s will. And yet—amid this brutality—some in the West continue to push for Ukrainian restraint, for a stop to the fighting on Russia’s terms, and for concessions that reward invasion with territory and more. Are we really going to let parts of Ukraine be gobbled up and crushed while lecturing its people about compromise?

Enough. It’s time to shift from timid appeasement to strategic dominance. That means helping Ukraine win.

Let’s be clear: helping Ukraine win does not mean rolling into Moscow. It means driving Russian forces out of Ukraine’s sovereign territory, restoring borders, and crushing the Kremlin’s ability to wage aggressive war. It means showing the world—especially Russia and China—that democracies won’t fold when authoritarian powers try to redraw maps by force.

Today, Russia’s forces are grinding forward in eastern Ukraine. They’re threatening key cities like Pokrovsk, gaining psychological momentum and physical ground. Their industrial war machine, now increasingly operating at scale, churns out killer drones and missiles with near impunity. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s defenders are struggling to hold the line, their supplies thin and their populations and cities vulnerable.

This must stop. The West has the tools to shift the war’s balance and, thereby, also re-position the terms of negotiations.

And this should appeal to the U.S. president who likes negotiating from a position of strength--with real teeth--that sets up an actual negotiated deal versus an endless series of meetings, threats, and peace plans, all while Ukraine bleeds and Putin makes gains at home and in Ukraine. And while China's Xi watches.

And here's a vital point: just talking about these measures shifts the strategic landscape, which occurred when the U.S. president said he was displeased with Putin and was going to enact secondary sanctions on Russia’s oil sales several weeks ago.

If the West shows that it’s truly serious, then even before the first missile flies or sanction bites, the pressure changes. Negotiations would no longer be about what Ukraine must give up, but what Russia must stop doing if it wants to survive economically and militarily. That’s how we change the West's and Ukraine's negotiating strength.

Marching Orders

Let’s start with the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets sitting in Western coffers. Right now, we allow the interest from that money to support Ukraine. That’s a timid half-measure. Instead, seize the principal—yes, all of it—over time for Ukraine’s war fighting, even greater arms industrialization, including for Western weapons manufacturers and suppliers to Ukraine, and eventual reconstruction. Ukraine should not have to beg for bullets while Putin builds still more drones and bombs, even if it is with money from his dwindling reserves and oil sales.

Second, flood Ukraine with advanced air defense systems—Patriots, IRIS-Ts, SAMP/Ts—and establish partnerships with Western defense manufacturers to scale up weapons production on European and U.S. soil in a substantial and even more rapid way. Some efforts have started; now it’s time to turbocharge them. Protect Ukraine’s people, skies, cities, and infrastructure with urgency—not over years, but in months or less.

Third, end the restrictions that prevent Ukraine from striking targets inside Russia. Right now, many of Moscow’s war factories, command and control facilities, logistics hubs, and more operate untouched—safe in the knowledge that Western-supplied weapons can’t reach them. That’s a strategic gift to the Kremlin. Let Ukraine hit back. Let Russia feel the ramifications of its monstrous violence and aggression.

Germany, for example, has long-range Taurus cruise missiles—precisely the type of weapons Ukraine needs to take out heavily defended targets inside Russian-occupied territory as well as Russian supply lines, command and control locations, and key choke points, such as bridges. Berlin has offered to help Ukraine develop long-range capability, but won’t supply the Taurus directly due to fears it could be used on Russian soil. Enough. Send the missiles. Give Ukraine the range, precision, and firepower to make continued Russian brutality and escalation come at a steep cost.

Fourth, oil—Putin’s lifeblood. Russia’s war machine runs on fossil fuel revenue. The West’s oil price cap has been riddled with loopholes and weak enforcement from the start. It’s time to fix that. Impose debilitating secondary sanctions and tariffs on every country that buys Russian oil in large quantities or above the price cap—without exception. No more free passes for China, India (against which Washington has imposed additional tariffs beginning later this month), NATO member Turkey, or any others, including European nations. Slash the price cap. Reduce the volume that can be sold. Make every barrel of oil that Moscow sells return even less with which it can kill Ukrainians.

And fifth, harshly go after Russia's economy across the board. As Ukraine’s Presidential Office Head, Andriy Yermak, recently argued in The Washington Post, the West must disconnect Gazprombank from SWIFT, and cut off Russia’s access to the international financial system if it really wants to change the ballgame. Also, target Rosatom, Roscosmos, and every other state agency enabling Russia’s war economy. Squeeze them out of global markets. Shut down dual-use technology transfers, and prosecute those enabling Russian logistics and cyber operations, including crypto infrastructure providers.

Teaching All Authoritarians a Lesson

Predictably, Russia will forcefully lash out. There will be even more aggression against Ukraine, and nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction saber-rattling, as well as increased "gray zone" attacks, cyber strikes and campaigns, information operations and propaganda, and much more.

Putin thrives on fear. But if we give in to it now, such as with one-sided territorial and other concessions on Putin's terms, we will pay much, much more later—in Ukraine, in Taiwan, in other parts of Europe, including the Baltics, and beyond.

The lesson to dictators must be this: war, rape, child abductions, torture, and genocidal conquest will not be tolerated. There will be powerful, punishing consequences and you will lose.

It’s time to stop hiding behind “avoiding escalation.” Russia escalated years ago when it invaded Ukraine not once but twice. It continues to escalate daily with every missile strike on civilians, every drone attack on power stations and other infrastructure, every load of kidnapped children taken to be “re-educated” and adopted in Russia.

We must make Putin pay the costs--gargantuan costs--that come with carrying out a war and brutality, thereby compelling him and his supporters to reel back and suffer, and causing other authoritarians and dictators considering a similar path to see their dreadful fate too.

History does not reward those who counsel surrender and accept an ill-conceived and dangerous precedent in the face of evil (e.g., Neville Chamberlain). It remembers those who fought back—and those who helped them win. Ukraine still has the will to fight. What it needs is for the West to match that will and action. Fight, fight, fight, as the U.S. president likes to say — and help Ukraine win.

This is the moment. No appeasement. No more half-measures. No more fear.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

We'd love to let you see this week's Dead Drop - the very best national security gossip (so says us) - but you have to provide credentials to get access. Not a Subscriber+Member? Don't worry, we hear it's easy to fix that.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Saudi Crown Prince Prepares for a Washington Reset — With Trillions at Stake

EXCLUSIVE EXPERT INTERVIEW -- Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is expected to visit Washington this November according to sources cited by Bloomberg, as the two countries work to finalize details around the hundreds of millions of dollars in business deals that were signed during the U.S. president’s visit to Riyadh in May.

Though the White House hasn’t publicly confirmed the meeting, it would mark the Crown Prince’s first visit to the U.S. since the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, and is expected to focus primarily on commitments to invest in artificial intelligence, defense and energy as well as regional stability concerns.

Beyond the business though, analysts say the meetings need to further deepen trust between Saudi Arabia and Washington at a time when alliances are having a significant impact in every region of the world.

“The time may well be coming when the U.S. and China will face off and we will need to ask our Gulf partners to stand with us in that tough moment,” former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI Norm Roule. “To do this, we need closer and more regular visits by the Saudi Crown Prince, as well as the Emirati President of the United Arab Emirates Mohammed bin Zayed.”

In a Cipher Brief exclusive expert interview, we asked Roule, who now works as an energy analyst and routinely travels to the Middle East for high-level talks with officials, about framing realistic expectations for a possible November visit.

Norman T. Roule

Norman Roule is a geopolitical and energy consultant who served for 34 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing numerous programs relating to Iran and the Middle East. He also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at ODNI, where he was responsible for all aspects of national intelligence policy related to Iran.

The Cipher Brief: What do you expect will be the key issues on the table during this meeting in November at the White House, if it does indeed happen?

Roule: The purpose of the trip is to complete the multiple commercial, economic, defense, and energy agreements developed during the unprecedented meetings by President Trump, U.S. cabinet ministers, and several dozen senior U.S. business leaders in the Kingdom in May 2025. These deals are viewed as socially and economically transformational agreements by the Kingdom. For the U.S., these deals will bring decades of valuable commercial engagement, worth somewhere between USD 600 billion and USD 1.5 trillion in trade to the U.S. The Crown Prince will travel to the U.S. as Prime Minister and a guest of the White House which requires a different protocol than in 2018. The schedule will likely be more formal. I would expect his visit, therefore, to be focused on the White House, Congress, and the Department of Commerce.

The Cipher Brief: We saw a number of agreements signed during President Trump’s visit to Riyadh in May, as you mentioned. How would you expect those agreements to be furthered during this trip? In other words, what would success look like in November?

Roule: For the U.S., it will be easy to look to the financial size of each deal, the number of jobs each brings, and where, and so on. Indeed, that’s important and I expect policymakers will cite these achievements. But we should also think about this architecturally. What will these investments mean to the associated industries of each country in the long term? The real benefits lay in the answer to that question because here we see how the success will transform the societies of each country.

Beyond business, the trip needs to deepen the relationship to allow us to turn to each other on other issues in the future. Events – good or bad – are all sitting on the horizon. They are best managed with partners we trust who are seen as stabilizing actors. The best way to build trust is to increase the frequency of contact between our various leaders.

The existing process of semiannual strategic dialogues is useful, but more of this is needed to build the trust and confidence needed to respond to the challenges our countries now confront. The time may well be coming when the U.S. and China will face off and we will need to ask our Gulf partners to stand with us in that tough moment. To do this, we need closer and more regular visits by the Saudi Crown Prince, as well as the Emirati President of the United Arab Emirates Mohammed bin Zayed.

Over the last decade, Gulf leaders have become routine players on the world stage. For example, over the last three years, around fifty world leaders have visited Riyadh, including those of the U.S., China, Russia, and India. Riyadh has hosted summits of leaders from Africa, Central Asia, the Caribbean, the GCC, the Arab League, and Islamic countries. The Crown Prince himself has visited around ten countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. And it was no coincidence that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy called the Saudi Crown Prince in the build-up to the meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin in Alaska.

The bottom line is that the issues we each confront, the investments we are making in each other, and the scale of our respective security commitments requires the sort of communication and relationship that can best be achieved by frequent personal interaction between Saudi leaders and our own public and private sector officials here in the U.S.

The Cipher Brief: Let’s go back to the May 2025 deals for a moment. How have follow-up discussions proceeded since those deals were announced? And beyond high-tech and energy, what other sectors of trade do you consider essential to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia?

Roule: We should look at this in two parts. First, Gulf and U.S. private sector partners have continued to meet. At least a half dozen major agreements have been concluded since May. In terms of the official management of the commercial and technical agreements, my understanding is that the Trump administration remains fully committed to doing whatever it can to fulfill the promises made by the President. In fairness, these deals are complicated, and the Department of Commerce has had quite a bit to do over the summer with tariff deals, but I expect the major issues will be sorted by November.

In terms of other sectors, it may not be the first thing that comes to mind, but we and the Saudis have significant shared interests in mining and critical minerals. Cooperation between Washington and Riyadh in the mining sector has grown significantly in recent years. It is a subject that touches national security, economic, energy, industrial development, China, Africa, private/public sector partnerships, state capital deployment, and other strategic issues that cut across government departments.

Mining license issuance has more than doubled in the Kingdom in the first half of this year alone as the Kingdom seeks local and foreign sources of lithium, copper, nickel, and other minerals needed to build renewable energy systems. This issue hasn’t been lost on the Trump administration, which signed an MOU on mining and mineral cooperation during the President’s visit for joint exploration, processing, and the integration of critical mineral supply chains essential for our manufacturing, defense technologies, and renewable energy sectors. The hope is that by aligning Saudi Arabia’s largely untapped mineral wealth with U.S. technology and training, the Kingdom will achieve its Vision 2030 goals while diversifying its supply chain by reducing China’s hold on critical minerals.

I don’t expect many surprises from the meeting in November, but I do think we should expect the Trump administration to be forward leaning in terms of engagement. We may see an expansion in the sale of significant military technology. If the U.S. believes the region needs to play a greater role in this area, sooner or later, we will need to sell them a military deterrent against Iran. If we can sell advanced military technology to Israel to deter Iran, many will reasonably argue that there is no reason why we shouldn’t be selling the same technology to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

The Cipher Brief: On the foreign policy front, with the ongoing Israeli operation in Gaza, how might the current Saudi role in Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese issues play out during the November trip?

Roule: The world can change many times between now and November, but at present, the visit is not expected to have any connection to Israel or the Palestinian issue. In terms of Saudi foreign policy in that area, it has been robust. The Saudis have maintained their posture as the leading diplomatic actor in the region, a difficult challenge given the intensity of the Gaza humanitarian issue, the complexity of Syrian and Lebanese politics, and the many different viewpoints within the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council. But I think we can point to several examples of successful Saudi foreign policy that are consistent with long-standing U.S. foreign policy goals.”

First, on Palestine, the Saudis played a leading role in a recent Arab League statement calling on Hamas to disarm and transfer control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority in a two-state solution with Israel that also calls for a freeze on Israeli settlement expansion. Riyadh recently signed several agreements with the Palestinian Authority in which it will assist with human resources development, education curriculum development, and the establishment of an electronic system by which Palestinians can access their payments from and administrative engagement with the Palestinian Authority. Seemingly mundane, this will allow reforms in areas that many have claimed have promoted the worst form of extremism and even terrorism within the Palestinian territories. The Kingdom has also committed $300 million to infrastructure assistance for Gaza and the West Bank.

On Syria and Lebanon, Riyadh has engaged both politically and economically with Beirut and Damascus for months and in close cooperation with Washington. It is no secret that the Saudis have sought to reduce Iran’s influence in these countries and see the revival of the Lebanese and Syrian economies and establishment of stable governments in these countries as the keys to doing so. Riyadh encouraged the Trump administration to lift sanctions on Syria and sent its investment minister, along with a number of business professionals to Damascus, accompanied by an offer of commitment of more than $6 billion in investment to spur Syrian employment. Riyadh and Doha also paid off Syria’s outstanding World Bank loans, enabling more funding to Damascus from that institution. This consistent attention to stability in the Levant has huge potential for the entire region and deserves our strongest support.

The Cipher Brief: We always close with a question on the Saudi economy and oil. Give us a quick run through on the status of the economy, its strengths, weaknesses, and near-term outlook.

Roule: Despite the downturn in oil prices and intense regional competition for foreign investment, the Kingdom’s economy is doing relatively well. The loss of revenue will delay some projects, but the Kingdom’s overall modernization strategy and the main projects seen as crucial to achieving that strategy remain unchanged. This unwavering focus and the level of planning behind each project – and some recent cost cutting – has been the secret of their overall success.

In terms of economic details, let me run through some numbers. Inflation is approximately 2.3 percent, unemployment about 2.8 percent, and women make up more than 36 percent of the workforce. Perhaps the best news in the recent IMF report was that youth and female unemployment have been cut in half over the past four years.

Non-oil is now more than half of the economy, in line with Saudi targets. Entertainment has been a particularly strong support. Liberalizing mortgages helped the local construction industry. And this month will see another E-sports world cup in the Kingdom. It remains ironic that the Kingdom has found success in a tourist event that is held during the hottest month of the year by recognizing that this event can only be held indoors. On sports, Riyadh continues to be keen on increasing its role in golf and tennis. I think we will hear more about this in the future as the associated leagues seem to be coming to terms with the Kingdom’s involvement. But Saudi economists won’t be able to take much for granted. Fortunately, Riyadh boasts some impressive economists and technical planners, so I don’t think this will be a significant problem.

Looking forward, oil will continue to account for a significant share of government revenue. This will gradually decline over time, but I suspect not as fast as Riyadh would like. Competition for foreign investment will continue to intensify in the region but such competition is good for everyone.

The challenge is that if revenue is maintained at a respectable level, spending won’t let up. Vision 2030 and Vision 2040 revenue demands probably seem insatiable to ministers. I don’t expect that to change. Deficits are likely to remain a new normal throughout this decade. And Riyadh will keep looking more to the private sector for local investment and liberalizing foreign ownership to encourage foreign investors. Careful borrowing is also expected to become the new normal.

In terms, of specific projects, ministers will work hard to expand local manufacturing in the automotive and semiconductor sectors to meet ambitious Vision 2030 goals. The Kingdom will also need to keep a close eye on giga projects to ensure they don’t drain capital and resources from the broader infrastructure development ecosystem.

All of this will be tough work. But my conversations with the Kingdom’s leaders tell me they are aware of these issues and believe they’re up to the task.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

It’s Time to Show Putin that the U.S. is Serious

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – As we reach a temporary ceasefire in diplomatic progress aimed at ending the war in Ukraine - a war that has cost the lives of more than a million people and has caused billions of dollars in damage – there is still a path we haven’t yet taken. One of maximum pressure. As of now, no agreement has been reached, no breakthrough achieved, no path forward identified, but the events of the past couple of weeks have made a few things crystal clear.

The first is that Russian President Vladimir Putin has no intention of ending the war he started on anything other than his own terms, which have not changed since the war began. Putin wants to occupy all of Ukraine and if that is not achievable through force alone, he will do his bet to turn the remainder of Ukraine into the 21st Century version of Vichy France.

Whatever contrary messaging Trump’s hopelessly overmatched envoy Steve Witkoff may have delivered, there can no longer be any doubt in the President’s mind of Putin’s intentions.

As Russia continues to bomb Ukrainian civilian targets throughout the period of negotiations including before and after the summit in Anchorage, Alaska, President Trump must now see clearly Putin’s love of brutality and his belief that he can win this war militarily.

It should also be clear to President Trump that his administration made a tactical and perhaps strategic blunder by granting Putin a meeting on U.S. soil with no concessions by the Russian side agreed to in advance. The U.S. move allowed Putin to end his diplomatic isolation, get a photo opportunity on U.S. soil for his constituents at home and seemingly disregard his history as an indicted war criminal.

In Putin’s mind, the summit was a meeting of equals and it was represented as such in the Russian press. This, despite Russia being a superpower only in that it possesses a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons. The U.S. is a superpower economically, militarily, and culturally. These are the reasons why Anchorage was a big win for Putin and an embarrassment for the U.S. But we can still fix this.

The White House meeting that followed the Trump-Putin talks, was an impressive display of allied solidarity that included Ukraine and senior European leaders. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky showed that he had learned some lessons from his previous visit to the Oval Office, this time, frequently and effusively praising President Trump and thanking him for the support the U.S. has provided since Russia’s full-scale invasion began.

Other NATO allies have clearly studied the playbook that Putin uses when manipulating Trump, managing to charm the U.S. president as they did during the NATO summit in the Netherlands earlier this summer. One hopes that President Zelensky and the other leaders effectively explained to President Trump the impossibility of Ukraine being able to accept Putin’s territorial demands, which aren’t only illegal under the Ukraine’s constitution but in Donetsk, they would mean abandoning carefully prepared defensive positions and the abandonment of over 200,000 Ukrainians to Russian occupation. For many, that would be a death sentence or rapid deportation to Russia’s gulags.

So far, the U.S. President has tried using flattery and accommodation bordering on appeasement to get Putin to end this war. It has not worked. He humiliated the Ukrainian President in the Oval Office to get him to do something he could not do—agree to what terms that to many, signify a surrender. The U.S. has cut off military and intelligence support to Ukraine. Still the Ukrainians fought on.

There is still time for the U.S. to act in a meaningful way.

The U.S. President has threatened Russia with “crushing” sanctions. But Putin played “rope-a-dope” and instead got a summit and postponement of sanctions for his efforts. President Trump has now set another deadline. The time for deadlines is over. It is time for action. The only path that has not been tried (but has only been threatened) is to put maximum pressure on Putin and the Russian Federation.

Who’s Reading this? More than 500K of the most influential national security experts in the world. Need full access to what the Experts are reading?

Here’s how we get there: first, the President should immediately authorize the advancement of pending legislation in the U.S. Congress on sanctions on Russia and purchasers of Russian hydrocarbon products.

Second, the President should use his authority to advance the sale or “lend lease” of military support for Ukraine.

Third, the U.S. should remove any restrictions on Ukrainian use of weapons systems already provided or already committed to help Ukraine defend itself. Let Ukraine take the war to the Russian Federation and make it visible to the people of Russia what is happening. If Putin doesn’t like it, let him end the war and withdraw from Ukrainian territory.

And fourth, the U.S. should restore maximum diplomatic isolation of Russia and publicly call out Russia as the aggressor in this conflict.

In this context, the success President Trump had ending the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict should be leveraged to reduce Russian influence in the Republic of Georgia, long a bastion of pro-U.S. sentiment but recently put under a cloud of Russian interference.

Let the loss of influence in the Caucasus be added to the list of Putin’s strategic failures. Put it on the list right next to Finland and Sweden joining NATO.

Sanctions alone won’t influence Putin, but sanctions, renewed military and financial support for Ukraine, renewed diplomatic isolation, and strategic leverage on Russia’s periphery might.

The path ahead should be clear to the U.S. President, who must now know that he can’t trust Putin. The Russian president is the enemy of the U.S. in every fiber of his being and it’s time for him to pay the price of his folly.

Disclaimer: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Ordinary Russians are Paying for Putin's Poor Alaska Performance

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE – The Russian state media's triumphant coverage of Vladimir Putin's August 15 meeting with Donald Trump in Alaska tells a familiar story: the great leader Putin has once again outmaneuvered the West, broken his international isolation, and secured recognition as an equal on the world stage. The reality, however, tells a different story entirely.

While Putin's propagandists work overtime to spin the Alaska meeting as a diplomatic victory, the facts reveal a Russian president who traveled thousands of kilometers only to return home empty-handed, his war machine no closer to achieving its objectives in Ukraine than it was before the meeting.

Thanks to what appears to be U.S. planning documents accidentally left on a hotel printer as reported by National Public Radio, we have a clearer picture of what Putin may have hoped to achieve in Alaska, and what he spectacularly failed to secure. The original itinerary included an expanded working lunch with senior U.S. economic officials, including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Steve Lutnik. Their presence would have signaled American willingness to discuss sanctions relief and expanded trade, the economic lifeline Putin desperately needs as his war economy strains under international pressure.

Instead, Putin found himself in abbreviated meetings with a U.S. president who refused to offer any meaningful concessions without concrete steps toward ending the war in Ukraine. No private tête-à-tête, no economic discussions, no promises of sanctions relief - just the same message the Kremlin has been hearing from the West for over three years now: end the war, then we can talk.

The contrast between Putin's return journey and Trump's is particularly telling. While Trump spent his flight consulting with European allies and announced that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would visit the White House just days later, Putin's "diplomatic triumph" consisted of a factory visit in provincial Magadan, and a phone call with his Belarusian vassal Alexander Lukashenko. For a man who once commanded attention on the global stage, this is a remarkably diminished itinerary.

The Kremlin's attempts to highlight increased U.S.-Russia trade since Trump's return to office only underscore Putin's weak position. These modest increases pale in comparison to the massive economic damage inflicted by three years of sanctions and international isolation.

Russia's economy remains fundamentally distorted by military spending, its demographic crisis deepened by mobilization and emigration, and its technological sector crippled by export restrictions.

What Putin received in Alaska was not recognition of Russian strength, but a final diplomatic opportunity that he appears to have squandered through his continued insistence on maximalist demands in Ukraine. Trump's willingness to meet, despite significant domestic political risks, represented exactly the kind of face-saving diplomatic opening that a more pragmatic Russian leader might have seized upon to begin extracting his country from an increasingly costly quagmire.

Who’s Reading this? More than 500K of the most influential national security experts in the world. Need full access to what the Experts are reading?

Instead, Putin's intransigence has left him more isolated than ever. His remaining international partners -China, India, Turkey, and the UAE - continue to engage with Moscow primarily for their own economic interests, not out of respect for Russian power or Putin's leadership. But even these relationships are increasingly transactional, with partners carefully avoiding actions that might trigger secondary sanctions.

The most damaging aspect of Putin's missed opportunity in Alaska is not what he failed to achieve internationally, but what his empty-handed return signals domestically.

Three years into a "special military operation" that was supposed to last days, the Russian president has little to show his population beyond mounting casualties, economic hardship, and diplomatic isolation. His inability to secure meaningful concessions from the United States, even from a president theoretically more sympathetic to Russian concerns, exposes the fundamental weakness of his position.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Putin's war has not made Russia stronger or more respected; it has made the country a pariah state dependent on increasingly costly relationships with authoritarian regimes. His Alaska journey, rather than marking Russia's return to great power status, instead highlights how far the country has fallen from its post-Soviet aspirations to rejoin the community of civilized nations.

The tragedy is that Putin's stubbornness is prolonging a war that is devastating not just Ukraine, but Russia itself. Every day the conflict continues, more Russian families lose sons and fathers, the economy becomes more distorted by military spending, and the country's international isolation deepens. The diplomatic window that Trump opened in Alaska may not remain open indefinitely, and Putin's next opportunity for a face-saving exit may come at an even steeper price.

For ordinary Russians watching state television celebrations of their president's "diplomatic victory," the question should be simple: if Putin won so decisively in Alaska, why is the war still grinding on, why are sanctions still crushing the economy, and why is Russia more isolated than ever? The answer, unfortunately, is that there was no victory at all - only another missed opportunity for a leader increasingly disconnected from both international realities and his own people's interests.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

Allies in a Dangerous Neighborhood: Why the Trump-Lee Summit Matters

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE -- In December 1952, President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower visited South Korea for a first-time presidential summit as the brutal war with North Korea raged. Now, President Donald Trump will soon welcome newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae Myung to Washington for another important summit between the two allies.

Mr. Eisenhower was determined to bring an end to the Korean War, that took the lives of tens of thousands of U.S. and South Korean military personnel and civilians. On July 27, 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed, halting the fighting, although the war continues till this day. The result was a 2.5-mile buffer zone, separating the two Koreas.

The decades that followed the Korean War were tense, with a belligerent North Korea continuing to threaten and provoke South Korea. Despite the provocations, South Korea was able to develop into a model liberal democracy that is now the thirteenth largest GDP in the world.

The summit of these two recently elected presidents is timely. During the past seven months, Mr. Trump has shown the world that he is a proactive peacemaker, determined to help resolve conflicts afflicting a growing number of countries. We saw this with Pakistan and India, with Armenia and Azerbaijan, with Thailand and Cambodia and with the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, and with Serbia and Kosovo and Egypt and Ethiopia. Mr. Trump’s efforts to bring an end to the war in Ukraine and in Gaza continue.

Indeed, this will be an opportune time for Mr. Lee to brief Mr. Trump on his vision for South Korea, both economically and geopolitically. And now that the tariff issue has been resolved with the U.S., the second largest trading partner with South Korea, there should be sufficient time to address the nuclear threat from North Korea.

The Lee Administration has reached out to North Korea, making clear that the new president wants a good relationship but the response from the North has been negative, with the powerful sister of Kim Jong Un, Kim Yo Jung, making clear that North Korea still views South Korea as the enemy, eschewing peaceful reunification of the two Koreas.

Mr. Trump has a special relationship with Kim Jong Un, after the 2018 and 2019 summits in Singapore and Hanoi – and a symbolic meeting in the DMZ so discussing the possibility of Mr. Trump reaching out to Mr. Kim will no doubt be discussed. This would also be a good time for Mr. Lee to explain what his administration will do, in addition to recently stopping broadcasts into North Korea and taking down loudspeakers along the border, to improve relations with North Korea.

North Korea’s new strategic relationship with Russia must be of considerable concern. Their mutual defense treaty with Russia and North Korean troops in Russia participating in Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine is of concern, as is the ballistic missiles, artillery shells and other weaponry the North is providing to Moscow. In return, of course, Russia is providing North Korea with satellite, nuclear, missile and other assistance.

Indeed, Mr. Kim is building more nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them, with the intent to reach the U.S. Their road mobile, solid fuel Hwasong/19, an intercontinental missile, is capable of reaching the whole of the U.S. This is the North Korea we’re dealing with. It’s the North Korea that views South Korea as the enemy, previously threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons against the South.

What should we be expecting from today’s North Korea? The reality is that North Korea’s new relationship with Russia could embolden Mr. Kim and incite him to do something provocative against South Korea, which we’ve seen in the past. And it could escalate quickly.

Given the threat from North Korea, the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea are a trip wire and help to deter North Korea from taking militarily action against the South. North Korea previously acted recklessly, when they didn’t have nuclear weapons or a mutual defense treaty with Russia. It’s important to remember that U.S. extended nuclear deterrence commitments are a core element of our allied relationship with South Korea. This summit will permit the U.S. to double down on these nuclear umbrella commitments.

Currently, South Korea spends close to $1 billion to defray some of the cost for the stationing of the 28,500 U.S. troops in the South. That amount, no doubt, will also be discussed.

The list of issues up for discussion is long. But permitting the new Lee Government to articulate its approach to developments in the South and East China Seas and possible developments with Taiwan will ensure clarity on a myriad of issues affecting both our countries.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Joseph Detrani was first published in The Washington Times.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

Intelligence Reform Should Include an Updated Probability Yardstick

OPINION — The US Intelligence Community (IC) is experiencing tumult and facing critique, and all things point to significant reform, creating an opening for the analytic community to rethink how it articulates probability in a way that is useful for customers and usable for analysts. DNI Gabbard has begun reducing her office’s budget and staff, and recently announced revocation of security clearances for a number of current and former intelligence officers. The Heritage Foundation, which initiated Project 2025, has called for analytic reform. Even British intelligence experts are noting an opening to reconsider our intelligence practices.

Senator Cotton, during DCIA Ratcliffe’s confirmation hearing in January, opened his comments by pointing to recent missed calls: In just the last few weeks, members of this committee—and, I presume, the president—had no forewarning of the New Orleans terrorist attack or the collapse of the Assad tyranny in Syria. The same goes for Hamas’s October 7 atrocity against Israel in 2023. I could give other examples, but suffice it to say we’re too often in the dark.
Cipher Brief authors in March offered a roadmap to rebuild the IC. The Heritage Foundation’s Robert Greenway—who also served on the landing team to prepare DCIA Ratcliffe for his confirmation early this year—has called for comprehensive reform of how the IC produces and presents analysis to the President of the United States.
While some of the tenor now is new, intelligence professionals are used to reform. Indeed, it has been a constant for those of us who spent our careers in the IC. For example, since 9/11 some select changes include the USA PATRIOT Act (2001), Creation of the Office of the Director of National intelligence (2004), the WMD Commission Report (2005), issuance of ICD 203 Analytic Standards (2007), the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (2012), the USA FREEDOM Act (2015), and a host of ODNI modernization initiatives since 2020.

The current calls for change are looking for a grand strategy. My focus here is admittedly small and more practical – we need a simple-to-apply and understand gauge for weighing and communicating probability. Intelligence professionals, and analysts in particular, have long been focused on their own self-reflection and analytic biases; this moment of change presents an opportunity for our analytic community to refine their measurement of, and language around, probability. Rest assured (and I am now just giving an educated guess as a former analyst who knows our culture of self-critique), officers across the IC have scrutinized their analysis of the many misses that Senator Cotton highlighted.

Sign up for the Cyber Initiatives Group Sunday newsletter, delivering expert-level insights on the cyber and tech stories of the day – directly to your inbox. Sign up for the CIG newsletter today.

Part of the challenge is that what analysts get right or wrong is not so binary. It’s based on a spectrum of probabilistic language that they use, often not so rigidly as presented below, but still quite similar. The specturm, as I highlight below, is prone to miscalculation, misunderstanding, and analyst apathy. I think we can do better. The old standard is ready for a refresh that analysts use to the benefit of US national security.

Current Standards – From ICD 203 section 2, a, noted above:

My Proposed Standards:

Author created using AI prompt.

I will not claim here that my proposed approach perfect, and I can hear my former colleagues now, pulling and picking it apart, as they should! I purposely shared this draft with no current or former analysts (which is the opposite of the norm) because I wanted to present a starting point for change. I contend that this new standard would be more usable, more often used, and yes, more accurate.

More Usable – It may come across as flippant, but weighing four categories of probability is just more doable than weighing seven. This assertion becomes less flippant once you look more closely and realize that analysts are being asked to consider probability within 5-percentage point increments. Can any human (or any AI LLM) forecast the likelihood of human behavior to the 55th percentile? No. Are we equipped to give a general range? Yes. The current gauge is asking analysts to split hairs when, instead, we should be bundling those hairs to give a more realistic assessment of whether events will occur.
More Often Used – Altogether, I have written and edited thousands of analytic assessments; overall, a tiny percentage used the ICD 203 framework. The truth is that analysts frequently use words such as “likely” and “unlikely” because that’s more effective than placing specific percentages in their written work. And so, they are quite unlikely (yes, less than 30 percent of the time) to pull out and use the ICD 203 standards. Congressional Oversight might say this is the problem. I would say we have given analysts a tool that is restrictive and cumbersome. Often, the best intelligence work is the analytic email or phone call to the customer sharing insights on the spot; that’s rarely, if ever, conducive to a seven-point probability gauge. And, when you do have time, the tool should work; I have sat in a few debates about whether something was likely or very likely. If the customer simply knew it was likely, and more than probable, it would have done the job.
More Accurate – Analysis is both an art and a science, and it is becoming more of a science with advanced technologies that allow the analysts to focus more on the why and “so what” than they do on the what, when, and where. But when you require exactness (like asking for gauging probability to a five percentage points), your result is likely to be less accurate. I once worked for a senior manager who compelled us to make a call but to avoid “hammer judgments” such as “leader x will win the election” or “leader y will not fall from power.” Such judgments are a sort of overconfidence bias, which is sometimes rooted in overprecision. The job of the intelligence analyst is to forecast, not predict. If you give the analysts a tool with broader probability ranges that they are more likely to use, they will be more likely to make a call, and the call is more likely to benefit from the nuance that surrounds it.

Give AI a Chance

Analysts have an opportunity to use AI in their search for probability. The IC is wrestling with how to adopt AI and whether its adoption is existential. It can be helpful without being overwhelming. Examining the probability of an issue is one good example. If an LLM has access to all the same reporting as an analyst, an easy and productive exercise would be to ask the AI platform the likelihood of X happening, and then analyze that result in comparison to the analysts’ original findings. I asked Chat GPT, based on my proposed probability standards, the likelihood of Russia and Ukraine reaching a peace deal; the response was that it was Possible (30–50%). That’s good fodder for an analytic debate to hone your own findings.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Global AI Leadership Requires More than the Best Models

OPINION — Last month, the White House released its AI Action Plan, followed by an Executive Order aimed at promoting the export of the “American AI technology stack.” These actions come six months after Chinese startup DeepSeek surprise launched its highly capable, open source AI model and undercut confidence in American AI superiority over China.

Taken together, the White House’s approach doubles down on a “race to achieve global dominance in artificial intelligence,” while recognizing that to win this race we need broad global adoption of U.S. AI technology. But it appears the United States has not fully absorbed the lesson of DeepSeek for global technology competition.

Leading U.S. AI companies continue to tout their superior sophistication. But during my time at the White House and State Department promoting U.S. cyber and tech abroad, I observed that most countries aren't looking for the world's most advanced AI. They want AI that’s good enough to meet basic needs and is compatible with their existing systems. They’re looking for simple, turn-key solutions. DeepSeek allows China to provide that – and edge out American companies in dozens of countries.

In acknowledging the need for a “full stack” strategy, the White House has taken an important first step in supporting U.S. industry. But success will rely on whether policymakers can shift their focus away from the most glamorous, frontier tech, and devote energy and resources to a more holistic approach. To reclaim global AI leadership, the United States must become a one-stop-shop for the digital infrastructure AI relies on.

Why the Full Stack Matters

The most advanced AI companies still depend upon basic tech infrastructure, known as the digital stack, to deliver their services to the public. These include subsea cables, data centers, telecommunications, and satellites. Long before leading proprietary models like ChatGPT and Claude entered the picture, the United States and China competed to provide that digital foundation to developing countries.

Typically, American companies offer superior, more secure technology at higher prices than Chinese counterparts, who rely on state subsidies and decades of intellectual property theft to keep costs low. But China’s other comparative advantage has been its integrated solutions: Huawei bundles 5G with other offerings, like cloud services in Egypt or cybersecurity training in Indonesia, which comprehensively address developing countries’ needs. Often, countries decide that cost efficiency and the convenience of a package deal outweigh the risks of Chinese technology, like spying, authoritarian propaganda, and the threat of technology shutdowns as a tool of Chinese government coercion.

With DeepSeek's R1, the Chinese package now offers a powerful open-source large language model to customers already reliant on Chinese systems. For these countries, DeepSeek may be good enough to suit their needs; moreover, it doesn’t require the purchase of more trustworthy and costly digital infrastructure necessary to safely run more advanced American models.

China winning the AI race in the developing world brings significant risk for U.S. tech and commercial leadership as well as national security. Broad adoption of Chinese technology would give Chinese companies – and by extension the Chinese government – vast troves of data and favorable market access, with potential economic, political, and military advantages.

Moreover, as countries’ critical infrastructure - such as power grids, telecom networks, and ports - becomes reliant on Chinese technology, they become more vulnerable to Chinese coercion on matters of security, sovereignty, and trade. China is already using this influence to shape policy norms and technical standards for AI use around the world; it could also become a point of leverage for trade deals, critical mineral access, and port access, as we’ve seen with traditional infrastructure projects.

Building a “Full Stack” Strategy that Meets the Moment

Despite these challenges, the United States still has advantages. Most countries prefer the quality and security of U.S. technology, including our leading AI models. But we need smart policies and an affirmative vision to effectively compete. Previous efforts have suffered from lack of follow-through, and relevant agencies will struggle with understaffing and uncertain resourcing in critical areas.

Last month’s Executive Order provides a good starting point; but as is so often the case, implementation will be the test. The executive order lays out a long missing mechanism for structured coordination between the federal government and U.S. technology companies, whose size, scale, and reach provide crucial advantages as we compete on the global stage – advantages that should be taken into consideration even as we review competition policies at home.

The order also references resources to level the playing field against unfairly advantaged Chinese competitors. Well-timed cybersecurity support, strategic loans from the Development Finance Corporation, access to planned undersea cable buildouts, and foreign assistance can be vital tools for advancing a trusted U.S. tech ecosystem. But these mechanisms can only succeed if the Administration signals to Congress that appropriately resourcing them is vital to advance U.S. interests – a prospect that is unclear at the moment.

Finally, we need to organize cyber, digital, and technology diplomacy as an integrated mission across government to support U.S. business. Last month’s order affirms the role of the Economic Diplomacy Action Group (EDAG) chaired by the Secretary of State to fill this function. But the Secretary of State’s dual role as National Security Advisor means limited bandwidth to carry forward this effort, and the State Department recently laid off many of its AI and technology experts and reorganized its cyber bureau.

A meaningful path forward will require agencies, especially the State Department, to address these gaps either through new hires or rehires, and delegate EDAG leadership to an official with the bandwidth and authority to coordinate disparate efforts across the government.

American AI leadership depends not just on recognizing the need for a “full stack” strategy, but meaningfully executing. If we can truly prioritize digital infrastructure as a foundational necessity for adoption of U.S. AI tech, we can meet this pivotal moment.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

We Blinked When Russia Invaded. Naïve Diplomacy Won’t Fix it.

OPINION -- I am a pessimist when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine situation. Talks at the White House this week between President Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders did nothing to improve my outlook. From my perspective, the meetings felt naive and short-sighted. While I am hopeful for peace, I have spoken to a lot of Ukrainians - and foreigners fighting in Ukraine - who have no intention to stop fighting. And our leaders, eager for a quick resolution, aren't recognizing the challenges on the horizon.

Russia must achieve something that Putin can sell to the populace as “total victory”, or risk angering the Russian people. As the Russian author, Eduard Topol, pointed out on August 11, there is precedent in Russia for a violent overthrow in the aftermath of wars: the return of Russian troops from Europe after the victory over France led to the anti-tsarist uprising in 1825; Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War led to the 1905 Revolution; the desertion of a million Russian soldiers from the Russo-German front during World War I forced Emperor Nicholas II to abdicate and resulted in the February Revolution of 1917; the peace signed by Lenin with Germany allowed the Bolsheviks to execute the entire royal family; the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989 marked the beginning of the USSR’s collapse.

While regime change is probably Putin's central concern, even if a ceasefire occurs on favorable terms (for Russia) what will Russia do with more than a million Russian soldiers, many of whom are former prisoners, returning from the Ukrainian front with post-traumatic trauma and other behavioral issues? The effect will be devastating for Russian society, which has little or no mechanisms for dealing with a crisis on this scale.

The same is true for Ukraine. If a ceasefire happens, there are no guarantees that former Ukrainian soldiers, disenfranchised with the terms of a ceasefire and unwilling to give up “a single inch” of Ukraine to Russia, will not fire their massive stockpiles of one-way attack drones into Russia in a “flight of the valkyries” style assault. The effect would be yielding the “high-ground” to Putin by painting Russia as the victim of unwarranted aggression and violation of the ceasefire.

Couple that with the fact that Ukraine will have to reduce or dismantle their military completely without significant infusions of international capital. If Russia has the high ground and they are being attacked, their invasion of Ukraine will appear justified.

Without a standing army and with Putin portrayed as a victim in the eyes of the international community, our administration will be unlikely to send military aid.

The best case scenario, in my opinion, is pressing for something that looks like a Russian defeat. There is a chance that Putin will be replaced by someone worse. But if so, China will be decisively engaged in crisis management, stymieing their (likely advanced) plans for an invasion of Taiwan. We will also have set a new precedent for what happens when a major power invades their neighbors.

This is a case study for the benefits of early and powerful intervention.

If we had gone all-in when Russia invaded we wouldn't be staring at an existential crisis, and the world would not be contending with the dangers of emboldened (and well-trained) cartels armed with autonomous killer robots threatening global infrastructure.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Hard Truths Regarding an Unjust War

OPINION — Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an illegal and brutal war of aggression. Moscow is solely responsible for unleashing this conflict, and the world is right to recoil from the idea of rewarding Vladimir Putin for his crimes. Ukraine’s defense has been courageous and principled, and global support for its sovereignty is both moral and necessary. Yet even with this moral clarity, after more than three years of war, it is time to face several painful but unavoidable truths. Chief among them: Ukraine is slowly losing this war. Many media descriptions of the war in Ukraine as a stalemate do not reflect battlefield reality. The incremental but continual gains the Russians are achieving in the face of courageous Ukrainian resistance are obvious to anyone closely following events on the ground. The question is, if peace is not achieved now on the best terms possible, will those terms – from Kiev’s point of view – be any better 3-6 months from now? Absent a dramatic shift such as a coup in Moscow or direct NATO – read US – intervention in the war, the answer to that question is surely no.

Putin considers this to be an existential conflict. From the outset, he has made clear that NATO membership for Ukraine is anathema to Moscow. Further, the 2023 annexation of four oblasts (Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk) in addition to Crimea clearly indicates Russia’s minimalist war aims. Sanctions, even secondary sanctions, are unlikely to change him from this course in the near term. Absent an agreement that does not meet those war aims, he is likely to continue the war at least through 2025, by the end of which, the ‘Stavka’ or Russian General Staff, has told him they will have achieved those objectives. Whether those objectives are, in fact, achievable is open to question. What is beyond question, however, is that the Ukrainian military position is slowly eroding. As Putin’s unwillingness to agree to a ceasefire indicates, he believes he has the military initiative and intends to pursue a fight-and-negotiate strategy in order to keep pressure on Ukraine during any talks. Much like Stalin, who prolonged 1944-45 negotiations with the Western Allies over the fate of Poland long enough for Red Army advances to render those discussions moot, Putin is prepared to continue waging war to achieve his goals absent Ukrainian territorial concessions in the Donbas.

A second truth, one that follows from the first, is that the Russians have changed their strategy to enable them to sustain their war effort for some indefinite, but lengthy, timeframe to come. Moscow has long-since put the country on a war-footing. It is now capable of manufacturing much of what it needs to continue the war domestically. And that which it cannot produce at home, it has proven adept at getting either in whole (e.g. Iranian Shaheed drones and North Korean 152 mm artillery shells) or in part (e.g. Chinese electronic components) from its allies. Admittedly, western equipment supplied to Ukraine is generally more capable than that being employed by the Russians. But equipment that is available to the Russians does not have to be better than that which the West has put into Ukrainian hands. It has only to be good enough to allow Moscow to wage war effectively.

It is also evident that Moscow’s military approach to the war has shifted over time as dictated by circumstances in a manner that allows its forces to wage the war more effectively and at relatively lesser cost in human and materiel terms. The ill-considered coup-de-main strategy adopted by the Kremlin at the outset of the war and the brutal massed armors and human-wave “meat” assaults that followed have given way to operations emphasizing more limited incursions by smaller infantry or light mobile forces into weak points along the increasingly stretched Ukrainian front lines. These tactics are, not surprisingly, reminiscent of those employed by the Red Army on a grander scale against the Germans in the period between the 1943 Battle of Kursk and Operation ‘Bagration’ the following year.

At that time, the Soviets launched a series of limited offensive operations intended both to seize territory and to induce the Germans into almost inevitable counterattacks. This gave the Red Army the opportunity to use their greatest advantage – heavy firepower – against the elite Army and Waffen-SS armored ‘fire brigades’ dispatched to restore or, at minimum, stabilize the front lines. The consequent attrition of its mobile reserves left the Wehrmacht unable to respond effectively to the ‘Bagration’ offensive which resulted in the crushing of the German Army Group Center thereby setting the stage for the Red Army’s victorious drive to Berlin. The Germans lost control of the situation in much the same way in which Ernest Hemingway described his path to bankruptcy: ‘First gradually and then suddenly’. Given the comparative disparity in manpower, the longer the war in Ukraine goes on, the greater the risk that Kiev could find itself in a similar situation.

A third hard truth is that given all that has come before and the ruthless nature of the man in the Kremlin, there can be no peace arrangement that absolutely ensures Russia will not resume hostilities at some point in the future. What does, however, appear overstated is the Russian capacity to mount a successful attack on a NATO member. Given Moscow’s inability to conquer Ukraine, a country with about a quarter of Russia’s population and a tenth of its GDP, its prospects for military success against NATO – particularly with the recent commitment by alliance members to significantly increase their defense spending and the unity they have displayed of late in supporting President Trump’s Ukraine peace initiative – would appear remote.

Subscriber+Members have exclusive access to the Open Source Collection Daily Brief, keeping you up to date on global events impacting national security. It pays to be a Subscriber+Member.

It is likely evident to Putin himself that his military is not prepared to take on NATO. His continuing aspirations regarding Ukraine are, however, quite another matter. This means that the fact and form of the “security guarantees’ for Ukraine now being discussed are of critical import if a lasting peace is to be achieved. The Russians have repeatedly said they will not agree to the presence of NATO – which they consider a de facto enemy – on Ukrainian territory. It is less clear whether they would accede to the presence in Ukraine of forces from NATO countries under some other arrangement - perhaps as a ‘coalition of the willing’ - as part of a final peace settlement. This might seem a distinction without a difference in that Moscow would know that any resumption of operations in Ukraine bringing the Russian military into contact with western forces would – even with the US only acting as a ‘back-up’ by providing intelligence, logistical and, perhaps, air support - likely draw the same response from the West as would be the case with NATO forces.

But the fact that western forces would be deployed under something other than a NATO structure could make such an arrangement acceptable to Putin if it resulted in an agreement that makes it possible for him to point to territorial gains as a victory that justifies the exorbitant price his country has paid in blood and treasure for it. What is a virtual certainty, however, is that any acquiescence by Moscow to such an arrangement will – in keeping with usual Russian negotiating tactics - only come about at the last minute, that is after they have wrung every possible concession out of their opposite numbers. In this case, this would be following, or concurrent with, Ukrainian agreement on territorial concessions.

Finally, it must be borne in mind that US objectives in the Ukraine negotiations are not limited to concluding a peace agreement between Kiev and Moscow. As was the case throughout the Cold War, a post-Ukraine US objective must be to create and exploit fissures between Moscow and Beijing. Given the damage Russia has wrought in Ukraine, some will find even consideration of such a shift in approach abhorrent. However, the US does not want to find itself confronting a Russia allied to China if, or more likely when, the looming war with the latter comes to pass. Further, Washington must move with some alacrity in doing so given Xi Jinping’s oft-stated 2027 deadline for his military to be prepared to act against Taiwan.

It has long been evident that this war would end in either a negotiated settlement or a frozen conflict. That moment has arrived. It is now up to Ukraine to determine whether it is willing to enter an inherently uncertain peace arrangement in exchange for the ceding of territory it has sacrificed so much to defend. This is a terrible and unjust choice for Ukrainians to have to make. But it is sometimes necessary to amputate a limb to save a life.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

The U.S. Needs More Patriot Missiles

CIPHER BRIEF REPORTING – On June 23, the U.S. Army used roughly 30 Patriot missiles to defend against an Iranian attack on Al-Udeid, the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East. Iran’s attack was a retaliation for the American strikes – carried out just hours earlier – against Iran’s nuclear program. According to U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine, the engagement included the largest single-day usage of Patriot interceptors “in U.S. military history.” It also highlighted a major challenge for the Pentagon: keeping up with the demand for a hugely popular air defense system.

A week after the Iran strikes, the Trump administration announced a pause in deliveries of Patriots and other weapons to Ukraine, citing concerns that U.S. stocks were dwindling. Pentagon chief spokesman Sean Parnell said the pause was part of a broader review, intended to “create a framework to analyze what munitions we’re sending where, to help the president and secretary of defense make decisions.”

The Army’s FY 2026 budget request includes plans to quadruple its Patriot arsenal — from roughly 3,300 interceptors to nearly 13,800 — and it was made before June’s heavy use of Patriots. In the wake of the successful deployment of Patriots against Iran, Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll likened the Patriots to a “new tip of the spear.”

"You could never have enough PAC-3s," retired Army Lt. Gen. Daniel Karbler said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event last month, referring to the latest model of the Patriot. "It seems like the [combatant commands] line up outside the factory doors when PAC-3s are being produced."

Other key U.S. air-defense systems have been stressed as well. The Army fired more than 150 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile interceptors to defend Israel during its brief June war with Iran, according to The Wall Street Journal. That would amount to a quarter of all THAAD interceptors ordered or set to be ordered by the U.S. military to date.

While the Patriots are used primarily as missile defense for U.S. bases overseas – as in the June 23 launches, which protected the 10,000 Americans at the Al-Udeid base in Qatar – experts say the shortfall is also due to deliveries of Patriots to countries where there are no U.S. military bases.

“We've turned on the spigots [with the Patriots], particularly to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression, but also Israel,” David Ochmanek, a senior defense researcher at RAND and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, told The Cipher Brief. “And our industrial base was not geared up for this level of demand. So, we've been drawing down on our worldwide stocks in order to help these partners and allies defend themselves.”

“It is very effective, it's one of the most tested systems out there, and it's had a very long track record,” Michael Bohnert, a RAND analyst and former U.S. Navy engineer, told The Cipher Brief. “And from the perspective of capacity, it is the most proliferated system of its type amongst all U.S. allies and partners.”

A hot item

While the Patriot has become one the world’s most popular and widely recognized air defense systems, it’s also something of a paradox – a made-in-the-U.S. system that plays almost no role in defending American territory.

The Patriot made its debut during the first Gulf War in 1991, when Iraq rained Scud missiles against Israel and U.S. forces in the region, and Patriot missiles knocked most of the Scuds out of the sky. Ever since, the Patriot’s successes have put it high on the wish lists of military commanders the world over, and the U.S. has deployed, shared or sold Patriot batteries and missiles to Ukraine; to Germany, Poland and other NATO countries; to Japan and South Korea; and to Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

“Patriots are spread out in Asia, Mideast and Europe – we keep them everywhere,” Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, Senior Director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told The Cipher Brief. “Right now, the Middle East is where they're shooting things down aimed at our airfields. I think we understand that you need to have Patriots in place in Asia for a crisis with China. And for now, you need them in place in Europe for Russia.”

The Guardian reported last month that Patriot supplies had dipped to a quarter of the military’s needs. According to the report, the alert prompted Deputy Defense Secretary Stephen Feinberg to halt a pending transfer of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine.

The Pentagon pushed back publicly against the report, but its response was limited to a defense of U.S. overall military readiness; there was no denial of the review, or of the 25 percent figure. Parnell, the Pentagon spokesman, said the U.S. military had what it needed to “defend our homeland,” and that “we're always assessing our munitions and where we're sending them.”

Concerns about a shortfall have spiked as the U.S. deployed more Patriot interceptors to support its spring campaign against the Houthis, and then to beef up defenses at U.S. bases in the Middle East during the recent Israeli and U.S. strikes against Iran.

Gen. James Mingus, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, speaking at the recent CSIS event, called the Patriots "a very stressed force element."

Montgomery said that the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine should have been a wakeup call for Pentagon officials about the need for more Patriots.

“We did not take this seriously right after February 2022 like we should have, or even the next year, and even the year after that,” Montgomery said. “Now we are. Now the Army's like, ‘Hey, we have to build a significant stockpile of Patriots. We need to increase our production rates.’ Three years after Ukraine started, we're beginning to do that.”

Bohnert told The Cipher Brief that decisions on deploying the Patriots involve “risk tolerance” – as in, how much risk can Pentagon planners stomach in certain corners of the globe?

“The question of how many do you need relates to how you view the world,” he said. “So if you want to take risks, and take the perspective that I will put all of my Patriots into one theater of the world in a conflict, you'll get one answer. If I want to maintain a capability everywhere, you'll get a different answer. It's very perspective-based and you could ask three people and get five different answers.”

Ukraine’s moment of need

For Ukraine, the value of the Patriots is hard to overstate. The first U.S.-made Patriot systems arrived in Ukraine in April 2023, and since then, the U.S. has provided three batteries and an unspecified number of interceptors, which have been put to regular use against Russian drones and missiles. Experts say the Patriot is the only system that can defend against Russian high-speed and ballistic missiles.

Asked to give examples of weapons systems that NATO and Ukraine would struggle to replace if the U.S. halted military aid, two Cipher Brief experts with deep experience in Europe singled out the Patriot.

“The Patriot, that will be difficult to replace,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former Commander of U.S. Army Forces in Europe, told The Cipher Brief. “U.S. intelligence obviously has been important. But for me, the air and missile defense is the thing that comes to mind first.”

Doug Lute, a former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, said “high-end missile and air defense” would top the list of Ukraine’s needs, were American support to dry up. “Think of the Patriot missile system, which really doesn't have a European rival,” Lute said. “Systems like that, for which Europe has relied on the United States, would have to become increasingly European-owned and operated.”

The recent pause in U.S. shipments of Patriots came at a critical moment for Ukraine, as Russia was launching its heaviest aerial attacks of the war. Since then, the U.S. has turned to Europe, offering to backfill Patriot systems that Germany and a half dozen other NATO members would send to Ukraine. And the U.S. has ended its pause and offered to send additional Patriots, after President Trump determined – in his words – that Russian President Vladimir Putin “is not treating human beings right, he’s killing too many people, so we’re sending some defensive weapons.”

“They have to be able to defend themselves,” Trump said of the Ukrainians. “They’re getting hit very hard. We’re going to have to send more weapons. Defensive weapons, primarily, but they’re getting hit very, very hard.”

The China factor

As with many current Pentagon concerns, worry over the Patriot shortfall reflects anxiety over a potential conflict with China. U.S. involvement in a war over Taiwan – or any other conflict in the Pacific – would require defending U.S. forces against China’s arsenal of drones and missiles, at sites as spread apart as Japan, Korea, and the U.S. military base in Guam.

“We certainly do not have enough Patriot and other active missile defenses to comprehensively protect our land-based forces in a conflict with China,” Ochmanek said.

Newsweek and others reported that Patriots were moved earlier this year to the Middle East from Japan and South Korea, and that some of these were used to defend against last month’s strikes by Iran on the Al-Udeid Air Base. A China conflict would likely necessitate a flow of Patriot batteries and missiles back to Asia. The U.S. has some 55,000 troops stationed in Japan and another 28,500 in South Korea.

Ochmanek said that in any Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Beijing “would be very concerned to ensure that the United States was not able to bring to bear the full weight of its combat power to defend Taiwan,” and that could mean attacks against U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, Guam, and other parts of the Pacific.

“So, in anticipation of that kind of scenario,” Ochmanek said, “we have been deploying missile defenses to the Western Pacific and would deploy more in the weeks prior to a suspected invasion. They would be defending air bases, land force bases, ports that were used by military facilities, command and control sites that we believe would be attacked. Patriots would be a key component of that defense.”

Bohnert said the China war scenario represents another “risk tolerance” question for Pentagon planners. “If you believe there's going to be a conflict in the next couple of years with China,” he said, “you want a larger capacity right now.”

No easy fix

One thing is clear: restocking the Patriot arsenal won’t happen fast. The U.S. currently produces 600 Patriot missiles per year; Lockheed Martin has said it aims to raise annual output from about 600 to 650 missiles by 2027. For its part, NATO has announced plans to help European nations procure up to 1,000 missiles for their Patriot batteries. And Japan has a contract with Lockheed Martin to produce about 30 Patriot interceptors per year.

“I think even if we threw everything we had at it, we'll be lucky to produce more than 850 Patriots a year,” Montgomery said. “And that's with a lot of work. We are looking at joint ventures with Europeans to build them elsewhere. Japan has a joint venture with us to build some. But it's a very low level.”

Ultimately, Montgomery said that in the race to restock the Patriot arsenal, “the answer is it's going to be everywhere all at once.” As for those “risk tolerance” questions, he and others said that the priorities would likely shift to the Pacific.

“If I would have to predict long-term where we're going to concentrate, it would be in Asia,” he said. “And if we have knocked Iran back on their heels, we might pull back, eventually, the stuff in the Middle East. It's hard to do. Prioritizers would like to pick one theater and hang out in it, but that's not how the world works.”

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

Inside NTS-3: The Satellite Aiming to Reinvent GPS

OPINION — “The need for accurate and uninterrupted PNT (Positioning, Navigation and Timing) has never been more essential to our warfighters who operate in GPS (Global Positioning System)-denied environments. The successful launch of the NTS-3 (Navigation Technology Satellite-3) system is the first step in updating 20th century technology to help address current threats to our national security.”

That was Ed Zoiss, President of the Space & Airborne Systems segment for L3Harris Technologies, speaking August 13, about the successful launch and arrival in orbit of NTS-3, the most advanced U.S. experimental navigation satellite in nearly 50 years, that was designed and led by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) with L3Harris Technologies as prime contractor.

NTS-3 is managed by the AFRL Transformational Capabilities Office in partnership with the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Air Force.

Space Force’s GPS provides critical positioning capabilities to military, civilian, and commercial users around the world. The United States government created GPS for the military in 1973, launched the first satellite in 1978, made the system available to civilians in 1988, and has operated the full system of 24 satellites since 1993.

Today it is freely accessible to anyone with a GPS receiver, which means more than six billion users worldwide, according to GPS World, with an estimated 170 million in the U.S. Every day, GPS satellites aid in air traffic control, banking, farming, cellular networks, and countless other industries, and it is perhaps the space system that most people around the world depend on each day.

However, according to the Air Force, “The rapidly increasing pace of new threats to GPS, such as jamming and spoofing, indicate that agile and resilient approaches to augment the GPS system are needed to maintain users’ access to its critical service.”

The GPS system’s 24 operational satellites are strategically placed in six medium earth orbits (MEOs), at an altitude of approximately 12,550 miles, with three to four satellites in each plane making two orbits a day. This configuration ensures that at least six satellites are visible from any point on Earth at any given time.

NTS-3, is expected to change the architecture for satellite navigation and to deliver more robust PNT capabilities to warfighters.

NTS-3 will carry out some 100 tests over the coming year from near-geosynchronous orbit (GEO), where the satellite orbits directly above the equator at about 22,236 miles above the earth. The satellite's orbital period is close to 24 hours and appears stationary from the ground,

thus giving NTS-3 a clear, unobstructed and distinct vantage point without the interruption of weather or atmospheric distortion.

The NTS-3 program integrates a space-based payload, a reconfigurable ground control segment, and agile user receivers -- all linked by reprogrammable software. This architecture allows for rapid updates across all segments, enabling operators to counter jamming, deploy new signals, and adapt to evolving mission requirements without replacing hardware.

According to an AFRL release, “The [NTS-3] satellite will broadcast navigation signals from its phased-array antenna, which can electronically steer signals to a desired region [on earth] without physically moving the satellite. These signals are created through a digital, on-orbit reprogrammable PNT signal generator, which not only supports legacy signals and advanced signals not currently broadcast on GPS, but also allows new signal updates after launch.”

NTS-3 will test a new digital signal generator, AFRL said, “that can be reprogrammed on-orbit, enabling it to broadcast new signals, improve performance by avoiding and defeating interference, and adding signatures to counter spoofing.” A goal is to make possible the uploading of a signal to the satellite and start transmitting it without having to relaunch the entire satellite.

AFRL also said NTS-3 will also test “the CHIMERA (Chips-Message Robust Authentication) signal authentication protocol, which is designed to jointly authenticate satellite orbit data and measurements of the range between the satellite and user.” CHIMERA provides “an extremely robust protection against GPS spoofing for civil users. Future versions of CHIMERA, or different kinds of signals, can be uploaded to the satellite at any point after launch, based on new knowledge or threat developments on the ground.”

Over the next year, AFRL will conduct a series of demonstrations to assess these technologies in realistic operational scenarios, from countering electronic interference to rapidly deploying new signal configurations in response to emerging threats.

“Because SATNAV (satellite navigation) is critically dependent on precise timekeeping,” AFRL said, “NTS-3 will have multiple atomic clocks and timing sources onboard the satellite that will be used both independently and as an optimized ensemble to allow for automatic clock error detection and correction.”

The NTS-3 Ground Control Segment (GCS), AFRL said, is compatible with the Enterprise Ground Services, an architecture that the Space Forces’ Space and Missile Systems Center is developing, to provide a common system for satellite command and control. “The goal is to move from a portfolio of stove-piped ground systems to a single system that will connect with all Air Force and Space Force satellites, saving millions of dollars by streamlining user training and operations,” AFRL said.

NTS-3 ground control is also planning to leverage commercially-available services such as ground antennas and monitoring receivers to increase opportunities for contact time with the satellite while reducing dependence on already strained government antenna resources.

AFRL is also working with the non-profit MITRE Corp., to develop a reprogrammable software-defined receiver called the Global Navigation Satellite System Test Architecture (GNSSTA). That new receiver will allow users to receive both legacy GPS and advanced signals generated by NTS-3 -- and is of course critical.

Warfighters will be the ultimate beneficiaries of the impact of new navigation technologies and integrated SATNAV capabilities, and any changes to the signal being broadcast from space must be communicated to and coordinated with that user segment. NTS-3 tests will be used to demonstrate new features for warfighters carrying so-called Software-Defined Radios (SDRs), capable of receiving and processing reprogrammable SATNAV signals.

Testing will show whether warfighter SDRs “will be able to access accurate PNT data and enhanced flexible anti-jam and anti-spoof protections,” according to AFRL. “Lessons from the GNSSTA software architecture developed through NTS-3 will pave the way for future DoD major defense programs to successfully connect service men and women to a flexible and resilient SATNAV architecture of the future.”

Much like downloading a new smartphone app, think of what future NTS-3 software updates can bring routinely to future users without the recapitalization effort typically required to upgrade.

This is the future for users of GPS. Hopes are high that NTS-3 will guide us down the right path.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Unity at the White House Sharpens Pressure on Putin

CIPHER BRIEF REPORTING -- President Donald Trump said Monday that he is moving forward with plans to arrange a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in what is being seen as the next crucial step toward bringing an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine.

A meeting at the White House on Monday with President Zelensky and senior European leaders provided a strong show of solidarity, and a striking visual contrast to President Trump’s one-on-one meeting on Friday with President Putin in Alaska, which ended earlier than scheduled and without any public announcements of progress.

On Monday as the White House welcomed Zelensky, along with French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb, European Union President Ursula von der Leyen and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the images signaled a much stronger show of unity among those calling for an end to the killing and a sign that the ball is landing squarely in Putin’s court.

"This looks to me like the beginning of negotiations,” Ambassador Kurt Volker who served as U.S. Special Envoy for Ukraine negotiations from 2017-2019, and as Ambassador to NATO from 2008-2009, told The Cipher Brief. “Putin set out his maximalist position. Now, Ukraine and the European leaders are setting out a much more modest and realistic one and calling for a trilateral meeting to discuss.”

Even though a scheduled press conference between Presidents Trump and Putin was cancelled after the two leaders met on Friday, White House Special Envoy Steve Witkoff characterized the meeting to CNN as a win, saying that the ball had moved forward on convincing Russia to agree to “Article 5-like protections”, describing the guarantees as “game changing.”

Article 5 under the NATO charter, provides for collective defense, meaning an attack against one NATO member can trigger a response by any NATO member - something that has been a non-starter for the Russian president since Moscow’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The idea of a U.S.-supported Article 5-type measure is something that the Trump administration has said will largely be shouldered by the Europeans – with U.S. support – and it signals a lot more pressure on the Russian President to concede on some of his most adamant demands to date.

“Putin is under a lot of pressure,” former senior CIA Officer Glenn Corn told The Cipher Brief. “He's under stress. He understands that he doesn't have the cards.”

Even though the Russian President was not present during talks with Zelensky and European leaders, President Trump made a point to pause talks in order to call the Russian leader, according to European sources. A follow-up meeting between Putin and Zelensky would signal a strong win for President Trump. Not so much for President Putin.

“Putin is unlikely to accept such a meeting if his pre-conditions are not met,” Ambassador Volker told The Cipher Brief. “So, this is just positioning. The real issue will be what happens to Russian supply lines, increasingly targeted by Ukraine, and the Russian economy, which is faltering. I still expect Putin to go along with a ceasefire in place by the end of the year."

In addition to future security guarantees, another key issue on the table is that of land and just how much Ukrainian territory might be ceded to Russia as part of a deal to end the killing.

“Russia is chiefly looking to legitimize territorial gains obtained by force and Ukraine is looking for security guarantees if they are ever to agree to give up territory,” said former 6-time CIA station chief Ralph Goff in an exclusive Cipher Brief interview. “While the Ukrainians will hardly be ready to cede any territory without a Russian boot on it, Zelensky can likely give up territory but only if Russia accepts the Article 5-type" security guarantees.”

While an unpopular realization in Kyiv, some three and a half years into this war, Ukraine lacks the manpower to retake territory that’s been lost to Russia.

“Indeed, they are not able to prevent continuing incremental gains by the Russians albeit at huge cost to the Russians,” said Goff. “Thus, Zelensky can tell his countrymen "Look if you won't allow me to cede territory already lost to the Russians then I need to draft your teenagers to try and get it back."

Some experts, who have long advocated for more – not less – U.S. involvement in helping Ukraine are concerned about just how much land Kyiv will be forced to give up and how that may signal a win for Putin.

“The U.S. and our Allies have not actually even tried to help Ukraine win this war,” said retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges (Ret.), who served as NATO Senior Mentor for Logistics. “We never declared it as an objective or created or implemented policies that would make it so – we’ve barely touched Russia’s ability to export oil and gas and we’ve not touched frozen Russian assets, nor moved all of the military resources needed to help them win.”

Still, there is hope that the solidarity seen at the White House on Monday will be enough to pressure Putin to a deal.

“We shouldn't forget that Monday’s meeting didn't happen without White House concurrence,” said Corn. “They were guests of the United States Government and of the President of the United States. So, Europe, the U.S. and NATO seem unified in a way that we haven't seen in a while.”

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

How Culture Will Impact the AI Race

OPINION — In recent years, senior U.S. Department of Defense leaders have repeatedly emphasized that the U.S. military’s most important asymmetric advantage is not a weapon system or a budget line – it's the ability of our enlisted corps and junior officers to operate autonomously.

This concept, known as mission command, empowers military subordinates to take a commander’s intent and innovate each of the steps necessary to achieve it. This is a philosophy based on trust, initiative, and decentralization, which has repeatedly proven to be decisive on the battlefield.

A recent example of this is how Ukrainian forces, trained extensively by NATO advisers in mission command principles, have been able to adapt tactics in real time, innovate battlefield solutions, and exploit short-lived opportunities much faster than their Russian adversaries. The result is a resilient force able to operate even when communications are degraded and leadership is under fire, which results in dramatically improved tactical success.

This isn’t just a military curiosity. It’s the outward expression of something more profound: a cultural operating system. And that operating system may become just as important in the coming era of AI-enabled competition, particularly between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.

Cultural Operating Systems

In the West, especially in Anglo-American military and corporate cultures, autonomy is rewarded and encouraged. Mistakes made in good faith are often framed as learning opportunities, and initiative is a career accelerant. From early education through professional life, we instill the idea that solving problems independently is a virtue.

In the PRC, the dominant pattern of hierarchical collectivism is almost the opposite. Deep-rooted cultural norms reinforced by the political system strongly discourage independent deviation from the plan. In Chinese culture, errors can carry lasting personal consequences for the individual and even for their family’s honor. In the PLA, stepping outside one’s lane, even for a good reason, can risk professional ruin. In the business and research worlds, the same reflex applies: wait for guidance from the top, execute precisely as instructed, and avoid being the point of failure.

This is not to say there is no innovation in the PRC – there clearly is. But the default behavior in both military and civilian hierarchies is to minimize personal risk by minimizing independent decision-making. That cultural reflex has centuries of reinforcement, and it is amplified by a political system that prizes conformity and punishes deviation, often very harshly.

Of course, these are broad cultural patterns and not absolute, and cultures are adaptable and can change. These deep-seated tendencies influence short- to medium-term outcomes, but things can definitely shift. Western institutions can also lapse into bureaucracy and risk-aversion, while some Chinese firms, particularly in the tech sector, have shown impressive bottom-up innovation. Still, the prevailing norms shape how each system tends to operate under stress.

Why This Matters for AI

At first glance, artificial intelligence might seem like the great equalizer. With enough computing power, data, and engineering talent, any nation can field cutting-edge AI systems. The PRC has invested massively toward that goal, with clear state directives to become the world leader in AI by 2030.

But AI is not a plug-and-play solution. It is a force multiplier, and what it multiplies is the quality of the human decision-making and adaptation around it. To get the most from AI in complex, dynamic situations, you need people who can spot an opportunity the algorithm missed, reconfigure the system on the fly, and take calculated risks without waiting for permission. While humans remain in the loop, AI will amplify the advantage of cultures that reward initiative.

That is exactly what mission command principles train people to do. And this is where a culture that prizes autonomy has the edge.

If the human operators are hesitant to deviate from a directed procedure, even when the situation demands it, AI’s potential will be throttled. If they fear punishment for a failed experiment, they will never push the system to its edge cases, where the real breakthroughs often occur.

In practice, this means AI doesn’t just enhance analysis, it enhances the speed of adaptation. Environments that empower fast, local decisions will see AI act as an accelerant, while those that centralize approvals will see it act more like a bottleneck.

The Battlefield as a Laboratory

We’ve already seen how this plays out in the military sphere. Ukrainian small-unit leaders have improvised drones for new missions while in the field, invented new countermeasures to defeat Russian electronic warfare, and adapted tactics mid-battle without waiting for top-down approval. In many cases, these adaptations have been faster and more effective than any centrally directed plan could have been.

Contrast that with the PLA’s tightly scripted training patterns. Western observers note that even in exercises designed to simulate chaos, Chinese units tend to execute along predetermined lines. The result is a force that can be formidable when executing a well-prepared plan, but struggles to improvise when reality diverges from the script.

As an old American military quip puts it: “If we don’t know what we are doing, the enemy certainly can’t anticipate our future actions.”

In intelligence, logistics, and cyber operations, AI can identify anomalies or even propose courses of action, but deciding what matters and how to respond in the context of a broader scenario is still a human responsibility. Nations that push those decisions to the edge will move faster and adapt better than those that force every choice through a centralized chain of command.

Essentially, in environments that value autonomy, AI shortens the OODA loop, turning rapid detection into rapid adaptation. In centralized systems, where decisions must wait for top-down approval, AI risks becoming just another layer of data without adding real speed or agility.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

A Whole-of-Society Dimension

The connection between military doctrine and societal behavior shares common roots, but is not a one-to-one relationship. The same cultural norms that encourage or discourage initiative in uniform tend to shape how individuals approach risk-taking in business, research, and public service.

Underlying culture shapes how societies approach research, entrepreneurship, and governance in all facets of life, not just military decision-making.

In the U.S., a 24-year-old engineer can quit their job, raise venture funding, and challenge an industry incumbent, often with encouragement from former bosses. In the PRC, the same scenario is far more risky, particularly in strategic areas. Corporate and bureaucratic environments offer very little room for or tolerance of bottom-up innovation.

Of course, there is nuance here. Within the West, different approaches are also potentially traced to cultural considerations. For example, the EU's AI Act, which takes effect in 2025, prioritizes "trustworthy AI" and human oversight, which highlights a Western focus that isn’t purely on speed or bottom-up innovation. And China's success in areas like high-speed rail, quantum computing, and specific aspects of space exploration demonstrates a capacity for rapid advancement within a more centralized framework.

These cultural and social differences subtly shape how cultures use AI, and therefore how quickly each side can integrate AI into complex, adaptive systems.

Strategic Implications

If we accept the idea that cultural operating systems can provide a strategic advantage, several implications emerge:

● Double Down on Autonomy in Training

○ The U.S. and allies should continue to train military and civilian leaders in decentralized decision-making, making it a core competency in both defense and public-sector AI adoption.

● Export the Model

○ Just as NATO’s training transformed the Ukrainian military, mission-command-style education can be exported to partners and allies to improve their adaptability in both military and civil sectors.

● Guard Against Erosion

○ Few things erode autonomy over time like bureaucratic creep and risk aversion. Acquisition delays and corporate risk-management cultures within military commands are constant reminders that this advantage can be lost. Maintaining this advantage will require conscious leadership commitment to rewarding initiative and tolerating (or even encouraging) smart failures. The tech industry has embraced this approach with its “fail early, fail often” mantra.

● Leverage in AI Partnerships

○ When collaborating internationally on AI projects, the West can provide not just technology, but the organizational models that make technology effective under stress.

The Long Game

None of this is to underestimate the PRC’s capacity for technological progress. Beijing can and does produce world-class engineers, scientists, and technologists. It is investing heavily in AI research, infrastructure, and talent. But the cultural and institutional habits that govern how that talent is used are much harder to change. Culture is not destiny, but it is sticky. In fast-moving crises, ingrained reflexes shape how organizations actually perform under stress.

For NATO and Western allies, this is an opportunity. In an era when many advantages are fleeting, cultural operating systems are deeply rooted and can be a durable source of strategic differentiation.

The AI race will ultimately be measured in how quickly organizations can adapt, iterate, and exploit the unexpected. In that regard, the West’s culture of autonomy may prove to be its most powerful and enduring advantage.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Ex-Spy Warns of Case Officer Tactics in Trump-Putin Dynamic

EXPERT Q&A – After Friday’s meeting in Alaska between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, former CIA senior officer and 6-time station chief Ralph Goff breaks down how each leader worked to “case officer” the other and ultimately, who walked away with a strategic advantage, despite no deal being reached. (Our transcript has been lightly edited for length and clarity.)

The Cipher Brief: What was your general assessment of the pros and cons of the meeting between the two leaders in Alaska?

Goff: The summit wasn't the disaster that some feared it would be in Europe or in Kyiv - the capitals where people were waiting anxiously to see what happened. Nothing was really given away (in terms of territory), but it wasn't a success either because we didn't hear details of a follow-on meeting. Remember that President Trump was keen to have a follow-up meeting with President Putin and President Zelensky and himself.

I think in terms of winners and losers, I think on this one, Putin came out slightly ahead. For instance, there was no mention of any intensification of harsher sanctions being imposed on Russia, which is something that Putin, I'm sure, was desperate to avoid.

President Trump mentioned seeking a comprehensive peace agreement as opposed to an immediate ceasefire followed by talks, which is what the Europeans have been pushing for and Kyiv as well. They want an immediate ceasefire and then to engage in talks without any agreements yet in place. Putin is seeking peace talks while he continues to eat away at territory in Ukraine and continues to bomb their cities. As for that, it's maybe not a green light for further aggression, but he definitely didn’t get a red light.

I think also there was a lot of bad imagery. Having a red carpet there to welcome the Russian president – I get that it’s protocol - but I think things like a red carpet could have been skipped by the U.S. side. It gives Putin a boost with his domestic constituency. He was invited to the United States, so that will play well back home and may not play well in other capitals. There was a lot of criticism about Putin's status as a war criminal and he still gets to travel to the U.S.? I mean, that's kind of an empty argument but nonetheless, it is an argument that has traction in some capitals.

Prefer to watch The Cipher Brief interview with former 6-time CIA station chief Ralph Goff? Check it out by subscribing to The Cipher Brief's YouTube channel.

The Cipher Brief: There's a lot of concern about how the president is perceiving Putin – whether it’s as a friend or as someone who brutally launched this war in Ukraine. As someone with has experience in understanding how to manipulate other people to get them to do what you want them to do - which was basically your job at CIA – do you see those elements at play or is this just a bunch of talk by critics of President Trump?

Goff: There is some of that and Putin is a former KGB case officer and he is trying to use some of those skills. I don't think he's a very gifted case officer. I don't think he was actually really successful in the KGB. He was best known to be an obscure colonel somewhere in East Germany, but he is trying to manipulate the president. I think he's failing. And I think what we're seeing is Donald Trump trying to be a case officer as well. He's using flattery and he's controlling Putin and trying to get this guy to a deal right so he's not going to [verbally] bludgeon his way toward a deal although he does do that when Putin's not around. President Trump does have a habit of talking tough when he's with European allies or at some of his press conferences here in the United States - so there's a bit of case officering going on - on both sides and I would say that neither one of them is really being successful because it's pretty transparent on both sides.

The Cipher Brief: With Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky planning to meet with the President at the White House, what would be the best case scenario in your mind?

Goff: The best-case scenario, and this is based on the realities of the conflict itself, is to freeze in place. Russia keeps the territories wherever there is a Russian boot. Putin seems to be aiming to have the geographical boundaries of territories which are not in Russian control at present and that's something that Zelensky cannot agree to as that would be political suicide for him. And the Ukrainians fought and died to hold the lines where they're at so giving up territory that you fought over without having to is a nonstarter, I think, for them. But, you know, in the end, there is going to be a high cost of territory for Ukraine. That's just the reality. And they know that.

The Cipher Brief: The Cipher Brief has been fortunate enough to travel with you on several trips to Ukraine over the past few years. And there has been a sense that Ukrainians are ready for this war to end for more than a year now. When you combine that with the sanctions that President Trump is threatening, how desperate do you think the situation is on the Russian side to end this war?

Goff: The situation is not desperate enough to force an agreement by the Russians. It's not there yet, but the potential does exist, and the president has some tools at his disposal. He can intensify sanctions, he can continue to press India on the secondary oil market - that's having an effect – and when you look at recent political developments outside of Ukraine, like the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace deal that the president worked out, that's a problem for Russia. That's the beginning of the loss of the Caucasus.

So, cracks are beginning to appear in the so-called near abroad of Russia and meanwhile you you have new NATO members Finland and Sweden and in Finland in particular, President Alexander Stubb has gotten buddy buddy with Donald Trump. They call each other almost daily and they seem to have a real friendship. So, the president has a number of people who are whispering in his ear who understand the Russians and can guide him to some sort of political framework that is agreeable or acceptable to the Europeans and the Finns.

And prior to the summit, President Trump reached out to Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, Putin’s ally. That was a smart move. That can't have gone over well with Putin. Lukashenko is a stalwart ally, but he's several times during the past decade, he has tried to creep out from underneath the Russian thumb. And so, you know, this is another pressure point that President Trump can use to kind of guide Russia down the path that is desired by Europe and the West.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

The Cipher Brief: When you're looking at overall U.S. strategy right now, it sounds like you're seeing the bits and pieces of this come together in different ways.

Goff: Yes. I mean, there’s a lot going on and the media tend to shine a spotlight on just one spot. Meanwhile, there's stuff going on in the shadows outside that spotlight. And I think that's what we're seeing here.

Look, in the end, there is a lot to be said in favor of trying to get some sort of normalization of relationships between the United States and Russia. Putin's a horrible person. He's committed many crimes, whether it's the invasion of Ukraine or the murder of political opponents or the jailing of political opponents who then die in jail. He’s committed a host of crimes. And he may be an unsavory character, but he's the leader of a nuclear state that represents an existential threat to the United States. So, there is logic behind trying to force a better relationship between Russia and the United States. I give President Trump credit for trying to find a new way to deal with Russia.

The Cipher Brief: What are the key things you're going to be looking for on Monday as President Zelensky meets with President Trump that are going to indicate some kind of progress toward an actual end to this war?

Goff: The things to look for are when the president has his conversations with the European allies and has his conversation with President Zelensky, we want to see signs that there's a consensus there of where to go next and not arguing like we've seen in the past. So, I think a good sign for the West would be consensus.

And from the Russian side, they can do a lot here. They can tone down their attacks on civilian infrastructure and civilian targets in Ukraine. They're not going to stop fighting in the East and they’re not going to stop fighting on the front. That will continue. But they could throw President Trump a bone here and declare some sort of moratorium on strikes against civilian or infrastructure targets.

That’s a long shot, but it's something that if we saw it, that would be hugely positive. I just don't think we're going to see it. In the meantime, there's improved prospects for the Ukrainians too. There are a lot of rumors that they are developing a ballistic missile capability of their own and that would allow them to strike deeper into Russian territory at more strategic targets as opposed to just utilizing drone strikes. So, there's still stuff yet to come in this war that could have an impact.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

Can the U.S. Stand Up to Putin?

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE –The world is a much different place than it was in 2018, when Putin and Trump met in Helsinki. And the stakes for Friday’s meeting could not be higher because the world is a much more dangerous place. Without hyperbole, one can argue that the fate of the free world hangs in the balance.

If Putin walks away having conceded nothing and instead, convincing the U.S. to put pressure on Ukraine to make concessions or face consequences, Putin will have achieved a major success and will be emboldened to continue his aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere. China and Iran will be similarly encouraged with unfortunate future kinetic consequences in East Asia and the Middle East. This would be a train wreck for the free world.

We will see if the meeting turns out to be a catastrophe that leads to a bigger war as was the case with the Munich conference in September 1938. Or if Trump and Putin decide to go down the path of the Yalta meeting in February 1945 where the post war world was divided up between the West and the Soviet Union. Or it could be a meeting that bears the characteristics of the Casablanca conference in January 1943—at a time when World War II was not going well for the allies—where the leaders of the West (principally Churchill and Roosevelt) issued the Casablanca Declaration which promulgated the policy of “unconditional surrender.”

This doctrine represented the determination of the united powers of the Allies to fight to bring about the ultimate defeat of the Axis powers lead by Germany and Japan. Let us hope President Trump realizes the importance of the moment and uses the opportunity to pass a similarly strong message to the leader of the anti-free world coalition, sometimes referred to as the Axis of Resistance.

At the time of the 2018 Helsinki Summit there was no war in Europe. We are now witnessing the biggest military conflict in Europe since 1945, initiated by Putin. There is an ongoing conflict in the Middle East in Gaza and the possibility of renewed conflict with Iran if it attempts to rebuild its nuclear weapons program.

The Deputy Secretary of the Russian National Security Council has made direct threats of nuclear conflict and the use by Russia of a Doomsday weapon, the “Dead Hand” system. Trump ordered the out of cycle deployment of two U.S. nuclear submarines in response. China seems engaged in more aggressive and intimidating military operations around Taiwan.

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

There have been positive developments for the Free World since 2018 that President Trump should recall. The regime of Putin’s friend and ally Basher al-Assad in Syria collapsed and he is now in exile in Moscow. The favored proxies Hamas and Hezbollah, allies of Iran, have been crushed. Iran itself has been effectively attacked and its nuclear program severely damaged if not destroyed. Sweden and Finland are now members of the NATO alliance. NATO itself has found new relevance and purpose. Europe is committed to rearmament. From a strategic perspective, Putin’s situation has worsened dramatically since 2018. The Axis is sinking.

Yet Putin believes he is in a position of strength. He feels that way because of what he has achieved over the past several months – up to and including meeting with President Trump’s lead negotiator, Steve Witkoff. Astonishingly, Witkoff agreed to a three-hour meeting with Putin using only a Russian-provided interpreter. Putin certainly knew he was in complete control from that moment onward. It appears Witkoff was confused about what was said at that meeting and it is certain he delivered no tough messages to Putin about the consequences Russia would face if it continued the war in Ukraine.

Putin however, came away from the meeting having conceded nothing in terms of Russia’s objectives setting the stage for the Alaska meeting. First round to Putin. He gets a summit on US soil. And will get the prestige of meeting a U.S. President as an equal when he is not an equal.

The results of Witkoff’s meetings in Moscow and Trump’s refusal to stand by his threats of massive consequences if Russia didn’t take steps to end the war by last Friday, caused elation in Russian media and within circles in the Kremlin. They were equally disheartening in Kyiv and European capitals. Happily, the US, Europe, and Ukraine seemed to have aligned their positions following a conference call last week and Trump has renewed his threat of severe consequences for Russia if an agreement for at least a cease fire is not achieved on February 15. But this is not enough. Putin is buying more time to kill and wittingly or not, Trump is granting it.

Putin’s approach to Trump is not friendship. It’s raw manipulation. Much has been made of Putin’s background as an intelligence officer, in understanding how he thinks, as it should. His training has prepared him for meetings like this. And Putin has been at this game a long time. He has seen plenty of U.S. Presidents come and go. He will remember well the mistakes Trump made in the meetings they had during Trump’s first term. You can be sure Putin will use equal parts of flattery for what Trump has achieved in the first months of his second term, sympathy for the challenges Trump faces with the “deep state and Russian election influence conspiracy,” disparagement about the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations under the Biden Administration, and complaints about the corruption and Nazi antecedents of the Zelensky Administration, and plenty of rhetoric about the roots of the current conflict lying with the aggressive expansion eastward of the NATO military alliance. Putin is certainly confident these messages will resonate with Trump. Putin will be similarly confident Trump will be even less prepared for this hastily arranged summit than he was for their meetings during Trump’s first term.

As of now, there is no indication of any movement toward a concession from Moscow on Ukraine. Putin may offer some vague commitment to negotiations as he has in the past. He will likely offer concessions on an issue unrelated to Ukraine, such as nuclear arms control, to give Trump something that can be portrayed as an accomplishment from the summit. This costs him nothing and moves no closer to stopping the killing in Ukraine.

President Trump has the opportunity to turn the tables on Putin if he is willing. It’s not likely to happen, but Trump should first open the meeting by reminding Putin that he is a wanted war criminal and that it is only through the benevolence of the U.S. that he is not arrested and remanded to The Hague.

Secondly, Trump should tell Putin in no uncertain terms that Russia is solely responsible for this conflict and the “threat” posed to Russia by NATO is pure bunk.

Thirdly, Trump should express solid U.S. support for a free Ukraine and communicate clearly that when the conflict ends, the U.S. and its European allies will be guarantors of free Ukraine. Then Trump should turn to the matter at hand and demand Putin issue an immediate ceasefire order and begin negotiations with Ukraine on a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

President Trump should disabuse Putin of any notion that the old Russian negotiating maxim of “what’s ours is ours and what’s yours is negotiable” will not apply in these negotiations.

Trump should remind Putin he is prepared to move forward with the tough bipartisan sanctions legislation in Congress and immediately increase military and financial aid to Ukraine—especially air defense systems. Putin will certainly have on his mind the TACO acronym (standing for ‘Trump Always Chickens Out’) as he prepares for another opportunity to manipulate the U.S. President. Trump should create the reverse by putting the type of pressure on Putin that will send him back to Moscow with his tail between his legs. Anything short of that will not stop the killing in Ukraine.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Expert Q&A: Undersea Cables Under Attack, from Outside and Within

EXPERT Q&A — Reports of damage to undersea cables across the world are on the rise, with suspected foul play in many of these incidents. These cables are crucial conduits for communications, financial transactions, Internet traffic and even intelligence, making them prime targets of gray zone tactics, from suspected Russian sabotage of Baltic Sea cables to alleged Chinese severing of cables in the Taiwan Strait. The Federal Communications Commission voted last Thursday to update U.S. rules on subsea cable development, aiming to streamline construction and better protect this critical undersea infrastructure.

The Cipher Brief spoke with Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mike Studeman, who served as Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, about what he says is an ongoing assault on undersea cables — including “outside-in” attacks like sabotage and “inside-out” attacks from embedded exploits — and how the U.S. and its allies can better defend the cables they rely on. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

The Cipher Brief: What is the perceived danger that we're talking about here that the Congress is perhaps seeking to address?

RADM Studeman: It's very clear that the adversaries of the United States, the Chinas and the Russias of the world, are very keen on trying to get leverage in various ways against the United States and the West through critical infrastructure. The subsea cables are just one element of critical infrastructure.

But frankly, the statistics would blow people's minds. Ninety-nine percent of our Internet traffic goes through the undersea environment. When you think about the capacity of those cables, it's terabytes of information versus gigabytes of information through satellites. So essentially, when you go through satellites, it's like drinking a glass of water in terms of the amount of data throughput you get. But undersea cables, it's like trying to drink a large swimming pool worth of data. So we're highly dependent on those. $22 trillion of financial transactions are processed through undersea cables every day. We also have our defense, our national security, our intelligence riding those cables like everybody else with their streaming videos and emails and all the rest. So the threat there is significant, just like it would be on land-based sites with people trying to get into your communications, manipulate them, outright disrupt them through severing and cutting.

The Cipher Brief: The implication of the request made by the House would appear that this is less of a concern about the severing and cutting of cables, but more that Chinese companies, particularly the maintenance and repair companies, may be getting access to these cables,and then doing what? Is it tapping? What are we talking about here?

RADM Studeman: There's the outside-in and then the inside-out threats and it's worth bifurcating it in the beginning. So if you're talking about the six sea cables that were more than likely purposely cut by Russia and China since November 2024 in the Baltics and the Taiwan Strait, it shows you what can happen. Now there are natural ways cables get cut; 150 to 200 times each year cables are damaged by underwater volcanoes, dredging, fishing vessels accidentally dragging their anchors. But these are more purposeful nation state threats that we're seeing that are emerging. So there's no doubt about the outside-in, which means we got to track suspicious vessels.

But the inside out threat is just as significant and we need to be mindful of it. There's a lot of different equipment that can be at the terminal landing sites in between the subsea segments from optical repeaters to other junction points on sea cables that could potentially have malware in them that could perform a variety of functions when directed. So part of it is about espionage and the ability to shunt information into a place where Chinese and Russian intelligence can go through it, even if it's encrypted. They're hoping that later on with decryption capabilities they are working on that they could end up having all this data that they can back cast and decrypt to learn all sorts of secrets. So there's the shunting and the access to data. And there's also the ability to potentially exploit and disrupt from the inside with whatever functionality exists anywhere along the full length of those cables.

The Cipher Brief: How easy is it to say, we're not going to use those repair companies because they're associated with China, and we're just going to pivot and do it ourselves or figure out some other way? Is that something that can be changed on a dime? How hard is that?

RADM Studeman: We'll have to ask Microsoft, Google, Meta, and some other companies that question because the extent to which they're dependent and whether or not they have alternate ways of providing those services is really known better to them. But the report that got this going in the first place was that Microsoft was using Chinese companies to be involved in some of the maintenance work here.

I think we're doing the right thing. I think that there are alternate companies that can in fact provide these services and we need to get really wise about this and then hold the companies accountable to the national security requirements, which are legitimate, that we need them to be cooperative in to be safer and frankly more resilient because our adversaries wouldn't hesitate to use some of these exploitation techniques in the future. We can't be naive about this.

The Cipher Brief: Is there any evidence to your knowledge that this is more than a concern at the moment? In other words, any evidence that China has gotten into that big data fire hose that comes into this country or anywhere else for nefarious purposes?

RADM Studeman: I think it's 100% safe to say that the Chinese have been grabbing big data from all forms of communication that traverse the earth, including a substantial amount of U.S. and allied data that they have sitting there, which has been examined by their intelligence services, and could in the future, if encryption is broken, depending on what level it is, potentially also be something that they can analyze and go through. This is not some kind of theoretical threat. This is trying to stop something that's underway.

The Cipher Brief: And other than getting American or non-Chinese entities to do that work at the bottom of the ocean floor on the maintenance and repair side, is there anything else that you think ought to be done to address the threat?

RADM Studeman: I do think that when it comes to the manufacture of some of these cables that they're going, and discussions already exist about this, to put sensors of various types on there. There are normal anomalies and then other anomalies that could indicate that somebody's up to no good. There's signal distortions, there could be latency delays, there could be some anomalies after work is done in a certain segment of your cables. All those things deserve to have more sensors and therefore more analysis and more awareness because then you will know how to act appropriately to nip something in the bud, ideally, or to stop it soon after you detect it. But many cables are essentially dumb cables; they don't have enough of that sensing capability. So the newer ones should incorporate that technology that exists today. It's not hard, although it drives up the expense a little bit.

When it comes to the inside-out too, I do think that there are probably some software types and analytics that you could run against the data that the sensors provide. There's a different kind of tailored, maybe agentic AI which could be focused in this area too, to make sure you're not chasing your tail with false alarms. Trying to distinguish something that's truly, legitimately a concern versus something environmental or endemic to the running of the cable system altogether.

And then of course, you've already talked about steps to take with regard to identifying suspicious vessels that may be operating over these cables that may be up to no good. How do you deter that or how do you respond to that?

I also think that in terms of some of the resiliency efforts, we're gonna need to have more essentially underwater flyers, underwater drones. If you think about the Chinese and the Russian deep sea programs that have intent to go after cables, you need to examine them to make sure there's not a box that's been laid on top of them. Having some regular patrols, the Baltic states are currently doing that at the sort of air and surface level. And they're thinking about the desire for the undersea. We need to have more essentially drone flyers that are cheap, that can fly over the most critical cables out there. That to me is also where the future is going with all of these dangers that exist.

Opinions expressed are those of the interviewee and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Here’s How Russia’s Covert War Could Undermine its Own Goals

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE / OPINION — The July 2025 sanctioning and indictment by the United Kingdom of three units and 18 individuals affiliated with the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces - the GRU - highlighted clandestine sabotage and cyber operations by that service against communications lines and the Western transport and supply infrastructure critical to Ukraine’s war effort. "GRU spies,” British Foreign Secretary David Lammy said, “are running a campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and threaten the safety of British citizens."

In fact, GRU sabotage operations against targets in non-belligerent nations pre-date the current conflict and reflect Moscow’s use of sabotage as a tool of statecraft in both war and peace dating back to the Soviet era. During the Cold War, Soviet and Warsaw Pact planners, led by the KGB and GRU, created detailed lists of Western targets —bridges, power plants, rail hubs, fuel depots, pipelines, and communication lines. These operations emphasized covert acts made to look like accidents, aiming to demoralize adversaries and create political discord within the western alliance. To facilitate such operations, the GRU placed highly trained deep-cover “illegals” in target countries.

Fortunately, such plans were never fully actualized during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, we have not been so lucky. One GRU entity sanctioned by the UK - Unit 29155 - is assessed as having been responsible for the 2014 destruction of a shipment of Czech-origin 152mm artillery shells on route to Georgia and attacks that same year on a Czech ammunition depot. Officers of the same unit poisoned Russian defector Sergei Skripal in the UK in 2018.

The current Russian sabotage campaign is, however, being waged on a far larger – and potentially much more dangerous – scale than previously seen Russian. Since Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the GRU has engaged in extensive sabotage designed to disrupt the flow of Western aid to Ukraine, to demoralize that country, and to pressure its allies to reduce their support for Kiev. With a focus on entities supplying the Ukrainian military, these operations have targeted air, rail, maritime, and logistics supply chain, as well as energy infrastructure and undersea cables.

Most alarmingly, in 2024 Western intelligence detected a GRU-backed scheme to place incendiaries in air cargo packages destined for the UK, Poland, and potentially North America. In one incident, a magnesium-based device caused a fire on a plane in Leipzig, Germany. This was a method evolved from Cold War sabotage tradecraft. Other incendiary parcels were intercepted or ignited in warehouses in Poland and the UK. The Poles arrested four persons tied to this operation, which is believed to have been the work of the GRU.

Thankfully, plans to down or destroy civilian aircraft have thus far failed. But such plots—and their exposure—are indicative of Moscow’s willingness to accept considerable operational and political risk in targeting logistics and supply networks delivering Western support to Ukraine. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, this is an existential war. The Russian leader appears prepared to do whatever he believes necessary to hammer out something he can call victory. At minimum, this means establishing Russian control over the Ukrainian districts - Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—annexed by Moscow in 2022.

The friction surrounding any intelligence operation can lead to its failure no matter how well planned. But that peril is compounded when the intelligence service concerned has a well-deserved reputation for mounting operations both conceptually imprudent and flawed in their implementation. Soviet and Russian espionage history is rife with GRU operations that failed due to the sloppy tradecraft employed, a reality attested to in extensive open source reporting on that service’s supposedly secret operations by Bellingcat and others.

There can be no doubt that Putin, as a former KGB officer and Director of the Russian FSB, is aware of the GRU’s checkered operational history. The fact that he, nonetheless, sanctioned that service’s sabotage campaign speaks to the importance the Russian leader ascribes to impeding Western military assistance to Ukraine. At the same time, Putin surely also understands that his sabotage campaign might undermine his policy goals. Ongoing GRU sabotage operations – particularly if they result in a high-profile attack – can rebound against Russia’ goal of seeking to undermine Western backing for Kiev. A historical example of a sabotage campaign undertaken against non-belligerent targets by a military intelligence service with less than stellar operational acumen is instructive in this regard.

Everyone needs a good nightcap. Ours happens to come in the form of a M-F newsletter that keeps you up to speed on national security. Sign up today.

Early on July 30, 1916, one of the largest non-nuclear explosions in history rocked Black Tom Island, located in what is now Liberty State Park in Jersey City, New Jersey. A freight terminal and munitions depot storing approximately 2 million pounds of ammunition and explosives awaiting shipment to World War I’s Allied powers (primarily Russia and Britain) blew up with a force that measured between 5.0 and 5.5 on the Richter scale. Guards had noticed fires breaking out on the pier shortly after midnight. Despite efforts to raise the alarm and call firefighters, the blaze eventually reached massive stores of explosives, triggering the first and largest explosion. Additional blasts followed as the blaze spread through adjacent railcars and barges. Debris and shrapnel rained down across the region, injuring hundreds and sending residents fleeing their homes. Windows up to 25 miles away were broken and the Statue of Liberty was damaged, her torch closed to visitors thereafter. The catastrophe caused over $20 million in property damage (equivalent to over $580 million today). At least three adults and one child are known to have been killed, but some estimates put the toll much higher.

American investigators initially thought the disaster resulted from carelessness. There were, however, suspicions from the outset that it resulted from an act of sabotage perpetrated by German Military Intelligence. The only surprise was how long it took the U.S. to attribute responsibility to the Kaiser’s men given the many operational errors they made while carrying out a sabotage campaign against targets in what was then a non-belligerent U.S.

From the outset of World War I, the Germans were confronted with a conundrum as they sought to keep Washington neutral while at same time closing off the flow of food and war materiel from the U.S. to the Allied Powers. The strategy Berlin adopted – to rely on diplomacy to deal with the former challenge and on sabotage to achieve the latter objective – was mutually contradictory unless those sabotage operations were executed with perfect deniability. Unfortunately for the Kaiser, perfection is unachievable in clandestine operations.

Shortly after the 1914 assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Berlin named the German Ambassador in Washington, Johann Count von Bernstoff, as Germany’s espionage and sabotage chief for the Western Hemisphere. This was not a wise choice. Not only was the Ambassador ill-suited to the task, his involvement in intelligence operations, coupled with Germany’s initiation of unrestricted submarine warfare the following year, hamstrung Bernstoff’s ability to fulfill his diplomatic function as he was thrust into the center of a diplomatic firestorm that grew in intensity and culminated in America’s declaration of war against Germany in 1917. Those chosen to assist the Ambassador likewise proved unsuited to the task.

Military attaché Captain Franz von Papen - who, as Germany’s Chancellor in the early 1930’s, would play a key role in dissolving the Weimar Republic and paving the way for Adolf Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor - and Naval attaché Captain Karl Boy-Ed operated brazenly out of a commercial office in New York. They set up a proprietary company which ostensibly did business with the intent of providing munitions to the Allied Powers. Their intent, in fact, was exactly the opposite.

Like the GRU, which has blended sabotage operations with cyberattacks on telecommunication and transportation networks in an apparent attempt to disrupt supply lines and undermine public support for Ukraine, German military intelligence disseminated propaganda to counter information unfavorable to their country. Operatives also manufactured counterfeit U.S. passports for ethnic Germans returning to the Fatherland to fight. Papen and Boy-Ed, however, concentrated most of their attention on directly impeding shipments of munitions and food from America to the Allied Powers.

To that end, the Germans sought to recruit agents to assist with sabotage and subversion operations. Americans of German heritage and Irish-Americans, with their innate disdain for Britain, were particularly susceptible to their approaches. Similarly, as the recent Polish arrest of a Colombian national suspected of involvement in two arson attacks on warehouses in that country attests, the GRU has used third country nationals as well as local recruits in their sabotage operations.

Much like the GRU operatives behind the current sabotage campaign, the inexperience of Papen and his colleagues, as well as the bad tradecraft they employed, were evident from the outset. Their involvement in a plot to dynamite the Welland Canal linking Lakes Erie and Ontario - through which raw material needed to produce American munitions transited - was detected by the New York City Bomb Squad. This was not surprising in that they, among other things, had used material linked to a German firm in constructing the explosive device to be used; used the so-called German Club in New York – an establishment that doubled as a bordello - as a safe house (employing a site of criminality for espionage purposes being an operational faux pas); and used the office of a German-run commercial investigative agency for operational purposes (thus coming under suspicion for the wrong reasons).

The financier for German operations in the U.S., Dr. Heinrich Friedrich Albert, committed the cardinal sins of leading surveillance to a meeting with an agent and then leaving a briefcase filled with telegrams from Berlin, communications from German agents and financial records on a New York tram. Some of the material in the briefcase, which was picked up by an alert surveillant, was passed by the White House to The New York Sun. That paper’s publication of it led to the 1915 recalls of Papen; his colleague, Boy-Ed, and Albert to Germany.

As intended, this press reporting also lent support to President Woodrow Wilson’s previously voiced suspicion that he was “sure the country is honey-combed with German intrigue and infested with German spies.” Although Wilson sought to modestly augment the capabilities of the two agencies then charged with monitoring German spies and agents in the U.S. - the U.S. Secret Service and the predecessor to the modern FBI, the Bureau of Investigation – their capacity to do so remained woefully inadequate. Unfortunately, as has been the case with the current GRU campaign, diplomatic responses and legal sanctions did not deter the Germans.

Boy-Ed’s successor, Captain Franz von Rintelen, arrived in the U.S. in April 1915 on a doctored Swiss passport. He would prove the driving force behind the sabotage campaign, injecting energy - if not operational acumen - into it. Leading a network of intelligence officers infiltrated into the U.S., Rintelen sought to foment strikes, firebomb shipping, instigate embargoes against the Allied Powers, distribute pacifist propaganda, foment revolution in Mexico, and purchase munitions for the German government. His most important mission, however, was to impede or, if necessary, sabotage shipments of arms and munitions from America to the Allied Powers. Rintelen was clear about his intent, saying: “Munitions are my job - what I can't buy I'll blow up, kaput schlagen!"

He immediately set to work, directing a string of attacks against arms shipments to the Allied powers. Employing a tactic echoed by the GRU, his agents placed cigar-shaped incendiary devices in the holds of ships carrying weapons and munitions. The resulting investigations resulted in several of the saboteurs being identified. Soon, operational friction had begun to catch up with Rintelen himself. His involvement in a wide array of operations meant that the exposure of any one of them could lead to the compromise of all the others. The possibility this could occur was made certain by a string of operational errors.

Those mistakes included Rintelen’s personal interaction with German officials and a German bank even though he was ostensibly working undercover in the same job his compromised predecessor had used; using those banks to move operational funds; exercising minimal operational control over his agents who were subjected to minimal vetting; and using potentially hostile intermediaries - the Russians - to facilitate the diversion of arms being shipped to their country, and then bilking them out of money they paid for the shipment; and conveying covert messages over open communications.

Finally, and sensationally, Rintelen got scammed by the original “Wolf of Wall Street,” David Lamar. The German passed Lamar ca. $350,000 to fund a plan to foment strikes in munitions factories and shipping agencies; to hinder the manufacture and shipping of munitions by attacks on financial institutions and by litigation against pro-Allied businesses; to promote a U.S. peace movement; and to enhance public support for Germany. Only later would Rintelen come to realize that Lamar had swindled him.

In August 1915, with investigators closing in, Rintelen fled the U.S. by ship but was arrested by British authorities during a port call in the UK. Extradited to the U.S. in 1917 after America entered the war, he was convicted on a string of charges to include firebombing a ship, perjury and conspiracy to obtain a U.S. passport. Rintelen spent the remainder of the war in prison.

Rintelen’s departure did not, however, end the sabotage campaign. In February 1916, an explosion initiated by the saboteurs destroyed a munitions plant in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. This was followed by equally effective operations against an armaments factory in Bridgeport, Connecticut and a chemical plant in Cadillac, Michigan. After the successful attack on Black Tom, the saboteurs initiated a fire that destroyed a Canadian factory contracted by Russia to manufacture artillery shells. In February 1917, three Germans were arrested for attempting to (again) sabotage the Black Tom Island facility, which had been rebuilt. Because the April 1917 American entry into the war meant sabotage was no longer an option since the penalty was death to anyone caught in the act, the remaining German saboteurs fled the U.S.

U.S. efforts to seek post-war redress from Germany for the damage wrought by its sabotage campaign – and for Black Tom in particular – underscore the difficulty of holding a nation-state legally liable for its clandestine activities. The post-World War I German-American Mixed Claims Commission sought to assess Berlin’s responsibility and adjudicate indemnities for the consequences of the attack. Weimar Republic lawyers argued there was no evidence incontrovertibly linking German intelligence to it and the Commission ruled in their favor. In 1930, with more evidence of German culpability having come to light, the Black Tom case was re-opened. Once the Nazis came to power, however, the German representative to the Commission resigned when it looked like his country would be implicated in the case. Nonetheless, the Commission declared Germany guilty in 1939 and ordered Berlin to pay 50 million dollars. Unsurprisingly, the Nazi regime did not comply.

Although more evidence convincingly establishing German guilt and detailing the breadth of its pre-World War I sabotage campaign has emerged thereafter, Germany was never held to account for Black Tom. One suspects that, absent the arrest of the GRU operatives involved in the current sabotage campaign should they – like Rintelen – be unwise enough to travel to the UK, it is also unlikely Russia will be held to account for its actions.

The recent GRU sabotage campaign seems to have slowed since reaching its peak in 2023-24, possibly due to better coordination European security agencies and a conscious decision by the Kremlin to scale back operations in deference to discussions between Moscow and Washington about ending the war. With Putin apparently having resolved to continue his war against Ukraine, there is every possibility his security and intelligence services will renew sabotage operations in Europe.

But the UK’s public exposure of the GRU’s activities and U.S. warnings to Moscow that any attack causing an aircraft crash would be treated as terrorism and prompt a severe response are useful to the extent they cause Putin to rein in the aggressiveness of that service’s sabotage operations, thereby hopefully avoiding the repetition of a tragedy on the scale of Black Tom.

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

Expert Q&A: The Silent Chinese Spy Threat Under the Waves

EXPERT Q&A — There is increasing focus on the vulnerability of undersea cables — a critical infrastructure which is key to much of global communications. They have been damaged in various hotspots around the world, with some incidents pointing to nefarious actors. Another threat beyond physical damage is the potential for intrusions and tapping, especially when it comes to U.S.-linked cables and China. Central to this issue is the dominance of Chinese companies in making, maintaining or repairing the cables linked to the U.S. In July, the chairs of three House committees wrote to the CEOs of Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon to report on how exposed cables are to China in this way.

The Cipher Brief spoke with Beth Sanner, former Deputy Director of National Intelligence at ODNI, to assess the Chinese threat to undersea cables and why it is so challenging for the U.S. to mitigate the risk. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

The Cipher Brief: What is the worry here? What's the kind of nightmare scenario? Why is the Congress asking the tech companies to report back on these things?

Sanner: So much of our communications flows through these cables, including encrypted classified information. There is a lot of stuff that is important. Not all of it is classified, of course — just everyday materials from financial transactions or people's connections to the internet. So there are obviously multiple reasons why we should consider undersea cables as part of U.S. critical infrastructure. But that critical infrastructure, unlike most of what we talk about, isn't only in the United States. In fact, all of this is outside the United States, and not even all of that connects directly to the United States. The vulnerability is so global because we are sending financial transactions between the United States and Singapore, for example, or even for China.

The Cipher Brief: There's no shortage of issues where the same concerns apply in terms of China having a hand in areas of our lives that involve data capture and data collection. Here, it's very hard to see how A, one would know exactly where that Chinese hand is, and B, let's say one of these companies comes back and says, well, we think that maybe a Chinese entity does some maintenance work. I imagine it's pretty hard to suddenly shift gears for Meta or Google or the other companies to say, okay, we'll just suddenly have another maintenance company that isn't Chinese.

Sanner: Right, so let's break that down a little bit. First, the way that information flows over these lines, it's very hard to restrict where things go. The messaging traffic tends to go on the lines that have the least amount of resistance and the most efficiency. So, your data can be going almost anywhere.

And we know that the FCC is going to be meeting in August and considering, and I would wager that they are going to, banning any Chinese equipment in cables that connect to the United States. (Editor’s Note: On August 7, 2025 the FCC banned the use of equipment and services from Chinese companies on its “Covered List” and other agencies’ lists of entities deemed national security threats on any future undersea cables connecting to the U.S.)

That suggests to me that there might be a problem that we don't know about. Is there the use of Chinese components even inside the cables connecting to the United States? I can tell you all cables connecting to U.S. military installations around the world, that I know of, though there could be exceptions, I think are handled by the American company called Subcom, which is owned by Cerberus, which Steve Feinberg, the now Deputy Secretary of Defense, was the co-CEO of until very recently.

But we just heard that Microsoft, in their cloud computing, with the U.S. DOD is using Chinese engineers for part of the maintenance of the cloud. And so it makes you wonder, I suppose it's possible that people are doing stupid things like using pieces like switching devices. Those switching devices direct the transmission of the light, or they could shut it down. What if those components, just like components that we recently heard were embedded in solar panels in the grid in Texas, are transmitting back or somehow controlled by China? I don't know, this is beyond my engineering capability, but I would say that we might have a problem there.

And then the third problem I would say is that this idea of the repairs, because most cables that are cut are accidentally cut. But if we rely on China for repairs, then something can be inserted in that process to tap that particular cable. And that can go on then indefinitely.

The Cipher Brief: We were just talking about some of the reporting that some of the big think tanks have done, CSIS in particular, that suggests that whereas Chinese companies and entities are not the market leaders when it comes to the construction of these cables that are reaching U.S. shores, they have a big chunk of the market, two companies in particular, when it comes to repair work.

Back to the first question, from your intelligence community background, how worrisome is that?

Sanner: Well, that is the ability to insert a tap automatically. That's how it is done. So, any time a Chinese ship repair operation is happening by the company that's a subsidiary of Huawei or the other company, all of these companies report back to Beijing and certainly can be not even compelled, just told to do that mission. So I consider that an absolutely high risk.

Now, my understanding is that Cerberus and Subcom are beginning a fleet of repair ships. They have two ships in this fleet of cable repair ships, according to one article that I read in Reuters. That's all I know is open source, of course. And so I think the United States understands this weakness. But my understanding, too, is that those Chinese ships have repaired 25% of the cables that have been cut. So again, our information can be on lines that are outside of our ecosystem. And I will say that, in terms of the overarching issue here, this is a private sector endeavor, right? There are no government owned cable lines. Not really. This is a private sector deal. And so this is where public private partnership needs to work.

The Cipher Brief: Your point about American companies now getting involved in the repair work, the House committee that looks at China and national security issues has been so aggressive in everything from TikTok to all these other things. Undersea cables have been around for a while. You would think it would not have taken this long to do what you just said, which is have American companies go out and do this if they're so worried about it. Any thoughts as to why?

Sanner: Somebody's got to pay for the contract to have it because I think we've just counted on the private sector to do this.

The Cipher Brief: And then the other question, are we at a stage now with this sort of thing that if the company has any ties to Beijing that one has to be worried about it?

Sanner: I do think that it's true that anything that's connected to China is bad. We know that China's inside our critical infrastructure in the United States, right? And they are there to pre-position themselves in case of war, or maybe even as a preemptive thing to prevent us from interfering in, for example, a Taiwan invasion.

So I would think that undersea cables are no different when it comes to the United States, but I think we have a broader issue of the potential of a concerted effort to cut cables around the world because there's very little we can do to prevent that except in very defined geographic areas. So NATO last year set up a working group focused on undersea cables and the protection of them. And they're working on developing systems like AI systems and remote sensing in order to monitor what's going on and also to use that sensing to track the particular ships that they think are problematic, either from the gray tankers or these cargo ships that they know are problematic. We would need to replicate that in the Pacific. And who is going to do that? We don't have a NATO in the Pacific.

And so I think that that is a real challenge for us down the line. We can't just think of this as a geographic problem that begins and ends with what connects to the United States. I keep seeing this. It's like, well, we don't care what happens in Ukraine or we don't care what happens, we're here in America. That just does not work anymore. Our geography is wonderful and it protects us from some things, but when it comes to cyber and space and undersea cables, communications, that is not enough. So we have to think globally.

Opinions expressed are those of the interviewee and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

I Sat Across the Table from China’s Spies. Here’s How They Operate in Fragile States

OPINION — In 2016, I sat across the table from China’s Director of Operations for the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Their visit to Kabul was tightly scripted, speaking only from prepared documents, with translators on hand, and never deviating from the line. The meeting was part of a broader intelligence dialogue between the MSS and Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), which I led at the time.

Their concern was focused and unyielding: the presence of Uyghur militants affiliated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Afghanistan. While our engagement was primarily with the Ministry of State Security (MSS)—China’s civilian intelligence service—it’s important to note that other Chinese intelligence elements were also present and active in Afghanistan. These included PLA military intelligence officers (previously known as 2PLA), operating under diplomatic cover and conducting parallel HUMINT efforts.

That engagement was just one example of how China quietly but assertively embeds intelligence influence in developing nations. While Beijing’s actions may be framed as counterterrorism cooperation or economic engagement, the deeper pattern reveals a calculated gray zone strategy—operating below the threshold of open conflict through long-term penetration and influence—which deserves close scrutiny as U.S.-China competition escalates globally.

From Economics to Intelligence in Afghanistan

In the 2000s, China’s Afghan presence was commercially driven. The $3 billion Mes Aynak copper mine contract reflected its resource-focused strategy. Intelligence collection remained passive, primarily routed through commercial and diplomatic channels.

But after 2014, Beijing’s calculus shifted. The emergence of ISIS and the growing presence of Uyghur militants in northeastern Afghanistan—particularly Badakhshan Province, which borders China’s Xinjiang region—prompted MSS to take more direct action. China feared that ETIM fighters fleeing conflict zones, often via Turkey, were regrouping near its border.

Chinese intelligence officers, including those from the MSS and the PLA’s military intelligence, expanded its footprint inside the Chinese Embassy in Kabul and began targeting local Afghan influencers—especially Members of Parliament from affected provinces. These officials were invited to “vacations” in China, where they were offered cash, hosted with care, and asked to share intelligence about their regions. Their relatives were offered scholarships and Chinese-language education. MSS leveraged these officials to target provincial governors, police commanders, and community leaders for further influence.

Engaging the NDS: A Partnership with Limits

Eventually, MSS sought formal engagement with the Afghan intelligence community. Initially cautious due to our close relationships with the CIA and other Western agencies, the Chinese approached both the Office of the President and senior NDS officials. High-ranking Chinese delegations, including Politburo members and MSS deputy directors, visited Kabul and opened dialogue.

Their primary interest was not in Afghanistan’s broader stability or democracy—it was in neutralizing ETIM.

In 2016, we established a joint counterterrorism unit: eight MSS officers working alongside a dozen Afghan case officers and analysts. While the collaboration was framed as mutual, Chinese officials were assertive and fixated. They would repeatedly push intelligence partners to focus on specific targets, often raising the same names in meetings with senior Afghan and even U.S. officials.

MSS offered technical support to NDS, particularly in signals intelligence (SIGINT), which comprised 80% of our raw intelligence. While this support came through MSS channels, it is likely that PLA cyber and signals units—previously known as 3PLA and now part of the PLA’s Information Support Force—were also involved behind the scenes or in an advising capacity. Our assessment found MSS prioritized learning NDS’s capabilities over improving them. We rejected offers of equipment and sensitive technical aid and kept our digital infrastructure tightly compartmentalized.

China’s intelligence architecture is multilayered. In addition to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), agencies such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Intelligence Bureau of the Joint Staff Department (formerly known as 2PLA), the PLA’s Cyberspace Force and Information Support Force (formerly 3PLA), and the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission (previously the General Political Department Liaison Office, or GPDLO) each conduct overseas intelligence, HUMINT, and influence operations—often under diplomatic, journalistic, or commercial cover. This complexity often goes unnoticed but is central to understanding China’s gray zone activities.

China’s Strategic Apathy Toward the Republic

Unlike many of Afghanistan’s partners, China demonstrated no interest in preserving the Afghan Republic. As the U.S.-Taliban peace talks advanced and President Biden’s withdrawal plan crystallized, MSS showed no concern for institutional continuity. Instead, they accelerated covert outreach to Taliban factions—replicating their northeast strategy of assistance, relationship-building, and targeted intelligence requests.

Chinese intelligence services continued to focus on ETIM. While the MSS was the primary interlocutor, other entities reportedly provided technical training and surveillance support to the Taliban’s General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI). Following the Taliban’s takeover, former Afghan SIGINT officers reported observing Chinese technicians inspecting GDI’s signals intelligence infrastructure—raising concerns about potential Chinese access to post-Republic systems. This growing alignment now extends beyond Kabul into Afghanistan’s strategic peripheries.

In Badakhshan province Chinese companies are operating mining projects in districts such as Shignan, Shahre Bozorg, Raghha, and Yaftal Payen. Presented as economic development, these projects let Chinese intelligence surveil border zones and track Uyghur militants. The mining operations likely serve dual purposes: resource extraction and the embedding of forward intelligence assets under the cover of commercial engagement.

Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.

Beyond Afghanistan: A Global Gray Zone Pattern

Afghanistan is far from an outlier. China’s intelligence and influence playbook extends broadly across the developing world, leveraging economic presence as a key tool for long-term strategic penetration in what can best be described as gray zone competition.

Pakistan offers a critical case study. Having lived there as a refugee from 1988 to 2001, I witnessed firsthand how China evolved from an economic partner to a deep intelligence and defense collaborator. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, China steadily deepened its role in Pakistani infrastructure, defense, and nuclear development—significantly strengthening Islamabad’s strategic posture against India. This relationship has since matured into a robust intelligence and military alliance.

Chinese technologies, including surveillance platforms and drones, have reportedly been deployed in recent Indo-Pakistani confrontations—marking their first use in live regional conflict. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s heavy dependence on Chinese investment through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has facilitated deeper Chinese Intelligence entrenchment, disguised as security cooperation.

This pattern extends beyond Asia. In Africa, Huawei’s surveillance systems in countries like Uganda enable Chinese intelligence access, while in Latin America, Peru’s Chancay port conceals Chinese intelligence operations, much like Afghanistan’s mining projects. Investments often conceal surveillance and intelligence. This covert encroachment threatens state sovereignty, undermines alliances, and demands a comprehensive U.S.-led response to counter China’s gray zone strategy.

Strategic Lessons for the United States

China’s engagement with developing nations is not always adversarial. In some cases, its presence has contributed to regional forums, infrastructure development, and even security coordination. But it’s also carefully calculated. Chinese intelligence agencies do not operate randomly—they target areas of strategic concern, build long-term leverage, and prioritize influence over ideology.

The United States should avoid dismissing these efforts as mere economic opportunism. When the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan, it left behind a vacuum that China quickly filled—not only through commercial activity, but by embedding Chinese intelligence influence inside Taliban intelligence.

This pattern is not unique to Afghanistan. Based on firsthand experience with how China operates covertly under the banner of economic engagement, it is highly likely that similar influence operations are unfolding in other countries where Chinese investment and development projects are expanding. The U.S. must take a more proactive approach—scrutinizing Chinese activities beyond just trade and tariffs—and develop a clearer understanding of how China embeds intelligence and influence networks in fragile or strategically significant nations.

America still has leverage. Hundreds of thousands of Afghans were trained through U.S. military, educational, and governance programs. This young diaspora represents a future democratic force. Rather than cede the ground, Washington should support the formation of a credible Afghan opposition—one that reflects the will of the Afghan people and preserves their connections to the democratic world.

China’s intelligence services have mastered the art of quiet influence. What starts as economic cooperation evolves into deep-rooted intelligence presence—often without the host nation fully realizing the shift. In Afghanistan and beyond, Chinese intelligence has successfully positioned itself to secure Beijing’s interests while eroding U.S. influence.

Understanding—and countering—this strategy requires not just vigilance, but a long-term investment in allies, civil society, and the information domain in the developing world.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

Are Undersea Cables a “Backdoor for Espionage” Against the U.S.?

CIPHER BRIEF REPORTING — The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and members of Congress are warning that China may be engaged in underwater espionage – accessing government and private-sector data that travel via the vast global network of undersea cables.

The FCC voted Thursday to accelerate the deployment of American-made submarine cable systems, and prohibit the use of technology manufactured in China in any subsea cables that reach the United States. And last month the chairs of three House committees wrote to the CEOs of Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon, asking them to identify the extent to which the subsea cable systems they use are produced, maintained, or repaired by China-based firms.

In their letter to the big tech companies, the members of Congress called undersea cables “one of the most strategically significant, and increasingly vulnerable, components of the world’s digital infrastructure…powering not only global commerce and innovation but also the core operational systems of national security, intelligence, and defense,” and they warned that the cables could “become a backdoor for espionage, disruption, or exploitation of U.S. data and communications assets.”

More broadly, the undersea cable questions are the latest in a series of concerns about actions taken by Beijing to infiltrate American critical infrastructure, following cyberattacks and breaches of U.S. water systems, power grids and other networks.

“The Chinese have been grabbing big data from all forms of communication that traverse the earth, including a substantial amount of U.S. and allied data,” Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mike Studeman, a former Commander of the Office of Naval Intelligence, told The Cipher Brief. “This is not some kind of theoretical threat. This is trying to stop something that's underway.”

The potential infiltration of the undersea cable network is “a significant threat,” Nick Thompson, a former CIA paramilitary officer and Naval Special Warfare Development Group operator, told The Cipher Brief. “China has invested heavily in cable repair infrastructure, and combined with its constant nefarious maritime activity throughout the world, it’s logical to elevate the risks to the highest levels of [the U.S.] government.”

Sabotage and espionage on the ocean floor

As The Cipher Brief has reported, undersea cables have become a vast and largely unseen piece of critical global infrastructure. Roughly 650 cables cover more than 800,000 miles of ocean floor, carrying a staggering 98 percent of the world’s data – everything from e-mail traffic to military communications to an estimated $22 trillion in financial transactions processed every day.

“When you think about the capacity of those cables, it's terabytes of information versus gigabytes of information through satellites,” Rear Adm. Studeman said. “When you go through satellites, it's like drinking a glass of water in terms of the amount of data throughput. But undersea cables, it's like trying to drink a large swimming pool worth of data. And so the threat is significant…people trying to get into your communications, manipulate them, or outright disrupt them through severing and cutting.”

The U.N. estimates that between 150-200 incidents of undersea cable damage occur each year, and while most are accidents involving dredging operations, dragged anchors, or natural disasters, cables have also been targeted by saboteurs, operating in what one report called the “gray zone of deniable attacks short of war.”

Russia and China have been accused of intentionally severing cables, particularly in the Baltic Sea and the waters near Taiwan. In one of the most widely-reported cases, Taiwan said that two submarine cables leading to its island of Matsu had been cut in 2023, causing widespread internet outages. Taiwan blamed two Chinese vessels for the damage, and officials in Taipei said they had documented 27 incidents since 2018 of Chinese vessels damaging undersea cables that served the island.

China and Russia have denied tampering with any undersea cables.

The latest concerns are less about cutting cables, and more about the entities that manufacture and maintain the undersea network. More than 90 percent of the world’s subsea cables are manufactured and installed by four private firms: the American SubCom, France’s Alcatel Submarine Networks, Japan’s Nippon Electric Company and China’s HMN Technologies. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), HMN, formerly known as Huawei Marine Networks Co., Ltd., has been the world’s fastest-growing subsea cable builder over the past decade, and accounts for 18 % of the cables currently on the ocean floor.

HMN and the State-controlled Chinese firm S.B. Submarine Systems (SBSS) are also major players in the cable repair space – and they routinely underbid other companies for the repair work. According to CSIS, HMN Technologies’ bids for undersea cable projects are priced 20 to 30 percent lower than its rivals.

“If we rely on China for repairs, then something can be inserted in that process to tap that particular cable,” Beth Sanner, a former Deputy Director for National Intelligence at the ODNI, told The Cipher Brief. “Anytime a Chinese ship repair operation is happening…all of these companies report back to Beijing. So I consider that an absolutely high risk.”

Thompson noted that China offers an unparalleled suite of maintenance and repair services for the subsea cable networks – they have “available assets, they have the technical skill, and their services are much cheaper than Western companies,” he said. And the CSIS report warned of frequent repairs done by “high-risk vendors, some of whom are Chinese.” It found that “the overreliance on Chinese repair ships due to limited alternatives in the marketplace is another vulnerability…There are concerns that Chinese cable repair companies such as SBSS could tap undersea data streams.”

Erin Murphy, a Deputy Director at CSIS and expert on the undersea cable issue, likened the cable-repair issue to the questions any consumer might face when looking for a quick and effective fix.

“When you have a cable that needs to be repaired, you basically get in a queue to get a cable repair ship,” she told The Cipher Brief. “And sometimes it's Chinese. This doesn't mean that all Chinese ships are ready for espionage and ready for damage, but when there is a need to repair cables, you’ve got to go with the first-come, first-serve.”

Rear Adm. Studeman made the distinction between “outside-in” sabotage – the cable-cutting incidents – and “inside-out operations” that might be carried out in maintenance or repair work.

“The inside-out threat is just as significant and we need to be mindful of it,” Studeman said. Access to the cables, he said, allows U.S. adversaries to either capture data or sabotage the cables themselves.

“Part of it is about espionage and the ability to shunt information into a place where Chinese and Russian intelligence can go through it,” he said. “Even if it's encrypted, they're hoping that later on with decryption capabilities they are working on that they could end up having all this data that they can decrypt, and learn all sorts of secrets.”

Everyone needs a good nightcap. Ours happens to come in the form of a M-F newsletter that keeps you up to speed on national security. Sign up today.

What to do about the problem?

The recent congressional requests of the four tech juggernauts are essentially a probe of their exposure to undersea espionage. The letters went to those four companies for a good reason: Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft own or lease roughly half of all undersea bandwidth.

The committees asked the companies to submit detailed information on the subsea cable systems they use – the companies that manufacture and maintain them, and whether any China-linked “system elements” are used in the cables. The tech firms were also asked to provide lists of entities that had been contracted to work on the cables since Jan 1, 2018, information about how they monitor the traffic of foreign-flagged vessels near the cables, and “the physical and cyber safeguards put in place by each company to protect the cables during this maintenance or repair.”

The letters referenced Russia as well, but the focus was on China. The committees requested answers by August 4, and a briefing from each company by August 8, 2025.

After the deadlines passed, a source close to the committees would say only that the tech firms had responded and that “we have meetings set up” on the issue. The Cipher Brief reached out to Meta, Microsoft, Google and Amazon for comment but we have not heard back from them.

Whatever the companies report, experts are convinced of the risks, and many have offered potential solutions. One obvious remedy would involve turning to American companies to do the maintenance and repair work. Experts have called for growth in the Cable Security Fleet program, through which Congress has funded two privately-owned U.S. ships to repair hundreds of cables that reach the U.S.

Among other ideas: Build more cables. As CSIS’s Murphy said, “It comes down to a redundancy issue. The more cables that you lay…the more redundancy you build in.” Others have suggested establishing “a cable corridor,” in which critical cables are concentrated, meaning commercial vessels know to avoid the area, and monitoring is relatively easy. The drawback is that a malign actor would presumably learn about the location of “corridor” as well.

Rear Adm. Studeman and others have suggested the use of technology to upgrade the cable network, ensuring that more undersea cables are “smart,” and equipped with sonar to detect breaks easily. He suggested that sensors be placed in cables that would detect anomalies and “indicate that somebody's up to no good.” Such anomalies might include signal distortions, latency delays, and any hints that repair work had been done in a questionable manner.

“All those things deserve to have more sensors and therefore more analysis and more awareness,” Studeman said, “because then you will know how to act appropriately to nip something in the bud, or to stop it soon after you detect it.”

Ultimately, the concerns about infiltrating undersea cables amount to one more worry for national security officials who are already concerned that China has breached a range of critical systems in the U.S.

“We know that China's inside our critical infrastructure in the United States,” Sanner said. “And they are there to pre-position themselves in case of war, or maybe even as a preemptive thing to prevent us from interfering in, for example, a Taiwan invasion. So I would think that undersea cables are no different when it comes to the United States.”

Are you Subscribed to The Cipher Brief’s Digital Channel on YouTube? There is no better place to get clear perspectives from deeply experienced national security experts.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

How U.S. Dialogue Can Break the North Korea-Russia Alliance

OPINION — It’s time to resume talks with North Korea. During the past five years, when we didn’t talk to North Korea, they built more nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver nuclear bombs as far as the U.S. During this time, North Korea also established a close allied relationship with Russia, with a mutual defense treaty that resulted in North Korea sending over 12,000 combat troops to Russia’s Kursk region to join Russian forces in its war of aggression in Ukraine. North Korea is also providing Russia with significant quantities of artillery shells, ballistic missiles and drones. In short, North Korea is now Russia’s principal ally and supplier of weaponry for its war with Ukraine.

Logically, this should not have happened. No doubt, North Korea remembers the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of their 1961 Peace and Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union. This Treaty was replaced with a watered-down friendship treaty that made no mention of “mutual defense”. Russia ceased viewing North Korea as an ally. Russia’s focus at that time was on improving economic relations with South Korea.

North Korea’s pivot to Russia in 2024 was a smart tactical move. It put North Korea on center stage with the introduction of its troops and weaponry to aid Russia with its war with Ukraine, while messaging the U.S. and China that North Korea is an independent actor, not solely dependent on China and not fixated on a normal relationship with the U.S. North Korea’s message was and is: We can go it alone. And now we have Russia, a nuclear superpower that not only accepts our status as a nuclear weapons state, but provides us with the nuclear, missile and satellite technical support necessary to exponentially increase our nuclear and missile capabilities.

But is this what North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, really wants? Is this what his grandfather, Kim Il-Sung, and father, Kim Jong-Il, really wanted for North Korea? Certainly since 1994, North Korea’s focus was having a normal relationship with the U.S. For thirteen years, ending in October 2016, with my last face-to-face meeting with North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister, I was repeatedly told that North Korea aspired to normal relations with the U.S., asking to be accepted as a nuclear weapons state, promising never to use these weapons offensively; they were a deterrent, to prevent war. And North Korea would be a good friend of the U.S., no longer tethered to China. They cited Pakistan as a model to emulate – “you did it with Pakistan, you can do it with us.”

In the next few weeks, there will be a summit between President Donald Trump and South Korea’s Lee Jae Myung. No doubt trade issues will be discussed, but I think a fair amount of time will be spent on national security issues and developments with North Korea.

A few days ago, Kim Yo-Jong, the powerful sister of Mr. Kim, said Kim Jong-Un’s relationship with Donald Trump wasn’t bad, implying that dialogue with the U.S. was possible. Ms. Kim conditioned such dialogue on the U.S. “accepting North Korea as a nuclear power.” Ms. Kim spoke of the changed reality since the Trump-Kim summits in Singapore (2018) and Hanoi (2019) and the symbolic DMZ meeting in 2019. And that changed reality is North Korea’s mutual defense treaty with Russia and its military assistance to Russia for its war in Ukraine, and the nuclear and missile support Russia is providing to North Korea. This new relationship with Russia has emboldened Mr. Kim, which could incite the North Korean leader to be overly aggressive and optimistic in his relationship with South Korea.

While saying dialogue with the U.S. was possible, Ms. Kim was clear in stating that South Korea was the enemy and the North was not interested in a dialogue with the South. Despite Ms. Kim’s harsh words for South Korea and the new Lee Jae-Myung government – which most South Koreans have become accustomed to hearing – the North recently stopped its harassing broadcasts to the South, apparently in response to the new Lee government halting all its broadcasts to North Korea, to include the National Intelligence Service’s daily broadcast of news, dramas and K-pop music.

Everyone needs a good nightcap. Ours happens to come in the form of a M-F newsletter that keeps you up to speed on national security. Sign up today.

South Korea knows the U.S. position on North Korea retaining nuclear weapons has not changed: Complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This was the language Mr. Kim’s father, Kim Jong-Il, accepted in the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the Six Party talks, and the language Mr. Kim personally accepted in the June 2018 Singapore summit – “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

This is the time for President Donald Trump to personally reach out to Kim Jong-un and arrange for senior officials from both countries to meet to arrange for a third summit between the two presidents. No one wants a repeat of the failed Hanoi Summit, so preliminary arrangements must be thorough, with agreement on a deliverable – further meetings of the principals or their senior representatives and agreement on what the U.S. and North Korea are prepared to offer. For North Korea, they can and should halt all nuclear tests, fissile material production, ballistic missile launches, cyber and other illicit activities directed at the U.S. and end their military support to Russia for its war of aggression with Ukraine. For the U.S., the easing and lifting of sanctions imposed on and after 2016, economic development assistance, security assurances, a path to ending the Korean War with a peace treaty and the eventual establishment of liaison offices in our respective capitals.

The issue of denuclearization would initially encompass a statement from both sides as to their ultimate goals. For North Korea: Acceptance as a nuclear power. For the U.S.: Complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This will be a subject further discussed, once we move to the lifting/removal of sanctions and North Korea halts nuclear tests and fissile material production and suspends missile launches. This likely will be a protracted process, requiring considerable time for negotiations.

President Donald Trump has the personal relationship with Kim Jong Un to resume talks with a North Korea that is building more nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them, while embracing a revanchist Russian Federation.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

I just want to read the news

Get the news and only the news!

Guardian

Back to top

Kaupunki

Back to top

Yle

Back to top

CNN

Back to top

Hesari

Back to top

Al Jazeera

Back to top

New York Times

Back to top

Reuters

Back to top

NPR

Back to top

The Cipher Brief

Norman T. Roule

Back to top