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“This is not at all a strategy-driven [FY 2027 defense] budget. This is a budget-driven budget. If you look at the Truth Social posts by the President [Trump] and the statements of the people around him, he [President Trump] makes very clear that this budget was driven by a budget number, a budget target, an arbitrary level that was set based on five percent of last year's GDP…They set this arbitrary level and then at relatively the last minute in the budget development process the [Defense] Department was told come up with a request that gets you to this number, this $1.5 trillion number. And so they did.”

That was Todd Harrison of the American Enterprise Institute and one of the nation's top experts on defense strategy and the defense budget, speaking last Tuesday at the Brookings Institution as part of a panel on The FY 2027 defense budget: How much is enough?

Remember, as I wrote last week, the Trump FY 2027 defense request is for $1.15 trillion with another $350 billion request to be placed in a FY 2026 reconciliation package; and there now also is the new FY 2026 supplemental request, which has another $67 billion for the Defense Department.

House members have been weighing all the defense numbers and this week may be voting on a FY 2026 reconciliation package of $95 billion with only $73 billion for defense – far less than what was being sought.

Last Tuesday, Harrison went on to explain what may have been going on: “I say it is absolutely not a strategy-driven [FY 2027 defense] budget because they didn't have to make hard choices. They made some easy choices.”

As an example, Harrison said, “Do you want, you know, a fourth generation fighter jet? Buy some new fourth generation [F-15s]; or do we want to continue buying the fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 we have in production; or do we want to invest in sixth generation fighters? Do all of them, right? You can do all three at once, if you have a virtually unlimited budget, you don't have to make those hard tradeoffs.”

And, in fact, all three are included in the proposed FY2027 defense budget.

But Harrison goes on to suggest another way to view this Trump defense budget giant increase saying, “There's still a limit to how much the department can consume in terms of this funding…because I don't think they [the Trump budgeteers] actually intend this to be like a one-year budget authority number, especially with the reconciliation [set at $350 billion]. I think it is actually more like a five-year budget number that they're trying to get pre-funded up front, but they actually plan to spend it at a slower pace over the next five years.”

Harrison also looked at “the parts that I think absolutely don't belong in here are these big pots of money they created in defense-wide accounts that have very little description with them.”

For example, he picked out “$54 billion in the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG) line item. That is a single program element that's got $54 billion in it,” Harrison said. “That's unprecedented. If you read the budget description with it, it gives very little detail. You know, it's [clears throat] supposed to be investments in drones and things like that, but like tell us

quantities, tell us specific types of drones, like tell us what you're going to be using it for, and that detail is not there.”

Harrison went on, “It appears they haven't figured that out yet, so I think $54 billion is quite a reach, trying to ask for that much money for something that has not yet been well defined. So, I think that there are areas here where they've really overshot and they've tried to just throw everything in there and ask for a super high number. And I wonder if they almost expect that they're not going to get that full number -- that Congress will cut them back down quite a bit. But they were just trying to reach that overall $1.5 trillion level.”

As Yahoo Finance pointed out earlier this month, the $54 billion for DAWG sought for FY 2027 is 243 times greater than what DAWG got this year, and “now exceeds the entire Marine Corps budget request of $52.8 billion and represents nearly 15% of the entire $350 billion reconciliation package.”

Harrison’s view: “You get to the endgame, Congress is going to have to sort through this and say, ‘Okay, what are the what things in here are serious things that really do need to get funded one way or the other, and we'll have to figure out how to make that happen, and what are the other things that were just budget gimmicks or just filler?’"

Harrison was not the only expert on last Tuesday’s Brookings panel.

Joining him were David Wessel, who runs Brookings’ tax and fiscal policy in the economic studies program; and Mara Karlin, professor at John's Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, who has worked for six Defense Secretaries over her career.

Wessel took a broader financial view saying, “The President is proposing a big defense budget at a time when we have unsustainable fiscal trajectory, and so I think that raises an important question and that question is…budgeting is about tradeoffs and the President and Congress at the moment seem to be avoiding trade-offs. There are ways we could offset if defense spending is really important. We should think about ways to pay for some of it either by cutting some other places in defense or raising taxes. And there's some ideas floating around on that, but none of them are politically popular.”

Wessel also raised two other issues: “I think it also requires some trust on the part of the public that the money is being well spent and that relies on Congress doing oversight. And secondly, that we are sticking with a military that is nonpartisan and follows the leadership of the President and the Congress, but is not totally politicized. And I'm afraid that the trust in the military is being eroded by some of the personnel decisions that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is making. And I think that's a problem.”

As for Karlin, she referred to the Trump national strategy and focused on what she called “a break with the bipartisanship that has characterized how folks have thought about these threats for a long time.”

Karlin noted, “The real emphasis of this [Trump national] strategy is on the Western Hemisphere, right? The real threat is seen in this strategy as these alleged narco-terrorists as they're so named…So, that's the priority.”

But, she adds, “You then see China mentioned, but in a pretty circumscribed way, just the first island chain. And in general, the language reads a lot softer than almost any recent defense strategy. You see a desire to downgrade involvement in European affairs, a little bit of mention of the Middle East, but in no way signaling that we would be starting this massive [Iran] conflict. And so here's where I think, there's some confusion worth highlighting because traditionally a national defense strategy is a decoder ring. It's going to tell you where the Secretary of Defense will put their energy and attention.”

“When we look at this budget, this very large budget, that's really at kind of World War levels,” Karlin said, “and frankly, the number [$1.5 trillion] isn't really merited by the strategy.”

She explained, “If one were really to just prioritize the Western Hemisphere and this quite circumcised focus on China as a major threat, and not be involved in most other regions of the world, in fact, the Trump administration could have put out a quite tiny defense budget request. So I leave you with a bit of perplexity.”

Two more things Harrison mentioned need recording.

“I forgot to address the [Trump] battleship issue,” Harrison said at one point, “because you know that's in here and far from defending it, I think that's one of those examples of things that got thrown in because they didn't have to make tough choices.”

Then he explained, “No one in the Navy can say with a straight face that we're going to go from starting a brand-new, clean-ship design in FY 2027, to procuring the lead-class [battle]ship in FY 2028, to going to all the way by FY 2031 being at full rate production, ready to buy them at one per year. That doesn't pass the laugh test…And so are we just setting ourselves up to spend a few billion dollars chasing, you know, this weird idea before we eventually have to cancel it and then things go back to the way they were before.”

Finally, Harrison said, “I think there needs to be some fundamental look on the congressional side at just how do we reform the budget process to get it working again; open the aperture to things like changing the start date of the fiscal year [which now begins October 1], re-jiggering the committee structure.”

I believe Harrison is questioning why each year the Armed Services Committees in both the House and Senate each authorize spending programs, and then the House and Senate Appropriations Committees set the actual dollar-level of funds made available for that year.

“You know,” Harrison said, “I'm talking a lot of third rails here, but I think we're at that kind of point like we were in the early 1970s where Congress realized it [the budgeting process] just wasn't working. I think that they need to do some serious inward-looking reform like that.”

I agree, having twice worked on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the 1960s, and followed defense spending over the past 60 years. Harrison is right – the Legislative Branch system for passing Executive Branch funding needs to be repaired.

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Ankara's Charm Offensive Should Not Buy Back the F-35

The choreography in Ankara last week was impressive, even by Recep Tayyip Erdogan's standards. Cannons fired, mounted honor guards paraded, and jets flew overhead trailing red, white, and blue smoke as Donald Trump arrived for the NATO summit. By the time the two leaders sat down together, the American President was already telling reporters that Turkey has been "much more loyal" than other allies, and that reinstating Ankara into the F-35 program is "certainly something we will consider." He went further, promising to lift the sanctions imposed under CAATSA after Turkey's 2019 purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system.

Washington should slow down and reconsider any such move. The temptation to reward Erdogan for a good show of pageantry and for playing a useful back channel to Tehran is understandable. But the case for readmitting Turkey to America's most sensitive fighter jet program does not hold up, and the reasons go well beyond the S-400 that got Ankara expelled in the first place.

Let’s start with Turkey’s original sin. Turkey was removed from the F-35 program precisely because the S-400 system stationed on Turkish soil poses a collection risk to the F-35's stealth signature and sensor data. Nothing about that system has left the country. Trump's own suggestion that he has "no concerns at all" about Turkey operating Russian and American systems side by side ignores the technical judgment his own administration reached in 2019: an S-400 battery within range of an F-35 is an intelligence-gathering platform aimed at the jet's most guarded secrets.

Turkey now appears it wants to atone for its sins: In the days that followed the NATO summit, well-placed sources in Ankara announced Turkey’s intention to sell or transfer its S-400s to another country, possibly Qatar or the United Arab Emirates. Doing so may satisfy the letter of the law, section 1245 of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, which bars F-35 transfers to Turkey unless Washington certifies Ankara no longer "possesses" the S-400.

Then come regional concerns. Israel has lobbied hard against the F-35 sale, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warning that Turkish F-35s would erode the air superiority that guarantees Israeli and American posture across the Middle East. Athens and Nicosia have made similar appeals, citing Turkey's continued military pressure in the Aegean and its decades-long occupation of northern Cyprus. These are warnings from allies and partners who would sit on the receiving end of Turkish airpower upgraded with fifth-generation stealth.

But there is a fourth danger that has drawn far less attention in Washington, and it may matter more than any of the others: Turkey's telecommunications backbone is no longer fully Turkish. The country's leading systems integrator, Netaş, is roughly 48 percent owned by ZTE, and Huawei is deeply embedded in the networks operated by Turkcell, Türk Telekom, and Vodafone Turkey. Under China's 2017 National Intelligence Law, that ownership is not a passive investment. Beijing can compel any Chinese firm, anywhere it operates, to hand over data on demand, and corporate assurances of independence carry no legal weight against that obligation.

Washington has already treated this exact problem as disqualifying. In 2021, a $23 billion F-35 and drone package for the United Arab Emirates collapsed, in part because Huawei was building Abu Dhabi's 5G network and American intelligence had identified a suspected Chinese military-linked facility at Khalifa Port.

Turkey’s embrace of Chinese telecoms also cuts against the Alliance’s moves towards securing the critical infrastructure underpinning its military mobility — the bridges, rail links, and digital networks that allow allies to uphold deterrence. Across the continent, these networks have become a critical target over the course of the war in Ukraine, as adversarial actors linked to Russia use grey zone tactics to undermine collective resilience and damage alliance cohesion.

Washington increasingly views countering this threat as a top priority. In May, the Trump administration urged NATO members to spend a portion of the 1.5 percent of GDP allocated to defense-related spending on removing Huawei components from their domestic networks, highlighting the vulnerabilities posed by Chinese equipment and hacking campaigns such as Salt Typhoon. While that call is already being heeded by several NATO allies — Sweden and the UK have been particularly proactive in securing their systems — Ankara remains a laggard, undermining its contribution to alliance interoperability.

The risks are not simply tied to the F-35 itself, but to its entire operating environment. If sold, the fighter will be operating within an ecosystem saturated by Chinese-produced telecom equipment, reliant on a deployment infrastructure whose roots directly tie back to Beijing, operated by a capital pulling in the opposite direction of a key Alliance priority. While the U.S. has heavily invested in protecting the F-35, no system is ever fully secure, and any sale would force the jet to operate in a vulnerable environment for decades to come.

Turkey’s pending S-400 sale may remove dangerous hardware, but it does not eliminate the systemic risk associated with the deal.

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25 Years After 9/11, the Next Global Shock Could be Worse

The next 9/11 is unlikely to be another terrorist attack of equivalent scale nor a cyber-attack nor even another pandemic. The next global shock may be the use of nuclear weapons assisted by the more casual attitudes of less responsible world leaders and the lack of popular understanding and fear.

Journalists around the world are already working on their articles for the 25th anniversary of 9/11 this autumn. Most assume that the focus should be on Afghanistan and the renewed threat there from ISIS-K (the Khorasan province of the Islamic State terrorist group) and from the remaining elements of Al Qaida. A United Nations report alleges that both groups are surviving if not prospering in Afghanistan. But history tends not to repeat itself and, although President Biden's evacuation of Afghanistan following President Trump's Doha Agreement with the Taliban was a costly error, there are no signs that either group could carry out an attack of the magnitude of that terrible day in New York and Washington.

"the scourge of terrorism...is much closer to home"

The scourge of terrorism will, of course, continue and nowadays it is much closer to home, both in West Africa and inside our own countries where isolated young men self-radicalise in their bedrooms and then take a kitchen knife or the family car and attempt to do their worst.

In the 1990s Western governments worried a great deal about chemical and biological (CB) terrorism, particularly after the Aun Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway. In London there was concern about a mass casualty attack on the London Underground. But a CB attack is extremely hard to undertake and that very complexity means that security services should become aware of planning.

Since 9/11 security services have become much more skilled at monitoring terrorist preparations. No agency on earth can expect to surveil every disgruntled loner (nor should that be the expectation) but Artificial Intelligence (AI) will greatly assist services around the world, flagging, for example, unusual travel patterns and the purchase of precursor materials.

Indeed AI would surely have "joined the dots" prior to 9/11 after the British had warned of attacks in New York involving the hijacking of airliners by AQ and the Americans had other evidence including unusual flying school requests.

So, if not terrorism, then what is going to provide the next global shock to rival Pearl Harbor and 9/11? In the mid-2000s the assumption was that it would be a cyber-attack. Richard Clarke, a special advisor on cyber security at the White House, wrote Cyber War (Harper Collins, 2010) which evoked an image of modern cities reduced to quasi stone age existence with air traffic control and hospitals paralysed, banks and financial transactions frozen, heating and air conditioning no longer functioning and fuel quickly running out. Cyber defences are now much stronger although AI will provide a boost to the capabilities of both attacker and defender. This is at the heart of the current debate about Anthropic's Mythos.

Covid 19 could be viewed as the successor to 9/11 in terms of global shock. It was, of course, a tragic event and there is a danger of seeming callous when observing that the World Health Organization estimated that 0.09% of the global population died (although the real figure may be slightly higher). By contrast the Black Death between 1347 and 1352 is estimated to have killed 40% of Europe's population. However the impressive and fast development of vaccines during Covid and the value of AI in shortening timelines for vaccine development and testing suggests that another pandemic might be shorter and therefore less devastating. On the flip side malign actors could use AI to develop more virulent diseases.

The extraordinary developments in warfare in Ukraine since 2022 should make governments and populations worry about the use of drones closer to home. They will surely become the routine tools of rogue states, terrorists and assassins. It is remarkable that the first (and so far only) drone assassination attempt took place back in 2018 against President Maduro of Venezuela since when Ukrainian development of drone technology has been exponential. It is only a matter of time before we see them used in a domestic context, perhaps against critical infrastructure such as nuclear reactors. All countries need to prioritize counter drone systems and some (particularly UK) require an emergency program to develop a coherent missile defence capability.

"a willingness to play nuclear roulette"

However by far the greatest danger of a massive global shock would come from the use of a nuclear weapon in anger for the first time since 1945. From 1945 to 1990 the world lived in dread of nuclear war. Films like The War Game (1966), Fail Safe (1964) and even the darkly comedic Dr Strangelove (1964) achieved genuine popular traction. Hot lines and fail-safe mechanisms were devised to minimize the danger of accidental war. Politicians liked to believe that the non-use of these weapons was due to effective mutual deterrence but, in truth, there were too many near-misses (between 9 and 22 according to a scan of reputable think tanks) for that to be a convincing argument. 45 years of nuclear non-use may sound impressive but barely moves the needle when thinking of the future of the planet and humanity.

Since the Cold War that fear of nuclear weapons seems (for no good reason) to have largely evaporated at a popular level and world leaders now make threats in a relatively casual manner. One must aim off for deterrence requiring leaders to assert their willingness to use such weapons in extremis but President Trump, President Putin, India's Prime Minister Modi and Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir have all been quoted indicating a willingness to use nuclear weapons in less than extreme circumstances.

Furthermore there has been a willingness to play nuclear roulette by firing missiles and drones near nuclear facilities. The Russians did this before seizing the Zaporizhzhia power plant and have subsequently fired missiles near Chernobyl. Iran appears to have targeted sites in the vicinity of the Dimona nuclear facility and the Indians, on 10 May 2025, deliberately hit Pakistani bases (such as Sargodha) where nuclear capable aircraft are known to be based.

In the 2000s much thought was given to preventing nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists with a particular worry about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal being accessed by AQ or other regional groups. Both Presidents Bush (junior) and Obama believed this to be a top global threat, Obama famously insisted that "The single biggest threat to U.S. security, both short term, medium term and long term, would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon." Fortunately the dual concerns about Pakistan "descending into chaos" and its army becoming Islamist have since receded.

"populist leaders cannot be trusted with weapons of such power"

Concerns about rogue Islamists have been replaced by a wider concern that increasingly populist world leaders cannot be trusted with weapons of such devastating power. Since the Millennium there has been a tangible decline in the standards of global governance. Just compare the key leaders at the time of the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis (Kennedy, Khrushchev, MacMillan and De Gaulle) with some of those controlling nuclear arsenals today (Trump, Putin, Netanyahu, Modi, Asim Munir, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un). The former four had witnessed world wars at close quarters.

In academic circles there is much debate about the dangers of AI being used inside nuclear decision-making with a particular insistence that there must always be a "human in the loop". Faster missiles lead to shorter decision times, making serious and informed human consultation virtually impossible. A retired senior Pakistani officer told the author that Pakistan had 25 seconds to consider the implications of the eleven Indian cruise missiles launched against its air bases on 10 May 2025. (A quick check of AI gives a figure of 29.77 seconds). At the time Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif was asleep. The temptation to delegate decision-making to AI could be hard to resist. However the AI debate is of secondary importance. AI might eventually mitigate human fallibility and anyway it hardly matters if the world is destroyed by a bad decision taken by AI or a human.

The use of even one nuclear weapon might be enough to shake the world out of its astonishing apathy about the nuclear threat. Rutgers University demonstrated that a war between India and Pakistan involving 150 nuclear warheads would lead to over a hundred million deaths and a climatic and environmental disaster leading to mass global starvation. A report submitted to the 10th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2021 reiterated these risks and then, bizarrely, called for more research into the effects of such weapons (as if there was not enough evidence) and questioned their legality under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as if any user is going to summon their legal advisers.

One thing is for sure. The use of modern nuclear weapons would relegate 9/11, Pearl Harbor and Covid 19 (and even Hiroshima and Nagasaki) to such a distant category of global shock that the very comparison would seem absurd.

Remember March 2020 when nobody could believe that the world was locking down due to a pandemic. A nuclear war will not be about an inability to join dots but another massive failure of human imagination.

Tim Willasey-Wilsey is a Cipher Brief Expert. He was an advisor to the British government on overseas counter-terrorism from 1996 to 1999 before advising Ministers on Asia (including the Indian Subcontinent) from 2005 to 2008.

This article first appeared on the website of RUSI-The Royal United Services Institute

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
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Winning Battles, Losing Strategy: Why Military Superiority No Longer Guarantees Victory

America’s battlefield dominance remains unmatched, but Iraq, Afghanistan and now Iran shows that tactical success increasingly fails when military power is not matched by a coherent political strategy.

No military in modern history has possessed the technological reach, global mobility and combat capability of the United States. Yet, its greatest battlefield victories have increasingly produced some of its most difficult strategic dilemmas.

This contradiction lies at the heart of American military intervention over the past several decades. Washington has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to defeat formidable opponents, overthrow governments and deploy troops across vast distances. But military supremacy has not always produced the stability, legitimacy or political order American policymakers sought.

Afghanistan revealed the limits of occupation and state-building, ending not in lasting transformation but in the return of the Taliban in 2021 after their initial ouster by American forces twenty years earlier. Iraq showed how removing a hostile regime could unintentionally strengthen Iran’s strategic position and deepen regional instability. Iran itself has proven resilient, with external pressure often hardening rather than weakening its strategic posture. Meanwhile, the Arabian Gulf has become an unpredictable region, where security, energy and great-power rivalry intersect with global consequences.

These cases raise a central question: why do tactical victories so often produce strategic setbacks?

The answer lies in the changing character of ‘limited war,’ in which military superiority remains decisive on the battlefield, but political endurance increasingly determines strategic outcomes.

The Post-War Pattern: Tactical Success, Strategic Frustration

The paradox at the heart of American military intervention is neither new nor uniquely American.

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated an unparalleled ability to project power globally. From Korea and Vietnam to the Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq, no nation has matched America’s technological sophistication, logistical reach, intelligence capabilities, or ability to sustain expeditionary operations over long distances. This record is well documented in studies published by the RAND Corporation and the U.S. Army War College Press.

Yet history demonstrates that battlefield dominance alone does not guarantee political success.

The Korean War (1950-53) ended in containment rather than reunification, while Vietnam (1965-75) exposed the limitations of overwhelming firepower against an adversary willing to absorb enormous losses in pursuit of political objectives. The Coalition victory in the 1991 Gulf War reinforced the belief that precision-guided weapons, advanced command-and-control systems, and overwhelming technological superiority had fundamentally transformed warfare.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), many policymakers concluded that American military superiority could reshape political realities well beyond the battlefield. Historical assessments by the U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian and the U.S. Army Center of Military History trace the evolution of these campaigns and their strategic consequences.

While military force remains highly effective at defeating conventional armies, destroying infrastructure, and removing governments. It has proven considerably less effective at building legitimate political institutions that can endure after foreign forces depart. As Carl von Clausewitz argued in his classic work, On War, war is an extension of politics by other means. Military victory therefore achieves little if political objectives remain undefined, unrealistic, or ultimately unattainable.

The challenge confronting modern intervention is not one of military capability but of strategic translation. Tactical victories increasingly fail to produce durable political outcomes because the post-intervention political environment is often more complex than the military campaign itself. As scholars of strategy, such as Lawrence Freedman, and the research communities at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) have argued, the decisive challenge for modern military power is no longer winning the battle but securing a sustainable political end state.

Iraq: Breaking the Anti-Iran Bulwark

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 removed Saddam Hussein from power but also eliminated Iran’s principal regional counterweight.

What Washington saw as a decisive blow against a hostile regime became, in strategic terms, a gift to Tehran.

The collapse of Iraqi state institutions created a vacuum filled by sectarian competition, militia politics, and external influence. As Iraqi institutions weakened and political fragmentation deepened, sectarian identities grew more powerful, armed groups gained legitimacy, and the state’s monopoly on force eroded.

Iranian influence expanded through political allies, security networks, and Shia militias that embedded themselves in Iraq’s evolving political, post-Saddam order.

In an ironic twist, the U.S. intervention in Iraq was meant to reduce internal danger and violence; instead, it fostered a more favourable environment for Iran and the country’s political influence.

The United States spent enormous blood and treasure removing a regime that had contained Iran for decades. In seeking to eliminate one threat, Washington disrupted the regional balance and inadvertently strengthened another. Historically, Iraq stands not only as an example of a military campaign governed by ‘shock and awe,’ but remains a stark warning about the unintended consequences of overthrowing a state without understanding what will replace it.

The occupation of Iraq damaged U.S. credibility in the Middle East by disrupting power balances without a clear post-war strategy.

It increased uncertainty among allies, created opportunities for rivals, and enabled Iran to expand its influence, reshaping the strategic landscape and contributing to greater instability.

Afghanistan: The Limits of Military Occupation

Nowhere is this paradox of modern limited war intervention more apparent than in Afghanistan.

The United States and its allies rapidly dismantled Taliban rule following the attacks of 11 September 2001. Within months, al-Qaeda’s sanctuary had been destroyed, Taliban formations dispersed, and a new Afghan government established under international protection. Militarily, the campaign was remarkably successful. Contemporary assessments of the campaign and its objectives are documented by the U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian and the CFR.

The challenge emerged only after the battlefield had been won.

Over the next two decades, Coalition forces invested enormous resources attempting to build functioning political institutions, professional security forces, and a democratic state capable of sustaining itself. Yet legitimacy proved far more difficult to establish and sustain than military capability. Extensive investigations by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) repeatedly highlighted the disconnect between military achievements, governance reform, corruption, and institutional resilience.

Corruption, weak governance, factional politics, and ongoing insurgent pressure steadily eroded public confidence in Kabul’s authority. The human, financial and strategic costs of the intervention have been comprehensively documented by the Brown University Costs of War Project.

The Taliban understood a fundamental principle of limited war: they did not need to defeat NATO militarily, only to outlast the West’s commitment to supporting Kabul.

As domestic political support in Coalition capitals diminished, strategic patience shifted in favour of the Taliban-led insurgency. The collapse of the Afghan government in 2021 demonstrated that two decades of military success could not compensate for the absence of enduring political legitimacy. Subsequent analyses by the CFR and the SIGAR conclude that institutional fragility ultimately proved more decisive than Coalition military capability.

Afghanistan, therefore, offers a broader lesson. In modern limited wars, technologically superior powers often discover that destroying hostile forces is considerably easier than replacing the political order those forces once sustained.

The lesson from Afghanistan is not unique.

In modern conflicts, technologically advanced militaries increasingly find that battlefield success is becoming decoupled from political outcomes. This reflects a broader evolution in limited war, where endurance, legitimacy and the capacity to impose continuing costs frequently outweigh conventional military superiority.

Recent assessments by the RUSI, the CSIS and the Modern War Institute at West Point (MWI) increasingly argue that political resilience and strategic endurance have become as important as battlefield dominance in determining the outcomes of contemporary conflicts.

Conclusion: Rethinking Military Success

There is an old regional saying that, rather than killing the snake, repeated attempts to strike it often make it more dangerous.

The 2026 Iran War is the starkest test of that proposition in a generation.

The US-Israeli military campaign that began on 28 February inflicted severe damage on Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure and, according to multiple reports, killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Judged by the metrics Washington and Jerusalem set—degrading capability and decapitating leadership—the campaign appeared to succeed.

Yet strategic outcomes are far less straightforward.

Reporting from Reuters, the BBC, and other outlets indicated that despite the shock of the strikes, the Iranian system moved quickly to preserve continuity. The Revolutionary Guard and other coercive institutions positioned themselves as defenders of a nation under attack. This pattern aligns with longstanding scholarship on external pressure and authoritarian resilience, which shows that coercion may consolidate regimes as easily as it weakens them. Iran’s economy was battered, its proxies pressured, and its deterrent credibility damaged, but the outcome Washington most wanted to prevent—regime survival—persisted.

This is not a defence of the regime, nor an argument that the strikes were unjustified.

Rather, it is an argument that force applied without a coherent theory of political aftermath can entrench the very resilience it seeks to break.

Iran has been hit hard, but it has also adapted, hardened, and become more difficult to read strategically. That unpredictability does not stop at Iran's borders; it radiates outward, especially across the waterway connecting Iran to global markets.

The lesson from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran is not that military intervention should never occur, nor that the United States should retreat from its global responsibilities.

Instead, the character of limited war is evolving in ways that increasingly favour politically resilient adversaries over technologically superior expeditionary powers.

This shift has become a recurring theme in contemporary strategic analysis published by the RUSI, the CSIS, and the MWI.

Cheap autonomous systems have fundamentally altered the economics of military power.

During the Cold War, technological superiority rested upon expensive platforms fielded by a handful of industrialised states. Today, relatively inexpensive drones, AI-enabled targeting systems and commercial technologies have dramatically lowered the barriers to resistance, enabling weaker actors to impose disproportionate costs upon militarily superior opponents.

Recent assessments by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), CSIS, and RUSI suggest that the strategic premium once attached to technological superiority is steadily being eroded.

Meanwhile, democratic powers continue to operate under political constraints imposed by public opinion, electoral cycles, international law, alliance commitments, and coalition management.

Their adversaries often face far fewer such limitations.

Victory is therefore no longer determined solely by military technology, but increasingly by which political system can sustain the contest for longer.

This observation reflects the enduring insights of Carl von Clausewitz and later strategic thinkers such as Robert Endicott Osgood, whose work Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (1957) emphasised the intimate relationship between military operations and political objectives.

The United States remains the world’s most capable military power.

Nothing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Iran diminishes that reality. These conflicts, however, reveal that military superiority alone no longer guarantees strategic success.

The ability to destroy an adversary’s military capability is no longer synonymous with the ability to shape the political environment that follows. As recent analyses by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and RUSI continue to argue, the decisive challenge for modern armed forces increasingly lies in translating battlefield success into enduring political outcomes.

The challenge for American policymakers is therefore not simply how to strike harder or faster, but how to ensure that military action serves coherent political objectives capable of enduring long after the shooting stops.

Great powers rarely decline because they lose battles.

More often, they decline because they mistake military victory for strategic success.

Military technology can destroy armies. It cannot, by itself, create political legitimacy.

Until strategy gives equal weight to what happens after the battlefield falls silent, even the most technologically advanced militaries will continue to confuse tactical victory with strategic success.

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Cold War 2.0 Will Be Won by Private Capital

The next Arsenal of Democracy will be built as much by investors, entrepreneurs, and operators as by government.

Cold War 2.0 is not coming, it’s already here. This version will not be fought only with tanks, missiles, ships, and proxy armies. Those still matter, but much of the real competition is taking place through capital markets, technology, critical minerals, supply chains, ports, telecommunications, manufacturing, energy, intellectual property, and information.

Put simply, much of the modern battlefield now sits in the private sector.

China understood this years ago. The Chinese Communist Party does not separate commercial activity from national strategy the way we often do in the West. Beijing treats finance, industry, technology, diplomacy, intelligence, media, and military power as parts of the same system.

The United States should not copy that model. But we do need to recognize what we are competing against. Our answer should be to unleash something authoritarian systems struggle to replicate deep, innovative, risk-tolerant capital markets. Unleash free market capitalism!

Economic security and national security are now inseparable. Government cannot realistically compete across every company, transaction, technology, and supply chain. Private capital, industry, and experienced national-security professionals must become a much larger part of the response.

China has already weaponized capital

The CCP Belt and Road Initiative is probably the clearest example.

It is usually described as an infrastructure and development program. That is true yet incomplete statement. It also combines state-backed financing, ports, telecommunications, mining rights, construction, energy, logistics, commodity access, and political/media influence.

A port is not just a port when it sits on a critical trade route. A telecom network is not merely commercial infrastructure when it carries government and economic data. A mine is not just a commodity asset when it controls access to materials needed for semiconductors, weapons, batteries, and advanced manufacturing.

Beijing understands that capital can create strategic leverage without firing a shot. It can lock up supply chains, shape political decisions, create economic dependencies, and establish long-term access.

The West has spent too much time debating whether this is development, competition, or coercion. China has simply kept investing. The answer is not more bureaucracy or a watered-down version of Chinese state capitalism. The answer is Western capital showing up with a better proposition: better governance, stronger local partnerships, durable jobs, superior technology, and financing that does not come with hidden strategic strings.

You cannot warn countries away from Chinese money while offering nothing credible in its place.

Private capital is ready for the next chapter

Over the last decade, private capital poured into early-stage companies across defense, AI, autonomy, cyber, space, communications, robotics, energy, and advanced manufacturing.

That movement mattered. It helped create a new generation of national-security companies outside the traditional defense-industrial base.

But startup land is no longer the only opportunity.

A much larger pool of capital is now looking for what comes next. That includes growth equity, private equity, infrastructure funds, family offices, pension capital, and institutional investors that may not want early-stage technology risk but understand industrial businesses, hard assets, recurring cash flow, and long-duration infrastructure.

The next phase is not just building new companies. It is acquiring, recapitalizing, modernizing, and scaling strategic assets that already exist.

That includes mines, processing facilities, ports, defense suppliers, energy infrastructure, semiconductor capacity, logistics networks, telecommunications, and advanced manufacturing.

It also includes rebuilding advanced and autonomous shipbuilding capabilities. The United States does not simply need better ship designs. It needs modern yards, modular production, digital engineering, robotic fabrication, advanced materials, and the ability to produce autonomous surface and undersea systems at scale.

Capital that modernizes shipyards and expands autonomous maritime production is not investing in just another industrial theme. It is investing directly in deterrence.

These sectors are not merely investment categories. They are components of national power.

Private equity already knows how to fight

None of this requires inventing a new financial discipline.

Private equity firms, distressed investors, activist funds, and turnaround specialists already know how to identify weak assets, acquire companies during periods of dislocation, restructure liabilities, replace poor management, consolidate industries, and create value where others see a mess.

In many ways, corporate raiding and economic warfare are already part of the private-equity world. The terminology may be different, but the mechanics are familiar: pressure, leverage, information, timing, capital, and execution. The opportunity now is to pursue profit while also strengthening the economic and national security of the United States and its allies.

That does not mean investors should accept poor returns in the name of patriotism. The model only works if the investments are commercially sound.

Buy the mine because it is undervalued and strategically important. Recapitalize the manufacturer because it can generate a return and rebuild domestic capacity. Finance the port because it is a good asset and reduces adversarial leverage. Modernize the shipyard because it can become profitable while restoring critical naval capacity.

Profit and patriotism do not have to be competing ideas.

A modern Letter of Marque

There is a useful historical precedent.

In the early United States, Congress could issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal. Privately financed vessels were authorized to capture enemy shipping under a legal framework established by government.

The private sector supplied the ships, crews, and capital and accepted the risk. Government defined the adversary, set the rules, and provided legal authority.

The modern lesson is not that investors should be turned loose to seize assets outside the law. It is that America has used public authority before to direct private risk-taking toward national objectives.

A modern equivalent would be financial, legal, and commercial. It could include tax-advantaged national-security funds, political-risk insurance, export-credit support, allied co-investment vehicles, faster regulatory review for strategic acquisitions, purchasing commitments, and carefully managed threat briefings for vetted investors.

Government sets the conditions.

Private capital finds the opportunity, performs the diligence, assumes the risk, improves the asset, and earns the return.

That is not piracy. It is economic statecraft through markets.

Government should set the objective, not run the deal

Government has an important role, but it needs to understand its limitations.

It should identify strategic priorities, provide clear demand signals, enforce laws, share appropriate threat information, and create incentives where markets are not properly pricing national-security risk.

What it should not do is try to become a venture capitalist, private-equity manager, or operating executive. A venture-capital model is useful: signal the problem, invite multiple solutions, fund in stages, establish measurable milestones, scale what works, and stop funding what does not.

We do not need another innovation command or working group that spends two years admiring the problem.

We need clear objectives, credible markets, and room for professionals to execute.

The Americas should be the first major test

This approach is especially important in Latin America.

Chinese capital has expanded across the region through mining, energy, ports, telecommunications, logistics, agriculture, and manufacturing. Washington cannot simply warn governments and business families about Chinese influence and expect them to walk away from available financing.

Western capital must compete.

A modern economic Marshall Plan for the Americas should be driven largely by private investment, working alongside aligned governments, local families, entrepreneurs, and industrial groups.

The pitch should be practical: better capital, better governance, stronger local partnerships, more jobs, and a business model that leaves more value in the country.

That is how Chinese influence gets displaced—by offering something better, not simply issuing warnings from Washington.

The fiscal argument matters

There is also a major federal-budget advantage.

Under the traditional model, government identifies a strategic need, appropriates taxpayer money, creates a program office, hires contractors, and carries most of the financial risk.

Private capital changes that equation.

Investors fund the companies and acquisitions. They absorb losses when investments fail. When they succeed, they create jobs, profits, tax revenue, industrial capacity, and stronger supply chains.

Government gains capability without paying the entire bill.

This does not eliminate the need for defense budgets, grants, procurement, or public infrastructure. Some missions only the government can perform. But every strategic capability financed primarily by private investors is one less burden placed entirely on the federal balance sheet.

That is not deficit reduction through austerity. It is deficit reduction through growth, investment, and a larger tax base.

Capital is becoming an instrument of national power

Cold War 2.0 will be shaped by AI, autonomy, cyber, space, critical minerals, energy, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, autonomous shipbuilding, logistics, and financial networks.

The next Manhattan Project will not be one building or weapons program. It will be an ecosystem of investors, entrepreneurs, private-equity firms, family offices, corporations, universities, operators, and national-security professionals working toward aligned outcomes.

The CCP has shown what centralized state power can do when fused with capital.

The West’s answer should be the full mobilization of free enterprise.

Cold War 2.0 will be won as much in boardrooms, factories, ports, shipyards, bankruptcy courts, and investment

committees as on traditional battlefields.

Capital is not simply financing the arsenal anymore.

Capital is becoming the arsenal.

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The Pentagon Built a Faster Engine, Nobody Built the Steering

The Department of War has just executed the most ambitious acquisition reform in six decades. It scrapped JCIDS — the requirements process that ossified innovation for a generation; replaced program offices with portfolio executives, and built a Warfighting Acquisition System designed for speed.

The changes deliver on years of reform proposals. They also risk repeating a costly mistake of the post-9/11 wars: chasing evolving threats with rapid fixes while no one is responsible for understanding them. Industry will help determine which path prevails.

Counter-drone fight as test case. We’ve seen this movie before

Consider the counter-drone fight, the clearest test of the new system. Washington treats it as an engineering puzzle: build a better jammer, field a cheaper interceptor. The technology shelf is full — directed-energy weapons at $12 a shot, drone-on-drone interceptors with more than a thousand kills in Ukraine.

While the technology works, the process for getting it to the warfighter does not.

Soldiers today engage FPV drones that cost a few hundred dollars with $400,000 Stinger missiles, because the cheap interceptors proven in Ukraine still have no fast path into U.S. formations. A new drone variant appears on the battlefield every week, built from commercial parts and open-source software. A firmware update that defeats a jammer costs nothing and takes hours. Our counter, even through the reformed system, takes months.

This is not a technology gap. It is a cycle-time gap. And I have seen it before. From 2010 to 2013, I led the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force at the height of the counter-IED campaign in Afghanistan. The structural parallels are exact: cheap dual-use components, knowledge that spreads faster than countermeasures, adaptation at near-zero cost, tactical variation that defeats one-size-fits-all solutions, and an institutional reflex to throw technology at a systems problem. We spent $75 billion on counter-IED and lost that fight anyway. Drones are IEDs that fly.

The part nobody owns

Here is what the reforms miss: Successful innovation runs in six phases — detect, define, develop, deploy, assess, distribute. The reforms invested almost entirely in the middle two, develop and deploy. Nobody persistently monitors how the threat evolves at the tactical edge. Nobody scopes each unit’s problem with enough precision to drive useful solutions. Nobody measures whether fielded systems actually work against an adversary who adapts after every engagement. And nobody moves what one unit learns to every other unit facing the same threat at operational speed. Three of the six phases have no organizational owner.

The department built a faster engine. Nobody built the steering — the mechanism that decides which problems the engine should be pointed at, whether the solutions worked, and who else needs to know.

Industry’s new role

That gap is the industry's opportunity — and its obligation. The DoW can’t solve this problem by itself. Companies that want to matter in this market need to do their part. They should start by doing three things differently.

First, invest in problem discovery, not product pitches. Requirements still originate in headquarters, not from soldiers watching the problem in context. The companies that win the next decade will be the ones that put engineers and business developers forward with operational units to understand problems before proposing solutions. The quality of your solution is determined by the quality of the problem you choose to solve. Einstein’s formula applies: 55 minutes on the problem, five on the solution. Most of industry has that ratio inverted.

Second, build for adaptation, not for the requirement. If your product cannot change in weeks — modular hardware, software-defined behavior, upgrades at firmware speed — it is obsolete on delivery. The adversary’s development cycle runs in days. A requirement frozen at contract award is a snapshot of a threat that no longer exists.

Third, plug into the new portfolio structure as a sensor, not just a supplier. Industry keeps asking the department for a clearer demand signal, and fairly so. But the demand signal has to come from somewhere, and the fusion cells that Portfolio Acquisition Executives need — nodes that merge ground truth from the field with what industry and the labs know is possible — cannot function without industry feeding data in and absorbing assessment data out. Companies that operate at that tempo will define the portfolios. Companies that wait for RFPs will trail them.

Doing these three things means stopping three others. Stop building to frozen requirements and calling it responsiveness. Stop treating a prototype contract or a demo-day win as the finish line — it is the starting line of the assessment the department never runs. And stop spending capture budgets decoding what headquarters wants instead of discovering what the warfighter needs. The hours are the same; the direction is not.

New authorities need new operators

None of this works without people, and people are where the reform agenda is thinnest. The department is converting the Defense Acquisition University into a Warfighting Acquisition University, trading compliance training for scenario-based judgment. That is the right instinct. But this year’s defense authorization offered little else on workforce, which means the authorities changed faster than the people who must wield them.

We know what works: experiential, problem-first education. Hacking for Defense has spent a decade putting university students to work on real national security problems alongside the people who own them. It has produced a generation of founders and public servants who know how to interrogate a problem before building a solution. That model needs to scale — into the department’s schoolhouses, into two-way exchanges between government and industry, and into industry’s own training pipelines, which today produce engineers who have never seen the field and capture teams fluent in the FAR but not in the mission.

The department has reformed how it acquires. It has not yet reformed what it acquires, whether it worked, or who else needs to know. Industry can wait – and hope – the government will close that gap, or it can help close it — by discovering problems & opportunities at the edge, building for adaptation, and educating a workforce trained to out-cycle an adversary rather than out-comply a regulation.

In this fight, the adversary does not need to out-technology us. He only needs to out-cycle us. We have already paid $75 billion to learn where that leads.

Pete Newell is a retired U.S. Army colonel, former director of the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, and CEO of BMNT. He co-created Hacking for Defense with Steve Blank and is the author of “The Innovation Targeting Cycle.”

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The West Must Tell Russians the Truth About the War

Tell the Russian people about the carnage in Russia’s war with Ukraine. Tell them about the Russian lives lost and the crushing financial cost of a five-year invasion of a sovereign nation. Former President Ronald Reagan ensured that he got information into the former Soviet Union to truthfully speak to the people about their government’s lies about the cost – in lives and money – of their war in Afghanistan. After ten years, in 1989, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the final chapter in the Cold War.

Russia’s Vladimi Putin seemingly doesn’t care about the Russian lives lost or the crushing financial cost of a five-year invasion of Ukraine. Over 1.4 million Russian casualties (killed, wounded, missing, or captured), and over 500,000 killed at a cost of over $500 billion. Are the people in Russia aware of the magnitude of this tragedy? Are they aware of Mr. Putin’s view that Ukraine has no right to exist and he is justified in invading a sovereign Ukraine that gave up its nuclear weapons for security assurances?

Indeed, Ukraine’s casualties are over 600,000, with close to 140,000 killed, including 16,000 civilians. The cost so far is close to $600 billion, with a price tag of $U.S. 1 trillion to reconstruct a devastated Ukraine. This is the price Ukraine is paying because of the Russian invasion and Mr. Putin’s goal of attempting to recreate the Russian empire.

President Donald Trump has reached out to Mr. Putin numerous times to secure a cease fire and an eventual peace treaty. To date, those efforts have been unsuccessful, but Mr. Trump persists, fortunately. But until we secure a cease fire, Ukraine needs the support of the U.S. and the European Union, for the weapons and missile defense systems needed for its survival.

Fortunately, the recent NATO Summit of 32 allied countries reaffirmed their strong support to Ukraine, pledging 70 billion Euros to Ukraine and giving Ukraine a green light to produce PATRIOT missile interceptors.

But the U.S. – and our NATO allies -- can do more to get the truth to the Russian people. The truth about the hundreds of thousands of Russians killed in Ukraine and the bereaved families that are paying the ultimate price.

Although the United States Information Agency closed in October 1999, it transferred its important mission to the Department of State. And hopefully our colleagues at State are working hard to ensure that we are getting the message to the Russian people that the war must end; that they and the people in Ukraine have suffered enough. That Mr. Putin and his cronies need to explain why so many men and women died, in a war Mr. Putin created, as he enriches himself. A war that has made the Russian Federation a pariah state.

This should be a whole government mission: to disseminate primarily in Russia the truth about the hundreds of thousands of Russians (and Ukrainians) killed and maimed in a war created by an arrogant and inept Putin.

Although the audience for this important message is the Russian people, China should also be mindful of the tragedy of the war in Ukraine. Indeed, China is aligned with a Russian pariah state, heavily sanctioned by the international community. Is this the image China wants to share with the world?

The NATO Summit was clear in its support of Ukraine, the victim of a cruel and brutal Russian invasion. It’s time for the Russian government to listen to the Russian people and end this bloody war.

The author is the former associate director of national intelligence. All statement of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.

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A Master List of Espionage Targets, Suspected Spies, and Potential Recruits

It was with alarm that I read the recent New York Times article reporting the regurgitation of a truly terrible idea that, like a bad meal, continues to come up every several years.

The Times reports that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

is demanding that American intelligence officials turn over the names of all foreign espionage targets, including suspected spies and potential recruits, to create a master list, to avoid inadvertent conflicts between agencies and to better track foreign intelligence threats in real time.

A primary task of any corporate security department or Federal counterintelligence activity is to prevent, deter, and detect human and technical compromises of sensitive information. Even innocent errors can result in massive damage when they reveal sensitive information. Nor is it a secret that any large organization, no matter how carefully it screens its people, may have persons in its ranks who would betray their colleagues and their country. And of course, malign foreign actors routinely seek to access U.S. information systems and classified computing resources.

Just as a comprehensive list of CIA employees, including covert officers serving in dangerous locations, would be of great value to any number of foreign adversaries, so too would the proposed list of espionage targets, suspected spies, and potential recruits. And the drawbacks associated with creating such a list are significant - and potentially catastrophic.

The mere process of assembling the relevant data from within separate departments and agencies would require the assembling of multiple intermediate lists -for example, all subjects of interest from multiple operating components of the FBI, CIA, and additional agencies, each one of which would pose a separate significant and potentially catastrophic counterintelligence vulnerability. Compiled into a single comprehensive set, the theft or leak of the combined list would work incalculable damage to the United States.

Similar proposals have been made for decades. At the very best, they are a solution in search of a problem; for every time two or more agencies trip over one another in the pursuit of intelligence opportunities, there are literally hundreds more occasions in which the existing deconfliction arrangements work exactly as they should.

I spent several years in an ODNI policy position when the Office was first created. From time to time I encountered colleagues from one or another part of the Government, or from outside the Government completely, who sought to establish policies and procedures to address some obscure, long-since resolved, or simply imagined pet peeve. While some concerns truly reflect structural obstacles and warrant serious consideration, sometimes the most responsible thing to do is simply draw the line and withdraw a truly bad proposal. This is one of those times.

Jonathan M. Fredman is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Princeton University School of Public and International Affairs. He spent 36 years in legal and policy positions at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

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Afghanistan Lost the Cognitive War Before It Lost the State

The collapse of Afghanistan in August 2021 is still widely interpreted as a military or political failure. That interpretation is incomplete.

Afghanistan collapsed because it lost the cognitive war long before it lost territory.

Inside the system, we did not face a simple insurgency. We faced a persistent contest over how reality was defined, how legitimacy was perceived, and how decisions were made. The Taliban did not defeat the Afghan state by force alone. Regional actors did not undermine it through proxies alone. The deeper failure was this: the Afghan state never fully aligned its political identity with the way its people understood themselves.

That misalignment became a vulnerability - and in the gray zone, vulnerabilities are not observed; they are exploited.

The Cognitive Gap at the Center of the State

Every state rests on an implicit agreement between its people and its institutions: a shared understanding of identity, legitimacy, and purpose. In Afghanistan, that agreement was never fully stabilized.

The modern state carried the name “Afghanistan,” historically associated with a specific ethnopolitical identity. Yet the lived reality of the country was far more complex-linguistically, culturally, and historically. For many citizens, identity was rooted not in the modern state construct, but in a deeper civilizational memory: Khurasan.

This was not nostalgia. It was cognition.

Khurasan represented a mental map that connected Herat to Nishapur, Balkh to Bukhara, Kabul to a wider intellectual and cultural ecosystem. It was inclusive, fluid, and expansive. Afghanistan, by contrast, became a bounded political construct, defined by borders drawn through imperial competition and reinforced through centralized power struggles.

This divergence created a cognitive gap: the state operated under one identity framework, while large parts of society operated under another.

In a stable environment, such gaps can be managed. In a contested environment - especially under gray zone pressure - they become strategic liabilities.

From Identity Misalignment to Decision Failure

Cognitive gaps do not remain abstract. They translate directly into how decisions are made.

Inside government, this misalignment manifested in three critical ways.

First, trust was fragmented. Decisions that should have been based on competence and mission effectiveness were filtered through identity, faction, and perceived alignment. This weakened institutions at their core.

Second, intelligence was politicized. When leadership does not share a stable understanding of the state it governs, intelligence becomes contested terrain. Information is not only collected - it is interpreted through competing lenses of identity and interest.

Third, legitimacy was shallow. Citizens interacted with the state, but many did not internalize it as fully their own. That distinction is decisive. A state that is not cognitively owned cannot be strategically defended.

These were not theoretical weaknesses. They shaped daily governance, security coordination, and strategic planning. And they created the conditions for external actors to operate with precision.

Gray Zone Exploitation: Attacking the Mind, Not the Border

Afghanistan became a textbook case of gray zone competition.

Regional actors did not need to defeat the state conventionally. They exploited its cognitive vulnerabilities.

Pakistan leveraged identity divisions through the Taliban, framing them as authentic defenders of religion and tradition. Iran used cultural and sectarian narratives to extend influence in parallel networks. Russia and China approached Afghanistan as a space of managed instability, where influence could be expanded without direct confrontation.

These were not isolated actions. They were coordinated forms of cognitive warfare - targeting how citizens perceived their state, their leadership, and their future.

As one senior U.S. official recently noted, modern adversaries are engaged in a “persistent, persuasive campaign of cognitive warfare… shaping how societies see reality, trust, and decide.”

Afghanistan was already vulnerable to such campaigns because its internal narrative was never fully consolidated.

The Taliban’s Cognitive Strategy

The Taliban’s success cannot be understood without recognizing its cognitive dimension.

They did not present themselves only as a fighting force. They presented themselves as a corrective identity, a return to authenticity, faith, and order. At the same time, they framed the Republic as externally imposed, corrupt, and disconnected from the society.

This narrative was not universally accepted. But it did not need to be. It only needed to create doubt.

Cognitive warfare is not about replacing reality. It is about degrading confidence in reality.

As trust in institutions eroded, as leadership appeared divided, and as international commitment became uncertain, the Taliban’s narrative gained relative strength. The battlefield shifted from territory to perception. By the time military collapse came, cognitive collapse had already taken place.

The Strategic Vacuum: Who Defines Khurasan?

One of the most dangerous developments today is the appropriation of the term “Khorasan” by extremist groups such as ISIS-K.

This is not accidental. It is strategic.

When legitimate actors fail to define identity, adversaries will weaponize it. ISIS-K uses “Khorasan” to project a mythical, apocalyptic narrative designed to attract recruits and legitimize violence.

This creates a second-order threat. Not only is the state weakened, but its deeper civilizational identity is being redefined by actors who reject its intellectual, cultural, and inclusive legacy.

In cognitive warfare, naming is power.

If Khurasan is defined by extremists, it becomes a tool of radicalization. If it is reclaimed as a civilizational identity rooted in knowledge, trade, and coexistence, it becomes a counterweight to both extremism and fragmentation.

The Failure of State-Building as Cognitive Strategy

The international intervention between 2001 and 2021 achieved significant tactical and developmental gains. But it failed to address the cognitive dimension of state-building.

Institutions were built. Capacity was developed. Elections were held. But the deeper question - how the state was understood and internalized by its people - was never fully resolved.

This produced a structural imbalance:

A state that functioned administratively but not psychologically
A security force that fought effectively but lacked a unified narrative
A political system that operated formally but remained contested internally

In effect, we built a state without fully securing its cognitive foundation.

Toward Cognitive Realignment

Any future strategy for Afghanistan - and the broader region - must begin with cognitive realism.

First, policymakers must recognize that identity is not symbolic. It is operational. It shapes legitimacy, decision-making, and resilience under pressure.

Second, engagement must move beyond traditional state-building toward cognitive alignment. Governance structures must reflect the diversity and lived reality of the population, not impose narrow frameworks that generate resistance.

Third, investment in cognitive infrastructure is essential. Education, narrative development, and diaspora engagement are not secondary tools, they are central to long-term stability.

Fourth, the region must be reframed. Afghanistan should not be treated solely as a battlefield or buffer. Historically, as Khurasan, it functioned as a connector of regions, ideas, and economies. That perspective remains strategically relevant.

Conclusion: Stabilizing Meaning

The lesson of Afghanistan is not that state-building is impossible. It is that state-building without cognitive alignment is unsustainable.

For two decades, we focused on stabilizing territory, institutions, and security forces. We underestimated the importance of stabilizing meaning - how people understood the state, and whether they believed in it.

In modern competition, that is where advantage is decided.

The next battlefield is not territory. It is perception. It is cognition. It is the ability to shape how societies interpret reality and make decisions.

Afghanistan did not lose only because it was attacked. It lost because it could not fully define itself in a contested cognitive environment.

Reclaiming Khurasan, therefore, is not about returning to the past. It is about restoring a coherent, inclusive framework of identity that can withstand manipulation, resist fragmentation, and support legitimate governance.

Until that alignment is achieved, any political structure - no matter how well funded or defended - will remain vulnerable.

Because in the end, states do not collapse only when they lose control of land.

They collapse when they lose control of meaning.

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Washington’s Spy Ring and Paine’s Democracy

Agent 711 was one of the most effective and least known spies in our nation's history. He used dead drops to communicate about enemy plans. He used secret chemical processes to create new forms of invisible ink. He spread disinformation to disguise his own troops' movements and confuse the enemy. The year was 1778. Agent 711 was George Washington. He was our nation's first spymaster, and his network of informants was the Culper spy ring. It was one of several that he ran through the war and also during his time as president. Washington's army was undermanned, underfunded, frequently on the run. He knew he needed an edge, and he found it with intelligence. A British intelligence officer later said Washington did not really outfight the British — he simply outspied us.

At the same time, as a young nation was leaning heavily into its very first intelligence community, Thomas Paine was inspiring a nation to democracy. He had ideas about equality, rights, and the limits of government — revolutionary ideas for the time. He had ideas about power: it was not a divine right handed down to a monarch, but power rested in the hands of the people. Government borrows that power for a time, within limits. The representatives of that government are meant to be of the people and return to lives among the people, not to be separate or above or disconnected from what's going on among them.

Thus, our nation was born, not out of a tension between intelligence and democracy, but as an alchemical mix of both. We carry these ideas forward into a modern context. Power rests with the people. They loan it to the government. We trade some of our liberty for things that no one person can provide — roads, the power grid, police, submarines, national security. In exchange, we demand things of our government: accountability, adjustments, change, transparency. But we also demand security, and we demand economic prosperity. That's the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness part.

It's easy to forget that there are still those in the world who wish to take these things away from us. It's also in part generational — today’s college graduates were not alive during 9/11 or had maybe just been born. There are still terrorists and cartels who wish to take life. China seeks to take liberty — they want to subjugate people to their will, as they've done in Tibet, in Hong Kong, as they're attempting to do in Taiwan. Russia wants to end the pursuit of happiness. Some men truly do just want to watch the whole world burn to make themselves feel better, and Putin is one of those. Rather, they want happiness on their terms. This looks like power for the elite few oligarchs around Vladimir Putin, while he sends the poor to fight his war in Ukraine. It looks like the ruling elite of the CCP and their little princelings. They want order. They want to take liberty to hold power. The state has shown, in their case, security, but only for the few.

Why? Because liberty is messy. It is a struggle. It's making our own way while everyone else does the same. It's making space for ourselves and for each other, and when those spaces conflict, we figure it out. Thomas Paine wrote that “when we speak of rights, we ought always to unite them with the idea of duties — rights become duties by reciprocity: the right which I enjoy becomes my duty to guarantee to others, and he to me.” So today we are the guarantors of each other's rights. In Paine's time that looked like representative democracy and a little bit of revolution. Today, specifically with regard to spy work, it is a hard concept to wrap your head around — it's actually protection of rights by proxy.

In my pocket I carry a coin — the first one made for the Senate Intelligence Committee, on which I served for six years. On one side is Washington's seal, to represent our very first spymaster and to honor the intelligence officers who were so instrumental to the birth of this nation. But there are also two sets of stars on this coin. There's a set of 15 around the outside that represents the 15 members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who represent the entirety of the Senate. And then on the other side there are a hundred stars representing the Senate as a whole.

Why are there two layers? The 100 senators represent the entire country. The 15 members of the committee represent the Senate. Just as Washington went to great pains to encode secret messages and hide what he knew from the British army, secrets today must stay secret — the more people who know a thing, the less likely something is to stay secret. The intel committees are there to be the eyes and ears of the entire Senate or the House, and by extension the nation. These committees were designed to bring things back into balance.

During the 1960s and 1970s, another time of intense national upheaval, the IC got way out of hand — spying on political figures like Martin Luther King, attempting assassinations of foreign leaders, and engaging in massive propaganda campaigns. The Church and Pike committees united to investigate and create both the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Intelligence Committee, to provide permanent, comprehensive oversight to keep this balance.

People who don't know intelligence work think that it's all-powerful and full of abuse. They see the spy thrillers that are in the movies. They think the 1970s continue today. But people who do know it, know it's a microcosm of liberty. It's messy. It's flawed. But it's also full of checks, balances, and people doing the right thing. These are my friends and former colleagues. They look like me. They look like you. They miss dinners with families. They put themselves in harm's way. They don't get parades. They don't get early boarding on flights. They don't get military discounts. They just do the work.

For us as a country, I fear there are rough seas ahead. We face two revisionist powers that, like King George III, believed that one person should be in charge through might alone. These people want to set up a false choice: freedom or security, not both. But the truth is that freedom and security are deeply intertwined. It is fear that leads to that false choice. On the one hand, dictators fear chaos — they think that people will come to understand that their oppressive dear leader does not, in fact, have their interests at heart. The supposed strongman is actually terrified. He's desperate to hold on to power. On the other hand, amongst some, there is fear the security mission will take over and become too big, too powerful, lodged in the hands of someone who is too power-hungry. But the goal is balance. We need Washington's spy ring. We also need Paine's ideals. And we need them working together.

One further reflection on that Paine quote: the rights I enjoy, I also guarantee to others. This is perhaps most true for those who operate in the shadows. They guarantee the rights of fellow citizens day in and day out, with a million small decisions, even when no one is watching. Democracy enables good spy work — only in a democracy can you walk into the Oval Office and deliver truly terrible news to power, tell the president things have gone sideways, and work together to fix it.

Spy work also makes democracy possible. I look forward to a day where there are no enemies; no one who seeks to assert ultimate power over others. That day I will have happily worked myself out of a job. But it is not today. Today I am fully employed attempting to create deterrence, know our adversaries, create a future of peace through strength. I have sworn an oath to support and defend the Constitution four times in my life, and hopefully one day I'll do it a fifth, but inside government or out, trying to work for democracy, for freedom, for a secure America and a secure world is the mission.

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Inside the $87.6 Billion Iran War Supplemental

“In addition to supporting OEF (Operation Epic Fury, the Iran War) costs incurred by DOW (Department of War), the [$87.6 billion Fiscal Year FY 2026 Supplemental Trump administration] request provides $768 million to the Department of Energy to support nuclear and other energy security requirements, primarily for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for OEF-related activities.”

I was intrigued by that segment, from a June 24 letter to House Speaker Rep. Mike Johnson (R-La.) from Trump’s Office of Management and Budget Director Russell T. Vought, because I could not imagine what costly “nuclear and other energy security requirements” NNSA – the U.S. nuclear weapons complex – could be playing in the Iran War.

However, a chart attached to Vought’s letter said that $672 million was for NNSA to fund “activities for complete and verifiable termination of Iran’s ability to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon, including the disposition of proliferation sensitive material, technology, equipment, and infrastructure.”

Another $95.5 million, destined for the Department of Energy’s Environmental and Other Defense Activities elements, was listed for “support of Operation Epic Fury and other classified purposes.”

Perhaps members of the Senate Armed Services Committee can find out about the plans behind this $782 million package for NNSA and Energy this morning [July 14], when they question Jules W. Hurst III, who is up for confirmation as Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

By the way, when was the last time a U.S. President went to war and added a tax to help pay for it? As an old-timer I remember – it was 1968, when then-President Lyndon Johnson got Congress to pass a nine-month, 10 percent surcharge on individual and corporate taxpayers to help pay for the Vietnam War. Low-income individual taxpayers were entirely exempt from the surcharge.

Since then, both Republican and Democratic Presidents used deficit spending and borrowing to pay for military conflicts. So far this year, the nation’s total deficit has increased through May 2026 by $1.25 trillion, according to the Treasury Department, with Defense Department spending running $20 billion more through May 2026, than it was last year.

But I remind you, Congress now has three defense funding requests before it: a $1.1 trillion FY 2027 base budget request; an additional $350 billion request to be placed in a 2026 reconciliation package; and now the new FY 2026 supplemental request, which has $67 billion for the Defense Department.

No one can say for sure how Congress will deal with these requests that total over $1.5 trillion.

For comparison, I point out that according to a December 8, 2014, Congressional Research Service study, Congress, over the prior 13 years, approved total appropriations of $1.6 trillion for Afghan and Iraq “military operations, base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and Iraq security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the war operations initiated since the 9/11[2001] attacks.”

What the Vought chart also shows is that almost 23 percent of the funds in what has been described as the Iran War supplemental, went for different and, in some cases, totally unrelated purposes that I will describe below.

As for the NNSA money, a FoxNews story June 24, said, “The funding would support the removal and elimination of Iranian nuclear materials, including uranium hexafluoride (UF6), uranium in various forms and research reactor fuel, including highly-enriched uranium, according to details shared by a White House official.”

FoxNews also said, “The request also would fund U.S. verification activities inside Iran, support inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, strengthen nuclear-smuggling detection efforts and expand Nuclear Emergency Support Team operations across the Middle East.”

In short, Trump is asking for funds to deal with Iran’s enriched uranium before he has any agreement with Tehran that gives the U.S. access to that material.

Perhaps Trump thinks in the end he will have immediate success with Tehran as in he did in Venezuela. There, after the U.S. seized President Nicolas Maduro in January 2026, and four months later, in May, NNSA removed from Venezuela 13.54 kilograms – approximately 30 pounds – of highly-enriched uranium from a legacy research reactor in that country which had been shut down since the early 1990s.

The supplemental request also contains $1.5 billion for the State Department’s of which $850 million is for the Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems program at high-risk diplomatic posts overseas along with security upgrades and equipment replacement. Another $300 million for Embassy construction and maintenance would be used to address needs following the start of the Iran war in Bahrain, Dubai, Karachi, Lahore and Riyadh, according to the Vought chart.

The State request also includes $100 million for the Diplomatic and Consular Service account to meet unanticipated needs related to the Middle East situation including departure assistance to U.S. citizens seeking to leave the region with their families. Transfer authority and an increase in repatriation loan level is also being requested to meet the needs of destitute U.S. citizens.

Another $1.35 billion for the State Department is sought to deal with the Ebola Virus, or as Vought put it in his letter to Speaker Johnson, “These funds would be used to limit the spread of Ebola beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda to other vulnerable nations and ensure the virus does not reach U.S. shores.”

Some $800 million for State is proposed for the International Humanitarian Assistance account, formerly managed by USAID, and another $550 million for Global Health Security, which funds “would support contact tracing, personal protective equipment and commodity procurement, disease surveillance, laboratory capacity, and cross-border coordination,” according to the Vought chart.

There is another $2 billion for the U.S. Coast Guard to support OEF where Pentagon “assets are not available to support Western Hemisphere operations. This includes funding for operations at the Southern Border, ” according to the Vought chart.

Meanwhile, the largest amount, other than for OEF in the supplemental, is $11.1 billion for the Agriculture Department, the bulk of which, $10 billion, would be for American farmers as “temporary economic assistance for row and specialty crops planted in crop year 2026,” according to the Vought chart. An additional $1.1 billion is being requested specifically for farmers in Florida “to rebound from devastating losses that were the result of crippling storms this past winter.”

I believe that money has political implications because rural Americans are pulling away from the President. As Brookings Institution polling recently showed, “Only 24% of white rural voters think that the condition of the economy is excellent or good, while 77% rate it as fair or poor. Just 16% say their family’s financial situation is better than it was two years ago (near the end of the Biden administration), compared to 49% who say they are worse off.”

Then there is $1 billion in the war supplemental to assist in the final design and construction for renovation of New York City’s Penn Station. In a New York Times op-ed last Friday, Rep. Jerold Nadler (D-N.Y.) said that the White House last year took control of the $8 billion Penn Station project from the [New York] Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

Rep. Nadler wrote, “Behind closed doors, Mr. Trump has already attempted a quid-pro-quo, offering federal funding for New York’s transit needs only if Penn Station and [Virginia’s] Dulles Airport are renamed for him.”

However, Nadler also noted, “It’s still $7 billion short, and with top appropriators already opposing the supplemental funding request, it’s unlikely to be approved anyway.”

Another $1 billion in the war supplemental, according to the Vought chart, is for the Labor Department’s Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation “to increase the benefit levels for participants of certain pension plans that were sponsored by Delphi Corporation and terminated as a result of General Motors ' bankruptcy in 2009.”

The money would reverse pension reductions for some 20,000 retirees that have spent years arguing their pensions were unfairly reduced after the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation assumed responsibility for the company’s pension plans during GM’s 2009 financial crisis.

According to the Detroit Free Press, “Various legislative efforts to restore the benefits have failed or stalled, despite bipartisan support. Perhaps knowing it's a potentially powerful issue in the Midwest, Trump (and President Joe Biden before him) has signaled his support of the workers in politically sensitive moments such as just before the 2020 election.”

Then there is $500 million for the National Park Service in Washington, D.C. for, as the Vought chart explains, improvements to the World War II Memorial on the Mall and restoration and construction for the Tidal Basin Seawall along West Potomac Park to include the planting of hundreds of new cherry trees and stabilizing the surrounding grounds.

Last Friday, the conservative group Americans for Prosperity pointed out that even the supplemental’s defense and Iran-related spending “deserve further scrutiny,” noting that $15.6 billion for the Pentagon are justified by Vought simply as “Administration priorities,” “Readiness,” and “Classified Programs.”

In fact, I think the whole package needs congressional oversight, and from the reactions of some key Senate and House leaders, that’s what it’s going to get.

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America’s Military Plans Depend on Infrastructure It Doesn’t Secure

Military power is meaningless if it cannot move.

Every American war plan, from deterring aggression in Europe to prevailing in the Indo-Pacific, depends on our ability to maneuver people, equipment, fuel, information and combat power faster than any adversary can react. We invest billions in advanced aircraft, ships, satellites and weapons systems, yet every one of these assets depends on transportation and communications networks that the Department of Defense does not own. Washington needs to invest in the cybersecurity of these assets otherwise we risk having troops and materiel that can’t get off the base to the front line.

A tank leaving Fort Cavazos does not magically appear in Europe. An Air Force squadron deploying to the Pacific does not simply launch into combat. Every deployment begins on commercial railroads, moves through civilian ports and airports, depends on privately owned communications networks and increasingly relies on digital logistics systems that connect government and commercial partners.

That is America’s strategic advantage. It is also one of our greatest vulnerabilities.

China does not need to destroy American combat power to gain an advantage. It simply needs to delay it. Every day that equipment sits in a rail yard, every hour a port is offline, every aircraft waylaid by corrupted logistics data or disrupted communications creates exactly the kind of friction an adversary seeks during the opening days of a conflict.

This is not theoretical.

For more than two years, top U.S. intelligence officials have warned that Chinese cyber operators are compromising hundreds of American transportation, communications, energy and logistics systems. They gain persistent access, so that Beijing can disrupt and destroy system at the time of its choosing.

Russia’s cyberattacks against Ukraine’s transportation, energy, and communications infrastructure reveal what this looks like in practice: modern wars are fought as much against the systems that sustain military power as the military itself.

Today’s military power is no longer built solely on concrete, steel and fuel. It is built on networks and connectivity.

Ports rely on automated cranes and digital cargo management systems. Railroads depend on computerized dispatching and signaling. Airports operate through integrated flight planning, air traffic management and logistics software. Fuel distribution, maintenance scheduling, cargo visibility and command and control all depend on data moving securely across interconnected networks.

Imagine a deployment where cargo manifests are corrupted, rail dispatch systems slow movement, satellite communications are degraded and fuel deliveries are redirected through manipulated logistics data. Aircraft still exist. Ships still sail. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Guardians remain ready to fight. But when the Joint Force begins arriving late and incomplete, the operational tempo required to seize the initiative is lost.

History reminds us why speed matters.

During humanitarian operations following Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, the systems underpinning military mobility were the lifeline connecting isolated communities to food, water and medical care. Every hour mattered. Delays translated directly into human suffering.

Combat operations are no different. Time is often the most valuable resource a commander possesses. The same lesson applies in deterrence. The faster America can generate and maneuver combat power, the less likely an adversary is to miscalculate.

Military and commercial networks need to work together to dynamically reroute forces around cyberattacks, infrastructure failures or contested logistics. Decision advantage will increasingly come not from owning more platforms, but from orchestrating movement better than our adversaries can disrupt it.

The problem is that military planners have spent decades assuming that civilian infrastructure will simply be available when mobilization orders are issued. That assumption deserves renewed scrutiny.

The Defense Department has publicly identified which ports, rail corridors and airports are “strategic” and indispensable to national defense. The Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard and transportation agencies have been tasked to understand the infrastructure. Commercial operators understand their own networks better than anyone. But somehow the needed public private collaboration to protect these national assets has not occurred and, as a result, many of these communities will come together for the first time during a national emergency.

Congress and the executive branch should establish and harmonize cybersecurity standards across transportation sectors so operators spend more time improving security than satisfying overlapping regulations.

Infrastructure directly supporting military mobility deserves dedicated cybersecurity investment. Smaller ports, airports and rail operators cannot reasonably defend themselves against nation-state adversaries without federal partnership. Congress should provide cybersecurity grant programs for the under-resourced transportation infrastructure operators to address identified vulnerabilities.

Most importantly, America must begin exercising the way it expects to fight.

National, regional and local exercises should assume degraded communications, cyberattacks against transportation systems, corrupted logistics data and contested movement inside the United States. We should practice fighting through disruption instead of assuming perfect connectivity.

There is an old military saying: amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.

The next war demands we take one step further.

Victors study maneuver.

America’s adversaries already understand that mobility is our greatest strategic advantage. That is precisely why they are targeting the networks that make it possible.

If America cannot connect, America cannot maneuver. If America cannot move, America cannot fight.

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Trump’s Dangerous Bet on Pakistan’s Army Chief

In the dusty streets of Rawalakot in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir this June, security forces opened fire on demonstrators demanding basic rights and an end to elite privileges. At least 11 people were killed in the clashes, with eyewitnesses and local leaders describing heavy, indiscriminate firing on what began as a largely peaceful protest. Families mourned as authorities claimed “miscreants” had provoked the violence. A year earlier, in March 2025, Pakistan security forces arrested prominent Baloch human rights defender Dr. Mahrang Baloch during a sit-in in Quetta, Balochistan, who was protesting enforced disappearances and police excesses. She now faces life imprisonment on terrorism-related charges widely viewed by rights groups as politically motivated reprisal for her activism against the military’s heavy-handed tactics in Balochistan. These scenes of repression unfold against a backdrop of deepening militarisation in Pakistan. Meanwhile, in Washington, President Trump has repeatedly hosted and publicly praised Pakistan’s Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir—calling him his “favorite” and crediting Pakistan with special insight into Iran.

President Donald Trump’s courtship of Munir may look like transactional statecraft, but it is also dangerously short-sighted. Trump’s administration has leaned on Munir as a key interlocutor in US-Iran diplomacy, hosting him at the White House and highlighting Pakistan’s role in passing messages and facilitating talks during periods of heightened tensions. However, it ignores fundamental divergences in strategic interests. It rewards a military establishment whose consolidation of power at home is actively destabilizing the very region the United States claims to want stabilized.

A Dubious Mediator

Trump has publicly credited Pakistan with special insight into Iran, noting that Pakistanis “know Iran very well, better than most.” Munir has been positioned as a back-channel messenger and facilitator during periods of US-Iran tension. In reality, however, Munir’s role in the negotiations deserves scrutiny, not applause. It appeared to align with Tehran’s demand that Washington ease pressure before talks could proceed. Munir reportedly told Trump that the US blockade of Iranian ports was a major obstacle to negotiations, reinforcing Iran’s position rather than balancing between both sides.

Pakistan’s mediation appeared to endorse Tehran’s preferred sequence: de-escalation by Washington first, negotiations only afterward. Pakistan may have been useful as a messenger, but usefulness is not the same as strategic alignment. A state that presses Washington to relieve pressure on Iran while presenting itself as an American partner is not acting from shared security priorities. It is managing its own regional equities—border stability with Iran, domestic pro-Iran sentiment, Gulf diplomacy, and its need to remain relevant to multiple camps at once. Trump’s personal comfort with Munir risks mistaking tactical access for strategic convergence. Naturally, Washington has made this mistake before, because the ghosts of US-Pakistan policy apparently enjoy repeat performances.

The “Hard State” Washington Is Normalizing

The problem with Washington’s engagement lies not only in Pakistan’s foreign policy but in the domestic system Field Marshal Asim Munir now represents. The 27th Constitutional Amendment significantly expanded the Army Chief’s authority, creating a new overarching military command, placing the navy and Air Force under his control, and granting him direct oversight of the nuclear arsenal. It also curtailed the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction through a parallel judicial structure.

The 27th Amendment is not an abstract doctrine, as it also manifests in the military’s expanding economic empire. The Fauji Foundation, the army’s flagship conglomerate, controls assets estimated at $5.9–6 billion according to the Wealth Perception Index 2025—making it one of Pakistan’s largest business groups. Its engineering arm, the Frontier Works Organization (FWO), has secured major infrastructure projects, including the Machike–Thallian–Taru Jabba White Oil Pipeline, routed through the military-dominated Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC). Marketed as a single-window facilitator, the SIFC bypasses standard public procurement, parliamentary oversight, and regulatory scrutiny—effectively funneling strategic contracts to military-linked entities.

The critical minerals angle is especially revealing. A US company signed a $500 million agreement with Pakistan’s FWO to develop critical minerals and establish a poly-metallic refinery, with initial exports including antimony, copper, gold, tungsten, and rare earth elements. Diversifying US supply chains away from China is a legitimate strategic priority. But doing so through Pakistan’s expanding military-commercial ecosystem risks rewarding the very institution hollowing out civilian oversight, weakening democratic checks, and converting foreign investment into military power. That is not strategic diversification, but dependence dressed up as realism.

Repression at Home, Bombs Abroad

Munir’s Pakistan is not just authoritarian in structure but also coercive in practice. In Pakistan-administered Kashmir, mass protests over governance, elite privileges, and political representation have repeatedly turned deadly. Last month’s clashes in Pakistan-administered Kashmir have left more than 30 people killed as police and paramilitary forces remain deployed against protesters.

Balochistan tells an even darker story. Amnesty International has reported that prominent Baloch activist Mahrag Baloch had been charged in more than two dozen anti-terrorism cases after a prolonged period of unlawful detention. Baloch was sentenced to life imprisonment in June 2026, in a case that is politically motivated and procedurally flawed. And then there is Afghanistan, where Pakistan’s military operations across the border have been reckless and devastating. Human Rights Watch called a March 2026 Pakistani airstrike on a Kabul drug treatment center unlawful and a possible war crime, in which at least 143 people were killed and more than 250 injured, most of them patients. Most recently, following an attack targeting Pakistani paramilitary personnel in Karachi, the Air Force carried out strikes that killed at least 28 civilians and injured 49 along the Afghan border.

Conclusion

This is the regime Trump is courting: one that crushes protest in Kashmir, jails Baloch activists, militarizes the economy, weakens courts, and bombs Afghanistan while marketing itself as a regional peacemaker.

The United States does not need to cut off Pakistan. That would be lazy policy masquerading as moral clarity. Pakistan remains geopolitically relevant because it borders Iran, Afghanistan, India, and China; it has nuclear weapons; and it can be useful in limited diplomatic channels. But Washington must stop confusing utility with trust. Trump’s courtship of Munir risks repeating the oldest mistake in US-Pakistan relations, which is rewarding the Pakistani military for short-term access while ignoring long-term divergence. Pakistan’s regional aspirations do not align cleanly with US priorities. It hedges with Iran, deepens ties with China, antagonizes India, suppresses democratic dissent, and uses its military-commercial complex to convert foreign engagement into domestic power.

Munir may offer Washington a convenient channel, but channels can also become traps. If the United States elevates Munir without demanding accountability, it will not stabilize South Asia or the Middle East. It will legitimize a military regime that has learned to monetize crisis, repression, and geography. That is not strategic realism, but “short-termism” dressed up as diplomacy.

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America’s Export Controls Are Becoming a Strategic Liability

Welcome to The Iron Triangle, the Cipher Brief column serving Procurement Officers tasked with buying the future, Investors funding the next generation of defense technology, and the Policy Wonks analyzing its impact on the global order.

A little over a year ago I watched a good company die. They built technology that worked. It was not a slide or a concept, but a thing that did what it was designed to do. They had European clients interested, checkbook open, at exactly the moment Europeans started opening checkbooks for real. They did not close the deal. They could not figure out how to export their product without tripping over the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), they could not afford the lawyer who could tell them, and they ran out of runway waiting on a U.S. contract that was still three review cycles from signatures. The technology did not fail. The paperwork won.

Around the same time, I sat with a foreign team with excellent tech who wanted to build in the United States. They decided against it. Their reason was not taxes or visas. It was that the moment their intellectual property became American, it might become ITAR-controlled, and they were terrified that a regulation written in Washington would strand the hardware they were shipping to Ukraine to kill Russians. Restated, our export-control regime is so feared that talented people keep their best work out of the American ecosystem. That is not security. That is self-harm.

The $3,000 Toll to Export Nothing

Start with the cost of admission. To legally export a defense article, you first register with the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). As of January 2025 the base registration fee rose to $3,000 a year, and you pay it whether or not you ever ship a single item. That fee is the insult, not the injury. It’s the trivial part that buys you the right to then apply, per transaction, for a DSP-5 license, a process that consumes months, specialized counsel, and a full-time compliance officer that a nine-person startup does not have and cannot afford to hire.

For Lockheed Martin, this is a rounding error and a competitive moat all at once. The primes have entire floors of export-control lawyers; the regulation that annoys them is the regulation that buries smaller companies. The same $250,000-a-year compliance function is a nuisance on a $61 billion contract base and a death sentence on a Series A. ITAR does not have to be designed as a moat to function as one.

The See-Through Rule and the Birth of "ITAR-Free"

Here is the part that turns a domestic annoyance into a strategic own-goal. ITAR does not stop at the first sale. Every onward move, a re-export to a third country, a retransfer to a different end user, needs its own license. Control follows the item forever. Two features make this uniquely radioactive. The first is the "see-through rule": American law looks straight through a foreign-built system to control the U.S. part buried inside it. The second is that ITAR, unlike Commerce's export rules, has no de minimis threshold; there is no amount of American content small enough to escape. One controlled datalink in a drone taints the entire aircraft, permanently, and Europe cannot freely sell it onward, or keep sending it to Kyiv, without asking for permission.

So Europe did the rational thing. It started designing us out. "ITAR-free" is now a selling point, a feature you advertise the way you'd advertise waterproofing. The control regime we built to protect technology has taught our allies to build parallel supply chains that don't need us at all. We are not catching diversion. We are losing the room, one clean-sheet component at a time.

We Are Guarding a Henhouse the Fox Already Breeds

Now the objection every serious reader is forming: won't loosening the rules help China? It is the right question, and it deserves an honest answer. Post-sales diversion to Beijing is a threat, and the wall against it should stay standing.

But look at what the small companies I'm talking about actually build; let’s be precise about it. The airframe of an attritable FPV drone is commodity hardware, every component sourceable on Alibaba, and China manufactures the world's drones at a scale and price we cannot approach. Nobody in Beijing is combing American startups for quadcopter know-how. What can be genuinely sensitive is the layer you can't buy on Alibaba: the autonomy stack, the radio's waveform library, the ISR payload's processing. Control that. But applying munitions-grade export control to benign parts isn't guarding the crown jewels. It's standing armed guard over a henhouse the fox already owns, breeds, and exports. Control the narrow band that matters; stop strangling everything downstream of it with rules written for an age when a weapons system took a decade to build and stayed secret for two.

The Money Nobody Talks About

Investors should sit with the scale of the mismatch. In 2025, venture capital poured a record $49.1 billion into defense tech, up more than 80 percent over the year before. It sounds like a golden age until you notice most of it stacked into a handful of nine-figure megarounds while the Forgotten Bench, the small firms building the actual arteries of the future force, fought over grants. A typical DoD SBIR Phase I award runs about $256,000; a Phase II might reach a couple of million, if the company survives the wait. Many do not.

Now hold that against one ITAR-specific insult. On an ordinary afternoon, RTX booked $183.7 million for Patriot hardware bound for the United Arab Emirates. The prime exports to the Gulf on a Tuesday while the startup cannot work out how to ship a drone to a NATO ally. That is not a difference in risk. It is a difference in legal firepower. And the Pentagon posts these awards daily, every one above $7.5 million. The primes' budget rounding errors could fund the next generation of warfare. Instead they accrue to the incumbents while the little guys are fenced out of a market currently on fire.

What Each Corner of the Triangle Should Want

For the Procurement Officer, this is about coalition speed. You cannot field an allied force at the pace of a per-transaction license queue. Interoperability that requires a lawyer is not interoperability.

For the Investor, ITAR reform is a total-addressable-market unlock. European defense budgets have gone vertical, and right now your portfolio company is legally walled off from them. The moat you think protects your prime holdings is the same moat drowning your early-stage investments. Your small companies are not competition for the primes; there is plenty of room for both to be successful.

For the Policy Wonk, the pitch is precision. A control regime that treats a drone like an ATACM has no credibility left to spend when it actually needs to stop something dangerous. Overcontrol is how you get evasion; targeted control is how you get compliance.

The Fix Already Exists: We Just Gave It to Two Countries

We do not have to invent anything. In September 2024, the State Department stood up the AUKUS exemption, a license-free environment for defense trade, between pre-approved, vetted users, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, fenced by an "Excluded Technology List" that keeps the genuinely sensitive items behind the wall. In an early three-month sample, only 18 percent of requests fell on the excluded list; the other 82 percent could move without a license. The mechanism works; State approved it six months ago.

So extend it, carefully, because this is the part the cynics should watch. AUKUS worked because State vouched for allies whose export-control systems were judged comparable to our own. Thirty-two NATO members are not thirty-two equal risks, so the honest version of this is tiered: the most-trusted governments first, each on its own comparability finding. Build a NATO Trusted Trade tier on the same architecture: license-free authorization for vetted allies on the commodity tier, a narrow excluded list. Industry's loudest complaint about AUKUS is that the list is already too broad. Then build a small-business fast lane that waives the registration toll for firms below a revenue threshold. Keep the wall. Widen the gate. Stop making a startup spend its entire budget on compliance lawyers to sell drones to Poland.

I have spent a career watching good technology lose to bad processes. This is the purest example I know. The threat is real, the fix is proven, and the only thing missing is the will to admit that a rulebook written in the era of glacial weapons development is actively kneecapping the fast, cheap, disposable systems that are winning wars right now. Europe wants viable technology. Our young innovators are starving for a customer. ITAR is standing between them, collecting a $3,000 toll, and calling it national security.

I am not naive about post-sale diversion to China. The real leak in a trusted-ally tier is not China raiding our startups; it is a vetted ally re-exporting onward. This is why truly sensitive items stay behind the wall. A trusted-ally tier is only as good as the "trusted" part: the whitelist has to be policed, the excluded list has to be honest, and end-use monitoring has to be real. I will not pretend reform fixes everything. For some European governments "ITAR-free" is industrial policy, a way to protect their own primes and their own jobs. No amount of American good behavior erases that motive. But reform removes the legitimate excuse, and keeps our companies in contention where today they are auto-excluded. The answer to a blunt instrument is a sharper one, not no instrument at all.

We wrote the words "ITAR-free" onto our allies' marketing brochures ourselves, one anachronistic rule at a time. The question is whether we notice in time to erase them, or we keep guarding the henhouse until the last American startup gives up and the last European customer stops asking. Who are we protecting, and from what?

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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The Front Line of the AI Race Runs Through Your Company's Chat Logs

Last week, a statement from former White House AI advisor David Sacks stopped Washington cold. "We now have a Chinese open-weight model that is as good as the currently available models from OpenAI and Anthropic," Sacks told a podcast audience, describing Z.ai's GLM-5.2 as comparable to Anthropic's Opus and level with OpenAI's latest offerings. A Chinese startup had, in his telling, matched the two American frontier labs that have spent tens of billions of dollars to stay ahead.

The reaction in policy circles was predictable, viewed by many as a "DeepSeek" type watershed moment (or a “Sputnik” moment for AI). Some warned that American export controls—tightened out of fear that China might steal our most advanced models—were now slowing our own companies down while Beijing caught up on its own.

That debate matters. But it also misses a much larger, more dangerous point. The critical question was never merely whether China could build a competitive frontier model. It was how China would build it: by leveraging an unprecedented industrial espionage infrastructure that has, over the past three decades, executed the most expansive campaign of intellectual property theft in human history.

The Strategy Behind the Steal

We spent two years researching this pattern for our book. The conclusion was uncomfortable and unavoidable: the theft of American intellectual property by the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not a series of isolated incidents. It is a well-resourced national strategy directed from the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Consider the closest analogy to the current moment. A federal jury in San Francisco convicted former Google engineer Linwei Ding on multiple counts of economic espionage and theft of trade secrets. While drawing a Google paycheck, Ding uploaded more than a thousand confidential documents describing the company's AI supercomputing architecture to a personal account. Simultaneously, Ding was building AI companies in China, pitching Beijing investors on his ability to replicate the proprietary architecture he had taken. It was the first conviction on AI-specific economic espionage charges in American history. It will not be the last.

Ding represents the headline-grabbing version of the threat: a single insider walking out the door with the crown jewels. But focusing exclusively on these dramatic cases obscures a stealthier, more systematic campaign that has done far greater structural damage.

For more than a decade, state-linked actors have vacuumed up the personal data of the American people at an industrial scale:

The 2015 OPM Breach: Exposed the security clearance files of more than 20 million federal employees—the most sensitive personnel records the government keeps.
The Anthem Breach: Compromised the health records of nearly 80 million people.
The Equifax Breach: Handed over the financial histories of some 145 million Americans.

None of these breaches were random. Aggregate these datasets and you map the human terrain of any target organization. Who holds a clearance? Who is in debt? Who is vulnerable? This is the raw material of counterintelligence—the blueprint an adversary uses to identify, pressure, or monitor individuals inside a critical company or government agency. The Ding case and the mass data breaches are not separate stories; they are the same narrative operating at different scales, both optimized to accelerate the PRC's ascent as an AI superpower.

The Threat of 'Digital Exhaust'

Now comes the newest chapter. Alongside human espionage and big-data harvesting, Chinese labs have increasingly utilized "distillation"—the practice of systematically querying leading American models via proxy accounts to extract their behaviors, subsequently training cheaper domestic competitors on the output. It is intellectual property theft automated via software.

The result is the arrival of models like GLM-5.2, which are functional and cheap enough that Western enterprises are already debating whether to integrate them. When European companies begin exploring the use of these models in enterprise settings, it should deeply worry anyone who understands where this technology originates and what running it inside a secure network invites.

This is the vulnerability the current AI-race debate routinely skips: You do not need to steal a frontier model to win the geopolitical competition. You need the data that surrounds it.

The richest source of that data is rarely a heavily guarded research lab. Instead, it is the everyday communication of American companies, defense contractors, and technology startups working in sensitive dual-use fields like quantum computing or autonomous systems. It is the steady stream of messages, proprietary files, meeting notes, and project plans moving every hour across consumer chat apps and fragmented collaboration tools that were never engineered to withstand a nation-state adversary.

We call this "digital exhaust." It is the operational residue of how an organization actually functions, and it is enormously revealing:

A messaging thread reveals internal hierarchies and decision-makers.
A shared drive exposes which critical program is behind schedule and which supplier holds the bottleneck component.
A calendar maps exactly when and where executive leadership is traveling.

None of this information is classified, yet all of it is highly actionable. An adversary does not need to break advanced encryption if they can seamlessly map an organization from the outside, identify its weak points, and exploit them. This is precisely the operational targeting that mass data theft enables, and precisely the exposure that a fragmented, consumer-grade communications stack guarantees.

Securing the New Front Line

The frontier of great-power competition has fundamentally shifted, dissolving the old division of labor between public defense and private enterprise. The front line no longer runs exclusively through government agencies; it runs through global logistics firms, the energy grid, defense-tech startups, and commercial AI labs.

Private companies and critical infrastructure operators are now the first points of contact with nation-state adversaries. Yet, they are expected to coordinate with law enforcement and government partners in real time using an improvised patchwork of commercial applications—each representing a separate vendor, a distinct cloud, and an isolated point of failure.

The federal government solved this vulnerability for its own operations long ago by building sovereign, compartmented, end-to-end secure networks like the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)—environments designed from the ground up on the absolute assumption that a nation-state is actively trying to get in. The private sector, now standing on that same front line, possesses no equivalent infrastructure.

Closing this gap is a matter of immediate national security. The current moment demands a unified coordination layer built to the rigid security standards the government holds itself to, but optimized for the commercial operators and law enforcement agencies that protect our critical infrastructure.

Achieving this requires a fundamental shift in how we approach enterprise security:

Consolidated Environments: Moving communications and collaboration onto a single, hardened platform rather than a fragmented scattering of consumer tools.
Sovereign Data Control: Ensuring an organization’s operational data and "digital exhaust" never reside in vulnerable, third-party commercial clouds beyond their direct control
Verified Identity Architecture: Implementing strict identity verification to prevent adversaries from covertly infiltrating internal organizational communications.
Cross-Institutional Security: Enabling secure, real-time collaboration across institutional seams—from a private tech firm to a police department to a military command—without downgrading to unencrypted group chats.

This shift toward sovereign, secure enterprise infrastructure—the exact architectural paradigm we are focused on building at Coalition Systems—is the only way to deny an adversary the digital exhaust they have learned to harvest so effectively. It brings the core principles of sovereign government networks to the commercial frontline.

The defining lesson of the last decade is that the PRC treats the systematic theft of American ingenuity as a core instrument of national power. The rapid closing of the AI capability gap is a stark reminder of how far that strategy has carried them. The correct response cannot just be guarding the frontier models inside the labs. We must secure the operational ground where the day-to-day competition is actually being fought: the everyday communications of the American enterprise. We have left that ground undefended for too long. We cannot afford to do so any longer.

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Iran: On Negotiating with Criminal/Terrorist Organizations, States, and Other Entities

Pending the failed cease-fire and Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] between Iran and America, all eyes have focused on the ongoing, difficult negotiations – mediated by Pakistan, Oman, Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt – between America and Iran. The late Uri Lubrani, Israel’s last Ambassador to Iran in 1978, always warned about the perils of negotiating with the Iranians (“a nation of carpet weavers and of chess players”), whom he respected for their negotiating prowess, calling their manipulation of negotiations “a masterpiece of hoodwinking the world.” Other contemporary experts (former American intelligence officers) such as Mark Fowler, Norm Roule, and Hamlet Yousef have made similar observations. Their collective wisdom is worth noting as the United States continues its diplomatic negotiations with Iran in today’s modern version of ‘The Great Game.’ What is increasingly pertinent in such negotiations pertains to the role of third-party nations such as Oman, Turkey, Qatar, and Pakistan, not as mere mediators, but rather, especially in the case of Pakistan and Turkey, as modern purveyors of ‘intelligence diplomacy.’

Turkey’s road to intelligence diplomacy occurred strategically, rather than organically, as its Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan (previously Director of its intelligence agency MIT, for over a decade) and current MIT Director Ibrahim Kalin purposefully and intentionally positioned Turkey to play an increasingly important role in regional conflicts, covert diplomacy, and intelligence – as in Kalin’s words in a recent speech - “drawing important lessons for our country’s security, strategic positioning, and regional perspective.” This doctrine had previously involved backchannel negotiations in Gaza, Ukraine, Europe, the Balkans, Russia, (cf. the 2024 spy swap), and now, Iran. Other examples include the appointment of former senior MIT officer Gürsel Donmez as Turkey’s Ambassador to Austria, a key worldwide intelligence and diplomacy hub, and Turkey’s successful hosting of the NATO summit last week.

Pakistan is, like Turkey, hardly new to the Great Game. Readers will recall its role in facilitating – during 1971-1972 – the historic Kissinger-Nixon opening to China. But this year’s MOU between Iran and America has thrust Pakistan (and its leaders Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and military chief General Asim Munir) into the limelight. Pakistan has handled sensitive backchannel negotiations, hosted talks in Islamabad, and worked closely with its Saudi and GCC partners as the recent MOU came into play. But in its world of zero-sum diplomacy, Pakistan’s strategic successes in intelligence diplomacy heighten its regional and broader posture – especially vis-à-vis America and serves to weaken India’s strategic position and diplomatic influence. In today’s world, as always, Pakistan’s gain is India’s loss and China’s gain (in my opinion, China is the REAL winner of the US-Iran war).

How does one negotiate, or facilitate negotiations with a country which is a combination of a civilization (Persia), theocracy, nation state (Iran), terrorist organization, and criminal entity (IRGC)? Iran has revealed itself to be a formidable negotiating partner, more akin to a sophisticated hostage taker, in which traditional western, Harvard metrics of ‘Getting to Yes,’ or “Getting Past No’ hardly apply. And yet, like hostage takers in [law enforcement] hostage scenarios, Iran must be appreciated as a ‘rational’ actor. The Iranians have brilliantly used ambiguity and opacity as negotiating strategies, and they have adeptly utilized social media to carve out confusing, ambiguous negotiating positions, in addition to asymmetric warfare, closure of the Straits of Hormuz, disinformation, propaganda, cognitive warfare, and traditional diplomatic efforts. One could surmise that the Iranians are truly gifted students, who have read - and survived! - President Trump’s The Art of the Deal. And for President Trump and his national security team, negotiating with a dead, or severely injured, possibly brain-damaged Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei may be the most complex task of all. Such scenarios aren’t taught in diplomatic faculties, business schools, or at the FBI Academy.

Negotiations involving criminal terror groups such as the IRGC (now led by General Ahmad Vahidi) - who have committed numerous worldwide acts of violence and terror over decades - often require third party emissaries (as legitimate governments cannot be seen as a main negotiating partner) and high-level intermediaries in ‘track 3’ diplomacy. Over the past two decades, examples include the former German intelligence officer Dr. Gerhard Conrad’s hostage negotiations involving Hamas and Hezbollah, Swiss American attorney Daniel Levin’s work in the Middle East with The Liechtenstein Foundation for State Governance, and Swiss diplomat Pascal Holiger’s negotiations involving the victims of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The role of empathy, culture, trust, language, and nuance remains critically valuable in such delicate endeavors. And today, trust remains the coin of the realm as 3rd-party nations such as Pakistan and Turkey, as well as others, facilitate ongoing diplomatic negotiations with Iran’s IRGC leadership.

The Iran negotiations will involve more time, which remains Iran’s best weapon, as it can continue to cause economic pain for the West, especially America, as it approaches the November 2026 midterm elections. During its devastating war with Iraq during the 1980s – with over 1 million Iranian casualties – Iran fought for 8 years before the late Ayatollah Khomeini made a peace deal, “drinking from the poisoned chalice.” And a battered, weakened Iran continues to be patient and resolved. And so, a key question now involves President Trump, and what actions – diplomatic or military – he might take next, and whether he too, will be forced to “drink from the poisoned chalice.” The stakes could not be higher. And practitioners of intelligence diplomacy, such as Pakistan, Turkey, and other actors, will continue to be linchpins of any diplomatic successes. But unlike past similar negotiations, which involved discretion and secrecy, today’s intelligence diplomacy takes place in the glare of the media and its heir apparent, social media --- a curse and a blessing for its practitioners. What hasn’t changed is that words and actions – especially those of President Trump and the Iranian leadership - still matter, more than ever.

Dr. Kenneth Dekleva served as a Regional Medical Officer/Psychiatrist with the U.S. Dept. of State from 2002-2016 and is currently CEO of Blackwood Advisory Solutions LLC, and Professor of Psychiatry, UT Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas, TX. The views expressed by Dr. Dekleva are entirely his own and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Dept. of State, or UT Southwestern Medical Center.

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The Continued Myth of Russia’s Imminent Collapse: Lessons from Prigozhin’s Mutiny Three Years On

KREMLIN FILES/COLUMN: Three years ago, in June 2023, the Kremlin confronted one of the most dramatic internal crises of Vladimir Putin's quarter-century in power. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the former convict turned oligarch, Wagner founder, and longtime Kremlin insider known as Putin's "chef," launched an armed mutiny that stunned Russia and captivated the world. Wagner fighters seized the headquarters of Russia's Southern Military District in Rostov before beginning an astonishing march toward Moscow, encountering remarkably little organized resistance along the way.

For nearly twenty-four hours, the aura of Kremlin control appeared to evaporate. The episode immediately fueled predictions that Putin's regime was beginning to unravel. Some declared the mutiny the beginning of the end. Others saw it as the first crack that would inevitably bring down the Russian dictator. Three years later, those predictions have not aged well. But similar predictions now are all over U.S. and European news sources about another imminent collapse. The anniversary, therefore, offers an opportunity not to revisit sensational headlines but to remember three enduring lessons—especially at a time when rumor, hopeful thinking, and unfounded speculation once again dominate discussion over Russia and the Ukraine war.

Rumor and Reality

Prigozhin survived a negotiated settlement and the initial aftermath of his short-lived rebellion only to have his plane fall out of the sky months later. Wagner was dismantled and its elements incorporated into the Russian armed forces and intelligence agencies. Putin remains firmly in power, and the past three years have only seen a strengthening of his security and intelligence services.

Russia continues its war against Ukraine. And there are more rumors in recent months, from experts around the world, claiming Putin is “more vulnerable than ever.” This assumption is mostly grounded in Ukraine’s tremendous progress in escalating the drone war, its long-range strikes making a real impact on Russia’s energy sector, and heavy Russian casualties at the front continuing to mount throughout the year. There has also been more public criticism among Russia’s ruling elite than at any time during the war. But speculating from those facts that Putin is now substantially weaker as a dictator, or even, as some have suggested, “ripe for a coup,” is mostly wishful thinking.

Such rumors from alleged intelligence agency leaks, and experts cited by media outlets, offer a tempting, albeit false, notion that the Ukraine war might come to an end without the West having to do more; that Putin will just be overthrown and a more democratic alternative might come to power. Or that resolve and strong support for our Ukrainian allies, who are still fighting and dying every day, are not really needed, and that the “war is surely coming to an end…” That was the response given this week when Germany was pressed on providing long-range weapons:
“well, Ukraine is doing better than ever!” But none of that is based on reality, and Ukraine needs NATO and the U.S.’s support to see this war through to a just settlement, one where Ukraine does not sacrifice long-term security for peace.

Looking back at the war and to Prigozhin’s mutiny, the first lesson to remember is that the Prigozhin’s move exposed important vulnerabilities within the Russian state, ones that have existed for decades. Wagner's convoy advanced hundreds of miles while much of the security apparatus appeared confused, hesitant, or absent altogether. The episode reinforced what many who study Russia have argued for years: corruption, patronage, bureaucratic dysfunction, and institutional rivalries remain defining characteristics of Putin's system. Loyalty often trumps competence, and political reliability frequently matters more than military effectiveness.

Those weaknesses are real. They were discounted by far too many Western military experts before the 2022 invasion, who predicted a quick Russian victory. I have documented numerous examples of such failures across the Russian intelligence, military, and security establishment in my own book: Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin’s Secret War (Naval Institute Press 2026).

Yet acknowledging these shortcomings should never lead us to underestimating the adversary. The war has damaged the Russian economy, and the energy sector is in crisis due to Ukraine’s strike campaign. Still, as The Economist recently noted, the economy is not in shambles, unfortunately, and won’t crash anytime soon.

Russia’s intelligence services (RIS) remain capable, adaptive, and ruthless. They have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to recover from mistakes, suppress internal threats, and preserve the regime. They get the very best in terms of resources and reconstitution from any losses, and they are expanding their hybrid war against Europe and the U.S.

Weakness and Resilience in Putin’s Russia at War

Weakness and resilience are not mutually exclusive. Prigozhin’s mutiny revealed both. This is the second lesson from three years ago. War has strengthened the RIS and, especially, the FSB’s chokehold on the Russian people. Their economy has largely weathered sanctions and repeated hits, and their population, unfortunately, remains hypnotized by heavy propaganda. Sadly, most Russians support Putin as strongly as the Nazi Germans did Hitler, even to their bitter end. Unfortunately, Russian propaganda today has many more tools than Dr. Goebbels did, and they use them very well.

Prigozhin knew it. He was not marching on Moscow to overthrow Vladimir Putin. This has been widely misunderstood. Throughout the crisis, Prigozhin directed his fury overwhelmingly at Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov. His extraordinary public denunciations in the weeks prior to the mutiny, shouting at both on Russian TV, stunned all of Russia but received little attention in the West. Prigozhin accused the military leadership of corruption, deception, and catastrophic mismanagement of the war in Ukraine. His objective was to humiliate them, force their removal, and compel Putin to intervene—not to replace Putin himself. He was screaming into Russian cameras, “Shoigu! Gerasimov!!” But not once did he shout Putin’s name. He knew where to stop with his ire.

Western observers too often interpreted the mutiny through their own hopes for regime change. It was an elite struggle within the existing system, not a revolutionary movement against it. Understanding that distinction is essential. Elite infighting should not automatically be mistaken for the imminent collapse of the regime.

Putin is a master, just like Stalin was 80 years ago, at playing his lieutenants and loyalist Siloviki against one another. While they jostle for power, he remains firmly in control, and they are constantly trying to curry his favor. Prigozhin sat at his table—and prepared that table—for decades. He knew it.

The third lesson is perhaps the most consequential. Putin's system was never designed to depend solely on the regular armed forces. It rests on multiple overlapping centers of coercive power, principally at the hands of the intelligence services. The Federal Security Service (FSB) remains the dominant institution protecting the regime. Alongside it stands the National Guard (Rosgvardia), with its vast manpower and domestic security mission, and the Federal Protective Service (FSO), whose responsibilities include safeguarding the country's leadership (first and foremost in the personage of Putin). These organizations were deliberately structured to counterbalance one another, prevent any single institution from becoming too powerful, and ensure that threats to the regime can be contained from multiple directions. Putin is a master at it.

The Wagner mutiny did not invalidate that architecture. If anything, the aftermath demonstrated its durability. While the regular military was embarrassed, the broader security state remained intact. Rosgvardia was strengthened immediately after the mutiny, receiving more heavy equipment, tanks, and APCs designed to put down even the most serious uprising by disloyal units, should they ever get past the wary watch of the FSB. It is headed by General Viktor Zolotov, a loyal former KGB colleague of Putin’s. That layered system and those allegiances help explain why authoritarian regimes like Putin’s can absorb dramatic shocks without collapsing (Iran provides parallels, and no doubt Russia and Iran continue to learn from one another).

None of this means Putin's regime is invulnerable. History offers countless reminders that authoritarian systems often appear stable until they suddenly are not. Internal rivalries matter. Economic pressure matters. Military setbacks matter.

But careful analysis requires distinguishing between long-term structural vulnerabilities and near-term political collapse. Those are not the same thing. Russia under Putin has shown a remarkable ability to overcome its structural and corrupt vulnerabilities to launch out repeatedly with aggression.

Three years after the Wagner mutiny, the greatest analytical mistake would be the same one made in June 2023: allowing hope to substitute for honest assessment. We cannot simply hold our breath, wait for the next rumor of elite discord, and convince ourselves that the dictator—and the security state he has painstakingly constructed over twenty-six years—will collapse under its own weight.

It will not be that easy. If Russia's aggression is ultimately to be defeated, it will require sustained Western resolve, continued support for Ukraine, and a clear-eyed understanding of both the strengths and the weaknesses of the adversary we face. Strategy demands as much patience as the current optimism calls for. But our strategy also demands more resolve, as well as something else missing in 2022—and for much of Putin’s reign—a more credible deterrent from the West.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.

An Outlook for What’s Next in Iran War

With tensions rising all week, the U.S. has launched a new round of strikes against Iranian military targets and maritime assets. The strikes follow an announcement made by President Donald Trump just hours earlier, declaring the ceasefire agreement with Tehran as ‘over’. The fresh wave of strikes signals a U.S. shift back to a strategy of military pressure and economic coercion. The Cipher Brief reached out to Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI Norm Roule for context.

"For now, the U.S.-Iran diplomatic track remains alive, but its ability to produce meaningful near-term progress is uncertain, and its long-term survival and utility are increasingly at risk. U.S. strikes in Iran over the past two days will degrade important elements of Tehran’s capabilities in the short term and may buy space for Pakistani and Qatari mediators to reduce tensions and bring about at least a temporary halt in the attacks. However, even if the latest U.S. retaliation deters Iranian attacks in the near term, Tehran is unlikely to abandon its claim of administrative control over the Strait of Hormuz or halt retaliatory attacks against Gulf states that host U.S. bases. Iran’s actions support its long-standing intention to be viewed as a regional hegemon with veto rights over Gulf security, using asymmetric weapons to offset U.S. and Gulf conventional advantages.

Specifically, Tehran is highly likely to continue periodic harassment of shipping to undermine confidence in the security of the Omani transit route. However, Iran is unlikely to try to close the Strait outright unless the United States reinstitutes a blockade against Iran. An effort by Tehran to close the Strait would alienate its customers, unify much of the world against it, and risk a wider war with the United States that the Iranian regime might survive but cannot win. Iran almost certainly believes that it does not need to close the Strait to weaponize it. It only needs to make passage so uncertain enough that insurers, shippers, energy firms, and Gulf governments begin pricing Iranian permission into the movement of commerce and eventually decide they have no choice but to accept a construct that gives Iran permanent influence over passage and Tehran the right to charge fees to those who use it.

The United States is determined to show Iran that these actions carry material costs and that Tehran will not be allowed to control an international waterway. The latest U.S. strikes against Iran, following Tehran’s missile and drone attacks against commercial shipping and Gulf targets, were significant and went well beyond the more limited retaliation that followed earlier Iranian provocations. U.S. forces struck more than 80 Iranian targets on July 7 and approximately 90 additional targets on July 8, including Iranian air defense, command-and-control, coastal surveillance, anti-ship missile, drone, naval, and logistics assets, as well as more than 60 IRGC small boats. Press reports claim U.S. strikes or explosions at key sites near Bandar Abbas, Chabahar, Qeshm, Sirik, Bushehr, and Kharg Island, Iran’s principal oil export terminal. President Trump has threatened further escalation, including attacks against Iranian infrastructure and Kharg Island, if Iranian attacks continue.

This was a significant attack package, but one that still avoided leadership targets and most major civilian infrastructure. The strikes show that the United States will defend its regional partners and the international status of the Strait of Hormuz, and that it has a good understanding of the military system and infrastructure it needs to target to degrade Iran’s attack capabilities in the near term.

Although it remains unclear whether Tehran will de-escalate to avoid further damage, doing so would be consistent with its past behavior and would fit its long-term strategy of episodic attacks that unsettle shipping and test, but do not cross, the line that would ignite a large-scale conflict with the United States. The nature of Iran’s attacks to date, however, shows that Tehran is willing to assume a greater risk of renewed large-scale conflict with the United States if that is the price of forcing others to treat Hormuz as a waterway subject to Iranian permission. The tenor of Iranian rhetoric toward the United States has also sharpened after the former Supreme Leader’s funeral, including public revenge threats against the President. Defiance rather than cooperation is likely to define Iran’s near-term approach.

The Gulf states seek to avoid escalation, but they continue to firmly reject Iran’s claim of control over the region’s central maritime artery. Bahrain, Kuwait, and reportedly even Qatar have now all been drawn directly into the latest Iranian response. This response shows that Tehran is not only threatening commercial shipping and Gulf energy exports, but also targeting Gulf states with the sensing, communications, and command architecture it believes supports U.S. deterrence in the region. These attacks also message that U.S. basing will not protect Gulf states from Iranian attack.

The Gulf states’ immediate focus has been to remove ambiguity regarding safe passage and Iran’s persistent threats by using Qatari, Omani, and Pakistani diplomatic channels, as well as by exploring alternative transit, pipeline, and international maritime arrangements to reduce Iran’s leverage over Hormuz. Iran’s strategy depends on undermining the perception that Omani waters offer protection from Iranian attacks. Tehran’s rejection of reported UAE-backed efforts to develop an International Maritime Organization role in managing the Strait underscores that Iran is fighting not just over shipping lanes, but over who has the authority to define safe passage. Qatar’s role in this regional dynamic is complicated: it is both a valued diplomatic channel and the region’s dominant LNG exporter. At the same time, the reported attacks on Qatari-linked vessels and Iranian pressure on Gulf basing infrastructure show that mediation won’t insulate Doha from Iranian missile and drone strikes.

Energy markets face increased pressure that is likely to vary in intensity over time. Gulf exports had been recovering since mid-June, but the security architecture underpinning that recovery is now visibly eroding. Treasury’s revocation of the oil license granted to Iran after the June deal strips Tehran of the principal early economic concession it gained from the reopening arrangement. Brent and WTI both rose sharply on the news, reflecting not only fear of lost barrels but fear that Hormuz is again becoming a contested operating environment. Nonetheless, the market is responding in a way that shows it sees this week’s flare-up as contained, and that robust production from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other producers, reduced Chinese imports from Iran, and the demonstrated resilience of energy markets will prevent a major price shock. In short, existing supply and demand conditions reinforce the prevailing belief that the regional strikes will not evolve into a broader conflict. Should this view be significantly challenged, however, oil prices could quickly move into the $80s or $90s. Longer-term, there is still a disconnect between current market sentiment, the heavy drawdown on global strategic reserves, and the fact that Gulf reliability has been damaged. Even if the Strait remains open, buyers, insurers, and refiners will now treat Gulf supply as politically contingent in a way they did not before the war."

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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Beyond Evo: Bolivia and the Erosion of State Authority in Latin America

In recent days, an unusual consensus has begun to emerge among some of Bolivia's most prominent public intellectuals, economists, diplomats, and former political leaders.

Former Foreign Minister Jaime Aparicio has warned that Bolivia has moved from "the theater of the absurd" to "the dialogue of the absurd," suggesting that the country may require international support to preserve democratic governance. Economist Jaime Dunn has repeatedly argued that Bolivia's central challenge is no longer merely economic, electoral, or ideological, but institutional. Former President Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga has warned of the corrosive effects of impunity and criminality on democratic government. Former La Paz mayor and economist Ronald MacLean Abaroa has likewise argued that Bolivia confronts a deeper crisis of governance than many observers recognize. Political commentator Vidal Dorado has advanced similar concerns.

These figures differ in generation, political affiliation, and professional experience. Yet they increasingly converge around a common diagnosis: Bolivia's greatest challenge may no longer be who governs the country, but whether the state itself retains the capacity to govern effectively.

That distinction matters.

Most international coverage of Bolivia's current turmoil continues to frame events as a political confrontation between former President Evo Morales and President Rodrigo Paz. The headlines focus on road blockades, food and fuel shortages, arrests, negotiations, and the possibility of emergency measures. Morales's supporters argue that he is being excluded from political life. His opponents contend that he is attempting to destabilize the government in order to preserve his political relevance and avoid accountability. Both interpretations contain elements of truth. Neither fully captures the significance of what is taking place.

As a Bolivian attorney and former Interim Mission Director of USAID/Bolivia, I have observed the country navigate moments of extraordinary turbulence. Bolivia has survived military governments, hyperinflation, constitutional crises, regional tensions, and repeated confrontations between state institutions and social movements. Yet what is unfolding today feels different. Increasingly, the central question is not who governs Bolivia. It is whether the Bolivian state can govern effectively.

The current crisis illustrates the point. Weeks of blockades have disrupted commerce, restricted the movement of food and fuel, and imposed substantial costs on ordinary citizens. Reports indicate that patients have died after being unable to obtain timely medical treatment because transportation routes remained blocked. The government has debated emergency authorities while attempting to avoid a wider confrontation. Yet even amid escalating tensions, important developments have occurred. The Central Obrera Boliviana has entered into dialogue with the government and established joint commissions to address detainees and other demands. At the same time, divisions have emerged within sectors of the protest movement itself, including organizations associated with the Tupac Katari movement.

These developments suggest that the crisis is no longer a simple confrontation between government and opposition. Bolivia increasingly resembles a contest among multiple actors, grievances, and centers of influence, none of which appears capable of imposing a definitive outcome on its own. The result is a growing debate not merely about political leadership, but about governability itself.

At the same time, public discussion has increasingly touched issues that until recently remained largely confined to security specialists and anti-corruption practitioners: narcotics trafficking, illegal mining, contraband, land trafficking, environmental crime, and the financing of political mobilization.

Whether any particular allegation ultimately proves true remains a matter for evidence, investigation, and due process. Yet the broader trend is difficult to ignore. Over time, illicit and informal economies can accumulate sufficient financial and political influence to shape governance itself. They provide livelihoods where the formal economy cannot. They generate patronage networks. They cultivate local loyalties. They penetrate institutions. Eventually, they cease functioning merely as criminal enterprises operating outside the state. They become alternative systems of power operating alongside it.

More than half a century ago, René Zavaleta Mercado, Bolivia's most influential twentieth-century political thinker, described his country as a sociedad abigarrada—a society composed of multiple social, economic, and political realities existing simultaneously within the same national territory. Zavaleta was attempting to explain Bolivia's complexity. His insight remains relevant today. Yet the challenge confronting Bolivia may now extend beyond the coexistence of multiple realities. Increasingly, some of the most powerful actors operating within those realities are neither political parties nor state institutions, but illicit economic networks whose resources and influence rival those of the state itself.

This is not solely a Bolivian phenomenon.

For much of the democratic era that followed Latin America's military governments, political debate revolved around elections, constitutions, economic models, and the alternation of power. The underlying assumption was that the state remained the principal arena through which political conflict would be resolved. Across much of the hemisphere, that assumption is being tested.

In Mexico, cartels have challenged state authority across entire regions. Ecuador's recent security crisis demonstrated how rapidly organized crime can reshape national politics. Colombia continues to confront criminal and armed groups whose influence extends well beyond traditional law-enforcement concerns. Guatemala has repeatedly struggled with corruption networks capable of penetrating public institutions. Venezuela presents perhaps the hemisphere's most advanced example of governing structures intertwined with illicit economic activity. Nicaragua's authoritarian consolidation likewise demonstrates how patronage, coercion, and opaque economic relationships can undermine democratic accountability.

Elsewhere, similar concerns are emerging. Brazil faces the growing influence of criminal organizations and illegal mining operations in the Amazon. Panama remains vulnerable to transnational money laundering and criminal finance. Jamaica and Trinidad continue to grapple with the political consequences of organized crime and gang violence. Guyana's remarkable economic expansion creates extraordinary opportunities but also governance risks familiar to many resource-rich states. Even Argentina's recent political debate, reflected in part through the rise of Javier Milei, has centered on public frustration with entrenched patronage systems, institutional weakness, and a perception that the state increasingly serves privileged networks rather than citizens. In Chile, support for figures such as José Antonio Kast similarly reflects anxieties about crime, state capacity, and the ability of institutions to maintain public order.

These countries are not identical. Their histories differ. Their institutions differ. Their democratic trajectories differ. Yet they increasingly confront a common challenge: preserving the capacity of legitimate institutions to exercise authority in the face of alternative networks of economic and political power.

The concern is not merely theoretical. It increasingly shapes political discourse throughout the hemisphere. What Jaime Dunn articulates in Bolivia is not entirely different from concerns expressed by reformers in Ecuador, opposition figures in Venezuela, portions of Peru's political class, or advocates of institutional reform elsewhere in the region. The ideological differences among these groups are substantial. What unites them is a growing belief that democratic governments are losing ground—not simply to political opponents, but to systems of power that operate beyond the effective reach of traditional institutions.

At this point, the observations of Jorge Basadre, Peru's great historian of the republic, become especially relevant. Basadre famously described Peru as both a problem and a possibility. The same might be said of democratic governance across much of Latin America today. The challenge facing many countries is not simply electing the right leaders or adopting the right policies. It is preserving institutions capable of channeling conflict through politics rather than allowing power to migrate toward criminal organizations, illicit markets, or networks that thrive on disorder and impunity.

Many of the hemisphere's most experienced diplomats and policymakers, including former U.S. Under Secretary of State Tom Shannon, have long argued that Latin America's enduring challenges are ultimately institutional rather than ideological. Bolivia's current crisis reinforces that point. The debate is no longer primarily about the distribution of power among competing political actors. It is increasingly about the capacity of democratic institutions to exercise authority, enforce rules, and maintain legitimacy.

This challenge also exposes a growing gap in the inter-American system. The Inter-American Democratic Charter was designed to defend constitutional democracy against coups, authoritarian ruptures, and attacks on democratic order. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption sought to strengthen integrity and accountability throughout the hemisphere. Both remain important achievements. Yet neither was drafted with today's challenge fully in mind. Increasingly, democracy is threatened not only by tanks in the streets or presidents who refuse to leave office. It is threatened by criminal networks, illicit economies, and corruption structures that do not seek to replace democratic institutions outright, but gradually hollow them out from within.

Two centuries ago, Simón Bolívar warned of the fragility of republican institutions in the newly independent Americas. More recently, Basadre reminded us that the republic remains both a problem and a possibility. Bolivia's current crisis suggests that those concerns remain remarkably relevant. Jaime Dunn and others have argued that the country's deepest challenge is institutional. The evidence increasingly suggests they may be right.

The fundamental question facing Bolivia today is not whether Evo Morales or Rodrigo Paz prevails in the next round of political struggle. It is whether democratic institutions can continue to exercise legitimate authority in the face of increasingly powerful alternative networks of economic and political power. That question extends far beyond Bolivia. Increasingly, it is becoming one of the defining questions of democratic governance throughout the Americas.

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After the Intelligence Cycle: A New Schema for AI-Native Intelligence Analysis

Recent discussion of artificial intelligence in intelligence analysis has consistently framed the technology as a means of accelerating an existing process. The intelligence cycle (collection, processing, analysis, production, dissemination) remains the implicit organizing schema, with AI cast as something used to drive its stages faster, increase resource efficiency, or widen its scope. We find this framing inadequate. It leaves the cycle itself intact, treating it as a sound structure merely in need of added speed, when the more consequential present opportunity is to reconsider the structure altogether. The intelligence cycle is an industrial-era artifact, popularized by Sherman Kent in the immediate post-war period, when information was scarce, expert labor concentrated, and the consumer a narrowly-defined institutional decision-maker. None of these conditions still holds. Recent work by Gartin, Schlickenmaier and by Reed and Szylkiewicz has argued for updating intelligence with agile, information-technology methods, and for shifting delivery toward a services-centric rather than goods-centric model. These arguments address the outdated production cycle, but neither fully anticipates the extent to which AI permits the cycle to be displaced wholesale rather than merely modernized.

As practitioners building intelligence programs in this environment, we observe that the prevailing conversation remains bounded by traditional conceptions of what analytic work is. This paper proposes a different framework, organized around a single assertion: that AI enables a scale and rigor in cognitive information work that were previously unavailable, and that this in turn dissolves several of the assumptions on which the cycle previously depended. The argument rests on a particular architectural premise that analytic reasoning can be captured as a structured data schema rather than compressed into an overly-simplified finished narrative. From this premise follow five ruptures with the traditional cycle:

First, the core value unit of intelligence shifts away from the finished assessment toward a more complex artifact that contains the entire decision architecture by which the assessment was reached.

Second, AI-enabled analysis becomes continuous and ongoing rather than fixed to a single publication date.

Third, analytic accuracy becomes measurable, and therefore improvable, for the first time in history.

Fourth, the relationship between provider and decision-maker narrows, and can be scaled to the needs of the individual consumer rather than to a generic reporting requirement.

And fifth, source handling and judgment collapse into a single operation rather than appearing as separate steps.

Taken together, these constitute a revolutionary rather than evolutionary departure from the manual methods that have governed intelligence analysis for a century, and they open new ground for rigor, accountability, and accuracy in global risk forecasting.

From Finished Product to Assessment Process

Modern intelligence analysis tradecraft treats the finished product as its core deliverable. The product serves both as the vehicle of value to the consumer and as the measure of organisational output, and it is the terminus toward which collection, refinement, and assessment are all directed. This arrangement was never optimal. Reliance on a single artifact collapses a complex analytic process into one compressed object, in which the judgments, and biases, included along the way are flattened into a single deliverable. Tradecraft notes and caveats have occasionally preserved fragments of this reasoning, but the product standing alone has never fully represented the value chain that produced it. The most important steps in the analyst's work, the alternative hypotheses entertained, the source biases weighed, and the contingencies sketched against one another, do not travel with the document, forming a lost layer of metadata that usually remains behind.

Artificial intelligence relieves the scale pressure that heretofore forced this compression. An analyst working with well-designed AI tools can now meaningfully execute and record each of the steps in an intelligence workflow rapidly and at scale, which permits the end product to change, away from the finished product deliverable to a searchable, indexable, and auditable log of expertise that has produced a range of potentially useful data through its work. In this process, the end value unit of analysis becomes the actual analysis itself, rather than an artificial summary of that analysis compressed to finished product size. By deprioritizing the focus on the product as the end goal of all analytic work, more of the valuable decisions and information which informed its creation become accessible to both the analyst and the consumer, which may audit and explore these dynamically to enhance their own understanding.

For this process to compound rather than merely accumulate, the analytic representation of judgments must be persistent and structured. Judgments of this type include the reliability of the source, the credibility of the information it contains, the weight that information should play in contributing to a view of the world, how it might interplay with other events and trends, and so on. These expert judgments are collected as structured data and recorded as they are formed, so that they can later be reviewed against real-world outcomes as those outcomes resolve. This foundation of analysis permits auditability and recursive improvement in judgment, source collection, and analytic framing. AI tools used correctly should permit a thoroughness which enhances judgment rather than eroding it, because they help create a massive record of analytic work that persists and can rapidly be revisited, rather than a sequence of keyhole snapshots of reality which age into irrelevance from the moment they are completed.

Because our representation of analyst judgment is structured across various data points rather than as a single loose narrative, it supports more than retrieval. A sufficiently large corpus of analytic judgments can be used to generate predictive assessments based on prior weighting and modal relationships, to trace multi-path higher-order consequences that human reasoning follows poorly, to identify which forces carry the most systemic weight, and to express conclusions as calibrated, quantified probability rather than verbal estimate.

From Episodic to Continuous Analysis

The intelligence cycle was built around episodic production not because it produced the best analytic results but because scale challenges prevented anything more rigorous. Between products, the analyst's judgment existed only in their head, and even then, was a nebulous and ill-defined thing. Kent’s “Words of Estimative Probability” and Tetlock’s superforecasting projects both pointed toward a need for improved, continuous, and calibrated judgment, but neither could provide a way to operate such a system of rigor continuously at scale. Artificial intelligence changes this arithmetic. A well-trained model handles what human analysts struggle to achieve at scale, ingesting raw data, mapping it to analyst-defined areas of interest, and updating mathematical prediction models. This rapid processing enables the analyst to spend bandwidth on setting the scope of analytic questions, interrogating the quality and biases of sources, and defining the weights and relationships the models will assign to various real-world events. Far from the language of the factory assembly line, the modern discipline of intelligence we espouse more closely resembles the rhythm of a trading desk, where equities analysts mark positions to market continuously, forever adjusting expectations based on a never-ending flow of data.

In this framing, an equities analyst wouldn’t save up all their trading positions to be submitted in one package at the end of the day, and we propose that appropriately tooled intelligence analysts similarly no longer need to wait until a publication date to deliver analytic value. By connecting front-end AI summarization and chat systems to back-end analyst enrichment areas, customers are able to query the latest in analyst judgment on demand, creating an instant feedback loop in which customer queries inform and sharpen ongoing analytic priorities. This serves the analyst as much as the consumer. It removes the obligation to produce filler during quiet periods, and it lets analytic output follow the genuine cadence of a topic rather than an arbitrary calendar.

Measuring and Improving Accuracy

Intelligence consumers hold the analyst accountable not only for a judgment but also for the reasoning by which it was reached. Historically this accountability has been difficult to honor, because much analytic judgment was formed reflexively and poorly recorded. The methods now available for capturing and structuring reasoning make the problem tractable for the first time. Once reasoning is recorded as structure, it can be scored against outcomes as they resolve, using calibration methods such as Brier scoring. The essential property is that each judgment is preserved as it was made and is not revised afterward. That is what keeps the scoring honest: the analyst is measured against the call they actually made, not a version softened by hindsight.

We are deliberate about the strength of this claim. The architecture does not inherently make analysts more accurate. What it makes possible is the measurement of accuracy and the diagnosis of error. When a judgment proves wrong, the structure allows the failure to be traced to a specific weighting or relationship rather than absorbed into an unaccountable whole. It is this decomposability, sustained over time and across many resolved judgments, that creates the conditions for improvement, for the individual analyst and for the models their judgments inform. The data describing how and why an analyst reached a judgment is, in this respect, more valuable than the judgment itself, because it is the raw material of recursive refinement.

This is a meaningful departure. For most of its history, intelligence analysis has struggled to know whether it was improving in delivering decision advantage or predictive insight, because the record needed to properly audit this improvement was never systematically available. For the first time, a complete and inspectable record scored against reality is within reach, presenting the opportunity for true improvements in forecasting accuracy.

From Generic to Specified

A further constraint the cycle never escaped was the assumption that consumers were finite and institutionally legible. The analyst writing for a government agency in 1990 could reasonably picture a handful of senior officials whose interests were bounded by their roles in advancing the national interest. This model functions poorly in the wider modern intelligence context, in which the reader of any given report might vary widely based on their position and access. For intelligence teams working in today’s commercialized contexts, the reader of a report might be a CFO weighing currency exposure, an operations director routing freight around contested waterways, a general counsel mapping sanctions risk, or a fund manager modelling financial tail risk. Each actor is sufficiently distinct from the others that how information is presented to them, and what information is relevant to their decisions, is so different as to destroy the value of a single, universal intelligence report. Each actor makes a different decision against a different geometry of exposure to the same geopolitical environment. A generic product written to the centre of this readership delivers very little decision value to any specific stakeholder because it is intended for none of them.

Bespoke intelligence tailored to individual stakeholders is rare, because it is cost-prohibitive. Examples like the President’s Daily Brief show just how complex and difficult the process is to tailor an intelligence report to even one customer, let alone many hundreds or thousands. Today, AI makes this feasible, because it permits a single body of robust analytic work to be expressed differently for each consumer according to their specific exposure. The assessment surfaced to a Nordic manufacturer with significant Strait of Hormuz exposure differs significantly from the one surfaced to a Latin American agribusiness with none, though both can draw on the same underlying analysis in order to inform a wider geopolitical frame. This approach keeps client-specific context separate from the shared analytic base rather than absorbing it permanently, which matters as much for data governance as for scale. In other words, by keeping intelligence about the threat environment separate from context about the user’s potential impact until the last possible moment, delivery of truly tailored insights is permissible at a scale that humans alone cannot match. Delivering this well still requires human guidance, because the object is to inform human decisions, but it is reachable by a useful number of consumers only through automated composition and delivery. In practice it increasingly resembles data layers, dashboards, and conversational interfaces rather than documents and slide decks, which are inherently static and cannot respond to unique and specific customer interrogation. AI’s ability to handle mass data sets and rapidly synthesize them for human engagement is the key which unlocks these dynamic product offerings.

Source Handling as Judgment

One fiction the cycle's imagery sustained was that a clean separation existed between collection and analysis. In the logic of the assembly line, collection produced sources, processing ordered them, and analysis applied judgment. Practitioners have long known this separation rarely held in practice. Deciding which information to credit, and how heavily, is itself an analytic act, one frequently practiced by collectors but only sporadically preserved in the finished product in the form of sometimes feeble source reliability statements. An AI-enabled team can make this categorization a continuous and systematic piece of the analysis rather than a burdensome and occasional addendum to it. High-volume collection and tagging let analysts reach and index relevant information by reliability far faster, and automated tooling lets them record, in real time, which signals they judge useful, to what degree, and for which questions.

Two disciplines give this its force. The first is continuity: signals attach to persistent, identified subjects rather than floating as unlinked text, so that a judgment made today accrues to the same subject a judgment made months earlier addressed. The second is provenance carried as structure. Each catalogued signal carries its source, the system action that surfaced it, and the analyst decisions that touched it, so that the basis of a judgment travels with the judgment rather than being reconstructed after the fact. In our architecture the analyst encodes meaning into collection from first contact through to the point at which a signal is connected to the wider analytic framework. The system performs the high-volume triage and flagging; the analyst accepts, challenges, or supplies the context the system cannot; and the system then does the durable work of attaching that judgment to analysis where it carries lasting weight. The provenance this produces is more than an audit trail, and becomes part of what the consumer can interrogate. It also forms the basis for learning, over time, about collection gaps and the reliability of sources, serving as an internal collection management architecture.

After the Intelligence Cycle

Building an intelligence team that is AI-native from the outset, at a moment when most established intelligence institutions predate AI and are captured by institutional cultures which inhibit profound change, has shaped our thinking profoundly. The most valuable applications we find for AI push beyond legacy tradecraft, and concentrate on the high-volume work of collection, structuring, and presentation of data. Critically, we do not use AI to replace human judgment. The reason is not that models cannot produce reasoning, because they can, often fluently. It is that a model's account of its own reasoning cannot be relied upon as a faithful record of why it actually reached a conclusion. Auditable, attributable judgment of exactly that kind is what our architecture is built to capture from human analysts. Throughout our experimentation we have found success in a consistent division of labour: the system handles scale, the analyst supplies judgment, and the system records and surfaces that judgment rather than manufacturing it. Attempts to use AI to replace the analytic steps of the cycle risk producing analysis that sounds authoritative but cannot be held to account, and that is most dangerous when it is wrong. Any technology that amplifies human reasoning inherits its errors along with its strengths, which is why the core work of judgment must remain human and auditable.

The process changes we describe are early in their lifecycle, and the work of demonstrating them against a long track record remains ahead of us. Still, the process has taught us that significant changes to the discipline of intelligence analysis are almost certainly on the horizon, particularly as technological advances in model sophistication render traditional information-work delivery obsolete. Human analysts may defend the old ways of conducting analysis on nostalgic grounds, but the truth is that intelligence analysis conducted in this way has a poor track record of success, and disruptions which pose the opportunity for step improvements should be welcomed. These improvements should proceed from the end goal of intelligence analysis - to provide sustainable, responsible, and accurate forecasts about the future that enable decision advantage - rather than from a reactive defense of the previous normal process. To integrate AI in intelligence analysis in responsible ways requires abandoning many of the bad habits and basic assumptions that limited intelligence work in the preceding era. It also requires reconceiving the notion of the value and role of the human analyst in providing insight, and an audacity to believe that what has historically been unknowably complex can be rendered intelligible through sufficiently sophisticated modeling. One hundred years ago, humans struggled to predict the weather with any reliability; today, they expect a device in the palm of their hand to predict rain down to the minute. Similar changes are coming to the world of intelligence analysis. But they will require leaving behind the archaic tools of a previous era in order to reach their full potential.

The Succession Question Haunting the Kremlin

The late-June 2026 death of Sergei B. Ivanov - the man once thought the most likely successor to Vladimir Putin - as well as the Russian President’s age, his rumored health problems, and the discontent over the economic impact of his disastrous invasion of Ukraine; have renewed speculation over when, under what circumstances and to whom he might cede power. The constitutional changes Putin orchestrated in 2020 potentially allow him to remain in office until 2036. Further, he has refused to answer questions about whether he will stay until then saying it is too early to discuss such matters and citing his focus on running the nation. However, given that Putin would be 83 in 2036, it is highly likely a leadership change will occur before then. How might Putin – assuming he is in a position to do so - handle such a transition? Ivanov’s history with him is instructive in this regard.

Like Putin, Ivanov hailed from St. Petersburg. They both served in the KGB’s foreign intelligence arm, the First Chief Directorate. But there was a difference between them that likely nettled the prideful Putin. While he served in Dresden, working with the allied East German State Security Service (a posting that earned him the not wholly complimentary sobriquet “Stasi” among his KGB colleagues), the polished, English-speaking Ivanov battled the ‘Main Enemy’ on the hostile side of the East-West divide. The two maintained a close relationship while Putin came to power and into the early years of his rule. Ivanov was the most-trusted of the coterie of St. Petersburg intelligence and security service veterans who formed the core of Putin’s governing elite as he founded what would become a de facto ‘Chekist” state in Russia.

When Putin was appointed Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) by then-President Boris Yeltsin, he named Ivanov as his deputy. As he moved on from the FSB to become prime minister and then president of Russia, Putin kept Ivanov at the center of his security apparatus, appointing him successively as Secretary of the Security Council from 1999 until 2001; as Defense Minister from 2001 until 2007; and then as First Deputy Prime Minister. Apparently seen by Putin as too ambitious and difficult to control, Ivanov’s influence began to gradually wane in 2008 as the Russian president named the more pliable Dmitry Medvedev as a placeholder president while he himself actually ran the country from his perch as Prime Minister pending a return to the presidency. Although Ivanov remained a trusted player in Putin’s orbit for years thereafter - subsequently serving as Deputy Prime Minster and Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration – the window for him to succeed his boss had long since closed. In 2016, he was relegated to a ceremonial position overseeing environmental and transport matters.

Repeating a Medvedev-like managed transition arrangement – that is Putin “retiring” while orchestrating events like a puppet master behind the curtain - is one likely scenario should he decide to depart the presidency. Another possibility is the constitutionally sanctioned model like that which played out in 1999 wherein the man Yeltsin named prime minister – in that case Putin himself - became his heir apparent. Putin went on to become acting Russian president and then president in 2000 following Yeltsin’s resignation. Another possibility is that Putin could precipitously decide to extra-constitutionally designate a successor.

The problem with these scenarios is that Putin to date has given no indication he might be willing to cede power. Nor, even if so inclined, is he likely to do so at least until he has secured something he can, however speciously, call ‘victory’ in Ukraine, a result that – at minimum - hinges on his ability to secure either through negotiations or force of arms the four oblasts Russia claims to have annexed in 2022. For Putin, successful resolution of the war is both a strategic imperative and central to his personal legacy. Given the grinding nature of the Russian Army’s advance in Donbas and the ferocious resistance being mounted by the Ukrainians, such an outcome appears unlikely in the foreseeable future if ever.

It is conceivable that the military or security services could mount a coup to topple Putin. Yet, despite the massive human and economic costs his war has imposed on the Russian people, there are to date no discernible indications such a putsch is in the offing. Additionally, the security measures taken following the abortive 2023 Wagner mutiny – to include the 2024 restoration granting of the Soviet-era Dzerzhinskiy title/honorific to a division of the Putin-created National Guard (‘Rosgvardiya’) protecting the country’s leadership and the ‘no man, no problem’ retaliation meted out to Yevgeny Prigozhin in its wake – mitigate against the success of any such attempt to overthrow the regime.

Given Putin’s age, and the fact that he rules a country wherein the male life expectancy is roughly the mid-to-high 60s, another likely scenario for an end to his regime involves his sudden death or incapacitation in office. Such an eventuality would unleash a period of leadership tumult in Moscow akin to that which followed the 1953 death of Stalin. With the demise of the Soviet dictator, it was widely assumed he would be succeeded by one of his closest lieutenants, Georgy M. Malenkov. Malenkov indeed became Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He successfully conspired with Red Army Marshal Georgy Zhukov, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and Nikita Khrushchev to dispose of the odious Lavrentiy Beria. Nonetheless, even though he was effectively the Soviet premier and the head of government, Malenkov was unable to consolidate power because he controlled neither the security apparatus nor the Soviet Communist Party. And it was Khrushchev - by then First Secretary of the Party – who ultimately won the fight between Stalin’s lieutenants to succeed him.

During a 1959 discussion with Khrushchev, former U.S. Ambassador W. Averill Harriman addressed Stalin’s lack of a succession plan, asking the Soviet leader who Stalin thought would succeed him. Khrushchev’s reply that: “Stalin didn’t think; he thought he would live forever” was, as was the case with much of what he said, calculatingly apocryphal. Stalin, notoriously conspiratorial by nature, clearly feared that if he acknowledged his rule would someday come to an end, his power would rapidly erode as plotting to hasten that indefinite date commenced. As the fight to succeed him would attest, he was surely correct in that judgement. After all, as Golda Meir would famously observe to Henry Kissinger in 1973: ‘Even paranoids have enemies’.

Reference in Ecclesiastes 7:15 to “the righteous perishing in their righteousness, and the wicked living long in their wickedness” certainly applies not only to Stalin but also to Putin. Nevertheless, absent some highly unlikely actualization of the scheme he discussed with Xi Jinping in 2025 of indefinitely extending his mortality by replacing organs in a manner akin to that of a Bond villain, Putin knows that his death is an actuarial certainty. But, like Stalin, he surely (and rightly) understands that any designation of a successor would inevitably and immediately lead to an erosion of his own power as others vied for his throne.

A precipitous end to the Putin regime would almost certainly trigger a period – perhaps an extended period – of crisis and uncertainty in Russia. Even in the best-case scenario – such as a decision by Putin to name a successor or wield power from behind-the-scenes as he did with Medvedev - it is likely that a contest among aspirants to his purple would follow. In addition to the character, worldview and policy goals of any new man in the Kremlin, the key determinants in any transition will be how it comes about and strength of support for that new leader. Putin has not allowed any subordinate to become an alternative center of power and the Russian political system is deliberately opaque with respect to any political matter, much less an issue as sensitive as leadership transition.

According to the Russian constitution, in the event of a president’s death, resignation, incapacity, or impeachment, the prime minister - currently Mikhail V. Mishustin - would serve as acting president pending a presidential election within three months. In practice, however, succession would likely be less about constitutional procedure than about who can best ensure elite status, security, property and de facto immunity from any legal accountability. The presidential administration, security services, state corporations, courts, political parties, media, and regional governors all look to the Kremlin for direction and sustenance.

Consequently, a decision on who would succeed Putin would involve bargaining among elites with roots in those sectors. While Mishustin would temporarily fill in as president in a sudden constitutional transition, he lacks the charisma, nationalist credentials, independent public backing, and security-service connections to become a permanent successor to Putin. That said, because the prime minister is the formal acting president in extremis, replacing Mishustin with another figure would be a clear signal that the person named is being positioned to succeed Putin.

Any change in leadership in the Kremlin, however it comes about, will - if only because Russia is a major nuclear power – engender worries about the nature of any regime following that of Putin. This was also the case after Stalin’s death when then-Vice President Richard Nixon voiced concern that his successor “might very well prove more difficult to deal with than Stalin himself.” As the recklessness Khrushchev displayed in deploying missiles to Cuba attested, Nixon was right to be worried. The Russian leadership itself probably understands such concerns and wants to avoid fueling them. That is one reason that the next Russian president is less likely to be an advocate of change than a continuity figure. Domestically, any successor would likely concentrate on consolidating his rule and avoiding anything that looks like defeat in Ukraine. Even if the next leader is less personally ideological than Putin, the governing structure he inherits will inevitably push him toward continuity. This would mean repression of any opposition, or perceived opposition, at home; deep suspicion of the West; protection of elite wealth; and management of the Ukraine war and its consequences.

In any transition scenario, but particularly in the case of an unexpected transition, the security services - the best organized and most powerful internal organizations supporting and enforcing Putin’s rule - will play a key role in determining who will follow him. Not surprisingly, then, several of those thought best positioned to succeed Putin have deep security service roots. Most prominent among them is ex-Putin bodyguard and former governor of Tula oblast Alexei Dyumin. He was given a position in the Kremlin and subsequently made secretary of the State Council, actions seen by many as signs he is seen by Putin as a possible successor. Another leading candidate, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev, is the son of the hard-line former Director of the FSB and Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev. Even potential candidates seen as technocrats or managers, such as First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, will have to account for the pervasive influence of the security services should they aspire to succeed Putin.

As Mark Galeotti, an expert on organized crime and the security state in Russia has noted, that country “is effectively a state with a nationalized mafia.” Officers and contacts of those services have leveraged their authorities and connections not only to the benefit of the Putin regime but also to line their own pockets. And there is no reason to suppose that the end of Putin’s rule - however it comes about - and the inevitable departure from the scene of Ivanov and other aging KGB veterans such as Nikolai Patrushev and FSB Director Alexander V. Bortnikov will herald an end to the Chekist State. Moreover, any idea that the new generation of security-state linked ‘siloviki’(strongmen) will willingly cede their sway on the most senior levels of Russian leadership is, to put it mildly, improbable.

On the contrary, for as long as the Ukraine war goes on the security services’ sway over the Russian state will almost certainly grow. Indeed, anyone succeeding Putin is likely to rely heavily on those same services to monitor and suppress any extant opposition to the war and his establishment of control over the levers of power. The impact of the security services on the Russian state after Putin will be much like their central role under him only more so. On becoming Prime Minster in 1999, Putin quipped that “a group of FSB colleagues dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed its first mission.” Sadly for Russia, its people and the people of Ukraine in particular, that mission continues with no end in sight.

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Putin’s Running Out of Scare Tactics and Options

Russian President Vladimir Putin can no longer conceal the cost of his Ukraine war from the Russian public. There are fuel shortages throughout the Russian Federation. Videos show hundreds of automobiles lining up to get a few liters of gasoline at gas stations around Moscow. Gasoline sales to civilian vehicles in occupied Crimea have been suspended as the Ukrainian blockade of the peninsula takes effect. Russia continues to make painfully slow progress in its efforts to capture territory in Ukraine and at a staggering cost in casualties.

“…sound out idols... by pos[ing] questions here with a hammer... scrutiny will reveal that they are actually hollow and meaningless—not the high, noble standards of conduct that their proponents claim them to be." — Friedrich Nietzsche

Twilight of the Idols

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov recently says that Ukraine has successfully regained the strategic initiative on the battlefield and Kyiv’s use of long-range weapons to hit targets deep inside of Russia is aiming to force Moscow to end the war through asymmetric attrition. Ukraine has recently intensified precision strikes 20-300 kms behind Russian lines to isolate Russian infantry, destroy high value air defense systems and disrupt the flow of supplies to the front line. The long-range drone campaign is systematically targeting Russia’s energy infrastructure with devastating economic and psychological effect.

Vehicles are lining up to cross the Kerch Strait bridge following successful Ukrainian drone strikes on the Tavriiska thermal power plant, major electrical substations and the Kerch and Dzhankoi oil depots. These strikes have caused blackouts in Sevastopol and Simferopol, the two largest cities in the peninsula. The panic caused by the energy shortages and the fear of total collapse has led many to flee, causing the massive backups at the bridge—with sometimes as many as 2,500-3,000 vehicles lining up to cross. The Crimean Peninsula is the crown jewel of Putin’s campaign against Ukraine which he re-ignited with its annexation in March of 2014.

But Crimea is just one of the many challenges facing Putin. Omsk is burning, having been struck on July 6 by Ukrainian forces in their deepest strategic strike of the war. The Omsk oil refinery is located approximately 2600 kms from Ukrainian territory and is Russia’s largest oil refinery and its top producer of gasoline. There are still lingering oily black clouds over Moscow from the June 18 Ukrainian strike on the Gazprom Neft refinery in southeast Moscow—just ten miles from the Kremlin. The refinery was struck by over 200 drones and sent thick greasy black clouds of burning petroleum directly over the high-rise and residential areas fthat are avored by Moscow’s elites. The clouds created “black rain” and forced disruptions at Moscow’s four airports.

A few weeks before, there were oily black clouds over St. Petersburg as Russia hosted its annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in early June. International visitors to the Forum (whose attendance has seen a significant drop since 2022) were re-routed to avoid risk of Ukrainian drone strikes and to avoid the clouds of burning petroleum. This read like quite the humiliation for the architect of Russia’s current economic disaster.

As devastating as Ukraine’s attacks have been, the situation on the front is even worse.

A recent thinktank study indicates that Russian forces have suffered 1.4 million total casualties including 450,000 deaths on the battlefield. Approximately 32% of Russian casualties result in death, a fatality ratio that is much higher than modern Western military standards would allow. Reports by analysts and Russian military bloggers indicate that once a Russian soldier is deployed directly into an active combat zone, their average life expectancy drops to just 20-25 minutes. The average survival time for a raw recruit measured from the moment they arrive at a regional training ground to their death in Ukraine, ranges from ten days to three weeks. Even by the Russian standards that were established for casualties in World War II, these losses are staggering and must be causing alarm bells to go off amongst Russia’s elite leadership. There is more visible criticism of how Putin is conducting this war than has even been seen before.

On the diplomatic front, challenges for the Russian president are rising. This week’s NATO summit is yielding results on Europe’s commitment to defense spending and re-armament, led by Germany which is considering incurring state debt to finance defense spending which would be unprecedented for a postwar German government. Putin’s confidence in his ability to count on President Trump to put pressure on Ukraine to end the war on terms that are favorable to Moscow may be eroding and Trump has recently acknowledged Ukraine’s success in the war.

Putin’s reliable ally in Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, seems also to be reconsidering the state of play and his enthusiasm for allowing Moscow to drag Belarus deeper into the conflict with Ukraine. resident Zelensky recently demanded Belarus take offline four relay facilities in Belarus’s Brest and Gomel regions near the Ukrainian border. These relay stations acted as signal boosters for Russian drones used to attack Ukrainian cities. The relays have been taken offline.

President Zelensky has just authorized a forty-day intelligence and security operation to heavily amplify pressure on the Kremlin to end the war. He is arguing that Russia’s elites live in Moscow and St. Petersburg and therefore, the war must be brought to their doorsteps. He also predicted that “When not one hundred drones but a thousand start reaching Moscow…Putin will be advised to move somewhere beyond the Urals. Zelensky is right and Ukrainians know Russia better than anyone in the West.

Despite the pressure he is under, it is too early to count Putin out. He has largely and cleverly managed his tenure as Russia’s leader. He is still two years short of Stalin’s 29 year record at the helm, but he is getting close and in his 27 years of running Russia, he has dug his tentacles deep into every level of the country’s power structure and has certainly accumulated kompromat on any potential rival or replacement. Many have speculated that if Putin departs the scene, his replacement could be an even worse partner for the U.S. and the West. I won’t argue that any replacement or coalition that follows Putin will be less anti West than Putin, but whatever constellation follows, they will not have the benefit of having roots and leverage as deep in Russia as Putin does.

For the moment, Putin still has escalatory options he can use to respond to increasing pressure.

In recent weeks, Russia has taken steps to close or severely restrict seven critical railway border crossings and road traffic crossings into Finland, Estonia, and Latvia. Apparently, negotiations are under way to restrict crossings into Kazakhstan and other central Asian states. The motivations for the abrupt closures are unclear but they suggest that Putin may be considering a mass mobilization and is trying to stem the likely departure of military age males to avoid the departures that have occurred since February 2022.

Mobilization alone will not solve Russia’s problem of shortages of equipment and training for conscripts as well as Russia’s World War I-style battlefront tactics. President Zelensky spoke on the margins of the NATO summit this week and said Ukraine is causing over 30,000 Russian casualties a month.

Putin can also rattle the nuclear saber again, but that is likely to be largely ignored as has his previous saber rattling. Most experts are confident that Putin has received firm guidance from his only remaining reliable ally China that he should not open the nuclear Pandora’s box in Ukraine.

The intelligence and security services in the Baltic States, Sweden, and Poland have recently assessed that Putin may try a provocation against one of the bordering NATO states in order to force an Article V action—which he hopes Trump would reject. But few analysts think Putin would risk an all-out war against NATO. That would be a path that could only accelerate Ukraine’s path toward NATO membership and could lead to further disasters for the Russian military, which many experts considered to be the most powerful conventional military in Europe prior to February 2022.

Putin’s most likely response to his current challenges is to continue to take advantage of weaknesses in Ukraine’s air defenses, particularly against ballistic missile attacks and hope that at some point, Ukraine’s morale weakens and pressure increases on Zelensky to end the war on terms that are more favorable to Russia. Such a change in Zelensky or Ukraine is inconceivable to any rational analysis of the current state of the war, but Putin is clearly not rational.

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If You Can Run a Spy, You Can Run AI

Generative AI should be managed like a human source: useful, fast, sometimes brilliant, sometimes wrong, and never a substitute for disciplined questioning and human judgment.

The three of us spent our careers in an environment where bad information costs lives. We learned early that the most dangerous source isn’t someone who lies to you. It’s someone who tells you what you want to hear—and does it convincingly. As we watch organizations race to adopt generative AI, we keep seeing the same mistake: treating these tools like oracle machines rather than sources that need to be run.

We are not AI experts. We are not here to debate model architectures or training data. What we know is how to extract reliable insights from sources whose motivations can’t be fully verified, whose outputs may be biased or based on incomplete information, and whose reliability must be continuously earned. That is exactly the problem organizations face with AI today.

This is what HUMINT tradecraft has taught us—and what it has to teach anyone who wants to get honest, useful work from a generative AI system.

The Source Who Was Never Wrong

Early in our careers, two of us ran sources who were brilliant, well-placed, articulate, and deeply motivated. They produced detailed, confident, and consistent reporting. Senior analysts loved them. Their product sailed through review. For months, everything they said checked out—until it didn’t.

The problem wasn’t that they were lying, exactly. In both cases, they filled gaps with inference. They’d learned what we wanted to hear, and their natural intelligence and experience let them produce it fluently. The reporting wasn’t fabricated—it was confabulated. Coherent and plausible, but in key places, wrong.

We’ve all seen this pattern in the early months of AI adoption. The tool is fast. It’s articulate. It never pauses, never says “I’m not sure,” and it formats its answers with the confident authority of a briefing document. A recent Science study found that across eleven state-of-the-art AI models, sycophantic behavior—affirming users’ views even when inaccurate—was widespread and measurable. Stanford researchers found that AI systems trained on human preference feedback are systematically rewarded for being agreeable rather than correct, because agreeable outputs receive higher ratings. The models learn to please.

We’ve seen that source before. We know how the story ends.

Selection: Not All Sources Are Equal

Before you run a source, you select one. That’s a discipline in itself. And a discipline to which AI tools may in fact be able to add value in identifying and sorting stressors that can be exploited (anything that causes stress and then outlines for case officers which levers to pull on a recruitment). You don’t recruit someone simply because they have access. You also generally don't recruit happy people. You have to evaluate reliability, motivation, and susceptibility to manipulation. A source with wide access and poor judgment can be more dangerous than no source at all.

The same applies to AI. Not all AI systems are created equal for every task or mission. Each must be evaluated on access, expertise, responsiveness, and the quality of reporting—and the last criterion is harder to assess than it appears.

A few selection questions worth building into any AI adoption process:

•What is this model’s known track record on this specific type of task, not in general but specifically?

•Where does it tend to confabulate? What are its known failure modes?

•Is it current? A model with a training cutoff is like a source who’s been out of the field for a year—still useful, but with blind spots.

•How does it behave when it doesn’t know something? Does it admit it, or does it keep talking?

Choosing an AI because it’s fast or because leadership read about it in a business magazine isn’t source selection. It’s the equivalent of recruiting the first walk-in who shows up at the door.

Elicitation, Not Interrogation

One of the first lessons a new case officer learns is that interrogation and elicitation are not the same. Interrogation demands. Elicitation draws out. A blunt question produces a guarded answer. A layered conversation yields insight the source didn’t realize they were sharing.

Most people using AI are interrogating it. “What’s the answer?” “Summarize this.” “Give me options.” That approach works, up to a point, but it caps the quality of what you get.

Effective elicitation with AI means:

•Never ask a direct question when an indirect one is better. Instead of “What should we do?” try “What factors would a skeptic weigh against this recommendation?”

•Compartmentalize your tasking. Don’t dump the entire problem into a single prompt. Break it into discrete, well-scoped questions. Discrete tasking yields more verifiable output.

•Build layered follow-ups. Ask: “What are you assuming?” “What would change your conclusion?” “Give me the strongest argument against this.”

•Probe for alternatives before you settle on an answer. A source that only confirms your hypothesis may be problematic.

This turns AI from a content generator into something closer to a thinking partner. But it requires the same discipline as running a source well: preparation, precision, and the intellectual humility to recognize that your framing shapes what you get back.

The Hostile Source Problem

There is a risk the standard AI adoption literature doesn’t spend enough time on. In intelligence work, we worry not just about sources who are wrong—we worry about sources who have been co-opted or doubled, or who are feeding us what we want to hear because they’ve learned our preferences and decided that’s what keeps the relationship alive.

AI systems have structural analogs to all three failure modes:

•Sycophancy as a design artifact. Because models are trained on human preference feedback, they are incentivized to produce outputs that feel satisfying. Researchers at Carnegie Mellon and Stanford have documented an “artificial hivemind” effect in which outputs from multiple AI models converge—reducing epistemic diversity at the very moment organizations need independent judgment.

•Training data is a contamination channel. A source’s worldview is shaped by their environment. An AI model’s worldview is shaped by its training corpus. That corpus reflects the biases, omissions, and assumptions of the material it was built on. You may not know where those biases are, and the model won’t volunteer them.

•Automation bias as a user vulnerability. A series of recent studies confirms what experienced case officers know: people grant far more credibility to confident, fluent reporting than the underlying evidence warrants. Research published in 2025 found that even users with high “AI literacy” were not significantly protected against automation bias—the tendency to accept AI output without critical evaluation.

The practical implication: approach your AI system with the same structured skepticism you’d bring to a well-placed source who has given you no reason to doubt them. That’s when discipline matters most.

Debrief Discipline: The Protocol That Makes It Real

After every source meeting, a case officer writes up not only what the source said but also their assessment of reliability—what was corroborated, what was assumed, and what needs follow-up. That habit is the difference between a professional intelligence organization and a rumor factory.

Most organizations using AI lack an equivalent discipline. Someone prompts the model, takes the output, and puts it in a slide. No one records what was asked, what caveats the model offered, or whether the output was independently verified. The result is institutional memory built on unexamined reporting.

A working AI reporting protocol should mirror the post-meeting debrief:

•Requirement—What question are we actually trying to answer?

•Prompt—What, precisely, did we ask? (Save it.)

•Output—What did the AI say?

•Source check—What in this output is reliable? What is uncertain? What is unsupported?

•Human judgment—What do we actually believe, independent of the AI?

•Action—What will we do?

•Review—What happened after we acted? Did the AI’s analysis hold up?

The review step is the one that organizations most consistently skip. But it’s where calibration happens. A source you never debrief after the fact is one whose reliability you can never actually assess.

A useful team habit before closing out any AI-assisted analysis: “Before we accept this answer, what would disconfirm it?” That question alone will catch more errors than any amount of AI governance policy.

Separating Collection from Analysis

This is a fundamental discipline in intelligence work, and it translates directly. AI is a tool for collecting and synthesizing. It can ingest, summarize, organize, and compare. What it cannot reliably do is interpret—to ask what the information means here, in this context, for this organization, with these constraints.

The error organizations make is treating AI as if it collapses the divide between collection and analysis. It doesn’t. It accelerates collection. The analytical function—applying judgment, context, institutional knowledge, and accountability—remains human.

Teams that hand over analytical responsibility to AI are not just making an efficiency error. They are making an accountability error. Someone has to own the conclusion. AI cannot.

Burning a Source: When to Stop Trusting the AI

This is the part of the tradecraft literature on AI that doesn’t exist yet, and it needs to.

Every experienced case officer has had to decide to terminate a source relationship. Not because the source was obviously lying—if that were clear, the decision would be easy. You terminate when the source's reliability has fallen below a threshold, when you have reason to believe the source has been compromised, or when the cost of continuing to run them outweighs the value of their reporting.

The equivalent decisions will come for AI systems, and organizations should prepare for them:

•When a model’s known failure modes consistently overlap with your mission-critical questions, it is time to stop relying on it for those questions—regardless of how it performs elsewhere.

•When an AI system has been demonstrably wrong in a consequential context and the organization has not developed a clear explanation for why, continuing to use it at the same level of trust is an operational error.

•When a model is updated or retrained by its provider, treat it as a new source and revalidate. Prior reliability does not transfer automatically.

•When you discover that the model has been systematically producing outputs shaped by the framing of your prompts rather than by evidence—that you have been leading the witness without realizing it—you may need to reset the relationship.

Burning a source is not a failure of the source-handling relationship. It is often the proof that the relationship was being handled well.

What This Means for How You Lead

The three of us came to this issue through intelligence work, but the problem is not limited to intelligence organizations. Any leadership environment where AI tools are proliferating faces the same structural challenge: the tools are fast, fluent, and confident, and organizational incentives often reward those who use them most rather than those who use them best.

The research bears this out. INSEAD’s 2025 analysis of firm-level AI adoption found that generative AI shifts value toward higher-order human judgment—not away from it. Microsoft’s research confirms that organizations with a well-calibrated understanding of AI perform better across missions than those that simply maximize usage. The tool is the easy part. The discipline is the hard part.

For leaders, the implications are practical:

•Build the habit of debriefing discipline before you scale AI adoption. The protocol above should be standard practice, not optional.

•Create psychological safety so people can flag AI errors. The greatest risk in any source-handling operation is the team member who saw the problem but didn’t say anything because the source had too much credibility.

•Distinguish between AI as a collection tool and as an analytical tool. Automate the former aggressively. Guard the latter carefully.

•Evaluate AI systems with the same rigor you would apply to any source—including periodic reviews of whether the relationship continues to produce reliable value.

Used with discipline, generative AI can be a genuinely powerful analytical partner—the kind of well-placed, high-access source that an experienced handler learns to work with carefully and derive real value from. Used without discipline, it becomes a certainty-destroyer—introducing noise, eroding judgment, and producing false confidence at scale.

The HUMINT model doesn’t make AI safer by limiting what it does. It makes AI safer by raising the standard for what we do with what it gives us.

AI doesn’t give you answers. It gives you reports. And reporting always requires a handler’s skeptical, trained eye.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Cyber Fraud, Banks, and What America Can Do About It

Your phone buzzes with a text from your bank: “Did you authorize a $2,400 transfer? Reply NO to stop it.” You reply, and seconds later a calm “fraud agent” calls, knows your name and the last four digits of your card, and walks you through “securing” your money by moving it into an account under the criminal’s control. No password was stolen, no malware installed. You handed over the money yourself, because everything looked and sounded real.

This is the new face of bank fraud and business is booming. Behind these scams sit organized adversaries: nation-state actors who treat theft as state revenue, criminal gangs running industrial-scale scam operations, and hacktivists out to embarrass institutions increasingly armed with AI that makes their lies cheap, fast, and tailored to you.

The problem: scams have gone industrial

Banks have spent decades hardening their vaults and networks, so attackers shifted to the softest target: the customer. Rather than breaking in, they trick people into transferring funds themselves. This is “authorized push payment” fraud where the victim approves the payment and it is far harder to claw back than a stolen card number. To hear how a typical scam call actually unfolds, watch the FTC’s short imposter-scam explainer.

With the age of AI, three key forces have turbocharged these threats. Payments now move instantly and irreversibly, so money is gone before anyone notices. Decades of data breaches let criminals buy your name, address, and account details cheaply, making their scripts eerily accurate. And generative AI has industrialized deception where more than half of fraud is now estimated to involve AI. A criminal can clone a familiar or family voice from seconds of audio, write flawless phishing emails in any language, and even deepfake a bank officer on a video call.

The people behind it are not lone hackers in hoodies. They range from sanctioned nation-state groups that steal to fund their governments, to criminal syndicates running scam centers staffed by trafficked workers, to hacktivists attacking banks to make a political point. For them, fraud is a scalable business and it is outrunning the banks, telcos, and Big Tech.

The real-world cost

The damage is measured in real households. The Federal Trade Commission reports Americans lost roughly $16 billion to fraud of all kinds in 2025 the highest on record and about 25% more than the year before. Imposter scams alone accounted for $3.5 billion, nearly tripling since 2020, and the single most lucrative version is the fake bank-security alert that convinces people to “protect” their savings by moving them.

These losses fall unevenly. Americans aged 50 and older reported $4.3 billion in losses in 2025, often life-altering sums drained from retirement accounts. The official numbers are almost certainly a fraction of reality, since many victims never report out of shame. Beyond the dollars, the human cost is real emptied college funds, missed mortgage payments, and a corrosive loss of trust in the financial system people rely on every day. One Florida couple lost $42,000 of their savings this way watch how it happened. In fact, this happens so often that Hollywood created an action movie about it with the Bee Keeper.

A National Security issue

Fraud and scams are not just a nuisance but far more dangerous. Fraud and scams in the United States have escalated into a national security issue because they are no longer isolated consumer crimes. They are large‑scale, foreign‑run operations that drain billions of dollars from the U.S. economy and undermine public trust in financial and digital systems. Federal agencies increasingly link these schemes to transnational criminal organizations, some of which also engage in human trafficking, money laundering, and other activities that threaten national stability. The financial impact is massive, with losses rivaling major illicit industries, and the proceeds often flowing to adversarial nations or criminal networks abroad.

The rules already on the books

The U.S. is not starting from zero. Along with the growth of the early Internet, in 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act went into effect and its Safeguards Rule in requiring banks to protect customer data, and guidance from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) pushes them toward stronger, multi-factor login security. The Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money-laundering rules, enforced by the Treasury’s FinCEN, require banks to flag suspicious transactions — a key tool for tracing stolen funds. New York’s Department of Financial Services Part 500 cybersecurity rule has become a de facto national standard.

Regulators are also targeting the scams themselves. The FTC’s Impersonation Rule, in force since April 2024, lets the agency go after fraudsters who pose as businesses or government agencies; in its first stretch it produced more than $70 million in consumer refunds. Voluntary frameworks like the NIST Cybersecurity Framework give institutions a common playbook.

The gap is not the absence of rules it is that attackers move faster than rules can be written, and that liability for scam losses remains murky when a customer is tricked into approving the payment. So, with all these rules and regulations, why are scams and fraud occurring faster?

The innovators fighting back

A fast-growing wave of companies is using the same AI that empowers criminals to stop them.

· Feedzai builds real-time systems that score billions of transactions as they happen, spotting the subtle patterns of a scam in under a second.

· Alloy helps banks and fintechs verify who is really opening an account, choking off the synthetic and stolen identities fraudsters depend on.

· Arkose Labs specializes in blocking automated bot attacks and account takeovers, while SEON, Lexus Nexus, and Sumsub offer identity-verification and fraud-screening tools that smaller banks and startups can plug in affordably.

· Netcraft is a company which doesn’t only detect scams but does something about it. It is very good at “take downs” of scam networks.

· Others are racing to build deepfake and voice-clone detection to catch fakes that fool the human ear and eye. Others get creative: UK carrier Virgin Media O2 built “Daisy,” a lifelike AI “granny” that answers scam calls and keeps fraudsters rambling for up to 40 minutes to tie them up so they have no time for real victims. Watch “Daisy” turn the tables on scam groups.

What unites all these is adaptive defense models that learn daily, because last month’s fraud pattern is already obsolete. All these point solutions are modeled on Intellectual Property that slows sharing. This model is not working.

What America should do

As scams become more sophisticated, especially with AI‑driven impersonation, deepfakes, and automated fraud, their ability to destabilize institutions, exploit citizens, and weaken economic resilience has pushed policymakers and security experts to treat fraud not just as a consumer protection problem, but as a strategic threat to national security. Staying safe will take coordinated effort. Everyone has a role.

Lawmakers and regulators

Fraud and scam laws in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia share the same objective: to protect consumers and disrupting criminal activity but each country approaches the problem with a very different regulatory philosophy.

In the U.S., the system is fragmented and enforcement‑driven, with no mandatory reimbursement for most scam victims and a heavy reliance on agencies like the FTC, CFPB, and FBI to pursue wrongdoing after the fact. By contrast, the U.K. has built the world’s most proactive framework, requiring banks to reimburse victims of authorized push‑payment scams, enforcing account‑name verification through Confirmation of Payee, and placing clear accountability on financial institutions to prevent fraud before it occurs. Australia sits between the two models, adopting U.K.‑style protections while expanding responsibility beyond banks to include telcos and digital platforms through its emerging Scams Prevention Framework. While the U.K. emphasizes consumer protection and the U.S. emphasizes enforcement, Australia is moving toward a shared‑liability, cross‑industry approach that recognizes scams as a systemic risk requiring coordinated prevention across the entire digital ecosystem.

A typical scam today uses several pieces of technology working together to make the criminal look real. It often starts with:

1. the scammer creating a fake website that looks almost identical to a bank or delivery company. They buy a cheap web address from a service like GoDaddy and change just one letter so most people won’t notice the difference.

2. Then they setup email accounts on services like Microsoft & Gmail to send out massive emails.

3. They use AI tools to scrape millions of social media profiles from Facebook, Instagram, etc. to collect data about YOU.

4. They use tools that let them fake a phone number (telco), so when they call you, your phone shows the name of your bank or a government agency.

5. After that, they send out text messages to iPhone and Android users that look official, things like “Your account is locked” or “You have a package waiting.” The link in the text takes you to the fake website, where the scammer collects your login details. If you call the number instead, it goes to a call center where the scammer pretends to be a bank employee.

All of this: fake websites, spoofed phone numbers, and realistic text messages works together to trick people into believing they’re talking to a trusted company when they’re actually dealing with a criminal.

What should the Critical Infrastructure do?

In the U.S., we have failed because we have not worked together across these technologies at scale & at the speed of AI. Why? Because we (collectively) do not have the incentives or requirements to do so. For the CEOs of these companies, they do not want to spend money & resources which do not drive revenue. Period.

There are glimpses of hope. A working model already exists:

· We have the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS‑ISAC) is a global, nonprofit organization that helps protect banks and other financial institutions from cyberattacks by enabling them to quickly share information about threats. It was created in 1999 (26 years!) to strengthen the safety and resilience of the financial system by collecting, analyzing, and distributing timely intelligence about cyber and physical risks so that member institutions can defend themselves and their customers more effectively. I am hopeful that they new CEO, Valerie Abend will drive more effective solutions.

· In 2026, eight major carriers: AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile and others just launched the Communications Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (C2 ISAC), chaired by longtime cyber expert, AT&T security chief Rich Baich, to share real-time threat intelligence across competitors. Because most scams ride phone and text networks before they ever reach a bank, telecom and banking defenses should connect through the same kind of collective-defense sharing. But the C2 ISAC cannot do this alone.

· In 2025, the Global Anti‑Scam Alliance (GASA) was formed to bring together governments, financial institutions, technology companies, law‑enforcement agencies, and consumer groups to fight scams on a global scale. GASA acts like a global “anti‑scam task force,” uniting experts and institutions so people everywhere are better protected from online fraud.

These have proven to not operate effectively to get ahead of scams and fraud. We need a better way – mandates of sharing, legal risks support, cross ISAC/intel which is tailored/aware, good native ML & AI models (not rules), and others working at speed and context with more transparent sharing.

In the meantime,

What should consumers do?

Treat any unexpected “urgent” message about your money as a warning sign, not a command. Banks will never ask you to move funds to “protect” them. Hang up and call the number on the back of your card. Turn on multi-factor authentication and agree on a private “safe word” with family so a cloned voice can’t fake an emergency. Report scams to ReportFraud.ftc.gov, even unsuccessful attempts, because the data helps train good AI/ML models to protect everyone.

What should all companies do?

Adopt adaptive, AI-native detection rather than yesterday’s rules, and design apps that help customers pause before they act. Investors should back the firms building deepfake detection and identity verification, and banks should partner with them quickly instead of waiting years to build in-house.

Conclusion:

With fast innovation, fraud & scams will not disappear, but it can be better contained. The criminals have industrialized deception; the answer is to industrialize defense with smarter rules, sharper technology, and a public that knows the warning signs.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.

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Endless Warfare – Part II: Countering Endless Warfare and its Networks

Author’s Note: This article is not about ‘endless wars’ as a critique of U.S. military interventions — that debate belongs elsewhere. It examines a distinct and increasingly visible pattern: how U.S. adversaries wage continuous, long-term conflict against the United States across peace and war, both below and above the threshold of open conflict. The aim is to clarify the nature of the competition we are already in.

Countering Endless Warfare and its Networks

The United States is not at peace. As I argued in Part I, the United States is already in a continuous, long-term conflict with determined adversaries who are waging warfare without crossing the threshold into open conflict. Endless Warfare is a framework for understanding how those adversaries pursue an enduring approach to erode and supplant U.S. power, influence, and global leadership over time.

Endless Warfare is not simply another label for the gray zone or cognitive warfare. Both are important elements and merit their own approaches, but Endless Warfare describes the adversary’s persistent, long-term strategy, not just the elements that enable it.

Given this operating environment, this is about far more than terminology. It is about how we understand conflict, how we achieve deterrence, how we protect decision autonomy, how we retain leverage, and, most importantly, how we disrupt the networks that fuel Endless Warfare.

What are the essential next steps?

Endless Warfare Requires a Different Strategic Mindset

Militaries are often criticized for planning to fight the last war. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was undermined by Russia’s underestimation of how much warfare had evolved since Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. The United States potentially faces that same risk today. It is important that we are prepared to fight and win the next conventional war, but there are risks in a focus on only that strategy. We must also prepare to fight and win—with the appropriate instruments of national power—the Endless Warfare being waged on the United States by its adversaries; warfare that incorporates gray zone activity, cognitive warfare, weaponized negotiations, proxies and surrogates, and other subversive networks.

This change in strategic mindset is not because of a lack of capability. The United States has considerable experience, resources, and capabilities in this space. Endless Warfare is conceptually different from conventional war—particularly given the ambiguous nature of gray-zone activity and cognitive warfare—and therefore demands a different approach.

Yet because it is a continuous state of conflict, it also requires the same level of national leadership and vision, organization, critical thinking, sense of urgency, and collaboration with allies that we apply to conventional conflict. This is achievable but will take some effort. It may require a senior White House official, such as a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Competition, to integrate interagency action and coordinate a sustained national response to this threat.

That Deputy National Security Advisor would not replace existing responsibilities of Departments and Agencies. The role would be to ensure that strategic deterrence in the gray zone, cognitive advantage, conflict negotiations when adversaries seek to extend rather than resolve conflict, and network disruptions are integrated into a coherent and sustained national response to the threat of Endless Warfare against the United States.

Strategic Deterrence in the Gray Zone

Strategic deterrence is one component of a broader approach to countering Endless Warfare. Gray zone activity is a powerful enabler of Endless Warfare because it gives our adversaries a space to undermine the United States while avoiding armed conflict.

Our adversaries have calculated that there are more gains than risks in the gray zone and that any risks they do face are acceptable. Actions that seek to counter or defend against gray zone activity but that do not impose meaningful costs or create credible deterrence may simply reward gray zone activity.

An effective strategy for achieving strategic deterrence in the gray zone rests on deliberate preparation, clear communication, a national approach, and the resolve to change the risk calculus of our adversaries.

Deliberate preparation means collecting and analyzing information on adversary gray zone trends, capabilities, and intent before they act; routinely coordinating at the national level so roles, responsibilities, and decision paths are clear; and reorienting institutions and the interagency to maintain effective balanced capability in both conventional and gray domains.

We also must communicate clearly domestically, to our allies, and particularly to our adversaries. A simple but clear message for our adversaries: “We will see what you’re doing, we will publicly attribute it to you, and we will impose costs that exceed your gains.”

This message is credible only if it is backed by action over time. The United States must convincingly demonstrate its resolve to proactively and persistently employ national capabilities to change the risk calculus and behavior of our adversaries.

This range of national capabilities includes coordinated diplomatic and allied action, economic sanctions and restrictions, cyber operations, legal and financial disruption, public attribution, denying access to critical technologies, cognitive measures, military posture and partner capability-building and—when necessary—kinetic responses. Recent examples illustrate that imposing costs is possible.

In 2021, the United States publicly attributed the SolarWinds supply-chain compromise to Russia, expelled Russian Intelligence Officers, and imposed broad financial penalties under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

In early 2025, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Company and associated individuals for their role in Salt Typhoon for attacks on network infrastructure of multiple major U.S. telecommunication and internet service providers.

These were hard-earned wins for U.S. Departments and Agencies involved, but Russia and China appear to have absorbed the costs and continued their operations. Achieving strategic deterrence means that actions like these must become the norm, not the exception.

The goal of strategic deterrence in the gray zone is to shape adversary decision-making before action is taken. It means proactively shaping the environment so adversaries hesitate before they act—a critical step in disrupting the cycle of Endless Warfare.

Gaining a Cognitive Advantage

Countering the impacts of cognitive warfare is essential to countering Endless Warfare. My colleague, Austin Branch, and I argued in The Cipher Brief that it was possible—and necessary—for the U.S. to seize a 21st-century cognitive advantage.

That argument is even more urgent today given the central role of cognitive warfare in our adversaries’ strategies of Endless Warfare. Cognitive Security, at its core, is the protection of human cognition and decision autonomy—our individual and collective ability to accurately perceive global events, to trust the knowledge we have and the information we receive, and to make confident, independent decisions free from external manipulation, influence, or coercion.

Cognitive Security is also about offense—outthinking, outpacing, and outmaneuvering our adversaries in the cognitive domain.

Our adversaries should understand that their leaders, institutions, networks, proxies—and decision-making—are vulnerable to cognitive pressure and influence. The goal is to force them—not the United States—to confront the uncertainties and risks of cognitive warfare and to weaken their ability to wage Endless Warfare.

There are some positive steps at the national level.

We now have a first-ever NSC Cognitive Advantage Director, and the FY26 NDAA directs the Secretary of Defense to formally define cognitive warfare for the Department. The Department’s Strategic Capabilities Office recently launched a Cognitive Warfare Project to advance the military’s cognitive warfare capabilities. There is clearly opportunity here.

Yet, these early steps remain fragmented. In contrast, China’s United Front Work Department, Russia’s Active Measures networks, and Iran’s diverse network of surrogates reflect centralized national direction and a long-term horizon as elements of a national strategy.

In this vital process, America’s approach has to be equally well-coordinated and strategic. It is essential that these new efforts avoid bureaucratic hurdles, over-prescription that may stifle innovation, and creating silos. Our adversaries will not wait for us to catch up.

Our national narrative—America’s Story—also plays an important role. As Branch and I argued in the Cipher Brief, our national narrative is both sword and shield. It projects power, influence, and advances our interests. It tells the story of our values, history, aspirations, and view of the world. It supports confidence in our actions, our institutions, and our global commitments.

Importantly, America’s Story counters adversary narratives and actions that seek to undermine America at home and abroad. It can serve as a powerful antidote to adversary campaigns that use cognitive warfare to sustain prolonged conflict. America’s Story was built at a time when much of the world saw America as liberator, peacemaker, builder, global diplomat, and above all, a powerful symbol of sacrifice, freedom, and self-determination. The long arc of America’s Story is its strength.

The United States cannot let this national narrative get lost in episodic political turbulence—its role in countering our adversaries is too vital.

Countering Weaponized Negotiations

In the era of Endless Warfare, adversaries often use negotiations as a continuation of conflict by other means—not as instruments of resolution. Negotiations can play an outsized role in Endless Warfare even though they only occur periodically. The central challenge is distinguishing when talks aim to legitimately resolve a conflict versus when they are designed to shape its next phase.

Today, drawing lessons directly from Russia’s behavior—from Georgia to Ukraine—and from Iran, several principles emerge that can strengthen our negotiating posture when facing adversaries that practice weaponized negotiations.

Those key principles include:

No upfront concessions. Make no upfront concessions to get an adversary to the negotiating table. Such actions erode diplomatic, economic, and military leverage and can shape the entire negotiations on unfavorable terms.

Establish clear overarching objectives and non-negotiable redlines early. This preserves decision autonomy, provides a framework for decision-making, and prevents adversaries from reshaping objectives to their advantage.

Proactively counter narratives. During negotiations over Ukraine, Russia repeatedly pushed narratives, such as “Ukraine can never win” and “territory concessions are inevitable,” to shape Western perceptions of what constituted a realistic outcome. Anticipating and countering false narratives ensures negotiations are not manipulated.

Concessions must be conditions-based. Any concessions given during negotiations must be based on measurable, verifiable actions with automatic snap-back mechanisms if commitments are violated.

Be willing to walk away. The desire for any agreement should never outweigh core national security interests. Suspending or ending talks is better than enabling or accepting a settlement that resets the conflict in an adversary’s favor.

Chester Karrass put it plainly, in life you don’t get what you deserve, you get what you negotiate. This is a powerful counter to American assumptions that raw power or battlefield success will carry the day at the negotiating table.

Countering Endless Warfare Networks

These measures—deterrence, cognitive advantage, and managing weaponized negotiations—greatly improve America’s posture, but they do not by themselves disrupt Endless Warfare networks.

The ultimate goal is systematically confronting the adversary networks that pose an enduring threat to the U.S. These networks fall into two broad categories: state institutional structures and more ambiguous structures that blur the line between state and non-state activity.

Institutional networks include military organizations, intelligence services, party organizations, proxy structures, and state-directed organizations such as IRGC-QF, MSS, GRU, and FSB, as well as the specialized units responsible for assassinations and sabotage, influence operations, and cyber-attacks as a few examples.

Ambiguous networks include ghost fleets, shell and front companies, criminal organizations, illicit financial systems, logistics systems influence networks, cyber hacktivists, proxy militias, smuggling organizations, and other similar entities.

These networks are not abstract. Iran, Russia, and China employ different approaches to Endless Warfare, but each illustrates how adversaries develop and employ both institutional and ambiguous networks to achieve persistent strategic objectives over a long timeframe. Just as a few examples:

Iran’s network of proxies and surrogates, built over decades, allows Iran to project power, coerce and intimidate its neighbors, and get inside the decision space of its adversaries at relatively low cost. The IRGC is an enabler of Iran’s distributed networks with global reach.

Russia’s networks conduct cognitive warfare against the U.S. and the West and conduct sabotage, assassinations, and political coercion across Europe. Russia’s “ghost fleets” have allowed it to generate billions in revenue despite Western sanctions.

China’s Cyber networks probe and penetrate U.S. critical infrastructure to sustain access, collect information, and provide a disruption capability during a crisis. Its networks enable sophisticated influence operations inside the U.S. and the transfer of critical technologies that directly enhance its military capabilities.

Shared and overlapping networks in gray and ambiguous spaces play a critical role. Ghost fleets, front companies, terror networks, illicit financial organizations, and criminal enterprises allow adversaries to bypass sanctions, sustain operations, and reduce international pressure.

Some of these networks are visible and attributable, others are intentionally obscured and decentralized to complicate attribution and defy sovereignty, international law, and national laws, including those of the U.S. We should expect our adversaries to fiercely protect these resilient, adaptive, and self-recovering networks they have carefully developed over time, often over decades, to gain and sustain a strategic advantage.

The critical question is how the U.S. can systematically reduce the effectiveness of these networks.

To paraphrase H.L. Mencken, for every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong. That is the dilemma facing the U.S. now. Overly simplistic approaches or single solutions that do not take into account the complexities of Endless Warfare and the commitment of our adversaries to that approach will consume time and resources but ultimately fail.

Countering Endless Warfare requires a sustained, network-centric strategy employing the instruments of national power—diplomatic, military, economic, technological, informational, cognitive, and kinetic—rather than a series of independent actions. This strategy consists of three mutually reinforcing lines of effort built on one foundational principle.

First, identify and prioritize the networks that pose the greatest long-term threat to the United States. There are no official estimates of this ecosystem of networks—and what constitutes a network has not been clearly defined—but Iran, Russia, and China, collectively direct or enable a very large number institutional, commercial, criminal, cyber, intelligence, influence, and proxy networks worldwide.

Second, sustain campaigns to daylight, degrade, disrupt, and impose costs on institutional networks that conduct and oversee attacks on the United States and our allies. It is unlikely that the U.S. can dismantle foreign institutional networks, but those networks can be degraded, constrained, and made costly and less effective.

Third, dismantle, disrupt, and prevent the regeneration of ambiguous networks by severing the financial, logistical, technological, and organizational systems that support them. This is not a one-time activity. Ambiguous networks are more vulnerable, but they are often adaptive and can regenerate or be replaced.

Cognitive Security and Cyber Defenses have a combined vital role to play. None of these efforts will succeed unless American citizens, business leaders, military commanders, and policy makers are less vulnerable to influence, manipulation, and coercion—preserving America’s decision autonomy—and unless governments, institutions, organizations, and critical infrastructure are less vulnerable to technological exploitation and disruption.

Summary

The concepts in this paper are difficult to neatly categorize because they describe a form of warfare that is not fully defined. As conventional warfare evolves, so do the more nuanced aspects of warfare that take place below and above the threshold of conflict and in the ambiguous space between peace and war. I offer four takeaways.

First, Endless Warfare is a distinct adversary strategy already underway by China, Russia, and Iran and should be treated as a current strategic threat—not just a future one.

Second, endless Warfare is sustained by sophisticated and interconnected networks that must become a primary target for U.S. and allied efforts.

Third, countering Endless Warfare requires a proactive, persistent, and network-centric approach backed by national-level leadership, a new framework for strategic planning, a sense of urgency, and coordinated interagency action. Is ittime to consider a senior White House official, such as a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Competition, to integrate interagency action and coordinate a sustained national response to this threat?

Fourth, strategic deterrence in the gray zone, cognitive advantage, disciplined negotiations, and network-focused disruption are core tools of that sustained national response to make Endless Warfare increasingly ineffective, costly, and ultimately unsustainable for China, Russia, and Iran.

Endless Warfare will not end because our adversaries choose peace. It will end when it is no longer effective.

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Gen. Dunford: Military Leaders Must Advise, Not Advocate

“We [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] often times in the national security decision-making process or White House meetings -- outside of the Pentagon process -- will go back and forth between military issues and political issues. And I think it's incumbent upon us to kind of stay in, you know, what the current [Joint Chiefs] Chairman [Air Force Gen. Dan] Caine describes as ‘the midfield’ in that regard. So we have to be aware of the political environment within which we're operating, but we have to be nonpartisan. And as long as we stick to addressing the military dimension of the problem, and not fall to the temptation to start participating and waxing eloquently about issues that are not in our purview, I think we can maintain that character.”

That was ret.-Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, former-Joint Chiefs Chairman during the second Obama and first Trump administrations, speaking last Tuesday on a panel entitled Inside the Pentagon: The Chairman, Congress & Combatant Commands, as part of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) 2026 Global Security Forum.

Also on the panel were ret.-Navy Adm. John Aqualino, former-Commander of Indo-Pacific Command and former-Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), a one-time Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

The panel’s hour-long discussion covered a variety of current issues and also at times provided a behind-the-scenes look at past Pentagon leaders’ thinking.

For example, Dunford said at one point, “I can't think of a time when I was participating in the National Security Council where I was dealing with a military problem. We were dealing with strategic problems that had a military dimension. And that's really important because in that capacity, you are providing advice about the military dimension and how the military dimension can best support the political objective that's been articulated by the President.”

Dunford further explained, “It's not the [Joint Chief] Chairman's role to go to the National Security Council and advocate for a particular policy that involves much more than just the military dimension. It's the Chairman's role to represent the other Joint Chiefs and provide military advice, again in a way that's integrated with all the other elements of national power to accomplish a particular objective.” And he repeated, “I think it's really important both in public and private that we be seen as advisors and not advocates.”

In Dunford’s view, discussions at the National Security Council “ought to remain private and most often they're very highly classified.” He added, “Even today, I don't feel at liberty to discuss what went on inside the National Security Council or what I specifically recommended.”

I quote these Dunford views because these days, for example. many Trump critics who disagree with the President’s decision last February to attack Iran, have wondered why no top military commander has yet to publicly voice opposition to that decision.

As Dunford explained his view, “Number one, it's the elected official who gets to decide. And number two, the best military option, in other words, the option that I might have offered that would provide the best military outcome may in fact not be the best option for the President when he looks at it from a broader strategic perspective."

He went on that his military option “may or may not be in a broader strategic context when you take into account our diplomatic, our economic interests and the other competing demands that the President may have at a given time strategically, whether they be in the security realm or elsewhere”

Dunford continued: “As I used to say, the President looks through this with a much bigger soda straw than those of us in uniform. And we need to be attentive to that in the public space and not put pressure on the Executive Branch to make a decision one way or another because of what military advice may be out there in the public domain.”

However, when Dunford went to see a Chairman of the House or Senate Armed Services Committee, he said, “Obviously you know the Legislative Branch of our government has a need to be informed about these issues and so the way I would approach it is less would I address specifically the advice I gave to the President, or again advocate a specific military option to be adopted. More often than not, what I would try to do is highlight the interdependent variables that went into the recommendation; talk about the risks; perhaps walk through each of the options that might be available from military perspective and the pros and cons of each, but then not be in a position publicly to say it should be this option or that option.”

As a former Committee Chairman, Thornberry said, “One branch [the Legislative] is responsible for raising and supporting; providing and maintaining; approving all the money, declaring war; and the other branch [the Executive] for the operations of the military. So we divide the authority. We have civilian control of the military, which is an important principle, but we make sure that it's a professional [military], nonpartisan, not taking sides.”

Thornberry also said, “It's important for Congress to hear from that professional military and to hear directly. Now, sometimes that'll need to be behind closed doors in classified sessions and some you can get franker that way, but it's not just Congress hearing. It's the American people hearing from the chairman or the combatant commanders or whoever.”

When it comes to congressional hearings, Adm. Aqualino spoke of a suggestion he had made that’s worth repeating.

He said, “I made a request of the chairman [of the Armed Services Committee] on the House side and the Senate side that said, ‘Hey, let's have a classified session first. Let me answer everything that I can in the classified space that will give you the understanding and oh, by the way, I think it'll help shape your questions for the public side.’ That ended up being very, very, I think effective both for Congress and certainly for me because it really made sure they understood where we were, why we were doing what we were doing and how it was going to deliver. And again, I thank all of the members of Congress for accepting that position because I found it very helpful.”

Actually, however, most closed-session hearings of those Armed Services Committees are still held after the public ones, although Aqualino’s approach is much more rational.

Dunford talked about how warfare has been changing.

“If you think about conflict,” he said, “this go back to the 1990s, you could assume that a conflict would be isolated to particular geographic area. It didn't involve largely sea, air, and space, and the homeland was protected. We didn't have the homeland issues…So, when you think about managing risk, you could manage risk within a specific geographic area. As the character of war began to change, threats to the homeland increased. We're now operating in sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace. We know now that there's no conflict that can be isolated to a specific geographic area.”

These days, Dunford said, “We can see the conflict in Iran and Ukraine and the global implications of those two conflicts. There needed to be somebody that could help the Secretary of Defense think about risk across all geographic combatant commands and in all of those domains and in the context of broader strategic issues like service readiness and being prepared for the conflict or crisis that that was going to come even as we were dealing with one that may be ongoing.”

Planning has also changed.

“When it came to planning,” Dunford said, “we used to have single numbered plans. You'd be familiar with those, where plans were focused on the Korea plan or the Iran plan. Well, there's again if you agree with me that there's no conflict [now] that doesn't have broad global implications. Planning needs to be done, not in a geographic combatant commander’s region, it needs to be done globally. Certainly informed by the supported combatant commander if it's a Indo-Pacom (India-Pacific) or not Pacom (Pacific) commander perspective. But while he's fighting the fight against China, there are certainly things happening globally that are going to require the prioritization and allocation of resources again back to foundationally defense of the homeland.”

Adm. Aqualino’s views of the Joint Chiefs system are worth repeating.

“When you talk about the [military] service chiefs as members of the Joint Chiefs,” he said, “that is an incredible thoughtful bunch to help the Chairman shape best military advice to remove blind spots that may be missing, and to get an incredibly broad perspective. So he [also] gets it from the Combatant Commander operational required to provide options through the lens of a single theater.”

Aqualino added, “Then the Joint Chiefs are able to put a layer on top of that and say, ‘Hey, more broadly, here's what I think it looks like globally. Here's what it looks like through the [separate military] service lens.’ And all that information informed the chairman to ultimately take the best option to the President. And then whenever I brief the [Service] Secretary, the [Joint Chiefs] Chairman was sitting in the room and sometimes we agreed, sometimes we disagreed…My advice was taken sometimes, and other times I got thanked for my interest in national defense. That's just the way it works.”

Looking back, Aqualino said, “I do think it has worked pretty well to have the [Joint Chiefs] Chairman speak for the whole military and yet not be directly in the chain-of-command. So far it has given him an objectivity where he didn't have to necessarily defend a decision, because they are political decisions, but he [the Chairman] can look at that broader picture about the state of our military, about the threats that we face, and I think those discussions for Congress to understand have been really important.”

One other point came up from former-Congressman Thornberry that also needs to be recorded, because neither Dunford nor Aqualino mentioned it.

“I got to say I think today there's a strain on between civil military relations,” Thornberry said, adding, “Part of the professionalism of the military is that it's a meritocracy. It's based on who does their job well, who can excel. And there have been some universally respected officers who've been fired recently with no explanation. And I think that leads to questions about what's really going on here. Is it still a meritocracy?”

At another point Thornberry said, “We were concerned…about using the military for law enforcement responsibilities, especially on the border during my time and now it's more broadly. I think that creates tensions, too. And so maybe this 250th anniversary is a good time for us to kind of remember, okay, what are the protections in our Constitution and in our system? And do we need to remember and maybe refresh some of them to make sure that the military continues the sort of respect that it has.”

With that background, I want to close with something Dunford pointed out early in his remarks that I think is worth consideration.

“Through most my career,” Dunford said, “polling said that about 80% of the American people had confidence in the U.S. military -- and that's 62% plus or minus today. Just in 2016 and 2017, Republicans had an over 90% favorability rating of the U.S. military. It's now somewhere in the 60s, overall about 62 percent. So we can put aside what our own personal judgments are. The data would tell us that there is a decline in the confidence U.S. military which reflects challenging times overall. We live in an incredibly hyper-partisan environment…[and] there is in many corners a declining trust in institutions broadly and one of those institutions has been the U.S. military. I think we can't be complacent about that.”

Dunford went on, “Why is it important: Number one, for recruiting and retention. The American people need to see the U.S. military as their military. It can't be partisan. Number two, when we're sending men and women in this harm's way, they have to have the support of the American people. And it can't be seen as a Republican or a Democrat decision to send people to war. These are Americans that got to be supported by the American people at home.”

We all should agree with that.

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Colombia’s Election Exposes a Country Still Split

Colombia stands at a crossroads because of the narrow victory of right‑wing outsider Abelardo de la Espriella over leftist Senator Iván Cepeda. On August 7, 2026, Colombia will close the country’s first experiment with a left‑wing presidency while leaving its worsening social, economic, and security dilemmas unresolved. The choice between these competing projects forced Colombians to decide whether they would prioritize a hardline stance towards security and a more economic market orthodoxy or continue a contested path of socialist structural reforms and unsuccessful efforts for a negotiated peace with insurgent groups and criminal Cartels.

From Petro’s Experiment to Right-Wing Resurgence

Gustavo Petro’s government marked a historic break: he was Colombia’s first left‑wing president, elected on promises of social reform, environmental transition, and a reorientation of the peace process with armed groups. His administration became a referendum on whether Colombia could simultaneously confront inequality, rural marginalization, and entrenched violence through progressive policies rather than traditional security and economic policies. De la Espriella’s win, backed openly by U.S. President Donald Trump, signals a swing back toward the right after this four‑year experiment with very mixed results at best. Yet the victory margin—about 49.7 percent to 48.7 percent—shows a country almost evenly split, ensuring that any agenda he pursues will confront a mobilized opposition and a society that has not reached consensus on its model of development and governance.

Security vs. Peace Process

The election exposed starkly different visions for dealing with Colombia’s enduring conflict a decade after the FARC peace accord. Cepeda campaigned on deepening Petro’s approach of his “Plan Paz Total” (Total Peace Plan) which depended on negotiations with leftist insurgent groups and narcotics cartels to roll back the increasing violence in the country. Also included were social and economic reforms aimed at what Petro described as the root cause of the violence. However, during Petro’s four year administration, violence returned to highs not seen in decades, coca cultivation increased to record levels and the economy muddled along without showing any dramatic gains. By contrast, De la Espriella positioned himself as a tough‑on‑crime outsider promising order, harsher measures against criminal groups, and a rollback of what the right portrays as excessive concessions to insurgents and criminal organizations. This clash between “peace through reform and dialogue” and “peace through strength and crackdowns” left the country at an inflection point: continue a fragile peace architecture which saw the insurgent groups and cartels regain strength and control over vast swaths of the country, or re‑embracing strict security measures which in the past proved successful but led to uncertain consequences and human rights abuses.

Economic and Social Policy Choices

Petro’s camp argued that Colombia needed redistributive policies, stronger social protection, and state‑led reforms to break cycles of poverty that feed violence and migration. Critics accused his government of scaring investors, mishandling fiscal policy, and failing to deliver visible improvements, especially amid inflation and uneven growth. De la Espriella’s coalition now promises a more orthodox pro‑market line—greater emphasis on private investment, energy sector continuity, and deregulation—combined with promises to defend “the people” from crime and chaos. The crossroads lies in whether Colombia can craft an economic model that restores business confidence and restores security while still addressing the structural inequalities and social demands that gave Petro and Cepeda their base in the first place.

Why This Moment Matters

De la Espriella’s government inherits a society that has tasted left‑wing rule, remains deeply divided, and is wrestling with increased violence and insecurity, inequality, and institutional mistrust. De La Espriella, who takes office on August 7,2026, will be challenged to fulfill his campaign promises. The March 8, 2026 elections left the Colombian congress splintered among various parties with no party or coalition taking control. Just as the congress proved to be Petro’s main obstacle to many of his social and economic reforms, De La Espriella will be faced with this same problem as his party gained very few seats during the elections and he will be forced to work with several political parties in order to pass his legislative agenda.

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What's at Stake as NATO Meets in Ankara

As NATO leaders gather in Ankara this week, the alliance faces a myriad of security challenges unlike anything it has confronted in decades.

With Russia's war against Ukraine raging on and instability in the Middle East following the conflict with Iran, President Donald Trump continues to press European allies to take on more of the burden for their defense. This all comes to a head in Ankara, where Turkey finds itself at the center of the alliance's most pressing strategic concerns. Taken together, the issues confronting leaders at this week's summit extend well beyond the traditional debates over defense spending.

"This is a great opportunity for Türkiye," retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe, told The Cipher Brief. "Finally many Allies will have the opportunity to better appreciate the strategically vital role that Turkey plays for NATO due to its geography as well as its defense industry and military capabilities." The changing perception of Turkey's role in the alliance represents quite a shift.

Only a few years ago, Turkey's relationships with many NATO countries were strained over its purchase of Russia's S-400 air defense system and disagreements over admitting new countries into the alliance shortly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February, 2022. Today, NATO looks to expand defense production and strengthen its southern flank.

Russia's war continues to shape NATO's priorities

The urgency surrounding Russia is likely to dominate the conversation in Ankara.

Another deadly wave of Russian missiles and drones struck Kyiv just hours before the summit, killing 21 people and injuring at least 77 more. President Volodymyr Zelensky is expected to seek additional Western air defense systems, particularly U.S.-made Patriot interceptors, during meetings with allied leaders. Beyond Ukraine itself, many in the alliance predict that Moscow will continue testing NATO's resolve across Europe.

"There is a recognition, regardless of what President Trump says when he speaks tomorrow, that this meeting has to set major new directions for cooperation between NATO allies," former senior British diplomat Nick Fishwick, who is attending meetings in Ankara surrounding the summit, told The Cipher Brief.

"Most people recognise that the days when European allies could freeload on massive U.S. security support have come to an end," Fishwick said. "European allies are now committed to spending two or three times the amount of GDP devoted to defence in 2015."

European governments are increasingly acknowledging that spending more money is only half of the equation, while rebuilding defense industries and coordinating military planning across the alliance have become equally urgent priorities.

"We Europeans have to find ways of cooperating, sharing and communicating in an age of hybrid warfare and AI-enabled cyber attacks," Fishwick said.

Beyond defense spending

President Trump is expected to arrive in Ankara seeking commitments from allies to meet NATO's new defense investment targets.

Retired Adm. James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, believes the summit's greatest achievement may be just preserving the alliance's unity.

"The most important thing is simply that there are no huge blowups," Stavridis told The Cipher Brief. "Worrisome issues include fundamental disagreements about operations in Iran; the pace of European defense spending; support to Ukraine, both diplomatic and military; and the lingering negative effects of the U.S. moves on Greenland."

One area where Stavridis sees potential progress is maritime security, particularly after recent instability in the Middle East. He said President Trump would likely welcome a European commitment to participate in operations protecting commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

Stavridis also said allies should move past broad spending pledges and begin outlining specific plans for expanding Europe's defense industrial base. Just as important, he said, should be addressing threats that increasingly blur the line between peace and war, or as we like to call it, the "Gray Zone".

"A robust discussion about how to counter increasing levels of hybrid and grey zone activity specifically including anti-drone cooperation would be meaningful," Stavridis said. "I would also hope to see some discussion of the role of the alliance in cyber security because the likelihood of Russian hybrid operations in that zone is significant and rising."

For Hodges, success in Ankara should be measured by whether the alliance shows that its members remain aligned on the issues that matter most to their collective security.

"A strong endorsement of Ukraine and the strategic importance for all NATO Members that Ukraine is successful in its war with Russia, with commitments of resources and capabilities from everyone, including the USA, to Ukraine," remains essential, Hodges said.

Whether leaders can deliver that message, and Trump's often unpredictable approach to NATO, will cement how this summit is remembered.

The gathering in Ankara is unlikely to produce any severe dramatic breakthrough. But at a time when Europe faces its most serious security environment in a generation, maybe it's enough for the alliance to demonstrate that it is capable of remaining united.

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A Tale of Two Africas in Maps, And How It Affects the United States

As an Africa watcher, I have long told the story of two continents, juxtaposing the region’s plight with its opportunities, often arguing that the West should prepare for the continent's strategic risks and opportunities. This is a decades-old mantra from across the Africa-watcher community. Alas, repeating these arguments over decades suggests we must work to deliver our message in a more compelling way. So, this is my attempt to tell the story of African issues more visually, with the hope that experts in geopolitics will gain a greater appreciation for the stories from the continent that carry compelling US implications.

The Effectiveness of Maps

For nearly three decades, I have grappled with the most compelling way to hook a reader, whether at the CIA, the Department of Defense, the State Department, in the university classroom, or working with industry partners. One consistent reality is that a good graphic is optimal for making a story stick. And in my experience, the map is the king of graphics. Indeed, in the countless briefings I delivered as an intelligence officer, I brought one or more maps along every time. Similarly, I have used at least one map in every class meeting with my students. Maps orient the reader geographically, grant easy visual context, and ground a story in scale.

Orientation: A reader can best relate to a story when they can see where it is taking place

Context: A map can provide a reader with helpful, visual facts, whether through data or comparison

Scale: The size and value of a specific trait are easily observable on a map

The Risk Side: Development Gaps and Conflict Reinforce Each Other

CRITICAL CONTEXT

Health

Poor healthcare infrastructure exacerbates communicable disease outbreaks, like Ebola in Congo in 2026 and West Africa in 2014, challenging global aid capacity.

Security

Lax development creates an environment ripe for extremism, creating a cycle where insecurity exacerbates underdevelopment that in turn fosters insecurity.

Geopolitics

Conflicts attract outside actors, creating a hotbed of geopolitical competition devoid of local interests and reducing African agency.

Why It Matters to Washington

Africa is the last entry in Washington’s National Security Strategy, reflecting a plan to allocate fewer resources to the continent, but Africa's crises often force unforeseen commitments. The Ebola outbreak in Congo underscores that weak health systems can turn outbreaks into global threats, compelling a US response. Insecurity due to extremist violence has prompted new and expanded US military action in Nigeria and Somalia, respectively. The continent leads the world in terrorist-related casualties, with more than half of global fatalities occurring in the Sahel, posing an enduring threat to greater African stability and attracting renewed US focus. This deepening malaise and Sudan’s civil war have become a magnet for regional and global competition, including increased intervention from Russia and China and adversarial action between US allies Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The Opportunity Side: Economic Growth and Demographics Are Standout

Strengths

CRITICAL CONTEXT

Growth Potential

Less developed countries have more room for economic growth. Africa has outperformed global growth by approximately 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points since 2000.

Imports

As economies and populations grow, so do imports. Africa is on track to outpace the rest of the world in merchandise import growth during 2026.

Workforce

Africans are the world’s future workforce. The OECD estimates that the continent’s working-age population (15-64 years old) will rise from about 850 million today to more than 1.5 billion in 2050, accounting for 85% of the global workforce increase.

Why It Matters to Washington

Africa’s GDP growth represents the high upside potential of the continent’s many comparatively less developed countries. Because African economies are not saturated, they have greater room to grow, making them attractive for investment gains. This coincides with the world's youngest population, which presents a range of reasons for outside nations to work with Africa, including circular migration deals for labor to sustain growth and to find markets for exports—60 countries are set to shrink in population this year alone, including economic juggernauts China, Germany, Japan, Italy, Russia, Spain, and South Korea.

- More pointedly for US implications, the country has been below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman for nearly two decades (1.6 in 2024). Mexico, the top provider of immigrant workers to the US, has been below replacement fertility for about a decade (1.9 in 2024), suggesting Africa is positioned to serve as a sought-after source of workers.

- For example, Washington could leverage Kenya’s plan to broker agreements for 1 million of its citizens to work abroad annually. Nigeria is on track to surpass the US as the world’s third-largest country by population within the next three decades and will almost certainly have to find foreign destinations for its workforce.

- Canada stands out as having conspicuously higher population growth in North America, the result of purposeful legal migration, which is 3 times that of the US as a percentage of the overall population.

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The West Needs to Prepare for a Russian Defeat in Ukraine

We are good at winning wars and generally bad at what comes after. Far from a partisan observation; this is a pattern with receipts. We removed Saddam Hussein in three weeks and then spent eight years discovering that we had no plan for Iraq. We helped topple Qaddafi in 2011 and left Libya to sort itself out, which it did into a decade of competing militias and open-air slave markets. We spent twenty years in Afghanistan and still managed to be surprised when the government we built collapsed in eleven days. The American way of war ends at the moment of victory. The credits roll, everyone goes home, and the sequel is a disaster nobody bothered to consider.

There is exactly one modern exception, and it is instructive. When the Soviet Union came apart in 1991, a Democratic senator from Georgia and a Republican senator from Indiana looked at roughly 30,000 nuclear warheads scattered across four newly independent, newly broke republics and decided, radically, to think ahead. The Nunn-Lugar program spent American money to secure, consolidate, and dismantle those weapons before they could walk out the door to Tehran or to a bidder we would like even less. It was unglamorous, it was expensive, and it worked. Three decades after the largest state collapse in modern history, there has been no loose-nuke catastrophe. We planned once. It went well. We have not repeated the experiment since.

I raise this because we may be about to need it again, and the warning lights are coming on faster than the planning is.

Start with the battlefield. Russia has absorbed somewhere near 1.4 million casualties since February 2022 in order to advance, in its showcase offensives, at a pace measured in tens of meters a day. That is more than any major power has taken in any conflict since the Second World War. In early 2026 that grinding pace stalled outright, and for the first time since 2023 Ukraine recaptured more ground than it lost. Russian military recruitment fell twenty percent in the first quarter of this year, into the teeth of the worst labor shortage the Russian economy has ever recorded. An army that cannot recruit and an economy that cannot spare the men are not a combination that trends toward Berlin.

Then follow the money, because wars end when the money does. Russia's federal budget deficit hit 5.9 trillion rubles in just the first four months of 2026. That is larger than the entire deficit it ran in all of 2025, and against a full-year plan of 3.9 trillion. The liquid portion of the sovereign wealth fund, the rainy-day cushion, has shrunk from 6.5 percent of GDP at the start of the war to 1.8 percent this April. Oil and gas revenue in 2025 fell to its lowest level since 2020, and in the first two months of 2026 it dropped nearly by half year-on-year. The Kremlin is raising its value-added tax from 20 to 22 percent and cannot borrow abroad, because we long ago cut it off from the markets. Putin is a man selling his furniture to make rent.

And here is the part that should be keeping planners awake at night: Ukraine has learned to hit the one thing Russia cannot armor. Kyiv's drones have taken more than a third of Russia's oil-refining capacity offline, roughly 38 percent by some counts. Gasoline output is down seventeen percent from a year ago. Refineries at Kirishi, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Yaroslavl, and outside Moscow itself have been forced to halt or throttle production. Russia, one of the largest oil producers on earth, has banned gasoline exports and is now rationing fuel to its own citizens, who are queuing at pumps in a country that floats on crude. A petrostate that cannot keep its own drivers in gasoline is a petrostate whose social contract is running on fumes.

Now the honest caveat, because I have watched too many confident men predict Moscow's collapse and end up eating the prediction. Russia has a genius for absorbing punishment that would break others, and "the regime is about to fall" has been the graveyard of Western analysis for a century. Vladimir Putin may well hang on for years. I am not promising you a collapse. I am telling you that a Russian defeat, a real one, military exhaustion bleeding into political rupture, inside the next two years, has moved from a fringe scenario to one that a serious government insures against. You do not buy fire insurance because you expect to burn. You buy it because you cannot afford the one time you do.

So what does the insurance look like in this case? A few things, none of which require us to want Russia to come apart.

First, dust off Nunn-Lugar and write the sequel now, before the crisis. Russia has roughly 1,800 strategic warheads today. If central authority in Moscow wobbles, the question of who controls them becomes the only question that matters. What’s worse, New START quietly expired this past February and is no longer around to give us the courtesy of counting them. We need pre-negotiated channels for securing those weapons, ideally including China and India, whose interest in not having loose Russian nukes on the market is every bit as sharp as ours.

Second, decide in advance what we will and will not recognize. A fragmenting Russian Federation could throw off breakaway republics the way the USSR did in 1991. The moment to agree on which borders and which authorities we will treat as legitimate is before a dozen regional governors declare themselves president, not while it is happening. Improvised recognition is how you turn a collapse into a set of proxy wars that makes Putin’s destabilizing behaviors look like child’s play.

Third, keep the technocrats employed. The most dangerous export of a collapsing weapons state is not a warhead; it is the underpaid engineer who knows how to build one. In 1992 we worried about Russian scientists boarding flights to Iran, Iraq, and Libya. This time we should build the landing pads, research funding, visas, civilian projects, before they start looking for the exits.

Fourth, tell Ukraine and our European allies what "victory" actually means, so that we are not improvising the peace the way we improvised Baghdad. A defeated Russia is not a solved Russia. It will still have grievances, a reconstituting army, and a long memory. The objective is a Russia that loses this war and cannot start the next one, a vacuum we will spend the 2030s regretting.

None of this is a prediction that Moscow falls next spring. It is the recognition that we have been surprised by nearly every ending we should have seen coming, and that the cost of preparing for a Russian defeat that never arrives is a few think-tank salaries and some awkward classified memos. The cost of not preparing for one that does is measured in warheads we cannot account for.

We have the receipts on what happens when we refuse to think ahead. We also have a single example of what happens when we do. Let’s choose the sequel we actually storyboarded.

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